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REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE
LAND OFFICE

FOR THE YEAR 1874

ALBANY, N. Y. 1875

WILLIAM H. BROWN

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SUPPLEMENTARY
DESPATCHES, CORRESPONDENCE,
AND MEMORANDA

OF

FIELD MARSHAL

ARTHUR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G.

EDITED BY HIS SON,

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G.

VOLUME THE NINTH.


SOUTH OF FRANCE, EMBASSY TO PARIS
AND CONGRESS OF VIENNA.

[APRIL, 1814, TO MARCH, 1815.]

LONDON:

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

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
PREFACE.

THE documents in this volume refer to the period between the Armistice which followed the battle of Toulouse, and the termination of the duties of the Duke of Wellington as British Plenipotentiary at the Congress of Vienna at the end of March, 1815, when His Grace was appointed to the command of the armies in the Low Countries.

Some letters of the Prince Regent, the Emperor Alexander, Louis XVIII., Murat King of Naples, the Earl of Liverpool, Viscount Castlereagh, Earl Bathurst, and other distinguished persons, are given for the elucidation of diplomatic and public transactions in which the Duke of Wellington was engaged.

London, June, 1862.

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SUPPLEMENTARY DESPATCHES.

CHAPTER VII.—FRANCE AND THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF EUROPE.

CONDITIONS UPON WHICH LIEUTENANT-COLONEL DUNDAS IS [753.]
*
AUTHORIZED TO CONCLUDE A SUSPENSION OF HOSTILITIES
BETWEEN THE ALLIED FORCES UNDER THE COMMAND OF
FIELD MARSHAL THE MARQUESS OF WELLINGTON, AND THE
TROOPS UNDER THE ORDERS OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL
LOVERDO.

Toulouse, 15th April, 1814.

1. The country occupied by the troops under the orders of Brigadier-General Loverdo is to have for its boundary the course of the river Tarn, from Villebrunnier to the junction of the Tarn with the Garonne.

2. The only deviation from this line is to be at the town of Montauban, where Brigadier-General Loverdo's posts may be extended, on the left bank of the Tarn, to the distance of three quarters of a league from the bridge of Montauban.

3. Above the town of Villebrunnier the boundary is to follow the limits of the department of Tarn et Garonne, on the right bank of the Tarn.

4. Below the junction of the river Tarn with the Garonne the boundary is in like manner to follow the limits of the department of Tarn et Garonne, on the right bank of the Garonne.

5. Although this boundary touches the right bank of the Garonne, the navigation of that river is to be perfectly free to the Allied army, and every facility and security is to be afforded to the boats employed in the service of the Allied army upon that river.

6. The passage of couriers by the great roads to and from Paris and Bordeaux is to be free and secure through the country

occupied by the troops under Brigadier-General Loverdo's orders.

7. The passage of couriers is also to be free and secure through the country occupied by the Allied army, except to such parts of France or to such armies as have not acknowledged and accepted the Constitution of the 6th of April, 1814.

8. The suspension of hostilities is to commence from the signature of the conditions by the officers appointed to settle them.

9. In the event of unforeseen circumstances leading to a rupture of the armistice, six days' notice is to be given to the Marquess of Wellington at his head-quarters, and to Brigadier-General Loverdo at Montauban, before hostilities are recommenced.

WELLINGTON.

Major-Gen. the Hon. C. Colville to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Boucaut, 15th April, 1814.

I am much concerned that by the return of the casualties of yesterday, transmitted by this same opportunity to the Adjutant-General, your Lordship will find their amount infinitely to exceed the rough calculation made of it.

The loss of the enemy was also considerable.

I have now the honour of forwarding to your Lordship Major-General Howard's statement, promised in my report of yesterday.

To Captain Forster's name, of the 38th Regiment, favourably spoken of therein, I beg leave to add that of a gallant and zealous young officer, Ensign Oliver, of the same regiment, on the representation made me of his conduct in the course of his duty here by Major-General Hinuber.

I further do myself the honour of laying before your Lordship the copy of a letter I am about to send in to the Governor of Bayonne, who is (perhaps at the instigation of General Abbé) firing with the greatest bitterness at us at this moment.

The concluding paragraph will account for my differing in this from the example of Sir John Hope, for which I must always have such high respect, and who wished in this to wait your Lordship's instructions. The fact is, that within I believe at one point not more than 250 yards from their works, they can sortie upon us so suddenly and in such force as we must be liable in the first instance to give way to; though, as in the case of yesterday (but with a heavy expense of men, to be grudged under the present circumstances of the war), we can have no doubt of being always able to recover the ground lost.

I most respectfully hope your Lordship will not disapprove the opinion I have formed or the sentiments I here express.

Lieutenant-Colonel Elphinstone desires me to report that his stores are all ready for a siege.

Lieutenant-Colonel Hartman informs me that his reports of progress go off daily to head-quarters, but that it will take a fortnight to bring up the battering-train after receipt of your Lordship's order to put it in motion.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

CHARLES COLVILLE.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Major-Gen. the Hon. C. Colville to General of Division Baron Thouvenot.

SIR,

Camp before Bayonne, 15th April, 1814.

I have the honour to inform you that a person, calling himself Richard Lataste, arriving from Bordeaux, has just delivered to me one letter for your Excellency from M. Jean Batevat and three others for inhabitants of Bayonne, and which letters he assures me, being sealed, were sent in the conviction that your garrison had already acceded to the decree of the Senate of the 2nd of April.

What that decree was, if you are yet ignorant of it, will, if you choose, be made known to you by the 'Journaux de Paris' to the 9th instant, which that said gentleman has brought with him.

I am assured so confidently in my own mind of the correctness of what these papers contain, that I will not even object to send your Excellency the letters, though sealed, and consequently a deviation from usual military precaution, provided you at the same time receive the newspapers alluded to.

On this subject I judge it only necessary to add what it would be an unmeaning affectation of delicacy to conceal, that I have a letter from the Marquess of Wellington, dated at Toulouse on the 12th instant.

I rejoice in the opportunity of offering those proofs of the total revolution in the government of France which, if received by your Excellency at an earlier period, might have saved that unnecessary effusion of the blood of both nations which took place yesterday.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your Excellency's most obedient humble servant,

CHARLES COLVILLE.

P.S. Your Excellency may be assured that to anything that may come to me through you from Lieutenant-General Sir John Hope, the most respectful consideration will be paid.

Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Bordeaux, 15th April, 1814.

As Fremantle proceeds to-day to your head-quarters, I take the opportunity to state General Decaen's arrival on the 13th, at night, at Libourne with 6000 men and 15 pieces of artillery, detached by Augereau, and under promise of entering Bordeaux. I have withdrawn across the Dordogne at St. André de Cubzac, and, in answer to an officer sent to me this morning by Decaen, I have given Colonel Gardiner power to treat upon a suspension of hostilities on the terms herewith enclosed.

I am told he himself is disposed to adhere, and has written so to Paris, but that his troops are riotous.

I will not give up the left bank of the Dordogne without your Lordship's orders.

Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell reports from Nérac that the partisan Florian still interrupts his communications. I have ordered the Chasseurs Britanniques to Bazas and Castel Jaloux, if Lieutenant-Colonel du Hautoy shall find it necessary.

I have also sent some of the proclamations on that subject.

I have the honour to be your Lordship's most faithfully,

DALHOUSIE.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie to Colonel Gardiner.

SIR,

Bordeaux, 15th April, 1814.

By this I give you full power to treat in my name for a suspension of hostilities between the corps of French troops under General Decaen and the division of the Allied army under my command, upon the following articles:

1. That a suspension of arms shall take place from this day at noon until the 30th of this month, or further; the party seeing cause to break it to give four days' notice.

2. That the river Dordogne shall be the line of demarcation between the troops of France and the division of the Allied army.

3. That my right shall continue to occupy St. Macaire, with my advance at La Réole and Sauveterre.

4. That as the corps of General L'Huillier is under the immediate command of General Decaen, the suspension signed with him shall become void for the purpose of being renewed by General Decaen on the proposed line of the Dordogne, leaving the free passage of the river (excepting ships of war) to be expressed in a separate convention with the Admiral commanding the British squadron in the river.

5. Should these proposals not prove satisfactory, I will agree to send any other proposals General Decaen may make to the head-quarters of the Marquess of Wellington; it being especially understood that in the meanwhile the left bank of the Dordogne is the advance of the British division.

DALHOUSIE.

The Duc d'Angoulême to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Bordeaux, le 15 Avril, 1814.

J'ai eu le plaisir de recevoir hier matin votre lettre du 12,* avec les deux pièces qui y étoient inclus. Je vous fais sincèrement mon compliment et sur la victoire que vous avez remporté le 10, et sur votre entrée à Toulouse. J'ai bien de l'empressement de pouvoir m'y rendre, mais je crains que le bien du service du Roi ne m'oblige de rester ici. Vous apprendrez avec grand plaisir par Fremantle que tout le monde porte la cocarde blanche à Londres, particulièrement dans la maison de Madame Pole. J'ai envoyé hier le Duc de Guiche au Général Comte Decaen à Libourne, et j'en ai

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., p. 631.

reçu une réponse extrêmement polie. C'est avec tous les sentiments de la plus haute estime et bien sincère attachement que je suis, pour la vie, My Lord,

Votre très affectionné,

LOUIS ANTOINE.

Baron Baude to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Albi, le 15 Avril, 1814.

J'ai l'honneur de prévenir Votre Excellence que le 14 du courant j'ai réuni extraordinairement auprès de moi les principaux fonctionnaires de l'ordre administratif résidant dans cette ville, et que nous avons signé un acte d'adhésion aux décrets du Sénat qui prononcent la déchéance de Napoléon Buonaparte, pour appeler au trône Louis-Stanislas Xavier de France, frère du dernier Roi, et après lui les autres membres de la maison de Bourbon, dans l'ordre ancien. J'ai invité MM. les sous-préfets à me transmettre l'expression de leurs vœux. Les maires et les conseils municipaux de toutes les communes du département dont l'administration m'est confiée recevront la même invitation par une circulaire que je leurs transmets, et qui est sous presse. L'adhésion sera générale; elle sera unanime.

Dans un des Actes du gouvernement provisoire de la France on lit :—" Il est permis d'augurer que toute contrée Française où l'on aura suivi l'impulsion donnée par le Sénat, le Corps Législatif, et le gouvernement, sera considérée comme étant en paix avec les puissances coalisées. Si ce vœu se manifeste dans un département, les troupes qui auront à le traverser pour les opérations de la guerre encore subsistante y passeront comme en pays ami."

Ces paroles de paix sont consolantes; j'ai cru qu'elles me fesaient un devoir de faire connaître à Votre Excellence les dispositions de tous les fonctionnaires du département du Tarn, qui sont celles de tous les habitants.

En vous donnant, My Lord, le signal de cette manifestation, j'ai pour but de vous persuader que je suis disposé à concourir aux opérations que vous pourriez juger utile d'ordonner dans le département du Tarn. S'il entrerait donc dans vos intentions d'y faire pénétrer des troupes sous vos ordres, je vous serais obligé de daigner m'en faire part en m'informant du nombre et des points sur lesquels elles devraient se diriger. Je m'empresserai de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour qu'il fut pourvu à tous leurs besoins, et de recommander aux autorités locales de les recevoir, et de les traiter comme l'on reçoit de vrais amis. J'ai l'honneur d'assurer Votre Excellence que ces mesures seront favorisées par M. le Général Lebondidier, qui commande la force armée du département.

Je suis, avec une haute considération,

My Lord, de Votre Excellence

Le très-humble et très-obéissant serviteur,

LE BARON BAUDE.

Cette lettre, My Lord, m'a demise à Votre Excellence par M. de Marlinvers, membre du conseil de préfecture du département que j'administre. Je vous prie de l'accueillir avec bonté, et de lui remettre la réponse qu'il vous plaira de me faire.

M. B. Toulourette to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MONSEIGNEUR,

St. Sever, le 15 Avril, 1814.

Ma soumission à votre autorité fut pleine et entière. Dès l'instant de votre entrée dans mon pays je me suis fait un honneur de la reconnoître en toute occasion, et un devoir de seconder vos intentions autant qu'il a dépendu de moi. Maintenant les puissances alliées ont manifesté leurs intentions en proclamant Roi de France un prince de la dynastie de Bourbon. J'ai dû céder à cette grande volonté, j'ai dû céder à l'opinion prononcée de la capitale, au désir de mes concitoyens, enfin au vœu de mon cœur.

J'ai donc proclamé Louis XVIII. dans la ville de St. Sever et dans l'arrondissement ; mais en même temps, plein de reconnaissance pour la bonté avec laquelle vous avez bien voulu répondre à la confiance sans borne que j'ai en Votre Excellence, j'ai cru devoir vous instruire de ma conduite, et par là vous donner une nouvelle preuve de la déférence et du respect profond dont je suis pénétré.

Daignez, Monseigneur, agréer cet hommage. J'aurai atteint le but que je me suis toujours proposé si j'ai le bonheur d'avoir fait ce qui peut vous être agréable.

Je suis avec respect de Votre Excellence,

Monseigneur,

Le très-humble et très-obéissant serviteur,

BASQUÉAT TOULOUZETTE.

[754.]

PROCLAMATION No. 45.

Au Quartier-Général, ce 16me Avril, 1814.

Monsieur Casasolles, Sous-Préfet de Lombes, doit résumer ses fonctions jusqu'à l'ordre du gouvernement provisoire de la France.

WELLINGTON.

[755.] ARRANGEMENT FOR THE MOVEMENTS OF THE ARMY ON THE 17TH OF APRIL.

Toulouse, 16th April, 1814.

Sir Rowland Hill will be so good as close up the troops under his immediate orders towards the front in a more concentrated position, and cause the British infantry under his orders to encamp. The 2nd division of pontoons will also move forward and join Sir Rowland Hill.

The 4th and 6th divisions and Colonel Vivian's brigade of cavalry will move upon St. Félix, and encamp in the most

convenient situation in that neighbourhood. These troops will establish a direct communication on their right with the troops under Sir Rowland Hill.

Marshal Beresford will send forward patrols from St. Félix towards Castelnaudary, and also towards Revel.

The Hussar brigade will move upon Puy Laurens, and communicate on its right with the troops under Marshal Beresford at St. Félix. This brigade will send patrols to Castres and to Revel.

Major-General Ponsonby's brigade will move to Caraman.

The brigade of German Light Dragoons will move to Escopon. This brigade will send a detachment to St. Sulpice.

Head-quarters will be at Baziège.

The Light division will move at 5 A.M. by the road of Carcassonne, and will encamp beyond Baziège, between that place and Villefranche.

The 3rd division will move at 7 A.M., and will encamp also in front of Baziège.

The brigade of Household cavalry will move from its cantonments at 9 A.M., and will proceed by the great road of Carcassonne to Mongiscard. The brigade will canton in the villages between Mongiscard and Castanet, but will not occupy Mongiscard.

Le corps d'armée Espagnol doit marcher demain par Fourquevaux à la Bastide, et prendra ses cantonnements dans les environs de ces deux villages.

WELLINGTON.

The Marquis de Villeneuve to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Toulouse, 16 Avril, 1814.

Le Marquis de Villeneuve, qui a eu l'honneur de voir et d'entretenir Votre Excellence à Grenade, prend la liberté de lui représenter qu'il paraît urgent de faire cesser la sorte d'anarchie où la désertion des principaux administrateurs a laissé ce département.

Que les effets de cet abandon deviennent de jour en jour plus sensibles, surtout dans les sous-préfectures de Muret et de St. Gaudens, où les partisans de Buonaparte et de Soult remuent et agitent la multitude.

Que dans les communes, les maires n'ayant plus de chef pour les diriger ou les surveiller, ne savent pas, ne veulent pas, ou n'osent pas reprimer les mauvais sujets qui s'y trouvent; que les proclamations même de V.E. ne leur parviennent pas avec exactitude, et y sont souvent ou inconnues ou négligées.

8 COL. NIEL CAMPBELL APPOINTED RESIDENT IN ELBA.

Que la nécessité de réorganiser la police, les finances, et les autres branches est sensible.

Qu'il parait d'ailleurs important de donner sans délai une direction certaine et uniforme à l'opinion publique dans ce département, dont l'exemple influe toujours sur les contrées voisines.

Le Marquis de Villeneuve, animé du plus vif désir de servir, au moment de la crise, son Roi, sa patrie, et la cause commune, de tous ses moyens, surtout en ce pays dont l'administration lui est particulièrement connue, offre à Votre Excellence et même sollicite d'elle la grâce d'exercer les fonctions de préfet de la Haute-Garonne provisoirement et gratuitement si elle veut, jusqu'au que S.A.R. Monseigneur le Duc d'Angoulême en ait fixé définitivement l'administration.

De Votre Excellence

Le très-humble et très-obéissant serviteur,

VILLENEUVE.

Viscount Castlereagh to Colonel Niel Campbell.

SIR,

Paris, 16th April, 1814.

I have to acquaint you that you have been selected on the part of the British government to attend the late Chief of the French government to the Island of Elba. You will be accompanied by an Austrian and Russian officer of rank; you will act in entire concert with them in the execution of this mission, and conduct yourself, as far as the circumstances will permit, with every proper respect and attention to Napoleon, to whose secure asylum in that island it is the wish of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent to afford every facility and protection. Should you experience any interruption, either during your progress or after your arrival, from any of His Majesty's officers by sea or land, you will explain to them the nature of the service with which you are entrusted, and that you are authorized by me to signify to them the Prince Regent's commands that they do respect and conform to such orders as you may have occasion to issue in furtherance of this service. You will acquaint Napoleon, in suitable terms of attention, that you are directed to reside in the island till farther orders, if he should consider that the presence of a British officer can be of use in protecting the island and his person against insult or attack.

You will correspond with me in the execution of this service, and you will address yourself for assistance so far as circumstances may require it to any of His Majesty's servants, civil or military, in the Mediterranean. You will exercise your own discretion as to the mode of communicating with His Majesty's government.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

The Duc d'Angoulême to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Bordeaux, ce 16 Avril, 1814.

J'ai eu le plaisir de recevoir hier matin votre lettre du 13,* par Lord W. Russell. J'ai été très sensible à ce que vous m'y dites d'aimable. Je regrette beaucoup d'être séparé de vous depuis si longtemps; jamais je n'oublierai que c'est à vous et à vos victoires que nous devons le 12 Mars, qui (je n'en doute pas) a grandement contribué aux événements qui se sont passés à Paris, que c'est à vous par conséquent plus qu'à aucun autre que nous devons notre restauration, et je sais que l'intention du Roi, mon oncle, est de vous en donner tous les témoignages honorables de reconnaissance qui seront en son pouvoir.

J'ai eu le bonheur de recevoir hier des nouvelles de mon père du 8 de ce mois; et en conséquence des ordres qu'il me donne comme Lieutenant-Général du Royaume, je renvoie M. de Carrère à Mont de Marsan pour rentrer en fonctions de préfet des Landes, et j'envoie des commissaires à Auch, Toulouse, Tarbes, et Pau pour y rétablir le gouvernement au nom du Roi. M. Ravèz, membre très distingué de mon conseil, qui va à Toulouse, aura l'honneur de se présenter chez vous, et je vous le recommande. A Agen le préfet m'a fait demander mes ordres, et je les lui envoie. Je reçois journellement des députations de toutes les autorités, d'Angoulême, de Saintes, de Rochefort, de la Rochelle, de Poitiers, et même de Tours; et je n'ai qu'à me louer infiniment des sentiments de joie que les habitants me témoignent partout sur le rétablissement de l'autorité du Roi. Je ne puis pas en dire encore tout à fait autant sur la disposition des troupes.

J'ai un grand empressement d'aller à Toulouse, mais je n'ai pas encore pu m'absenter d'ici.

C'est avec la plus haute considération et bien véritable attachement que je suis, My Lord,

Votre très affectionné,

LOUIS ANTOINE.

General St. Hilaire to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MONSEIGNEUR,

Toulouse, le 16 Avril, 1814.

J'eus l'honneur d'écrire à Votre Excellence le 12 Avril courant pour lui annoncer que je me réussissois au nouveau gouvernement Français. Je m'empresse de mettre aujourd'hui sous vos yeux mon adhésion formelle à la charte constitutionnelle qui rappelle sur le trône des Bourbons le vertueux Louis XVIII.

Je prie Votre Excellence de faire parvenir cette pièce à Son Altesse le Prince de Bénévent, président du gouvernement provisoire, à Paris.

Agréez, je vous prie, Monseigneur, l'hommage de mon profond respect,

ST. HILAIRE.

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., p. 639.

[756.]

ARRANGEMENTS.

Toulouse, 17th April, 1814.

The troops are to hold themselves in readiness to march to-morrow forenoon.

If any movement is to be made, the instructions for it will be given at Villefranche, to which place the Commander of the Forces will proceed early in the morning.

Officers are to be in waiting at Villefranche, therefore, from the following corps to receive orders :—

From the troops under Sir Rowland Hill.

From the General Officers in command of the 4th and 6th divisions.

From Major-General Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry.

From the Light and from the 3rd divisions.

The other troops not named will be in communication with the nearest of the corps above mentioned, that they may receive their orders through that channel.

Sir Stapleton Cotton is requested also to send an officer to Villefranche.

The orders for the Spanish troops will be sent to Major-General Freyre.

WELLINGTON.

Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie to the Quartermaster-General.

MY DEAR MURRAY,

Bordeaux, 17th April, 1814.

I have to report to you that I have signed, and I enclose the agreement for a suspension of arms unlimited, with General Decaen, commanding all the troops in my front.

In consequence I have drawn back all my people into Bordeaux, to refit a little, leaving General Inglis at Langon, to occupy (his advance) La Réole, Sauveterre, and St. Macaire.

A battalion of 2nd brigade at Camarsac and St. Loubés, with detachments at Braune and St. Vincent.

Jenkinson's guns and 12th Dragoons for the present in Bordeaux.

The Admiral this morning informs me that he has notice of the speedy arrival of forty sail of transports, having on board three provisional battalions of militia. I shall put them into L'Esparre, Castillion, Pauliac, until you send me instructions.

I wrote you some time ago to entreat our clothing, but I hear nothing of it. We are really worse than beggars in that respect.

I am lamenting most sincerely over Sir John Hope. I hope Colville

may lay the city of Bayonne in ashes, so full am I of revenge for "our slaughtered citizens."

Most sincerely yours,

DALHOUSIE.

P.S.—I'll write a line to Alexander Hope private by the earliest opportunity.

Colonel Grant, 15th Hussars, is this moment arrived here from England, and a messenger from Paris, preceding Sir Charles Stewart, who is on the road, coming here to see Lord Wellington.

The Duc d'Albufera to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Au Quartier-Général de Narbonne, le
17 Avril, 1814.

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

J'ai eu l'honneur d'écrire à Votre Excellence le 14 Avril,* pour lui proposer un armistice à la suite des derniers événemens de Paris, que le gouvernement provisoire m'a fait connaître. L'aide-de-camp porteur de ma lettre a éprouvé des retards, et n'a pu passer au quartier-général de M. le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie. J'ai depuis invité ce Maréchal à vous proposer un armistice en son nom et au mien ; mais d'après les nouvelles communications que je reçois, je désire, My Lord, revenir à ma première proposition, et conclure avec Votre Excellence, si elle le juge convenable, un armistice séparé pour l'armée que je commande. Cet armistice comprendrait la frontière de France et d'Espagne de ce côté, et il y serait particulièrement stipulé le retour des garnisons Françaises en Espagne, et la remise des places aux armées Espagnoles. J'autorise le Colonel de mon état major, Ricard, porteur de mes lettres, à signer les articles dont Votre Excellence conviendrait à cet égard, et je m'empresserai de les ratifier, pour les exécuter de concert avec le Général en chef Copons.

Recevez, Monsieur le Maréchal, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

LE MAL DUC D'ALBUFERA.

[ENCLOSURE.]

The Duc d'Albufera to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Au Quartier Général de Narbonne, le
14 Avril, 1814.

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

Le Colonel St. Simon, qui a eu l'honneur de vous voir à votre quartier-général de Toulouse, m'a donné l'assurance que Votre Excellence contracterait avec plaisir une suspension d'armes avec les troupes que je commande dès l'instant qu'elle serait informée de mon adhésion aux actes du gouvernement provisoire de la France.

Ces divers actes du gouvernement provisoire et du Sénat, et l'abdication de l'Empereur Napoléon, m'ayant paru en tout conformes au vœu général et au bien de mon pays, je n'ai point hésité de les adopter.

Jaloux de faire cesser une effusion de sang devenue aujourd'hui inutile,

* See following letter, proposing the Armistice.

12 ARMISTICE PROPOSED BY MARSHAL SOULT. APRIL, 1814.

je propose à Votre Excellence d'établir une ligne de démarcation qui couvre le département des Pyrénées Orientales, et une partie de ceux de l'Aude et de l'Arriège.

Je désire également que la frontière Espagnole, que je n'ai dépassée que hier à midi, serve de limite à l'armée Française et Espagnole.

Je vous offre aussi, Monsieur le Maréchal, de céder de suite à l'armée Espagnole les places de Sagonte, Peñiscola, Tortose, Barcelone, Hostalrich, et Figuières, si Votre Excellence veut me garantir la rentrée des garnisons avec armes et bagages. Je vous demande également le retour des garnisons de Lérida, Mequinenza, et Monzon, retenues sans égard au traité passé entre les généraux Français et le Général Copons.

Je m'estimerai bien heureux, My Lord, si au moment où deux grandes nations longtems rivales touchent à un rapprochement sincère, je puis contracter avec vous une convention, qui, en adoucissant le malheur des peuples, puisse également rendre de suite à l'Espagne la possession entière de ses places.

Si Votre Excellence adopte mes propositions, et se détermine à m'envoyer un officier, je le ferai accompagner en Catalogne par un de mes aides-de-camp, afin que la remise des places n'éprouve aucun retard.

Recevez, etc.

LE MAL DUC D'ALBUFERA.

The Duc de Dalmatie to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

Castelnaudary, le 17 Avril, 1814.

Je reçois à l'instant l'ordre du Prince, Major-Général des armées Françaises, de cesser les hostilités, et de cantonner les troupes qui composent mon armée. S.A. m'a aussi envoyé copie de l'armistice qui a été conclu avec les puissances alliées.

Dans cet état de choses, j'ai l'honneur de vous proposer une suspension d'armes, et de convenir d'un arrangement qui détermine provisoirement une ligne entre votre armée et celle que j'ai l'honneur de commander.

Je charge M. le Lieutenant-Général Comte Gazan, mon chef d'état-major, de se rendre à cet effet près de vous, Monsieur le Maréchal, et de se concerter avec l'officier général que Votre Excellence aura désigné pour régler les articles de l'arrangement que je propose, lesquels seront naturellement soumis à votre approbation et à la mienne.

J'ai l'honneur de vous prévenir que je donne des ordres pour que les hostilités cessent dès ce moment.

J'ai l'honneur de réitérer à Votre Excellence les sentimens de ma haute considération.

MAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

P.S. La suspension d'armes que je propose sera aussi commune à M. le Duc d'Albufera et aux troupes sous ses ordres.

DALMATIE.

The Duc d'Angoulême to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Bordeaux, le 18 Avril, 1814.

J'en ai reçu qu'hier votre lettre du 9.* J'espère que vous recevrez exactement celle que je vous ai écrite hier, pour vous annoncer M. Ravèz, qui j'envoie dans les départemens du Gers et de la Haute-Garonne. Si les nouvelles que j'attends de Paris n'y changent rien, mon projet est d'aller à Toulouse au commencement de la semaine prochaine. Je serai très heureux si je vous y trouve encore. Je n'ai rien reçu de mon père depuis son arrivée à Paris.

C'est avec la plus haute considération et bien véritable attachement que je suis, My Lord,

Votre très affectionné serviteur,

LOUIS ANTOINE.

The Duc de Dalmatie to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

Castelnaudary, le 18 Avril, 1814.

Monsieur le Lieutenant-Général Comte Gazan vient d'arriver, et il m'a remis la convention qu'il a signée au sujet de l'armistice. J'ai l'honneur de prévenir Votre Excellence que je l'approuve dans tout son contenu ; mais comme les expéditions doivent être signées par M. le Maréchal Duc d'Albufera, je ne pourrai renvoyer à Votre Excellence celle qui doit lui revenir que demain au soir, ou après demain matin.

D'après l'Art. 3 de cette convention, le département de la Haute-Garonne, du côté de l'Arriège, de l'Aude, et du Tarn, doit former la ligne de démarcation entre les deux armées. Je suis fâché que M. le Comte Gazan n'ait pas fait attention que la route de Castelnaudary, dans le département du Tarn, passe à Revel, qui est à l'extrémité du département de la Haute-Garonne. Comme la jouissance de cette route m'est indispensable pour le mouvement des troupes qui doivent se rendre dans les départemens du Tarn et de Tarn-et-Garonne, j'ai l'honneur de vous proposer, Monsieur le Maréchal, de restreindre la ligne de votre armée à la rive droite de la Sor, dans cette partie, ce qui ne vous privera que de 5 communes qui se trouvent en pointe entre les départemens de l'Aude et du Tarn, desquelles, s'il était indispensable, je pourrais vous offrir compensation du côté de l'Arriège ou de l'Aude.

Je désire que cet arrangement soit agréable à Votre Excellence, et qu'elle veuille bien m'en prévenir ; s'il en était autrement, j'en serais très gêné.

J'ai l'honneur de prier Votre Excellence d'agréer les sentimens réitérés de ma haute considération,

MAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., p. 628.

[757.]

MOVEMENTS OF THE ARMY FOR 20TH APRIL.

Toulouse, 19th April, 1814.

The 3rd division will march at daybreak to-morrow morning, and will proceed by the bridge of Toulouse to the villages of St. Martin du Touch and Blagnac. The division will continue its march on the 21st instant to Grenade. Sir Thomas Picton will be further informed as to the cantonments which the division is to occupy beyond Grenade.

The Light division will follow the 3rd division two hours after the former has commenced its march, and will proceed to cantonments in the vicinity of Toulouse, on the side of La Lande and Launaguet. The division will continue its march on the 21st to Castelnau, and Major-General Alten will be further informed as to the cantonments which it is to occupy in that direction.

The 4th and 6th divisions, and Colonel Vivian's brigade of cavalry, will move to-morrow morning by Caraman to Lanta and adjacents, extending towards Toulouse.

The brigade of German Light Dragoons will move from Escopon to St. Jean, and other cantonments in the neighbourhood of the Alby road, between St. Jean and Montartruc.

The Hussar brigade will move from Puy Laurens to Escopon, Verfeil, and adjacents.

To Lieut.-Gen. Sir Rowland Hill.

When the Light and 3rd divisions move to-morrow towards Toulouse, I beg you will replace your troops in cantonments, in the manner you find most convenient, between Villefranche and Mongiscard. They will be moved farther back as soon as some of the other divisions of the army have gone through Toulouse.

The 4th and 6th divisions, and Colonel Vivian's brigade of cavalry, fall back to-morrow to Lanta.

On the arrival of the 3rd division at Grenade, Sir T. Picton will be so good as place it in cantonments along the left bank of the Garonne, extending from Grenade by Verdun as far (if necessary) as to the road from Auch to Montauban.

On the arrival of the Light division at Castelnau, Major-General Alten will be so good as place the division in canton-

ments along the right bank of the Garonne, extending from Castelnau to Castel Sarrazin.

A ferry boat or flying bridge will be established upon the Garonne, where the great road from Auch to Montauban meets that river.

Lord Edward Somerset will be so good as arrange the cantonments of the 10th and 15th Hussars and two squadrons of the 7th Hussars in the country between the Garonne and the Tarn, from the Alby road to the junction of the two rivers, exclusive of the cantonments taken up by the Light division, as above allotted.

Lord Edward Somerset will be so good as put the Hussars in march to-morrow morning to take up their cantonments.

The two squadrons of the 7th Hussars now at Auch will be ordered to canton on the left bank of the Garonne, in the neighbourhood of St. Nicolas.

WELLINGTON.

The Duc d'Albufera to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Quartier-Général de Narbonne,
le 19 Avril, 1814.

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

Je viens de recevoir l'armistice conclu entre le Lieutenant-Général Comte Gazan et vos chargés de pouvoirs, confirmé par vous et le Duc de Dalmatie. Je me suis empressé de l'approuver également, voulant m'en remettre à votre loyauté sur quelques additions indispensables que je crois devoir vous proposer, et qui, dans le fond, ne changent rien aux dispositions principales de la convention.

Observations sur l'Art. 8 : Les garnisons de Murviedo et de Peñiscola se réuniront à celle de Tortose, et marcheront ensemble par la grande route pour rentrer en France par Perpignan. Le jour de leur arrivée à Gironne, les places de Figuières, Roses, et de son château seront remises aux troupes Espagnoles.

D'abord Roses et son château étant en très mauvais état ont été abandonnés sans garnisons. Il ne peut donc être question de leur évacuation.

Figuières se trouvant placé dans le voisinage de la frontière Française, et étant abondamment pourvu, est le seul point qui puisse assurer les vivres qu'il faut donner pour trois jours aux troupes qui se rendront à Perpignan.

La place d'Hostalrich n'étant pas comprise doit également être ajoutée.

En conséquence, Monsieur le Maréchal, je vous propose d'adopter pour l'évacuation des places d'Espagne le projet arrêté par M. le Duc de St. Carlos et moi, et approuvé par le Roi Ferdinand. Je pense que son exécution n'offre aucune espèce de difficulté, et je désire que Votre Excellence puisse en juger de même.

J'envoie près de Votre Excellence mon aide-de-camp, M. de Lusignan, et je charge le Colonel Ricard de conclure l'article additionnel que je vous propose, avec les chargés de pouvoirs que Votre Excellence voudra indiquer.

Je vous demande également d'ajouter que les différens bâtimens de guerre Français qui pourroient se trouver dans le port de Barcelone auront la faculté de se rendre dans un des ports Français de la Méditerranée sans être inquiétés.

Agréez, Monsieur le Maréchal, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

LE MAL DUC D'ALBUFERA.

[ENCLOSURE.]

General St. Cyr Nugues to Marshal the Duc d'Albufera.

MONSEIGNEUR,

Quartier-Général de Gironne, le 9 Mars, 1814.

J'ai l'honneur de rendre compte à Votre Excellence de la conférence que j'ai eu hier, 8 Mars, à Santa Coloma, avec M. Cabanes, chef d'état-major de l'armée Espagnole.

Il a été convenu de part et d'autre verbalement suivant mes instructions :

1. Que le Général en Chef Copons renverroit le plutôt qu'il lui seroit possible aux avant-postes Français les 1500 hommes environ dont se composent les garnisons de Lérida, Monzon, et Méquinenza, d'après les conventions signées par lui et M. d'Eroles. Ce renvoi auroit dû dépendre de M. le Général en Chef Copons; mais comme il a dit en avoir référé à son gouvernement afin de l'engager davantage à presser le succès de la demande, on lui remet intact le fort Montjoui de Gironne et les bastions de la place chargés et prêts à sauter.

2. Que la garnison de Tortose remettroit la place et les forts aux troupes Espagnoles, et qu'elle seroit renvoyée avec armes et bagages, recevant en route les vivres et transports, et passant à travers les postes de l'armée Espagnole jusqu'aux avant-postes de l'armée Française.

3. Qu'à l'arrivée de la garnison de Tortose aux avant-postes de l'armée Française, des ordres seroient expédiés à la garnison de Barcelone de remettre la ville et la citadelle aux troupes Espagnoles, et que cette garnison rentreroit immédiatement de la même manière aux avant-postes Français.

4. Que les mêmes ordres et les mêmes conditions s'étendroient aux garnisons de Sagonte et de Peñiscola, et qu'à leur retour aux avant-postes de l'armée Française on remettrait aux troupes Espagnoles le fort Montjoui de Barcelone et le fort d'Hostalrich, dont les garnisons seroient renvoyées aux avant-postes Français, toujours de la même manière.

M. Cabanes, en son nom et au nom de M. le Général en Chef Copons, a manifesté le désir de contribuer autant qu'il dépendroit de lui au succès de cette négociation, qu'il a jugée honorable et avantageuse.

Je suis avec respect, Monseigneur,

De Votre Excellence

Le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

ST. CYR NUGUES.

P.S. Il convient d'ajouter d'après l'armistice conclu qu'à l'arrivée à Figuières des garnisons de Sagonte et Peñiscola, du fort Montjoui de Barcelone, et celle du fort d'Hostalrich, "La place de Figuières comme sous le nom de Fort St. Fernando sera remise aux Espagnols, et que toutes les garnisons rentreront en France."

LE MAL DUC D'ALBUFERA.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Valencia, 19th April, 1814.

The King arrived here on the 16th instant, and was received with the same lively demonstrations of attachment which he experienced at Saragossa and all the other places through which he has passed.

On the 17th I had the honour of being presented to His Majesty, when he took occasion to express in the warmest terms his grateful sense of the exertions of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent in his behalf, and his attachment to the British nation for the sacrifices which it has made in support of his cause. His Majesty indeed omits no opportunity of testifying his sense of what he owes to Great Britain by the most marked attention to officers in the British service. Generals Whittingham and Roche had the good fortune to receive the King at the heads of their respective corps; the one upon His Majesty's entrance into Saragossa, and the other when he entered Valencia; and he has frequently expressed his admiration of the high state of discipline of these corps, as well as of the merit of the officers under whose command they have arrived at such a degree of perfection.

I had the satisfaction to learn from His Majesty himself that he had returned to Spain free from any conditions whatever with Buonaparte, and this was afterwards repeated to me by the Duke of San Carlos.

The day is not yet fixed for the King's departure for the capital.

H. WELLESLEY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Valencia, 19th April, 1814.

In my private letter from this place I informed your Lordship that a very general opinion prevailed here that the King would accept the Constitution. It may be doubted whether His Majesty ever entertained any such intention; but whether he did or did not, the demonstrations of affectionate attachment which he has received from his subjects, both at Saragossa and at Valencia, the few partisans who have as yet appeared in support of the Constitution, the dislike which is generally felt to it by the army, and, above all, the entreaties of the persons who have joined His Majesty from Madrid, would appear to have produced such an impression upon his mind as to have finally determined him to decline taking the oath.

I have reason to believe that this last resolution was formed previously to His Majesty's arrival at Valencia. The Cardinal de Bourbon, and the Secretary of State Mr. Luyando, were received by him with the most marked coldness; and he took an early opportunity of showing the former that he would not allow him to exercise any of the privileges belonging to his situation as President of the Regency; in which the King has violated the decree of the 2nd February, which denies him all authority until he shall have sworn to the Constitution.

But within these two days the determination to reject the Constitution

has been more openly manifested. General Elio, the Commander in Chief of the army, upon presenting the officers of the garrison to the King, stated in the most marked manner that he was authorized by them to renew to His Majesty the oath of 1808, by which they bound themselves to defend his integral rights as they had descended to him from his ancestors; and this was followed by a public declaration to the King from the Duke of San Carlos, that the whole army of Spain was in the same sentiments, and ready to take the same oath. A letter has likewise been published from the Conde de la Bisbal to the King, in which he makes no mention of the Constitution, but states that he and his whole army are devoted to His Majesty's service. The troops of this garrison, with some other troops, composing in all a force of about 5000 men, are under orders to march for Madrid; and it would appear to be the determination to employ force, if necessary, to carry into effect the objects which the King has in view.

It remains to be seen what line of conduct will be adopted by the Cortes upon the arrival at Madrid of the intelligence of what is passing here. They can scarcely avoid noticing the conduct of General Elio, who, by his imprudence, has made a premature disclosure of the King's intentions, and has thereby enabled the Cortes to take such measures as they may think best calculated to defeat them. The Grandees, however, who are here, and all the persons attached to the King, are filled with exultation, and think that the Cortes will not venture to oppose any resistance to the King's wishes.

Under the circumstances which I have stated, your Lordship will readily conceive that my situation between the two contending parties is extremely embarrassing. I have reason to think that the King has been apprised of the opinions which I gave to some of his friends previously to their leaving Madrid; for although he has treated me with the most flattering distinction, neither His Majesty nor any of his friends have once touched upon the question of the conduct which it would be proper for him to observe upon his arrival at Madrid. I am willing to believe that this silence proceeds as much from a sense of the difficulty of my situation as from a knowledge that the opinions which I gave are adverse to theirs. I see no reason to alter these opinions; for even if the King should succeed in getting rid of the Constitution, he will at no very distant period be involved in difficulties with which neither he nor his followers are equal to contend.

The line of conduct which I propose to follow is to avoid compromising His Majesty's government with either party, but to pay as much personal respect and attention to the King as circumstances will admit of, consistently with this line of conduct. I earnestly request, however, that your Lordship will have the goodness to favour me at the earliest possible period with the sentiments of the Prince Regent's government upon the extraordinary turn which affairs have taken here, in order that I may strictly abide by them.

H. WELLESLEY.

The Marquis de Marillac to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MONSEIGNEUR,

Villefranche, le 19 Avril, 1814.

Une circonstance fâcheuse pour l'opinion publique m'engage à réclamer de nouveau la bonté de Votre Excellence pour faire parvenir à S.A.R. le Duc d'Angoulême le paquet ci inclus.

Associés à nos opinions, les soutenant d'une manière si noble et si généreuse, Votre Excellence facilitera, sans doute, aux bons et vrais Français tous les moyens de servir utilement la cause de l'honneur.

S.A.R. Monsieur Comte d'Artois a par sa proclamation datée de Vesoul du 27 Février annoncé la suppression des droits réunis.

M. le Marquis de Chabannes l'a annoncé aussi de par le Roi.

En conséquence de la volonté de S.M.T.C. ainsi transmise les droits réunis ont cessé leurs fonctions dans cet arrondissement le jour que la nouvelle de la restauration fut proclamée.

Le commissaire du gouvernement provisoire, près le Ministère des Finances, a ordonné la remise en activité de cette régie, et Monsieur le préfet du département m'a transmis cet ordre avec celui de le faire exécuter.

Ne connoissant que Louis XVIII. pour Roi légitime, j'ai cru, par intérêt pour son service, et pour ne pas altérer le mouvement de confiance qui s'est manifestée pour ses vues bienfaisantes, j'ai cru devoir prendre sur moi de retarder l'exécution de cette mesure, et demander les ordres de M. le Duc d'Angoulême à ce sujet. Votre Excellence jugera qu'il m'est essentiel de les recevoir promptement.

Ne nous dissimulons pas qu'il existe encore quelques individus ennemis du retour de l'ordre, soit parceque leur déprédation n'aura plus d'alimens, soit parceque l'anarchie et le désordre sont leur élément. Ces individus sont aux aguets de tout ce qui peut nuire à cette harmonie si utile au bien général. D'autres individus, des fonctionnaires publics même, ont mis une réticence bien coupable dans la promulgation de la déchéance de Napoléon et la proclamation de la restauration de Louis XVIII., et se retranchent derrière cette constitution que l'opinion générale rejette : car pour les bons Français, "Si veut le Roi, si veut la loi : " voilà toute la constitution. "Le Roi de France et de Navarre : " voilà les titres de leur monarque.

Parlant de tiédeur et de mauvaise volonté à faire reconnoître la déchéance, etc., et proclamer Louis XVIII., j'ai été au moment de marcher sur Rodez avec toute la garde sédentaire de cette ville pour déterminer Monsieur le préfet à faire ce que l'impulsion de cœur a occasionné dans cette ville.

J'ai reçu hier, dans la journée, un exprès d'Aurillac, capitale du département du Cantal, qui est venu me demander de la part des gens bien pensant de cette ville d'envoyer à leur aide une force armée, ou bien de solliciter de Votre Excellence un fort détachement de troupe Anglaise, pour forcer Monsieur le préfet du Cantal à se prononcer d'une manière conforme à l'intérêt général. J'ai assuré cet individu que je prendrai la liberté de mettre sous les yeux de Votre Excellence la demande qu'il me portait.

Nous ignorons ce que sont devenus les débris de l'armée de Soult ; mais s'il n'a pas faite son adhésion, et qu'il veuille faire la guerre en partizan en se jetant dans les montagnes, il pourroit y tenir longtems, si Votre Excellence n'en fesoit occuper militairement les principaux points.

Si ce Général a faite son adhésion, sa troupe, mal disciplinée, se dislo-

queront ; des parties pourroient se jeter aussi dans nos montagnes, et y compromettre les intérêts du Roi.

Dans la dernière hypothèse, et si Votre Excellence jugerait convenable de parer à cet inconvénient, ce qui est dans son cœur comme dans la nôtre, je crois que 600 light horses seroient suffisants pour détruire toutes les incertitudes, et calmer l'effervescence des têtes mal disposées.

Si Votre Excellence se décidait à envoyer ce détachement, il pourroit être utile qu'une partie stationnat quelque tems à Rodez.

J'ai l'honneur d'être avec un profond respect, Monseigneur,

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

LE MARQUIS DE MARILLAC.

P.S. La mesure ordonnée par M. le préfet a depuis que j'ai terminé ma lettre occasionné une insurrection complete contre les droits réunis. Aux cris de Vive le Roi ! on a jeté dans la rivière tous les registres. J'ai eu toute la peine du monde à apaiser le tumulte ; mais celui qui crie aujourd'hui Vive le Roi ! peut crier demain Vive la Ligue ! Pour empêcher les mauvaises insinuations, je prie Votre Excellence de vouloir bien faire traverser cette ville d'après le plan proposé dans le corps de la lettre le plutôt possible.

MARQUIS DE MARILLAC.

The Duc de Dalmatie to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Castelnaudary, le 19 Avril, 1814,
à 11 $\frac{1}{2}$ heures du soir.

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

J'ai l'honneur d'adresser à Votre Excellence la ratification de la convention de suspension d'armes qui a été signée hier à Toulouse. Elle est approuvée par M. le Duc d'Albufera et par moi.

M. le Duc d'Albufera, duquel je reçois à l'instant une lettre, me fait observer que l'on a omis dans cette convention la garnison de Hostalrich, et d'autres détails qui conviennent à sa situation. D'après ce dernier motif il a désiré avoir une convention séparée. Il écrit à ce sujet à Votre Excellence.

J'ai reçu la lettre de ce jour que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire au sujet de la route de Revel. Je m'empresse de vous remercier, Monsieur le Maréchal, de votre obligeance en me mettant à même de disposer de cette route, dont je ne puis me dispenser de faire usage pendant le mouvement que je commencerai après-demain matin. Je devrai aussi, pendant le passage des troupes, en loger à Revel, ainsi que dans les deux ou trois villages dépendans de la Haute-Garonne qui sont entre cette ville et la Sor ; mais je ne laisserai personne dans ces endroits après que le mouvement sera fini.

Demain M. le Comte Gazan enverra un officier à Toulouse pour prendre à l'état-major de Votre Excellence des passeports, à l'effet de se rendre à Bayonne, Navarreins, St. Jean Pied de Port, et Santoña. Il pourra voyager avec l'officier que Votre Excellence se propose d'envoyer.

Le Chef d'Escadron de Choiseuil, l'un de mes aides-de-camp, que j'envoie à Paris près du gouvernement provisoire, doit passer par Toulouse, où il

demandera également un passeport pour continuer sa route. J'ai l'honneur de vous prier, Monsieur le Maréchal, de le lui faire délivrer, et de vouloir bien à l'avenir donner des ordres pour que la marche des courriers et des officiers en mission qui passeront par Toulouse ne soit point arrêtée.

J'ai l'honneur de renouveler à Votre Excellence l'expression de ma haute considération.

MAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

Convention between F. M. the Marquess of Wellington and Maréchal Suchet, Duc d'Albufera.

Toulouse, 19 Avril, 1814.

Son Excellence le Maréchal Marquis de Wellington, Commandant en Chef l'armée alliée, et Son Excellence le Maréchal Suchet, Duc d'Albufera, Commandant en Chef l'armée Française d'Aragon et de Catalogne, désirant conclure un armistice pour faire cesser les hostilités entre leurs armées, convenir d'une ligne de démarcation, et faire un traité pour la remise des places que l'armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne occupe encore en Espagne, ont nommé, le Maréchal Suchet, Duc d'Albufera, l'Adjudant Commandant Ricard, et le Maréchal Marquis de Wellington, le Major-Général Murray et Don Louis Wimpffen, Maréchal de Campo, lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pleinpouvoirs, sont convenus des articles ci-après.

ART. I.

Les bases établies dans le traité fait hier, 18 Avril, et signé par le Général Comte de Gazan, et le Major-Général Murray, et Don Louis de Wimpffen, Maréchal de Campo, sont adoptées. Seulement le Maréchal Suchet, Duc d'Albufera, désirant ne pas traiter collectivement, et stipuler seul les intérêts qui concernent l'armée qu'il commande, les articles du traité cité ci-dessus, qui ont rapport à l'armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, sont regardés comme nonavenus, et sont remplacés par ceux qui suivent.

ART. II.

La ligne de démarcation entre l'armée Française d'Aragon et de Catalogne et les armées alliées est fixée par celle des frontières de France et d'Espagne aux Pyrénées Orientales. Toutes hostilités cesseront dès ce jour, et ne pourront être reprises d'une part ni d'autre qu'en se prévenant cinq jours à l'avance.

ART. III.

Toutes les places que l'armée Française d'Aragon et de Catalogne occupe encore en Espagne seront immédiatement remises aux troupes Espagnoles. La place de Tortose sera remise la première ; la garnison se mettra aussitôt en marche pour Perpignan, en marchant par Étapes, et par la grande route. Le jour de l'arrivée de cette garnison à Gironne la forteresse de Figuières sera remise à l'armée Espagnole, et sa garnison sera mise aussitôt en marche pour Perpignan. Les places de Sagonte, Peñiscola, et Hostalrich seront également remises aux troupes Espagnoles le plutôt possible, et les garnisons dirigées sur Perpignan, après avoir été réunies. Aussitôt que la garnison de Tortose sera arrivée à la frontière de France, la place de Barcelone sera

remise aux troupes Espagnoles, et sa garnison se mettra en marche pour Perpignan. Les autorités Espagnoles seront tenues de fournir les vivres et transports dont les garnisons de ces différentes places auront besoin jusqu'à la frontière de France. Les malades qui ne pourraient pas suivre continueront à être traités dans les hôpitaux où ils se trouvent, et seront renvoyés en France à mesure de guérison.

ART. IV.

Les garnisons Françaises de ces différentes places en sortiront avec armes, bagages, leurs canons de bataille, caissons, et fourgons, appartenant à l'armée Française.

ART. V.

Toutes les armes, canons, et caissons de fonderie et de fabrique Espagnole resteront dans les places.

ART. VI.

Les armes, les fortifications, et les magasins seront remis dans l'état où ils se trouveront à la signification de la présente convention, et sans qu'il y soit fait aucune dégradation.

ART. VII.

Le Maréchal Suchet, Duc d'Albufera, ayant déjà rendu plusieurs prisonniers de guerre sans échange, et s'engageant à rendre tous ceux qui pourront se trouver dans l'étendue de son commandement, les militaires Français retenus en Espagne, et provenant des garnisons de Lerida, Mequinenza, et Monzon, lui seront rendus dans la même proportion de nombre et de grade.

ART. VIII.

Pour parvenir à la plus prompte exécution du présent traité, des officiers Anglais et Espagnols seront immédiatement envoyés en Catalogne avec copie du dit traité et les instructions nécessaires. Ils prendront leur route par le quartier-général du Maréchal Suchet, Duc d'Albufera, qui enverra également un de ses officiers pour agir de concert et lever toutes les difficultés qui pourraient se présenter.

ART. IX.

La ratification du présent traité aura lieu sous deux fois vingt-quatre heures, ou plutôt si cela se pourra.

Fait en triple expéditions à Toulouse le 19 Avril, 1814.

G. MURRAY, Major-Général.

Le Colonel RICARD.

Confirmé,

Approuvé et confirmé,

WELLINGTON.

Le Maréchal SUCHET,
Duc d'ALBUFERA.

To Dom M. de Forjaz.

[758.]
*

SENHOR,

Toulouse, 20th April, 1814.

I take the opportunity of the despatch of to Lisbon to inform your Excellency that Marshal Sir W. Beresford having proposed to take the opportunity of the suspension of hostilities to avail himself of the leave of absence given to him by the Portuguese government, I will conduct, during his absence, such details as it may be necessary to despatch; and I trust the government will think it proper to refrain from making any alterations in a system which has answered all its objects so perfectly, and has tended so essentially to raise the glory of the Portuguese army and nation.

This arrangement will bring me more frequently in communication with your Excellency, and I hope that I shall conduct the business in a manner which will be satisfactory.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD,

War Department, London, 20th April, 1814.

I have had the honour to receive your Lordship's despatches to No. 47 inclusive.

As it appears by your last letter that Lieutenant-General Clinton had not commenced his march into France, I have now to desire that (in case an armistice shall have taken place) your Lordship will instruct the Lieutenant-General to march immediately from Catalonia, with the whole of the British and German troops under his command, and proceed either to Pasages or Bordeaux, as your Lordship may deem it most advisable, both with a view to existing circumstances and the eventual embarkation of the troops.

Your Lordship will be pleased to communicate with Lord William Bentinck as to the return of the Italian and Sicilian troops from Catalonia to Sicily.

I have the honour to be

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

BATHURST.

Colonel Torrens to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

20th April, 1814.

I have received your letter of the 1st instant respecting Lieutenant-Colonel Napier; and you will find by his appointment to the 71st that your wishes in his favour have been anticipated.

According to your wishes in favour of young Russell, I have the pleasure to acquaint you that the Commander in Chief has recommended him for a company in the 2nd Garrison Battalion, and his promotion will appear in the 'Gazette' of next week.

We are much annoyed to find that the news of the proceedings at Paris had not reached you on the 7th. I earnestly hope they may still have arrived in time to prevent another action.

I think you will be surprised at the extreme folly of allowing Buonaparte to retain the title of Emperor. If they do not take care, he will still give trouble in Italy.

Ever, my dear Lord, most faithfully and sincerely,

H. TORRENS.

The Duc d'Albufera to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

Quartier-Général de Narbonne, le
20 Avril, 1814.

Votre Excellence aura vu par ma lettre d'hier, 19, que je me suis empressé de confirmer l'armistice convenu entre le Lieutenant-Général Comte Gazan et les Généraux Murray et Louis Wimpffen. J'ai été conduit dans cette occasion par le désir de n'apporter aucun retard à la suspension d'armes qui serait s'établir entre les trois armées; mais, au même tems, j'ai jugé convenable de présenter à Votre Excellence différentes observations dont j'ai abandonné entièrement la solution à sa loyauté.

Mon aide-de-camp Brasse vient de me remettre la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire hier, en même temps que M. Southwell, Lieutenant du 14^{me} de dragons Anglais, m'a apporté en triple expédition la convention que vous avez eu l'extrême complaisance de faire distraire de celle qui avait été conclue avec M. le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie.

Je m'empresse de vous renvoyer, revêtu de ma signature, cette convention ratifiée comme vous l'avez désiré.

Je ferai partir demain pour l'Espagne deux de mes officiers avec M. le Lieutenant Southwell, pour remettre au Lieutenant-Général Copons y Haria le traité d'armistice conclu hier.

Vous avez la complaisance de souhaiter, Monsieur le Marquis, que tout ce que vous avez fait me soit agréable; je vous avoue avec franchise que dans tout autre tems, et avec un homme dont la loyauté serait moins connue que la vôtre, je conserverai un cuisant regret de céder Figuières, avec ses immenses approvisionnemens, sans avoir vu au-delà des Pyrénées une seule de mes garnisons.

Votre caractère connu me rassure et m'est un garant de la fidélité avec laquelle le traité conclu entre nous sera exécuté.

Je vous prie de recevoir tous mes remerciemens pour l'intérêt que vous prenez au Général Comte Harispe, et pour l'accueil plein de bonté que vous avez fait à mes officiers.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, Monsieur le Maréchal, avec la plus haute considération,

Votre très obéissant serviteur,

LE MAR DUC D'ALBUFERA.

Séance du Conseil de l'Arrondissement de Toulouse du 20 Avril, 1814.

Monsieur le Président ayant annoncé que la séance était ouverte, chacun des membres a successivement demandé et obtenu la parole, et s'est empressé de témoigner avec le plus grand enthousiasme sa très grande satisfaction des événemens importans qui viennent de régénérer la France, de terminer son esclavage et son désespoir, en lui ouvrant enfin la carrière du bonheur.

En conséquence, après en avoir rendu grâces au Dieu de ses pères, le Conseil, impatient de témoigner publiquement ses sentimens, et combien il prend une part active à l'allégresse générale de tous les bons Français, a déclaré à l'unanimité et par acclamation, tant en son nom qu'en celui de l'arrondissement qu'il représente :

1. Que la règle de son devoir le plus sacré comme l'expression de son affection était renfermée dans la maxime suivante, gravée dans son cœur en caractères ineffaçables : Dieu et le Roi. Vive Louis XVIII. !

2. Que Son Altesse Royale Monseigneur le Duc d'Angoulême, qui dans ces contrées a été le précurseur du bonheur qui commence à luire pour la France, est supplié de transmettre à sa Majesté Louis XVIII. l'expression des sentimens si long tems comprimés dans nos cœurs, et du dévouement le plus absolu ; heureux si l'espoir de manifester de vive voix ces sentimens à Son Altesse pouvait bientôt se réaliser.

3. Que le midi de la France, et particulièrement l'arrondissement de Toulouse, étant redevable des obligations les plus importantes et vraiment inexprimables au magnanime héros Monseigneur le Feld Maréchal Marquis de Wellington et à la brave et loyale armée qu'il n'a cessé de conduire à la gloire, le Conseil se rendra en corps auprès de Son Excellence pour le prier d'agréer l'hommage respectueux de notre reconnaissance et de notre admiration.

La séance a été levée aux cris mille fois répétés avec attendrissement de "Vive le Roi !" "Vive la famille Royale !" et ont signé tous les membres présentes.

(Here follow the signatures.)

Count Gazan to Major-General Murray.

MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

Castelnaudary, le 20 Avril, 1814.

J'ai l'honneur de vous prévenir que M. le Lieutenant-Général Clausel va profiter d'un congé qui lui a été accordé par le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie,

et à cet effet se rendre dans une de ses propriétés située près de Haute-rive, département de la Haute-Garonne. Je ne pense pas que Son Excellence le Maréchal Marquis de Wellington trouve que la présence du Général Clausel dans le département de la Haute-Garonne puisse être nuisible aux intérêts de son armée, mais je vous prie de l'en prévenir, afin que s'il le trouvait mauvaise, M. le Lieutenant-Général Clausel puisse en être instruit et se retirer aussitôt de sa campagne.

Recevez, Monsieur le Général, l'assurance de la haute considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur de vous saluer.

LE LIEUT.-GÉN. COMTE DE GAZAN.

General O'Lawlor to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Valencia, 22nd April, 1814.

You must be aware that the King arrived here on the 16th; that Generals Elio and Pontons made the annexed speeches to His Majesty; and that they all have decided to keep him from swearing to the Constitution, and that they have sent towards Madrid the regiments of La Corona, America, and Logroño, and 12 flank companies of General Roche's division, which is composed of the best troops I have seen in Spain. The King is highly pleased with Roche; and on the 20th, that I had the honour to dine with His Majesty, he asked me about your Lordship and the army, and appeared to enjoy your Lordship's having always beat the enemy, and he said, "Yo quiero mucho á Wellington; es un gran General. La Division de Roche se compone de hermosa tropa. La Caballeria Whittingham esta muy buena."

The attention he pays on all occasions to Sir H. Wellesley has been unknown here hitherto to be made by the King to any ambassador. I am not well informed of the plan they mean to follow; but as General Elio and Count La Bisbal have offered their services and those of their troops, I infer that they are to endeavour to put the King on the throne without any limited power, but that he will call the Cortes as formerly immediately. They depend on your Lordship's countenancing this plan, and everything else they may undertake; and they are very anxious to have your Lordship's answer to the letter the King wrote you all of his own hand from Gerona, in which he shows you all kind of affection and friendship by what San Carlos tells me.

The people are here all the King's admirers, and he does everything to please. They doubted of Villa Campa, and he is ordered to come to meet the King. Whittingham's cavalry, it appears, is moving towards Madrid.

It is supposed that the Infante Don Carlos is to have the command of the Spanish troops, and that he will be sent to your Lordship's headquarters; but I do not know how this is to be done, whether you or His Highness is to be the Commander in Chief, &c.

No person knows yet whether the King will or not move soon from this. Some of Copons's troops are on their way towards Madrid, according to reports.

General Copons, it appears, is now wishing to join the King, though his conduct with His Majesty was regulated by the Cortes. I am in the

belief they formed no regular plan: still Labrador and the Duke of San Carlos are the leading men and directors here. Generals Elio and Zayas are, I should imagine, in some of the secrets.

Everything in the Soto de Roma continues well; and if the King succeeds in his plan, everything the Prince of the Peace had will be added to it.

Believe me, my Lord, to be very truly and gratefully

Your Lordship's humble servant,

JOSEPH O'LAWLOR.

P. S.—I hear of your Lordship's new victory, and I wish your Lordship joy.

The Duc d'Angoulême to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Bordeaux, le 22 Avril, 1814.

Ce sera un vrai bonheur pour moi de vous revoir. Je compte arriver Mardi avant la nuit à Toulouse, si je ne suis pas retenu sur les chemins. J'espère que vous ne trouverez pas mauvais que j'y prenne avec moi un détachement de la Garde de Volontaires que la ville de Bordeaux a formés pour moi. Je vous en demande l'agrément comme Commandant-en-Chef. C'est M. Bontemps de Barry qui a eu l'honneur de vous faire sa tour à St. Sever, qui commande les dix que j'y envoie.

C'est avec la plus haute considération et bien véritable attachement que je suis, My Lord,

Votre très affectionné serviteur,

LOUIS ANTOINE.

Le Général Decaen est venu me voir ici, et je vais demain passer ses troupes en revue à Libourne.

Major-Gen. the Hon. C. Colville to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Boucaut, 22nd April, 1814.

I have the honour to enclose herewith the answer I have received from the Governor of Bayonne to the communication I sent him on the subject of a suspension of hostilities, agreeable to the orders contained in your Lordship's letter of the 19th inst., which I had the honour to receive early this morning.

I have the honour to be, My Lord,

With the highest respect,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

CHARLES COLVILLE.

P.S.—In the last accounts from Sir John Hope he says he fears the wound in his leg will be tedious, but that he himself and the other wounded officers meet with every attention.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Baron Thouvenot to Major-Gen. the Hon. C. Colville.

MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

Bayonne, le 22 Avril, 1814.

J'ai reçu les pièces que Votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'envoyer en communication, et qui ont été remises à mon chef d'état-major. Après avoir examiné la convention faite entre leurs Excellences les Maréchaux Marquis de Wellington et Duc de Dalmatie, j'y ai vu que le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie doit m'envoyer un officier pour m'apporter officiellement une copie de cette convention, et que son arrivée ne paroît pas devoir être différée de plus de quarante-huit heures. J'attendrai donc l'arrivée de cet officier pour convenir avec Votre Excellence de toutes les mesures à prendre pour établir la suspension d'armes qui doit avoir lieu entre le corps d'armée que vous commandez et la garnison de Bayonne ; mais je donne immédiatement l'ordre de cesser le feu sur toute la ligne de mes avant-postes, en maintenant, cependant, l'ordre qui existe, d'empêcher toute communication entre vos troupes et les nôtres, ainsi qu'avec les habitants.

Je prie Votre Excellence de vouloir bien donner des ordres à ses avant-postes de ne point chercher à communiquer avec les nôtres, afin d'éviter tout prétexte et tout motif de recommencer le feu.

M. le Général Hope, auquel j'ai communiqué le billet de son aide-de-camp, m'ayant paru désirer de le voir, je prie Votre Excellence de le prévenir qu'il sera reçu demain à 6 heures du matin, et qu'il pourra entrer en ville avec les chaloupes qui apporteront les vivres pour les prisonniers.

J'ai l'honneur de renvoyer à Votre Excellence la lettre qui lui a été écrite par S.E. le Feld-Maréchal Marquis de Wellington ; je garde les autres pièces, qui ne sont que des copies.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, Monsieur le Général,

De Votre Excellence le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

B^N THOUVENOT.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Valencia, 23rd April, 1814.

On the 17th instant I received your Lordship's despatch, No. 1, enclosing a copy of a treaty which had been signed at Chaumont between the Courts of London, Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Berlin.

I took an early opportunity of informing Mr. Luyando that I had received such a communication, and that as soon as the ratifications of the treaty had been exchanged, the Court of Spain would be invited to accede to it. Mr. Luyando expressed himself to be highly gratified by this communication, and said that he had no doubt that the Regency would feel the greatest satisfaction in acceding to the treaty. He added that he did not conceive there would be any difficulty on the part of Spain in furnishing the same number of troops as that specified in the treaty as the number to be furnished by each of the Powers engaged in it.

Upon reflecting, however, that before I could receive your Lordship's orders to invite the government of Spain to be a party to this engagement, very considerable political changes would probably take place here, I deter-

mined to ask an audience of the King, and to ascertain His Majesty's disposition to make common cause with the Allies.

The King readily admitted me to an audience, at which his brother, his uncle, and the Duke of San Carlos were present. It happened that on the same morning I had received the intelligence of a provisional government being established at Paris, and of the probable abdication of Buonaparte. I therefore observed to the King that the communication which I had to make to him, of the treaty which had been signed at Chaumont, would probably appear of less importance on account of the late events which had taken place at Paris, but that still I thought it my duty to ascertain whether His Majesty would be willing to enter into a closer connection with the Allies by acceding to this treaty upon being invited to do so. The King replied, without hesitation, that he would most willingly make himself a party to this engagement, and that no consideration would induce him to separate his interests from those of his Allies.

I feel it to be the more necessary to obtain some declaration of the King's intentions upon this point, because the person who enjoys the largest share of His Majesty's confidence is the Duke of San Carlos; and although I have no reason to suppose that he would, under present circumstances, advise the King to pursue any system by which he should weaken the connection subsisting between Spain and her Allies, yet it is impossible to forget that he was the negotiator of the Treaty of Valençay.

H. WELLESLEY.

The Duc d'Angoulême to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Bordeaux, 23 Avril, 1814.

Descars, mon aide-de-camp, aura l'honneur de vous remettre cette lettre. J'ai été passer en revue aujourd'hui, à Libourne, l'armée de Général Decaen, et j'en ai été parfaitement bien reçu. D'après les difficultés qu'on m'a annoncés par le chemin, je crains de ne pouvoir arriver que Mercredi à Toulouse. J'aurais un bien grand plaisir à vous revoir. M. de Bertier est arrivé, et m'a rendu compte de la conversation qu'il a eu avec vous.

C'est avec la plus haute considération que je suis, My Lord,

Votre très affectionné,

LOUIS ANTOINE.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Downing Street, 23rd April, 1814.

I suggested to you yesterday in my letter which was to go by Paris, that the Regent might probably create your Lordship a Duke, in consideration of your distinguished services.

Lord Liverpool is authorised to make this communication to Lady Wellington this evening; and she is to consult Lord Wellesley on the subject of the recent title, for it is thought desirable not to delay the creation.

Sir John Hope, Sir Thomas Graham, Sir Rowland Hill, Sir Stapleton

30 CONVENTION WITH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT.

Cotton, and Marshal Beresford are to be made Peers. To those of them whom you may have an opportunity of seeing, your Lordship will have the goodness to give an *unofficial* communication of this intention.

I am going to write to Sir Rowland Hill's brother to consult him as to the title. The Duke of Newcastle will tell me that of Sir Stapleton Cotton.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,
BATHURST.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 24th April, 1814.

Sir C. Stewart has just left me. I wrote a line by the messenger to say that you may be at ease about Soult. He is recalled, and will not be employed. Suchet will replace him, in whose fidelity the government place entire confidence.

A Commissaire du Roi proceeds to Toulouse with full powers.

The King is expected on the 27th in Paris.

I shall probably remain here till the 15th of next month, before which time I hope we shall sign our peace with France. I have appointed Robert Gordon to act as Commissary to the government here, and to charge himself with all details: he will attend to any business you may have to transact with the offices here.

Believe me, my dear Lord, ever sincerely yours,
CASTLEREAGH.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Paris, 24th April, 1814.

I enclose, for your Lordship's information and guidance, the copy of a convention which has been signed by the Allied Powers with the French government, and which has been already ratified by the Sovereigns here present.*

I have transmitted this convention for ratification to England, and have to request your Lordship will in the mean time give effect to its provisions.

I am, with great truth and regard, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,
CASTLEREAGH.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Valencia, 24th April, 1814.

The Duke of San Carlos called upon me yesterday morning, and began a conversation, with a view, as he said, of apprising me of the King's intentions, but more, I believe, with the desire of sounding me as to the degree of support His Majesty might expect from me. He said that the

* Copy of Convention not found. See Treaty of 30 May, 1814, at page 120.

King had arrived at Gerona with the intention of accepting the Constitution, conceiving his acceptance to be unavoidable; that in his progress through the country, however, he had found that the Constitution, so far from being considered as advantageous, was generally odious to the people; that His Majesty had received repeated assurances of the prevalence of this sentiment, accompanied by entreaties that he would not lend himself to a system which would endanger the existence of the monarchy; that he could rely with the utmost confidence upon the promises which had been made to him of the support of the armies in any measures of resistance which he might judge advisable; that having so many proofs of the dislike of his people and of the army to the new order of things, he could not think himself justified in acceding to the Constitution, even admitting that he did not himself feel the objections which had been urged to it; that His Majesty was anxious to know my opinion, as also the degree of support which I might be enabled to give him; and that above all he considered it to be of the utmost importance that he should receive from Lord Wellington, as Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish armies, a letter, pledging himself to give him the same degree of support which had been promised to him by most of the officers commanding corps.

In reply I informed the Duke of San Carlos of the grounds upon which I had recommended some of the King's friends to advise His Majesty to accept the Constitution, which consisted principally in the difficulties in which he would hereafter be involved, even admitting that he succeeded in putting an end to the present order of things.

I acknowledged that, until my arrival at Valencia, I was not aware of the dislike to the Constitution which existed, at least in the provinces through which His Majesty had passed. I recommended it, however, to the Duke of San Carlos, before deciding finally upon the conduct to be pursued, to consider well the resistance which might be opposed to them at Madrid, and the lengths which they might be disposed to go in order to compel obedience to the King's will. It was possible likewise that the Constitution was not so unpopular in some of the other provinces of Spain as in those which the King had visited, and it would be well to ascertain what means the King might possess of immediately quelling any disturbances which might arise at a distance from the capital in consequence of his rejection of it. These were considerations entirely unconnected with the difficulties which would hereafter fall so heavily upon His Majesty, to meet which would require all the talents of the most able statesman.

I concluded by telling him that it was the anxious desire of the Prince Regent and of his government that the King should be re-established upon his throne with all the authority which ought to belong to him, and at the head of a nation rich, independent, and powerful, but that it was impossible for me to take any active part in support of the measures which I understood His Majesty to have in contemplation; neither could Lord Wellington, holding as he did the chief command of the Spanish armies merely with a view to offensive operations against the enemy, make any offers of support of the nature suggested by the Duke of San Carlos.

In the course of this conversation I endeavoured to discover whether the advisers of the King had any fixed plan upon which they meant to proceed; and from what I could gather from the Duke of San Carlos, it appeared to

be the intention that, as soon as a number of troops sufficient to ensure the King's safety should arrive at Madrid, he should proceed there, and repair to the palace, instead of going directly to the Cortes, according to the decree of the 2nd February. That the necessary measures should then be taken for dissolving the present Cortes, and a proclamation issued for summoning new Cortes, according to a different mode of election, which proclamation should contain the views of the King. The Duke of San Carlos said that the new Constitution would be such as would do justice to the liberal ideas of the King, and would not fail to meet the wishes of the people; that none of the institutions which were oppressive or odious to the people would be restored; and that another legislative body would be established, to be elected from the nobility and the higher orders of the clergy.

I have thus detailed to your Lordship the conversation which passed between me and the Duke of San Carlos. I have not much faith in the wisdom or firmness of the people who surround the King; but it must be confessed that if they succeed in establishing a Constitution upon the principles which they profess, affording to the Crown a competent share of power, they will be entitled to the gratitude of the nation, though much afterwards must depend upon the talents of those who may be entrusted with the management of public affairs.

H. WELLESLEY.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,

Valencia, 25th April, 1814.

Since the receipt of your letter of the 31st ult. I have received that of the 27th,* and I am very happy to find that I was mistaken in my apprehensions. I am well aware that your time is sufficiently employed to prevent your writing.

I send you copies of my despatches, which will show you what is passing here. My letters from Madrid mention that the Liberales are in very low spirits, and their opponents proportionably elated. The King is so popular that I think he may do what he pleases; but I dread the ignorance, violence, and absurd prejudices of his advisers, and no man can say what the result of all this will be. The King appears to me to be very amiable, much more lively and conversable than I expected, but without the least knowledge of business. I never see him without his speaking of you in the highest possible terms, and it is evident that he is fully sensible of how much he owes to you. Both he and his advisers seem to think that a declaration from you would be of the greatest advantage to the King, but I thought it right to put an end to all such hopes, as you will find I have done upon a perusal of my despatches. I wish you joy of your last success against Soult. God send that this may be the last of your battles, for some time at least.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., pp. 607, 614.

Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Bordeaux, 25th April, 1814.

With all the expedition I could induce the postboys to make, I only arrived here at 11 last night, and found His Royal Highness the Duke d'Angoulême in his carriage setting out for Toulouse. It was thus impossible to deliver him the message you had desired me, and it would have been equally unnecessary, as previously to seeing you he could not have acted on what I should have pointed out to him, and it was thus better to leave the case untouched upon till your seeing him.

I have not learnt anything particular here, where I still find Cotton, who will set off to-morrow by sea. He and Lord Dalhousie, whom I saw for a moment, are gone down to Médoc to see the militia. I shall leave this to-morrow morning for Paris, and expect to be there on the 30th, which I think I can do, taking the journey quietly. I only stopped four hours between Toulouse and this place. All here are desirous of seeing you come this way. This town appears still more magnificent after living in such a hole as Toulouse. If you come to an hotel, this, Des Ambassadeurs, is an excellent one. I annex letters to you from Sir C. Stewart, which were enclosed to me for my perusal, and which I have only received since I left you. They were sent to me to Bordeaux. There can be nothing now interesting in them to you, except the account of the battle near Paris, which I do not recollect that you had heard any particulars of.

It is probable I may stay about a week in Paris, in which time, if I can be of any use to you, I beg you will command me.

Believe me, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

W. C. BERESFORD.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir C. Stewart to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Heights of Belleville, near Paris, 30th March, 1814.

After a brilliant victory, God has placed the capital of the French empire in the hands of the Allied Sovereigns: a just retribution for the miseries inflicted on Moscow, Vienna, Madrid, Berlin, and Lisbon, by the desolator of Europe. It would be injustice not to declare that if the Continent has had the curse of all the evil arising out of the existence of Buonaparte, it is also crowned with the blessing of possessing a legitimate Emperor, who, by a series of firm and glorious conduct, richly deserves the appellation of the Liberator of Mankind.

I must very imperfectly detail the events of this glorious day at such a moment as the present, and therefore throw myself on your Lordship's indulgence.

The enemy's army, under the command of Joseph Buonaparte, aided by Marshals Mortier and Marmont, occupied with their right the heights of Fontenay, Romainville, and Belleville; their left was on Montmartre; they had several redoubts in the centre, and on the whole line an immense artillery of above 150 pieces. In order to attack this position, the Silesian army was

directed on Montmartre, St. Denis, and the villages of La Villette and Pantin, while the grand army attacked the enemy's right on the heights before alluded to at Romainville and Belleville. Marshal Blücher made his own dispositions for his attack. The 6th corps, under General Riefski, moved from Bondy in three columns of attack, supported by the Guards and reserves, and, leaving the great route of Meaux, attacked the heights of Romainville and Belleville. These are very commanding, as well as Montmartre; the ground between covered with villages and country seats, and the possession of the high grounds commands Paris and all around them. Prince Eugène of Wirtemberg's division of the 6th corps commenced the attack, and with the greatest spirit endured for a long period a very galling fire of artillery, being supported by the reserves of grenadiers. He, after some loss, carried the heights of Romainville, the enemy retiring to those of Belleville, behind them. The 4th corps supported this attack more to the left, and was directed on the heights of Rosny and on Charenton. The 3rd corps of the army was placed in *échelon* near Neuilly, in reserve, as well as the cavalry. The attack of the grand army had commenced some short period before that of the Silesian, having been delayed by some accident; but it was not long before Generals Yorck and Kleist debouched near St. Denis, on Auberville, and here and at Pantin a very obstinate resistance was made. His Royal Highness Prince William of Prussia with his brigade, together with the Prussian Guards, were much distinguished. The enemy's cavalry attempted to charge, but were brilliantly repulsed by the Brandenburg and Black Hussar regiments. A strong redoubt and battery of the enemy's in their centre kept General Yorck's corps in check for some part of the day, but their right flank being gained by the heights of Romainville, as well as their loss in every part of the field, and, finally, the complete discomfiture at every point, reduced them to the necessity of sending a flag of truce to demand a cessation of hostilities, they giving up all the ground without the barrier of Paris until further arrangements could be made. The heights of Montmartre were to be placed, by the generosity of a beaten enemy, in our possession (Romainville and Belleville being carried) at the moment when Count Langeron's corps were about to storm, and had already taken possession of the crest of the hill. Count Woronzow's division also carried the village of La Villette, charging with two battalions of chasseurs, and possessed themselves of 12 pieces of cannon, when they were also stopped near the barrier of Paris by the flag of truce. His Imperial Majesty, however, and Prince Schwarzenberg, with that humanity which must excite the applause while it calls for the admiration of Europe, acceded to a proposition to make arrangements in order to save the capital from being sacked and destroyed. Count Paar, aide-de-camp to Prince Schwarzenberg, and Colonel Orloff, aide-de-camp to His Majesty the Emperor, were sent to arrange the cessation of hostilities; and Count Nesselrode, His Imperial Majesty's minister, went in at 4 o'clock this evening, when the battle ceased, to Paris. The results of this victory cannot yet be known: numerous pieces of artillery taken on the field; a large number of prisoners have fallen into our hands. Our loss has been something considerable; but we have the consoling hope that the brave men who fell will accomplish the work of the downfall of despotism, and rear the standard of renovated Europe under a just equilibrium and the dominion of its legitimate Sovereigns.

I take the liberty of sending my aide-de-camp, Captain Harris, with this, being with me during the day: he will make his way, I hope, with the Cossacks whom Count Woronzow has given him, and will acquaint your Lordship

verbally of details I can but imperfectly enter into. When I receive Colonel Lowe's report, as well as Colonel Cooke's, I shall not fail to despatch again to put you in possession of all further information in my power of this interesting and wonderful day.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES STEWART.

P.S. Since writing the above, Prince Schwarzenberg has received a letter from Mortier, stating that Caulaincourt had gone to the Emperor of Austria, and that Prince Metternich was with Napoleon settling the terms of peace, and that he would enter into any arrangements ad interim. A very proper reply has been transmitted, declaring nothing but a surrender would be listened to. The Empress left Paris yesterday evening, and went to Rambouillet.

C. S.

II.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir C. Stewart to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Paris, 1st April, 1814.

I have the honour to annex herewith the capitulation of the city of Paris. I feel it is impossible to convey to your Lordship an accurate idea or a just description of the scene that presented itself yesterday when the Emperor of Russia, the King of Prussia, and Prince Schwarzenberg made their entry at the head of the Allied troops. The enthusiasm and exultation that were exhibited must have very far exceeded what the most sanguine and devoted friend of the ancient dynasty of France could have pictured to his own mind; and those who are less personally interested, but equally ardent in that cause, could no longer hesitate in pronouncing that the restoration of their legitimate King, the downfall of Buonaparte, and the desire of peace have become the first and dearest wish of the Parisians, who have by the events of these last two days been emancipated from a system of terror and despotism impossible to describe, while they have been kept in an ignorance, by the arts of falsehood and deceit, incredible for an enlightened people, and incomprehensible to the reflecting part of mankind.

The cavalry under the Grand Duke Constantine, and the Guards of all the different Allied forces, were formed in columns early in the morning on the road from Bondy to Paris. The Emperor of Russia with all his staff, his Generals and their suites present, proceeded to Pantin, where the King of Prussia joined him with a similar cortège. These Sovereigns, surrounded by all the Princes in the army, together with the Prince Field Marshal and the Austrian Etat-Major, passed through the Faubourg St. Martin and entered the barrier of Paris about 11 o'clock, the Cossacks of the Guard forming the advance of the march. Already was the crowd so enormous, as well as the acclamations so great, that it was difficult to move forwards; but before the Monarchs reached the Porte de St. Martin to turn on the Boulevards, there was a moral impossibility of proceeding. All Paris seemed to be assembled and centred on one spot. One animus, one spring, evidently directed all their movements. They thronged in such masses round the Emperor and the King, that with all their condescending and gracious familiarity, extending their hands on all sides, it was in vain to attempt to satisfy the populace; they were positively eaten up amidst the cries of "Vive l'Empereur Alexandre!" "Vive le Roi de Prusse!" "Vive nos Libérateurs!" Nor did the air alone resound with these peals, for with louder acclamations, if possible, they were mingled with those of "Vive le Roi!" "Vive Louis XVIII.!" "Vive

les Bourbons!" "Bas le Tyran!" The white cockade appeared very generally: many of the National Guards whom I saw wore them. The clamorous applause of the multitude was seconded by a similar demonstration from all the houses along the line to the Champs Elysées; and the waving of handkerchiefs, as well as the fair hands which waved them, seemed in continued requisition. In short, my Lord, to have an idea of such a manifestation of electric feeling as Paris displayed, it must have been witnessed; my humble description cannot make you conceive it. The Sovereigns halted on the Champs Elysées, where the troops defiled before them in the most admirable order, and the headquarters were established at Paris. I mentioned to your Lordship at the conclusion of my last letter the fact of Mortier's letter relative to M. Caulaincourt having gone again to the Emperor of Austria: you may therefore imagine the astonishment that was excited by his appearing at the Imperial headquarters at Bondy the following morning. When men in high situations resort to falsehood and chicane, what must be the state to which they and their cause are fallen! I have the honour to enclose the declaration of the Emperor Alexander, together with another declaration, which, though not official, is delivered all over Paris. Buonaparte, it now appears, moved his army from Troyes by Sens, towards Fontainebleau, where I suppose the débris of Mortier's and Marmont's corps will join him. He arrived in his own person at Fromont the day before yesterday, and would have been in Paris had it not been in the possession of the Allies. On hearing what had occurred, he returned to Corbeil, and from thence has probably collected his army in the neighbourhood of Fontainebleau, which cannot amount to more than 40,000 or 50,000 men. That he may make a desperate attempt I think probable, if his army stands by him, which will be questionable, if the Senate and nation pronounce themselves. The Allied armies march to-morrow, with the exception of the Guards and reserves, who remain here, towards Fontainebleau, and will take up a position or be regulated by the movements of Buonaparte.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES STEWART.

III.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir C. Stewart to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Paris, 1st April, 1814.

I have the honour to inform your Lordship that since I closed my despatches this day, I learn the Senate had a meeting, and have declared that as Buonaparte has deserted them, they feel themselves authorized in choosing another chief to the government of France, and that they are unanimous in declaring for their legitimate Sovereign Louis XVIII. I have no time for further particulars, as I fear Lord Cathcart will have despatched the messenger.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES STEWART.

IV.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir C. Stewart to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Head-quarters, Paris, 2nd April, 1814.

I have long and in vain tried, my dear Lord, to open a communication with you. Not having the power with the Emperor of Russia to persuade him to send some Cossacks, I have been at a loss how to proceed. Since the events

of these two last days, I trust there can be no doubt of the Spanish officer who has been liberated from prison reaching you : if he does, he will only give you my details of what you will probably already know. But at all events I hope hearing from me will not be disagreeable to you ; and if you send the man back, I shall have great pleasure in knowing how you are, and how all my friends are with you.

I think I may fairly and completely congratulate you on the exit of Napoleon. Your predictions have all turned out true, and Europe and posterity will never cease to bless your name. I am unwilling to add more on this chance.

We are in movement on Fontainebleau against the débris of the French army ; but I conceive, from what has occurred in the Senate yesterday, we shall have little more fighting.

Believe me, my dear Lord,

Ever most affectionately yours,

CHARLES STEWART.

Castlereagh is with the Emperor of Austria. When our communications were broken in upon, he went to Dijon with all the ministers, &c., and the Emperor, except Nesselrode, who is here.

Let me recommend the bearer to you, and, if you have an opportunity, send on my letters to Lord Bathurst, and let him know you have heard from me.

PROCLAMATION No. 52.

[759.]

Par son Excellence le Feld Maréchal Marquis de Wellington.

Au Quartier-Général, ce 26 Avril, 1814.

La municipalité de St. Jean de Luz est autorisé de prendre la somme de mille cent et douze francs cinquante deux centimes sur l'argent provenant des Douanes, pour payer les salaires des officiers employés à la surveillance des Douanes pendant le mois de Mars sur un état à moi donné.

Signé par Mons. Dominique Laxalde et Mons. Raimond St. Jean, et daté le 30 Mars.

WELLINGTON.

PROCLAMATION No. 54.

[760.]

Par le Feld Maréchal Marquis de Wellington, Commandant en Chef les Armées Alliées.

Au Quartier-Général, ce 26 Avril, 1814.

La municipalité de St. Jean de Luz est chargé d'avancer la somme de mille deux cents soixante et un francs soixante quatorze centimes sur l'argent provenant des Douanes, pour payer

les salaires et autres frais de l'administration de la ville de Siboure pour le mois de Mars, sur un état à moi donné.

Signé par Mons. Dechets et Mons. Dautche.

WELLINGTON.

Monsieur Charles to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MONSEIGNEUR,

Montauban, le 26 Avril, 1814.

Je me fais un devoir de rendre compte de tout ce qui peut être utile à la famille illustre qui vient enfin de remonter sur un trône qu'elle n'auroit jamais dû perdre si l'amour pour ses sujets eut été le préservatif contre l'intrigue. J'ai déjà rendu compte au gouvernement provisoire de tout ce qui s'est passé dans notre ville depuis le 12 à midi jusqu'au 15 à onze heures du soir : je vous en donne copie. J'ai signalé les hommes qui ont enfin arboré la cocarde blanche, quoique la rouge soit dans le cœur. Leur conduite est la même : tout ce que l'inertie peut jeter de défaveur sur les événemens actuels est employé pour faire des mécontents et exciter des troubles. Vous allez juger de ce que l'on doit craindre des trois hommes qui sont à la tête de l'administration. Le général, le préfet, et le maire sont les chefs d'une menée que l'on peut regarder comme une conspiration. Tout est en mouvement pour faire des adresses et envoyer des députés, soit à Paris, soit auprès de Monseigneur le Duc d'Angoulême. La majorité de ces représentans dans certaines députations est la représentation de tout ce qui tenoit le plus au système tyrannique : ils n'ont pas osé se présenter en masse ; il a fallu s'adjoindre une minorité d'hommes recommandables par leur moralité. Il sera facile de dévoiler cette faction qui veut être en permanence quelque chose qu'il arrive pour ou contre.

La journée du 24 fait connoître combien il est instant d'organiser l'autorité d'une manière à assurer le service. L'armée du Général Soult a pris ses cantonnemens dans le département de Tarn-et-Garonne, etc. L'arrivée des troupes a sûrement été annoncée. Ce n'est cependant qu'à 6 heures du soir que la farine a été distribuée pour faire le pain dont la distribution pour le 25 n'a pas eu lieu. Le même jour, à 10 heures du matin, le maire, de concert avec le général, fait publier que les soldats n'ayant pas de paye, les habitans sont invités à leur donner la viande sans s'inquiéter, si on en trouveroit chez les bouchers. Cette imprévoyance a fait que les habitans n'ont pas trouvé d'approvisionnement le 24 et le 25. Il est essentiel de vous assurer que les magasins sont remplis de farine, et que des fonds qui ont été levés arbitrairement sur différentes parties sont entre les mains de certaines personnes qui auroient bien trouvé de la viande sous le régime Napoléon, et qui n'auroient pas dû employer une partie de ces fonds dans des gratifications prématurées.

La distribution de ces troupes a été faite chez les habitans comme de coutume. Les hommes honnêtes y ont participé comme ennemis, et les partisans de l'ancien gouvernement comme privilégiés. La garde urbaine a été insultée en entendant crier par la troupe, "A bas le drapeau blanc !" L'autorité a gardé le silence sur ce cri ; elle n'a fait nulle recherche même pour la forme. Les propos que les soldats tiennent dans les maisons où ils sont

reçus prouvent assez le mauvais esprit des officiers. On a fait courir le bruit que deux des frères de Napoléon, Joseph et Jérôme, avoient chacun un corps de partisans dans les environs d'Orléans. Cette nouvelle a été accueillie avec plaisir, et le résultat a été que le soldat a crié dans les rues "Vive l'Empereur ! Au diable le Roi !" D'après tout ce qui se passe, je vous prie de faire examiner à Monseigneur le Duc d'Angoulême, dont on annonce l'arrivée à Montauban, s'il est prudent de passer dans ce moment sur toute une ligne jusqu'à Bordeaux, où il y a des moyens d'entreprendre un attentat dont le bon esprit de la majorité des habitans ne pourroit le garantir.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec le plus profond respect,

Monseigneur,

CHARLES,
Inspecteur des Contributions.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Bulletin de ce qui s'est passé dans la Ville de Montauban depuis le 12 à midi jusqu'au 15, 11 heures du soir.

Montauban, le 16 Avril, 1814.

Depuis trois mois la ville de Montauban est sous un joug qui a aigri tous les citoyens au point de désirer l'invasion de l'ennemi comme leur salut.

Foiblesse d'un maire qui préfère sa tranquillité à l'usage de ses devoirs, et qui ne fait que ce qui est profitable à son ambition, sans égard à la justice distributive.

Vexation d'un préfet, dont la conduite dans l'assiette, la levée, et l'emploi des impôts extraordinaires exige un examen dû à des administrés qui ont vu périr des acquisitions en nature pour nourrir 100,000 pendant un an.

De plus un renforcement de despotisme par un général dont le refrain dans tous les dires étoit fusillade, et que les administrés pouvoient attendre de ses fureurs. Il n'a manqué que l'exécution ; elle n'étoit pas éloignée ; une liste de proscription avoit été concertée entre lui et le préfet. Tout doit préparer à croire que de pareils hommes sont peu propres à servir des Princes dont la bonté se manifeste d'une manière si éclatante. Des faits vont confirmer leur dévouement à l'ancien gouvernement, qui convenoit si bien à leur caractère. Les vœux de tous les citoyens les rejettent ; leur conservation dans l'administration du département attire le bonheur des administrés.

Le 12, à une heure du soir, un courrier est arrivé. Il a dit publiquement qu'il étoit le précurseur des plus heureuses nouvelles. La France va jouir de la paix ; le Sénat a prononcé la déchéance de Napoléon Buonaparte ; le courrier Anglais qui me suit vous confirmera la nouvelle ; il précède la voiture de Monsieur St. Simon et d'un général Anglais, qui se rendent au plus vite à Toulouse pour faire cesser l'effusion de sang. Tout s'est confirmé. Le courrier Anglais est arrivé, et s'est rendu de suite chez le général. Une demie heure après Monsieur de St. Simon et le général Anglais sont aussi arrivés. Le Général Loverdo, commandant le département, les a invité de se rendre chez lui, où ils ont été retenus un tems plus que moral dans la circonstance, de manière que le peuple, impatient de jouir de la vue des porteurs d'un si heureuse nouvelle, a craint qu'un homme dont les mauvaises intentions sont si connues les retient prisonniers. Ce n'est qu'à deux heures passées, sans considération pour leur mission, et pour les événemens qui pouvoient avoir lieu par un retard, qu'ils ont pu prendre la route pour aller à leur destination. A trois heures le courrier de Paris est arrivé. Les papiers publics ont fait connoître

tout ce qui s'étoit passé dans la capitale, et les actes du gouvernement provisoire.

On croiroit que les autorités se sont empressées de publier et de confirmer le bonheur des Français. Elles sont restées muettes et dans l'inaction. Entraves, suspicions sur la vérité des faits, faux bruits répandus pour les altérer, redoublement de fureurs, ont été les résultats sur cet événement. Le courrier a été arrêté, et forcé de prendre une route étrangère à la porte. Il a protesté contre cet acte de violence à Caussade, où il a pris les moyens les plus prompts pour faire connoître les actes du gouvernement provisoire. Continuation de l'état de siège, continuation des barricades dans les rues, menaces des soldats et des officiers à l'égard des habitans, qui s'abandonnoient à la joie d'être délivrés du joug militaire, tolérance du général dans ce désordre. On devoit s'attendre qu'un moment d'erreur seroit réparé, et que la réflexion basée sur l'intérêt l'emporteroit. Rien n'a prévalu ; il y a eu accroissement ; bruit répandu que l'Empereur arrivoit dans le midi avec 30,000 hommes, persévérance dans les menaces, sont la réponse au journal officiel. La moitié de la journée du 12 et celle du 13 se passent comme si l'autorité n'eut aucune obligation à remplir à l'égard du public. La garde urbaine s'assemble, elle est cernée par la troupe ; ce n'est qu'au bonheur qui préside à tout ce qui arrive qu'il n'y a pas eu effusion de sang. Ce n'est que le 14, à 11 heures du matin, que la proclamation du préfet paroît ; elle est suivie de celle du maire, et malgré cette authenticité tardive, le peuple est encore comprimé. Il est incertain s'il peut faire disparaître toutes ces barricades dans les rues, qui sont autant de signes du joug où on voudroit le retenir. Il a fallu l'attachement des habitans de cette ville à la dynastie des Bourbons, dont ils n'ont point oublié le gouvernement paternel pour ne point souiller de si beaux jours par une résistance à cette oppression si contraire à l'élan de leurs âmes. La conduite de ces trois hommes n'est point équivoque : l'esprit est le même ; ils vont de concert.

Le maire est un homme nul qui sait le mal comme le bien. Il a quelques partisans qu'il n'a jamais obligé qu'au préjudice du public.

Le préfet a retardé jusqu'au 14, à 11 heures du matin, pour faire afficher sa proclamation. Son incertitude n'a été vaincu que par la communication qui lui a été faite le 13 à 9 heures du soir, de celle du maire de Toulouse. Il n'a pris le signe de la paix que le 13 dans la nuit, et le 14 il a paru en public sans ce signe.

Le général a été constamment en opposition à tout ce qui peut servir les vues du gouvernement provisoire. Colloque prolongé pour retarder l'arrivée des commissaires à Toulouse ; empêchement au courrier de prendre la route ordinaire pour ôter la connoissance des événemens ; violence qui lui a été faite sur la place publique pour le mettre à l'unisson et crier "Vive Louis XVIII. !" refus d'arborer le signe de la paix qui lui étoit présenté en demandant un jour pour répondre à l'invitation qui lui étoit faite ; demande d'argent et de vivres pour des conscrits, qui n'attendent que la permission pour se rendre chez eux ; accord avec le préfet pour les retenir ; enfin tout ce qui jette de l'incertitude sur les événemens présens : tel est l'état des choses dans notre ville. Sa situation mérite l'attention du gouvernement. L'esprit des habitans est au dernier degré de l'enthousiasme. C'est un devoir bien doux, et un grand soulagement pour tout homme dévoué à cette cause, de mettre sous les yeux d'un gouvernement l'attachement d'un peuple qui connoît l'étendue de son bonheur, et de désigner des hommes qui ne sont pas dignes d'y contribuer.

Le 15, à 10 heures du matin, la levée de l'état de siège est proclamée, aux cris de "Vive Louis XVIII. !" Les lauriers sont sur toutes les fenêtres.

A midi les autorités se sont rendues chez M. le préfet pour aller reconnoître publiquement le gouvernement provisoire. C'est dans cette assemblée où s'est

passée une scène scandaleuse. Monsieur le préfet s'est approché de Monsieur le substitut du Procureur-Général, et l'a traité de factieux pour avoir écrit au général que des soldats qui n'ont, comme leurs chefs civils et militaires, aucune mesure dans leurs actions, s'étoient porté à des excès contre une femme et contre un prêtre respectable. Cette apostrophe a été relevée avec fermeté et vérité par ce magistrat, qui a répondu qu'il n'y avoit de factieux que l'autorité qui comprimoit les élans du peuple envers le Souverain qui vient de remonter sur le trône de ses aïeux, et qu'il feroit connoître cette conduite révoltante, qui peut être regardée comme une rébellion ouverte. Dans ce moment le Général Bessièrès s'est approché du préfet, et lui a dit qu'il étoit étonnant que le premier magistrat troublât la tranquillité quand il devoit donner l'exemple du calme.

A 2 heures le gouvernement provisoire a été reconnu aux cris de "Vive Louis XVIII. !" et l'ivresse du plaisir est à son comble.

A 6 heures les tambours et les instrumens se sont rendus sur la place. Les maisons sont illuminées, excepte celle du général, mon voisin. Le peuple danse et se livre à une joie qu'il est plus aisé de sentir que de peindre. Il est 11 heures, et tout est encore en mouvement.

CHARLES.

Ce bulletin a été adressé à Monsieur de Montesquiou, membre du gouvernement provisoire.

Lieut. A. F. Southwell to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD,

St. Andreo, near Barcelona, 26th April, 1814.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I arrived here yesterday, where I found General Copons had established his head quarters. He sent me this morning into Barcelona to communicate with the French General, Baron de Flabert, who consented to a suspension of hostilities between the two armies. I received from Marshal Suchet a separate article from the treaty (allowing the vessels belonging to the French in the port of Barcelona to return to France unmolested by our cruisers, dated Toulouse, the 20th ultimo, and signed by your Lordship), which, with the treaty, I had the honour of delivering to General Copons. The vessels are in consequence to quit the port of Barcelona the day of the evacuation of the place by the French garrison.

I have not as yet received further instructions from General Copons, but I understand from him I am to proceed this evening with Marshal Suchet's aides-de-camp to Tortosa, where I hope to arrive the day after to-morrow. I have forwarded your Lordship's despatch to General Clinton, who I understand is at Tarragona.

I have the honour to remain

Your Lordship's obedient humble servant,

A. F. SOUTHWELL,

Lieut. 14th Light Dragoons.

The Duke of Clarence to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

DEAR MARQUESS,

Deal, 27th April, 1814.

By the tender and affectionate attention of the Prince Regent I last night received the 'Gazette' and a letter from my son, full of gratitude to your Lordship for your kindness and concern to my gallant Hussar, who has had the high honour of fighting the battles of his Sovereign under the Marquess of Wellington. A father cannot wish either to lose or to have his child wounded; but I know our country must be supported, and I rejoice from the bottom of my heart dear and gallant George is so well. I want words to express how very sincerely I feel your Lordship's care and kindness towards my wounded son. I only hope he will keep quiet, and then I make no doubt he will soon recover.

I congratulate your Lordship on this last victory obtained by His Majesty's troops, and rejoice there is at length a prospect of an end being put to the flowing of human blood. How different, thank God, must be your sensation from the feelings of the fallen Corsican despot! It is truth—to your Lordship does Europe owe her deliverance. You taught the Emperor Alexander and his Russian subjects, by the Portuguese stand, to defend their country; the King of Prussia and his subjects followed my friend Alexander's example and advice; and all Europe has risen to free itself. Proud and nobly proud must your Lordship feel; and I knew Arthur Wellesley a Captain in the 58th regiment at Cork. I cannot conclude without once more thanking your Lordship for your kindness to my son,

And ever remain, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

WILLIAM, P.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Downing Street, 27th April, 1814.

The wounds which Sir John Hope has unfortunately received will place it out of his power to accept the command of the expedition to America. I wish, therefore, your Lordship will inform me without loss of time, by the way of Paris, whether Sir Rowland Hill is inclined to accept. In that case, beg him to set off for England by Paris without delay: if he should decline, my intention is to offer the command to Sir Edward Paget, who is just arrived in England.

I am, my dear Lord, yours sincerely,

BATHURST.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 27th April, 1814.

I received with great satisfaction your letter by Charles, and shall write this night to impart my sentiments to the Prince Regent upon the importance of your taking charge of his affairs at this Court, where personal weight, decision, and judgment are essentially requisite to mature the

auspicious results of this most glorious war. I cannot doubt the eagerness with which His Royal Highness will embrace any occasion of preserving to himself your active services.

With respect to the period when you should present your credentials, I should wish to conform to your convenience and what your own judgment may dictate with respect to your present charge. If you find yourself enabled to pay even a cursory visit to Paris, we can talk the matter over together; if not, I shall be glad to receive such suggestions as occur. We hope to sign our peace with France, and that I shall be enabled to set out from hence about the 15th of next month. The convention transmitted by the last messenger clears away much of the ground-work.

Pole arrived yesterday. I have stated to him what has passed between us, and he seems disposed to postpone his excursion to you in the hope of seeing you here.

Believe me, my dear Lord, ever sincerely yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

Major-Gen. the Hon. C. Colville to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Boucaut, 27th April, 1814.

I have the satisfaction to enclose the arrangements for a suspension of hostilities agreed upon this day between the Governor of Bayonne and myself, and which I hope will be found conformable to your Lordship's intentions, and be honoured by your approval.

I further transmit the Governor's letters to me of yesterday and to-day, and his ordre du jour enclosed in the latter.

Your Lordship will see by the former that he had acceded to my proposal of treating before the arrival of the officers from the Duc de Dalmatie, who, however, came opportunely to give the desirable appearance of consistency and military etiquette to his conduct.

I desired Lieutenant-Colonel Burgoyne would mention how acceptable a peace offering the restoration of Sir John Hope and our other prisoners would be to us; but the subject was rather evaded, with the assurance only that what officers wished it would be allowed to go in and visit them.

However informal my doing so, your Lordship will, I trust, excuse my taking this opportunity of offering my most sincere congratulations on the proud and happy state of things to which the British nation and government, and, why should I omit them? the Allied army under your Lordship's command, have so essentially contributed.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

C. COLVILLE.

[Let a copy be made of the convention as soon as possible, that I may confirm and return it.]

WELLINGTON.]

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Suspension d'armes entre la Garnison de Bayonne et les Troupes Alliées qui font le blocus de cette place.

Monsieur le Général Honorable Charles Colville, commandant les troupes alliées devant Bayonne, et Monsieur le Général de Division Baron Thouvenot, commandant supérieur de Bayonne, désirant conclure une suspension d'armes entre les troupes alliées sous les ordres de Monsieur le Général Colville, et la garnison de Bayonne sous les ordres de Monsieur le Général de Division Baron Thouvenot, et se conformer à cet égard à la suspension d'armes qui a été conclue le 18 de ce mois entre MM. les Maréchaux Ducs de Dalmatie et d'Albfera et le Feld-Maréchal Marquis de Wellington, ont nommé les officiers ci-après désignés pour cet objet :

De la part de Monsieur le Général Honorable Charles Colville, Monsieur Burgoyne, Lieutenant-Colonel du Corps Royal du Génie au service de S.M.B. ; et de la part de Monsieur le Général Baron Thouvenot, Monsieur Gougeon, colonel du 94^e régiment d'infanterie de ligne.

Ces officiers, après avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs, sont convenus des articles suivans :—

ART. I.

A compter de la date de la présente convention, il y aura suspension d'armes entre les armées alliées sous les ordres de M. le Général Colville, et la garnison de Bayonne sous les ordres de M. le Général de Division Baron Thouvenot.

ART. II.

Les hostilités ne pourront être recommencées de part et d'autre que cinq jours après la notification de la rupture de la présente convention ; mais vingt-quatre heures après cette notification les deux parties contractantes pourront rétablir leurs avant-postes comme ils le font au moment de la signature de la présente suspension d'armes.

ART. III.

Les avant-postes des deux parties contractantes resteront dans leurs positions actuelles, mais en les portant de part et d'autre en arrière autant que les localités le permettront pour augmenter l'espace neutre entr'eux. Cet objet sera arrêté sur les lieux par des commissaires qui délégueront MM. les Généraux Colville et Thouvenot, et qui feront planter les jalons sur les points principaux.

ART. IV.

MM. les Généraux Colville et Thouvenot prendront des mesures pour que les troupes respectivement sous leurs ordres ne fassent aucune incursion dans le terrain reconnu neutre pendant la durée de la suspension d'armes.

ART. V.

A dater du jour de la ratification de la présente convention, la garnison de Bayonne aura la faculté de se procurer, de l'extérieur, dans un rayon de huit lieux, dont les villes de Dax et Peyrehorade font partie, la quantité de vivres et denrées portés en l'état annexé à la présente convention. Ces vivres et denrées devront être fournis par des réquisitions frappées sur les communes, d'après les bons qu'elles recevront à cet effet des commissaires des guerres de la place de Bayonne, qui seront chargés de cette opération. Les villes de St. Jean de Luz et de Cambo ne seront pas soumises à ces réquisitions.

Si cependant on trouve des entrepreneurs qui veulent faire la fourniture des subsistances journalières, ce moyen sera préféré, et il leur sera fourni, par les troupes alliées, les passeports et autorisations nécessaires pour faire leurs achats dans le pays.

ART. VI.

MM. les maires de Bayonne et de St. Esprit auront la faculté, pendant la durée de la suspension d'armes, de faire entrer dans ces villes les vivres et autres denrées journellement nécessaires pour la subsistance de leurs habitants. La ville de Bayonne sera calculée sur une population de douze mille âmes, et celle de St. Esprit sur une population de cinq mille.

La circulation des habitants de la campagne sera libre pour entrer à Bayonne et à St. Esprit, et pour en sortir, les jours de marché ordinaire, avec des légumes frais et autres denrées qui se portent journellement dans les marchés. Ces mêmes habitants pourront retourner chez eux avec les objets qu'ils auront achetés à Bayonne et à St. Esprit.

ART. VII.

Les transports des denrées qui seront destinées pour Bayonne et St. Esprit pourront y arriver par terre et par eau, et il sera délivré des passeports en conséquence.

ART. VIII.

Les courriers et estafettes destinés pour Bayonne pourront y entrer et en sortir librement lorsqu'ils seront munis de passeports valables.

ART. IX.

Les habitants étrangers à la population ordinaire de Bayonne et de St. Esprit auront la faculté de retourner immédiatement dans leurs foyers, conduisant avec eux leurs bestiaux et emportant leurs effets ; et les habitants de Bayonne et de St. Esprit qui auraient quitté ces villes à raison des circonstances auront la faculté d'y rentrer avec leurs denrées et marchandises.

ART. X.

Dans le cas où il y aurait des déserteurs de part et d'autre pendant la durée de la présente suspension, ils seront arrêtés et respectivement rendus s'ils sont réclamés.

ART. XI.

Les propriétaires qui se trouveront dans les terrains désignés pour être neutres pourront librement s'occuper de la culture de leurs propriétés, et seront, au besoin, protégés par les troupes alliées et par la garnison de Bayonne.

ART. XII.

M. le Général commandant la garnison de Bayonne consent à ce que les troupes alliées puissent faire transporter par eau à travers la place de Bayonne les vivres et autres effets qui leur sont nécessaires, à condition que les barques qui serviront à ces transports ne seront pas armées, et que les troupes alliées s'abstiendront de réquisitions de vivres dans le rayon de huit lieues assigné par l'article 5 à la subsistance de la garnison de Bayonne.

ART. XIII.

La présente suspension d'armes sera ratifiée par les deux parties contractantes dans le délai de six heures, à compter d'aujourd'hui à midi, et recevra son exécution immédiatement après sa ratification.

46 CONVENTION WITH THE GOVERNOR OF BAYONNE.

Fait double à la maison de Latreille, près Bayonne, le vingt-sept Avril, dix-huit cent quatorze.

Approuvé, un mot entreligné et deux rayés,

J. F. BURGOYNE,
Lieut.-Col. R.E.

J. GOUGEON,
Colonel du 94^{me} rég^t.

Approuvé,
Le Général de Division commandant supérieur,
BARON THOUVENOT.

Approved, liable to the confirmation of his Excellency
Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington,
C. COLVILLE.

Confirmed, with the exception of the 12th article.

WELLINGTON.

II.

Baron Thouvenot to Major-Gen. the Hon. C. Colville.

MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

Bayonne, le 26 Avril, 1814.

L'officier que M. le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie doit m'envoyer pour me donner une connaissance officielle de l'armistice qu'il a conclu avec le Feld-Maréchal Marquis de Wellington tardant à arriver, et les événemens se poussant avec rapidité, j'ai l'honneur de proposer à Votre Excellence de conclure une suspension d'armes entre l'armée des puissances alliées que vous commandez et la garnison de Bayonne. Si cette proposition est acceptée, je prie Votre Excellence de nommer un officier pour en traiter. J'ai l'honneur de vous désigner d'avance M. Gougeon, colonel du 94^{me} régiment de ligne, qui sera muni de pouvoirs et instructions suffisans pour cet objet. La maison de Latreille, située entre l'abbaye St. Bernard et l'arsenal de la marine, pourrait je crois convenir pour les conférences.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, Monsieur le Général,

De Votre Excellence

Le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

BARON THOUVENOT.

III.

Baron Thouvenot to Major-Gen. the Hon. C. Colville.

MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

Bayonne, le 27 Avril, 1814.

J'ai l'honneur d'adresser, ci-joint, à Votre Excellence plusieurs exemplaires de mon ordre du jour d'aujourd'hui. Trop longtemps le bruit des canons des nations a retenti en Europe pour la destruction des peuples. Je serais fort aise que demain, à midi, le bruit du canon des alliées et celui du canon de la place se fissent entendre en même temps pour saluer un pavillon qui a toujours été vénéré par les Français, et pour annoncer des événemens qui doivent donner la paix au monde.

Comme je ne doute pas que Votre Excellence ne partage mes sentimens, je

n'hésite pas de la prier de joindre ses salves d'artillerie aux nôtres pour saluer le pavillon blanc qui sera demain arboré à Bayonne.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, Monsieur le Général,

De Votre Excellence

Le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

BARON THOUVENOT.

Ordre du Jour.

Je m'empresse de faire connaître à la garnison l'ordre du jour que j'ai reçu ce matin de S.E. le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie, par un officier de son état-major, et dont copie est ci-après :—

“ ORDRE DU JOUR.

“ L'armée ayant manifesté son vœu sur la déchéance de l'Empereur Napoléon, et le rétablissement de Louis XVIII. au trône de nos anciens Rois, l'armée essentiellement obéissante et nationale doit se conformer à la volonté de la nation.

“ Ainsi, au nom de l'armée, je déclare que j'adhère aux actes du sénat-conservateur et du gouvernement provisoire relatifs au rétablissement de Louis XVIII. au trône de Saint-Louis et de Henri IV., et que *nous jurons fidélité à Sa Majesté.*

“ Au quartier-général de Castelnaudary, le 19 Avril, 1814.

“ Maréchal DUC DE DALMATIE,

“ Pour copie conforme :

“ Le Lieutenant-Général chef d'état-major général,
Comte GAZAN.”

En conséquence de cet ordre du jour et des actes du gouvernement provisoire que je ferai successivement connaître, MM. les généraux commandans les troupes et les commandans des gardes nationales feront prendre les armes, demain à midi, à tous les corps qu'ils ont sous leurs ordres, et leur donneront connaissance du présent ordre.

Demain 28 à midi le pavillon blanc sera arboré à la citadelle, dans la place de Bayonne, et sur les bâtimens de la Marine Royale. Ce pavillon sera salué par une salve générale de toute l'artillerie de la place de Bayonne, de la citadelle, de tous les camps retranchés, et de tous les bâtimens armés de la marine qui seront pavoisés le reste de la journée.

Les troupes resteront sous les armes jusqu'à ce que ces salves soient terminées.

La cocarde blanche sera arborée par les troupes de la garnison et par les gardes nationales.

Toute la garnison recevra demain double ration de vin et de viande salée.

Il sera payé immédiatement, au nom du Roi, un mois de solde à toute la garnison.

Une suspension d'armes a été conclue aujourd'hui entre la garnison de Bayonne et les troupes alliées qui forment le blocus de cette place. Les articles de cette suspension d'armes seront mis demain à l'ordre du jour.

VIVE LE ROI !

Le présent ordre du jour sera envoyé à LL.EE. le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie et le Ministre de la Guerre.

Bayonne, le 27 Avril, 1814.

Le Général de division commandant supérieur,
BARON THOUVENOT.

Pour copie conforme :

L'adjudant commandant, chef d'état-major
du gouvernement de Bayonne,
RÉGNIER,

IV.

ETAT DES CONSOMMATIONS par mois de la Garnison de Bayonne, à raison de 19,200 Rations par jour, y compris les Hommes aux Hôpitaux, la Marine, la Garde Nationale, les Etats-majors, et l'Administration Militaire, savoir :

Désignation des Denrées.	Quantité de la Ration.	Nombre de Rations.		Denrées Représentatives.	
		Par Jour.	Par Mois.	Par Jour.	Par Mois.
Pain	7½ hectog. (24 onces)	19,200	576,000	Qx. Ms. Kilo.	Qx. Ms. Kilo.
Légumes secs	6 décag. (2 onces)	19,200	576,000	112 0	3,360 farine.†
Sel	1/10 de kilog. (30e de livres)	19,200	576,000	11 52	345 60
Viande fraîche, pour la garnison	2½ hectog. (8 onces)	17,400	522,000	3 20	96 0
pour les hôpitaux	5 " (16 onces)	1,800	54,000	43 50	1,305 1,575\$
Fourrages : foin pour les chevaux	7½ kilog. (15 livres)	2,200	66,000	9 0	270 0
pour les bœufs sur pied	10 " (20 livres)	800	24,000	165 0	4,950 7,350
paille pour les chevaux	5 " (10 livres)	3,000	90,000	80 0	2,400 0
pour le couchage	8½ litres (2/3 de boisseau)	3,000	90,000	150 0	4,500 6,750
avoine	..	..	..	75 0	2,250 0
Chauffage : bois, y compris les hôpitaux et chauffage des fours	..	..	..	255 0	7,650 hecto.
charbon pour les hôpitaux	..	..	..	150½ 0	4,520 stères.
Liquides : vin	1/4 de litre	19,200*	288,000	3½ 0	100 sacs.
eau de vie	1/10 " "	19,200	576,000	2400 0	72,000 litres.
vinaigre	1/20 " "	19,200†	192,000	1200 0	36,000 "
Eclairage : chandelle	26½ déc. pour 16 hommes par jour.	19,200	576,000	320 0	9,600
huile à brûler	..	..	..	3 16	94 80
Denrées particulières aux hôpitaux :—	..	..	..	0 15	4 50
Huile d'olive	..	..	..	0 24	0 72
Pruneaux	..	..	..	0 24	7 20
Cassonade	..	..	..	0 6	1 80
Miel	..	..	..	0 12	3 60
Savon blanc	..	..	..	0 2	0 60

* De 2 jours, l'un.

† De 3 jours, l'un.

‡ Dont 795 qx. de pur froment, et 2565 mèteil à 1/4 froment et 1/4 seigle.

§ Viande distribuée. Si l'on remplaçait en lard salé la viande fraîche destinée à la garnison il faudrait 978 qx. 75 kilog. de lard en remplacement de 1305 qx. ms. de viande.

Bayonne, 26 Avril, 1814.

BARON THOUVENOT.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Paris, 27th April, 1814.

I have the satisfaction to transmit to your Lordship copy of a despatch which I have received from Sir Robert Wilson, transmitting a convention signed between the Allies and the Viceroy, which promises the early submission of that part of Europe to the Allied arms.

It also appears that the French garrisons on the side of Germany have very generally submitted to the existing government.

Buonaparte is, I hope, by this time arrived at St. Tropez, the place assigned for his embarkation.

I am, with great truth and regard, My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Major-Gen. Sir Robert Wilson to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Vienna, 17th April, 1814.

I have the satisfaction to acquaint your Lordship that a convention has this day been ratified by which Marshal Beauharnois engages to surrender to the Austrians, on the 20th inst., the city of Venice, with its dependencies, ships of war, arsenals, &c., and, moreover, the fortresses of Osappo, Palma Nuova, and Legnago.

It is further stipulated that the French troops serving in the kingdom of Italy shall, on the 19th inst., withdraw and continue their march until they have regained the ancient limits of France. Ten days after the first movement of the French troops towards France, the Austrian troops are to be permitted to traverse the kingdom of Italy by the routes of Cremona and Brescia, but they are not to enter the Italian capital.

An Italian deputation is to proceed to the head-quarters of the Allies ; and if hostilities recommence, 15 days' notice must be given.

Marshal Beauharnois not having any jurisdiction over the commanders of Alessandria and Genoa, no arrangements for those places would be introduced into the convention.

I have sent copies of the above information to his Excellency Lord William Bentinck and Admiral Sir John Gore.

By further reports from the Neapolitan and Austrian force operating on Piacenza, it appears that the loss of the enemy on the 14th amounted to nearly 1000 men ; that of the Allies to 400. General Nugent states that the conduct of friends and adversaries was very gallant.

The movement was to be continued against Piacenza, where the enemy was in force ; but the intelligence of pending arrangements will, it is hoped, have prevented an unnecessary sacrifice.

The enemy state that they have taken nearly 300 Neapolitans, who were thrown across the Po in the environs of Casal Maggiore to cover the construction of a bridge, and there is reason to believe the account is correct.

I have, &c.,

R. WILSON.

II.

Convention Militaire.

Les soussignés, après avoir échangé les pleinpouvoirs dont ils ont été revêtue par leurs généraux en chef respectifs, sont convenus des articles suivants, toutefois sauf la ratification des susdits généraux en chef.

ART. I.

A compter du jour où la présente convention aura été signée, il y aura armistice entre les troupes Autrichiennes commandées par Son Excellence Monsieur le Maréchal Comte de Bellegarde, les troupes commandées par Sa Majesté le Roi de Naples, celles qui sont sous les ordres de Son Excellence Lord W. Bentinck, et les troupes Françaises et Italiennes commandées par Son Altesse le Prince Viceroy.

ART. II.

Cet armistice entre les troupes des puissances alliées et les troupes Françaises durera huit jours après que les dites troupes Françaises auront dépassées les territoires occupés par les armées alliées en France, dans la direction de route qui leur aura été assignée.

ART. III.

Les troupes Françaises faisant partie de l'armée du Prince Viceroy rentreront dans les frontières de l'ancienne France au delà des Alpes.

ART. IV.

Si dans deux jours après l'échange des ratifications de la présente convention les troupes Françaises ne reçoivent pas les ordres de leur gouvernement, elles commenceront sur-le-champ leur mouvement pour rentrer en France, par divisions ou par brigades, selon que les localités le permettront, en marchant par journées détachées et avec les séjours ordinaires.

ART. V.

Les colonnes de l'armée Française se porteront d'abord à Turin par les routes détachées, qui leur seront fixées sur la rive gauche du Po, même pour celles qui se trouvent à Plaisance. Elles seront précédées par des commissaires et des officiers de l'état-major général, Autrichiens et Français, qui s'assureront à l'avance si les routes du Mont Genève et du Col de Tende sont praticables pour le passage des troupes et de l'artillerie dans la saison présente. Dans ce cas elles seront suivies par l'armée Française.

Dans le cas contraire cette armée passera par le Mont Cenis et la Savoye, conformément aux stipulations de l'article 2^{de}, et les commissaires ci-dessus désignés seront chargés de régler leur marche et tout ce qui concerne les subsistances, moyens de transport, etc., conformément aux réglemens militaires.

ART. VI.

Les troupes Italiennes, commandées par le Prince Viceroy, continueront à occuper toute la partie du royaume d'Italie, et les places qui s'y trouvent, qui n'ont pas été encore occupés par les troupes des puissances alliées.

ART. VII.

Les troupes Autrichiennes pourront traverser le royaume d'Italie par les routes détachées de Cremone et de Brescia. Le mouvement ne pourra com-

mencer que dix jours après que les troupes Françaises se seront mises en marche pour rentrer en France. Des commissaires Italiens accompagneront les troupes Autrichiennes sur le territoire Italien, pour leur faire fournir les vivres et fourrages, logement, et moyens de transport, et elles ne pourront exiger autre chose.

ART. VIII.

Une députation du royaume d'Italie aura la liberté de se rendre au grand quartier-général des alliés, et dans le cas où la réponse qu'elle auroit obtenue ne seroit point de nature à tout concilier, les hostilités ne pourroient cependant recommencer entre l'armée Autrichienne, les troupes alliées, et celles du royaume d'Italie, que quinze jours après le retour des déterminations des puissances alliées.

ART. IX.

Les places d'Osappo, de Palma-Nuova, de Venise, et de Legnago, et les forts indépendants, seront remis dans leur état actuel à l'armée Autrichienne aussitôt après la ratification de la présente convention. Cette remise aura lieu, dans les formes usitées, le vingt du présent mois.

ART. X.

Les garnisons de ces places partiront avec tous les honneurs de la guerre, armes et bagages, nécessaires militaires, effets d'habillement des corps, artillerie de campagne, caissons, papiers relatifs aux administrations. Les officiers du génie et de l'artillerie de ces places remettront aux officiers Autrichiens nommés à cet effet tous les papiers, plans et inventaires du génie, et de l'artillerie dépendants de ces places.

ART. XI.

Toutes les autorités civiles et administratives et judiciaires qui désireront suivre le sort de la garnison seront libres de sortir en portant avec eux tous leurs effets et papiers relatifs à leur service. Ils remettront à leur départ aux autorités Autrichiennes tous les papiers, documens, et archives qui concernent les fonctions dont ils étoient chargés.

ART. XII.

Les troupes Françaises qui se trouvent dans ces places suivront le sort de l'armée Française de l'Italie, et les troupes Italiennes celui de l'armée de ce royaume.

ART. XIII.

Dans le cas où quelques unes des places auroient capitulées avant l'échange des ratifications de la présente convention, les capitulations seront strictement maintenues, conformément à leurs conditions ; mais leurs garnisons, tant Françaises qu'Italiennes, rentreront sans autres conditions à leurs armées respectives.

ART. XIV.

Les troupes de ces quatre places traverseront, par journées détachées ordinaires, les territoires occupés par les armées Autrichiennes, et il leur sera fourni les vivres, fourrages, logements, et moyens de transport.

ART. XV.

Il sera fait des conventions particulières entre les commandants respectifs des dites places et les généraux Autrichiens commandants du blocus, pour

52 CONVENTION WITH THE VICEROY OF ITALY. AP., 1814.

le mode d'évacuation de ces places, ainsi que pour les malades et blessés qu'on laisseroit dans les hôpitaux, et les moyens de transport à leur fournir.

ART. XVI.

Les officiers de l'état-major chargés d'accompagner les diverses colonnes de ces garnisons veilleront afin que les bestiaux fournis par le pays pour les transports soient changés à chaque lieu d'étapes. Les commandants des colonnes seront responsables de l'exécution de cet article, et prêteront en tous la main aux commissaires Autrichiens en cas de réclamations.

ART. XVII.

Des officiers d'état-major Français et Italiens seront de suite envoyés dans les diverses places pour donner aux commandants respectifs de ces places connoissance du présent armistice, et leur porter l'ordre de se conformer à l'exécution de la présente convention.

ART. XVIII.

La présente convention militaire sera, dans le cas où elle recevrait sa ratification, échangée dans le plus court délai possible.

En foi de quoi les soussignés y ont apposés leur signature et le sceau de leurs armes.

Fait au Château de Sepiarino Rizzeno, en avant de Mantoue, le 16 Avril, 1814.

Signé :

S.E. le COMTE DE NEIPPERG,

Chevalier de l'Ordre de Marie
Thérèse, etc., Grand Croix de
l'Ordre de Ste. Anne, etc., etc.,
et Feld Maréchal, et com-
mandant l'avant-garde de
l'armée d'Italie.

S.E. le Général DODE,

Commandant en Chef de Génie
de l'Armée d'Italie.

S.E. TUCCHI,

Général de Division, Gouver-
neur de Mantoue, etc., etc.

En vertu de mes pouvoirs, et en qualité de Général en Chef des armées de S.M. l'Empereur d'Autriche en Italie, nous avons approuvés et ratifiés, approuvons et ratifions, les articles ci-d'après de la présente convention militaire donnée.

Le Maréchal COMTE DE BELLEGARDE.

Vérone, le 17 Avril, 1814.

True copy,

ROBERT WILSON, Major-General.

*Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie to Field Marshal the Marquess
of Wellington.*

MY LORD,

Bordeaux, 28th April, 1814.

I am happy to say I received this morning a long letter from General Decaen, couched in the most civil language, admitting the right of transports to come up to Bordeaux; but as boats are mentioned in the 12th article of the agreement between your Lordship and Marshal Soult, he begs to refer that point to your consideration. It is a matter of little consequence: the Admiral wished it to regulate the police on the river chiefly.

We therefore remain now entirely good friends, and the demarcation established as by your agreement.

I have the honour to be your Lordship's most faithful

DALHOUSIE.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD,

War Department, London, 28th April, 1814.

I received the honour of your Lordship's despatch No. 49, and I immediately laid it before His Royal Highness the Prince Regent.

I am commanded by His Royal Highness to assure you that the satisfaction with which he has received the account of the brilliant manner in which your Lordship has terminated the war in France by the capture of Toulouse admits but of one qualification: that the lives of so many brave men might have been spared had the restoration of the legitimate Monarch to the throne of France been communicated to your Lordship with the expedition that was practicable. But it appears to have been the last effort of an expiring cause, consistent in evil, to protract the miseries which its supporters had occasioned, and to postpone as long as possible the return of that harmony and peace which they had for upwards of twenty years too successfully laboured to disturb.

This unwarrantable delay in communicating the important event which had taken place at Paris furnished your Lordship, however, with an opportunity of showing that the ardour with which you led your troops to the heights commanding Toulouse did not transport you to the destruction of the city, then at your mercy, although by so doing you might have added to the renown of the day by destroying a considerable part of the enemy's army, which had taken refuge in it.

In this last opportunity which I may probably have of congratulating your Lordship on your successes, it is peculiarly fortunate that it is on an occasion which began with an act of well-concerted enterprise, so frequently manifested by your Lordship, and terminated in an act of mercy as characteristic of your Lordship's military services.

Your Lordship will be pleased to communicate to Marshal Sir William Beresford the high satisfaction with which the Prince Regent has remarked the great ability which has distinguished his conduct in the battle of Toulouse; and you will convey to the Marshal and to Lieutenant-Generals Sir Lowry Cole and Sir Henry Clinton, to the other General officers, and the officers who have had the opportunity of distinguishing themselves upon this occasion, the gracious thanks of His Royal Highness for their meritorious services.

I have the honour to be

Your Lordship's most obedient servant,

BATHURST.

The Duke of York to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Horse Guards, 28th April, 1814.

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 12th instant, conveying the copy of your report to the Secretary of State upon the operations of the army under your command, in its successful attack of the position occupied by Marshal Soult in the vicinity of Toulouse.

Having communicated with the Prince Regent since the receipt of this despatch, I have the commands of His Royal Highness to convey to your Lordship, in addition to those expressions of approbation which will be communicated by the Secretary of State, the high sense His Royal Highness entertains of the eminent services performed by the Allied army under your command, upon an occasion wherein success has no less been attained by the ability of your arrangements than by the distinguished good conduct of the General officers and troops who executed your orders.

Your Lordship's operations in the field having now happily drawn towards a close for the present, I cannot permit this last acknowledgment of such reports to pass without offering you my cordial congratulations upon the honourable termination of your distinguished labours, the whole course of which has manifested to the world the prominent share which your military talents and the valour of the armies you have led have had in the re-establishment of that good order and legitimate authority which is so likely to secure the peace and happiness of Europe.

I am, my Lord, yours sincerely,

FREDERICK.

Marshal Soult to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

St. Amand, le 28 Avril, 1814.

Etant instruit que S.A.R. Monseigneur le Duc d'Angoulême a dû arriver hier au soir à Toulouse, j'envoie M. le Capitaine Marie, mon aide-de-camp, pour prendre les ordres de S.A.

Je profite de cette circonstance pour vous renouveler, Monsieur le Maréchal, les sentimens de ma haute considération.

DUC DE DALMATIE.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD,

War Department, London, 28th April, 1814.

I have had the honour to receive your Lordship's despatches to No. 53 inclusive.

The subject of your despatch No. 50 has been taken into immediate consideration, and I shall lose no time in conveying to your Lordship the sentiments of His Majesty's government on this head as soon as I shall have received the opinion of the King's Advocate upon the legal questions which may be supposed to arise.

In answer to the suggestions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 52, I have to state that Viscount Castlereagh has been authorised to request from the French government a permission that the British cavalry and Horse Artillery, together with a select corps of infantry, may march through France in order to embark for England in some of the ports of the Channel, probably at Dieppe and Havre. Under these circumstances, I have to recommend that your Lordship should give the necessary directions for the sale of such horses only belonging to the cavalry and artillery as may be considered of little value; and the sooner such horses are disposed of the better.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,
BATHURST.

P.S. I enclose a memorandum of corps which His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief concurs with me in recommending for selection as those which should march through France. Lord Castlereagh will communicate to your Lordship the answer that may be given by the French government.

[ENCLOSURE.]

28th April, 1814.

MEMORANDUM of CORPS which it may be advisable to bring, with the consent of the French government, to Dieppe and Havre, in order to embark for England.

1. The Cavalry and Horse Artillery.
2. Twenty-one battalions of Infantry, viz. :
Four battalions of Foot Guards.
Ten battalions of Light Infantry, viz., 43rd, 51st, 52nd, 68th, 71st, 85th, 95th (2nd battalion), Light battalion of King's German Legion.
Fusilier brigades, three battalions (7th, 25th, and 23rd).
A brigade of Highlanders, four battalions (42nd, 74th, 79th, 92nd).
3. Five brigades of Light Artillery to accompany the Infantry.

To the Duque de Soto-mayor.

[761.]
*

Toulouse, ce 29 Avril, 1814.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre de V. E. Il ne m'est pas possible de recommander quelque chose à Sa Majesté qui soit contraire aux lois d'Espagne. Si je ne me trompe pas, V. E. est un de ceux qui ont prêté *juramento de lealdad* au récent gouvernement usurpatoire, et qui ont même servi le prétendu Roi. Selon les lois d'Espagne, vous ne pouvez pas y entrer sans vous soumettre à être mis en procès; et je ne peux pas demander ni conseiller au Roi qu'il fasse quelque chose

contre la loi. Je renvoie donc à V. E. la lettre adressée à S. M. que vous m'avez envoyée, vous priant de la lui faire parvenir par quelque autre intermédiaire.

J'ai, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Bayonne, 30th April, 1814.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter, and can truly assure you that the kind concern you express for my bad fortune has proved most gratifying and consolatory to me.

I am led to hope from the tenor of your letter that when I have an opportunity you will not object to my going home, as there is very little probability that I shall be able for a long time to undertake any military duty. In the mean time, however, General Thouvenot* does not feel himself authorised to let me go; but it is probable that he may shortly see matters differently. My wounds go on as well, I believe, as possible.

Believe me, my dear Lord, to be always yours very faithfully,

JOHN HOPE.

Major-Gen. the Hon. C. Colville to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Boucaut, near Bayonne, 30th April, 1814.

I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I am authorised by General Thouvenot to say that he will put Sir John Hope on board the first vessel that shall be appointed to receive him in the Adour, or outside the bar.

He also promises me the release of the whole of the prisoners now confined here; this release being, of course, liable to such reclamation as events, very little likely we trust to occur, can make necessary.

I have obtained this concession in consequence of my reading to the Governor, without reserve, the contents of your Lordship's letter to Sir John of the 27th,† and which he took in perfect good part, complaining only of the ignorance in which he has been kept by the provisional government and his chief, the Duc de Dalmatie.

He appears to me, indeed, to be a most gentlemanlike, well-intentioned man, having a difficult post with a garrison, great part of which cannot be supposed to be in a moment reconciled to a revolution so extraordinary.

I beg to express what strikes me as a very desirable measure to be

* Governor of Bayonne.

† See letter to Sir John Hope, *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., p. 675.

effected here as soon as possible, which is the considerable reduction of the garrison, by which those who remain will the sooner fall into the views and opinions of the inhabitants, which are most friendly to the new order of things.

On suggesting this to General Thouvenot, he bargained for the withdrawing of the blockade. I learn from Sir John Hope that his ideas on the latter subject have been, that when permitted by your Lordship to depart from the general investment, he would withdraw Don Carlos de España's division from their position between the two rivers to such cantonments as can be got for them, and confine our posts principally to the ground which on both sides of the river would give us the best protection of our bridge.

General Thouvenot mentioned to me that he has never heard of General Harispe's return; but he was willing enough to believe, on my suggesting it, that his detention at Toulouse might only be occasioned by his wound.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

CHARLES COLVILLE.

Major-Gen. Sir G. Murray to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Toulouse, 1st May, 1814.

I am sorry that the enclosed letter did not reach me before you left Toulouse, as I should have been very glad to have submitted my sentiments upon it to you in conversation, and to have had the advantage of knowing your opinions upon them.

Under all circumstances, and with the prospect which Colonel Torrens's letter suggests how the chief command is likely to fall (Sir John Hope being unable to accept it), it does not appear to me that the offer is very tempting; and I think the main point for me to consider is, how far duty obliges me to accept it.

I may lay myself open to the reproach perhaps of having been, in some degree, spoiled by the situation which I have filled in this army under your command; but the fact is, that to step from it to the appointment held out by Colonel Torrens's letter appears to me to be sinking very considerably.

I do not know how far your Lordship's sentiments may accord with mine in this matter, but, at all events, it would be very much misplaced in me to have any reserve in expressing my thoughts to you on a point connected with my professional interests, which have owed so much to your friendship.

Believe me, my dear Lord, very faithfully yours,

G. MURRAY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Colonel Torrens to Major-Gen. Sir G. Murray.

MY DEAR MURRAY,

Horse Guards, 14th April, 1814.

It is a long time since you and I have had any epistolary communication, and I think I cannot renew our correspondence in a manner more satisfactory than by offering my hearty congratulations upon the glorious events which are so likely to restore peace and good order to the world. I trust the accounts from Paris may have reached you before any action had taken place subsequent to the date of the Revolution.

The government have determined to give Jonathan a good drubbing, and orders have been sent to Lord Wellington to prepare a corps of 12,000 infantry and a small detachment of cavalry to be sent to America.

The infantry will be formed into two divisions; and, recollecting the desire you entertained for the command of troops, the Duke has put your name down for one of them: and in order that you should have such a command, no Major-General has been selected for this service senior to you. Sir H. Clinton will be offered the other division. In naming you for this service, I assure you, my dear Murray, that the Duke has been actuated not only by a desire to benefit the operation by your able services, but with a view of gratifying your professional feelings by an employment which may probably be more acceptable to you at the commencement of a period when our profession will have few opportunities of active service.

I am not certain yet who will command, but it will be offered in the first instance to Hope.

The Duke has written to Lord Wellington: and as I do not wish to anticipate his Lordship's communication to you, I beg you will consider this note as confidential information upon the subject; at least until his Lordship has spoken to you.

Ever, my dear Murray, yours most sincerely,

H. TORRENS.

The Hon. R. Gordon to Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY LORD,

Paris, 2nd May, 1814.

In answer to the representation which I made by your Lordship's desire to M. le Comte de la Forest respecting the American privateer *Prince of Neufchatel*, which sailed on the 10th ultimo from Havre de Grace, and which has subsequently captured several British vessels, I have the honour to inform you that his Excellency instantly promised to adopt such measures as might prevent hereafter American vessels of any description from being armed and fitted out in the ports of France, or from returning to them for the sole object of disposing of such prizes as may have been made upon British property.

At the same time his Excellency desires me to acquaint your Lordship how sincerely he regrets that, viewing the actually existing relations between France and America, he is unable precisely at this moment to adopt such public and official measures as this subject and his wish to accord in every respect with the views of the British government would otherwise recommend.

* After Sir Robert Gordon.

Whilst his Excellency hopes that the confidential communications he has already made to persons employed in the different ports of France may produce the desired effect, he requests me to inform your Lordship that his first care upon the arrival of His Catholic Majesty the King in Paris will be to take his royal pleasure (which could not fail to be favourable) respecting this subject, and to lose no time in the execution of it.

I have the honour, &c.,

R. GORDON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

On croit devoir vous prévenir, Milord, qu'il se trouve dans les ports de France de l'Ouest divers bâtimens armés portant le pavillon des Etats Unis d'Amérique, lesquels, avant les heureux changements qui viennent d'avoir lieu, ont causé au commerce Anglais des pertes considérables. Comme il est possible que ces corsaires voient dans l'intention de reprendre la mer pour croiser contre les bâtimens marchands qui sortiront des ports de France, sous prétexte que ceux-ci sont chargés pour compte Anglais, ou destinés pour l'Angleterre, ce qui nuirait beaucoup aux relations commerciales qu'il est si désirable de voir s'établir entre les deux pays, Votre Excellence jugera sans doute convenable de faire auprès du gouvernement Français les démarches nécessaires pour empêcher qu'il ne sorte de ses ports aucun navire armé en guerre hormis ceux qui porteront son pavillon.

Le gouvernement Britannique laissera sûrement assez de bâtimens de guerre sur les côtes de France pour tenir en échec les corsaires Américaines qui auront pu y être expédiés directement des ports des Etats Unis.

The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Fife House, 3rd May, 1814.

I shall direct this letter to Paris, as I think it very probable you may have arrived there. If anything should have detained you in the South, I shall beg Lord Castlereagh to take the first opportunity of forwarding it to you.

Your promotion to a Dukedom will appear in the 'Gazette' of this night, as well as the peerages of Sir John Hope, Sir Thomas Graham, Sir Stapleton Cotton, Sir Rowland Hill, and Sir William Beresford.

The Prince Regent and his government have been most anxious to take this opportunity of marking, in the most distinguished manner, the high sense they entertain of your services and those of your army; and I am confident the measures which have been adopted for this purpose will meet with the universal approbation of the public.

I am most happy to find, by a letter from Castlereagh, that you are not unwilling to accept the embassy to Paris. I am sure there is no situation in which you could be at present of more use. But your acceptance of it need not preclude your coming to England for a short time to see your friends, and to make any personal or family arrangements which you may feel necessary after so long an absence.

I heartily congratulate you on the glorious termination of all our efforts. I trust we shall now have a long peace. No other termination of the con-

test would have justified such an expectation. But the exhausted state of Europe, the high reputation of Great Britain on the Continent, and the good understanding and feelings of cordiality which it is to be hoped will continue to exist between the government of this country and that of France, afford the best prospect of such a result.

I am happy to find that your boys have taken so kindly to school, and that Lady Wellington continues to receive such favourable accounts of them from the master under whom they have been placed. I have had occasion to be acquainted with the school at East Sheen for several years, and I do not believe it possible that they could have been placed at their age in a way more satisfactory to you.

Believe me to be, my dear Lord,

Yours very faithfully and sincerely,

LIVERPOOL.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

War Department, London, 4th May, 1814.

I do myself the honour to enclose, for the information and guidance of your Grace, the copy of a letter which has been addressed to me by the King's Advocate, conveying his opinion upon questions which arose out of a consideration of the subject which had been brought before His Majesty's government by your despatch No. 50.

With regard to the magazines and military stores collected for the use of the French army opposed to your Grace, and which were captured at Mont Marsan and other places, I entertain no doubt that the forces under your command are entitled to receive the full amount of their value, and I have to request your Grace would cause certificates to be prepared and transmitted to me, showing the amount of the public stores so captured, accompanied by estimates of their value, signed by the Commissary-General, and approved by the Auditor of Public Accounts attached to your Grace's army.

I have the honour to be

Your Grace's most obedient, humble servant,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURE.]

The King's Advocate to Earl Bathurst.

MY LORD,

Doctors' Commons, 2nd May, 1814.

I am honoured with your Lordship's commands of the 26th ult., transmitting the copy of a despatch from Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington, together with its enclosures, relating to the vessels, public stores, and other property that have fallen into the power of the Allied army under his Lordship's command upon the occupation of Bordeaux; and your Lordship is pleased to desire that I would take the subject of Lord Wellington's letter into consideration, and report to your Lordship my opinion whether the enemy's magazines which have been captured, and the

vessels and property sequestered, at Bordeaux, are to be considered as prize belonging to the Allied army ; or if any, and what part, of the captured property can be considered as liable to the claims of His Majesty's ships acting upon the neighbouring coasts ?

In obedience to your Lordship's directions I have considered the same, and have the honour to report that the questions arising on these papers are of a delicate nature, and may depend on the fact whether any or what assurances were given or implied that the property in Bordeaux would be spared, or treated with special lenity, on account of the declaration of the inhabitants in favour of the Bourbons.

It does not appear from the papers that any such claim is advanced : on the contrary many things are acknowledged to be booty. But exceptions are claimed on grounds of appeal to the liberality of the conquerors, which seem deserving of consideration.

Assuming that the condition of the town was not in strictness distinguished from those of other conquered places by compact or other particular assurances, I should be of opinion that ships of war, merchant vessels afloat, and their cargoes, being the property of enemies, would be booty. I am of opinion also that ships of war belonging to the government, on the stocks, would be booty as public stores ; but ships on the stocks being private property, should, I think, be respected as the general mass of private property. On the same view of the case, the army will be entitled to make booty of the public stores in the magazines, and of merchandise being the property of the enemy's government, or any public trading company of the enemy. The possession of such goods by the government would be primarily evidence of the property ; but if it can be established on credible proofs that the government had only a qualified possession as security for duties or other demands, the captors would be entitled, at the utmost only, to the proportion so belonging to the government, and so held for its own use.

It is to be observed also, that if the duties can be considered as not levied, the captors could not exact them for their own benefit.

Under these circumstances, and with reference to the representations of the hardships which will be sustained if the exorbitant duties and other demands of the old government should be enforced, I venture to suggest whether it would not be a desirable expedient, by which many unpleasant consequences might be avoided, if for the strict claims of the army a composition on terms of mutual liberality could be substituted.

On the remaining point, respecting the interests of the fleet, I am humbly of opinion that there is nothing appearing in these papers which raises a supposition that the fleet will be entitled to share in any part of the booty.

The claims of the fleet, if any such can be supported, must be of a very especial nature, on which no judgment can be formed till they are set forth.

On the present statement I am humbly of opinion that there is nothing that will prevent the delicate questions which may arise under the peculiar circumstances of the present time from being settled by amicable agreement, on such terms as shall appear just and reasonable to your Lordship and to the Commander in Chief.

I have, &c.,

CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON.

62 MORNING STATE OF CAVALRY. TOULOUSE, 5TH MAY, 1814.

MORNING STATE of the CAVALRY under the Command of his Excellency
Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Head-quarters, Toulouse, 5th May, 1814.

	British.	Portuguese.	Total.
Officers :—			
Field Officers	32	10	42
Captains	108	18	126
Subalterns	221	57	278
Staff	95	42	137
Quartermasters of Cavalry	25	4	29
Serjeants :—			
Present	602	63	665
Sick :—			
Present	8	1	9
Absent	13	..	13
Command	62	29	91
Prisoners of War and Missing	8	..	8
Trumpeters :—			
Present	113	39	152
Sick :—			
Present	1	2	3
Absent	5	..	5
Command	1	10	11
Prisoners of War and Missing	2	..	2
Rank and File :—			
Present	7952	955	8,907
Sick :—			
Present	124	10	134
Absent	392	57	449
Command	829	613	1442
Prisoners of War and Missing	243	3	246
Horses :—			
Present	7575	854	8,429
Sick	536	99	635
Command	425	407	832
Alterations :—			
Horses :—			
Dead	38	..	38

MORNING STATE of the FORCES under the Command of his Excellency
Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

Head-quarters, Toulouse, 5th May, 1814.

	British.	Portuguese.	Total.
Officers :—			
Colonels	12	7	19
Lieutenant-Colonels	52	20	72
Majors	88	38	126
Captains	470	169	639
Lieutenants	978	197	1,175
Cornets or Ensigns	336	313	649
Staff	404	452	856
Quartermasters of Cavalry	25	4	29
Serjeants :—			
Present	2,888	1,320	4,208
Sick :—			
Present	90	31	121
Absent	515	174	689
Command	404	249	653
Prisoners of War and Missing	65	3	68
Trumpeters or Drummers :—			
Present	1,075	492	1,567
Sick :—			
Present	17	11	28
Absent	91	35	126
Command	20	51	71
Prisoners of War and Missing	44	7	51
Rank and File :—			
Present	38,810	19,762	58,572
Sick :—			
Present	1,443	516	1,959
Absent	10,470	4,604	15,074
Command	3,064	2,212	5,276
Prisoners of War and Missing	2,849	347	3,196
Horses :—			
Present	7,575	854	8,429
Sick	536	99	635
Command	425	407	832
Alterations :—			
Men :—			
Joined	12	44	56
Dead	20	15	35
Discharged	..	4	4
Deserted	2	1	3
Transferred	2	1	3
Promoted	4	2	6
Reduced	2	1	3
Horses :—			
Dead	38	..	38

EDWARD PAKENHAM, Adjutant-General.

Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LIVERPOOL,

Paris, 5th May, 1814.

I am truly sorry to occasion any embarrassment at home by being absent from my post, but I really work as hard as a man can well do in such a town as Paris to finish my work, and I cannot persuade myself that it would be safe to leave it incomplete. Robinson holds himself in readiness upon the return of the messenger to join you, if you still think it necessary ; but in that case you must spare me Hamilton, as the quantity of business here is considerable. I can hardly conceive the Opposition will persevere in pressing discussion.

The Norwegian point naturally invited a skirmish. The point agitated by Fremantle is quite clear. Colonel Cooke, and Colonel St. Simon on the part of the French government, were despatched on the night of the 30th. They were detained at Blois by the French authorities for four days, which was the occasion of their not arriving before the battle of Toulouse. The French government sent also to Bordeaux and other great towns. The officers in command, however, were not disposed to give credence at first to the news, at least to the extent, and the government of Bayonne acted hostilely after the fact of the *déchéance* was notified. Buonaparte's abdication was not spoken of till some days afterwards, and was not completed till the 11th, when I reached Paris.

Lord Wellington arrived yesterday without notice, in time, in his blue coat, to see the Russian and Prussian Guards defile by Louis XVIII. The Emperor of Russia visited him in the evening, and he afterwards appeared at a ball given by Charles, where he was the great object of admiration. He looks perfectly well, and does not show the effects of his campaigns as much as I expected in his countenance. I have had a full conversation with him this morning. His plan is to return on Sunday to his army, to make all his arrangements for their embarkation, &c. ; then to go to Madrid, and to make an excursion to England before he settles here.

You will see by Lord William's official despatches that we shall have something to unravel in Corsica, and also at Genoa. It was very inconsiderate his making a declaration in favour of the old system at the latter place, knowing, as he must do, that there is little disposition in the Allies to re-establish it. The enclosed secret letter will show you how intolerably prone he is to Whig revolutions everywhere. I am confident his mismanagement at least doubled all the natural dangers of Murat's rascality ; and my persuasion is, if the war had gone on much longer in France, we should have had a most disastrous complication in Italy, and that his corps acting separately would have been probably the first sacrifice. He seems bent upon throwing all Italy loose. This might be well as against France, but against Austria and the King of Sardinia, with all the new Constitutions which now menace the world with fresh convulsions, it is most absurd.

Campbell's letter will answer yours. General Shuwelloff, the Russian Commissary, assures me Buonaparte showed no fortitude in his difficulties. If his taste for an asylum in England should continue, would you allow him to reside in some distant province ? It would obviate much alarm on

the Continent. Joseph, now in Switzerland, has expressly solicited a passport. What am I to say?

I am, dear Liverpool, sincerely yours,
CASTLEREAGH.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Lieut.-Gen. Lord W. C. Bentinck to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Genoa, 27th April, 1814.

Lieut.-Colonel A'Court, who is the bearer of my despatches to your Lordship, enjoys my full confidence; but the communication I am now about to make may affect the lives of so many individuals, that it is unknown to him, and I have thought it better to confine the secret within my own breast. I transmit to your Lordship the original papers, and shall keep no copy either of them or of this letter.

On the 24th the Neapolitan General Filangieri arrived here in disguise, and wrote me the enclosed letter, transmitting a note from General Carrascosa to General Nugent. I saw the General the same night, and he immediately returned to the army on the same night, without being discovered by any one.

He told me that there was a general plan formed in the Neapolitan army to demand from Murat a free Constitution. The execution was to take place as follows:—He said that a part of the army were actually on their march to Naples; that the King was immediately to follow; and that it was understood that two divisions, under Carrascosa, would remain, or would not march immediately. It was proposed that when these two divisions, upon their return to Naples, had passed the frontier, a letter should be sent to Murat expressing the desire of the army. He read me a copy of the letter, which, after adverting to the disturbed state of some of the Neapolitan provinces and to the general discontent, states that these circumstances have been kept from his ears by the evil counsellors who surround him. It adverts to a remonstrance made some time ago by his Generals upon the state of affairs, which he refused to listen to, and threatened to shoot those who had signed the address. It goes on to ask very respectfully for a free Constitution, and expresses attachment to him and to his family, and their desire that they should continue to reign as their Constitutional Monarchs. He told me that all the Neapolitan part of the Guard was with them; that officers high in Murat's confidence were also engaged; and that measures had been taken for sending emissaries throughout the kingdom; but he deprecated the idea of effecting this revolution by any assistance of the people, who might possibly be led into great excesses.

His object in coming to me was to ask my assistance in two ways. 1st. He said the only fear they had of failure was from the effects of Murat's own personal bravery, and by some great act of apparent confidence and courage throwing himself among the soldiers, who he thought would not resist such an appeal to their feelings. They did not fear his resistance. Their first request, then, was that I would by some means or other continue to keep him at Naples, and prevent him from going to the army when they should declare themselves. His second request was, that as they received their pay only every fifteen days, I would lend them 500,000 francs to enable them to continue the payment of the troops. If this could not be a public loan, they begged it might be a private one, for which they were ready to give ample security. I answered that, much as I wished them success, yet, having made

an armistice with Murat, the honour and good faith of my nation forbade me from lending myself, either directly or indirectly, to any proceedings of hostility, and that I must positively refuse taking any part whatever in the transaction.

General Filangieri is son of the famous Filangieri—is a clever man, and distinguished officer. He was sent to me by Murat upon my first landing at Leghorn to propose a plan of operations. He related to me an anecdote of Murat's versatility, according to the admirers of that Prince; of his insincerity and weakness, according to others. General Filangieri, on his return, delivered to Murat a 'Moniteur,' which the latter opened and read in his presence. It contained some success of Augereau. He said the King was quite wild with joy, and said that if he continued successful on their flank, the Allies must be driven across the Rhine. It did not appear to be at all their wish to get rid of Murat, much less to see the restoration of Ferdinand, whose character and cruelty they seem both to despise and fear. They seemed to flatter themselves that under the restraints of a free government Murat, to whom he attributed the most despotic principles, could not do them any harm.

As Murat is the most distrustful man in the world, and as I am confident at this moment, when other nations are making efforts for their own liberty, he will look upon every one as a "révolutionnaire," so I should have been much disposed to suspect that General Filangieri might be the spy of Murat sent to discover my sentiments, and the degree of assistance I might be inclined to afford. But as General Nugent has been so long serving with the Neapolitans, he must be well acquainted with the individuals, and his favourable opinion of General Filangieri must remove this suspicion. I must, however, say that the impression left upon my mind from the whole of the General's conversation did not leave with me a very sanguine expectation of the result.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient servant,

W. C. BENTINCK.

II.

General Filangieri to Lieut.-Gen. Lord W. C. Bentinck.

MILORD,

Gênes, le 24 Avril, 1814.

Par la lettre que j'ai l'honneur de vous remettre ci-joint vous verrez, je pense, que je suis dans la nécessité, mon Général, de vous demander un entretien sans témoins. Mon arrivée auprès de vous est un secret pour tout le monde. Je désirerais en conséquence savoir l'heure à laquelle je pourrais dans la soirée me procurer l'honneur de me rendre chez vous sans être aperçu par qui que ce soit. Je crois nécessaire de faire savoir à Votre Excellence qu'il y a des officiers à son état-major qui me connaissent; et qu'en outre j'ai tout lieu de penser qu'il y a dans cette ville des émissaires du Roi de Naples chargés d'examiner s'il existe entre Votre Excellence et l'armée Napolitaine des relations mystérieuses, que l'on craint beaucoup. J'ai donc besoin de prendre les plus grandes précautions pour faire ignorer ma présence à Gênes.

J'ai voyagé comme courrier extraordinaire, et sous le nom de Charles Goffredi. Ayant fait la route des montagnes, je n'ai encore été rencontré par personne. Tout va très bien jusqu'à présent.

Permettez-moi, Milord, de saisir cette occasion pour vous offrir l'hommage du respectueux dévouement avec lequel je serai toute ma vie, de Votre Excellence,

Le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

CHARLES FILANGIERI.

III.

General Nugent to Lieut.-Gen. Lord W. C. Bentinck.

San Lazzaro, 22nd April, 1814.

I received this just now from General Carrascosa, the first in rank of the Neapolitan Generals, and a very determined man. The bearer will inform you of all. I know him. He is a distinguished officer, a man of honour, and worthy of every attention you will show him.

Yours most truly,

NUGENT.

General Carrascosa to General Nugent.

Borgo San Donnino, 21 Aprile, 1814.

Il Signor Generale Filangieri che si reca a San Lazzaro ove avrà l'onore di vedervi, vi esporrà quel tanto di cui siamo definitivamente convenuti; esso è di accordo con me, e con gli altri nostri compagni.

Vi ripeto le assicurazioni del mio inalterabile attaccamento ed amicizia.

CARRASCOSA.

Viscount Castlereagh to Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD B.,

Paris, 5th May, 1814.

I have delivered your despatches to Lord Wellington. He is to meet General Dupont, the Minister of War, to-morrow, to arrange all details for the movement of the cavalry to the points you wish. The infantry will be marched towards the western coast. Lord W. calculates that 6 weeks will be required for the march to Boulogne and Calais, in which time he expects you will have your transports ready. He counts upon 12,000 horses returning. For how many will you have tonnage at one trip? You must give him some idea in what succession they should arrive.

I have a letter from Graham. I think he has been unnecessarily modest in halting short of Brussels upon an invitation from Thielmann, who is much his junior. Even a small corps at that point would have been politically useful. I shall write to him upon this, and also Ostend, which I shall arrange by one means or another. The garrison of Antwerp will be British, or British and Dutch; but I do not think it prudent to hoist these colours exclusively, as all the ceded territory, of which this place forms a part, must be held in the name of the Allied Sovereigns generally. I thought an Austrian commissary a relief where ships were concerned. There has been a good deal of complaint with respect to requisitions, &c., in the Low Countries, and not without cause, but they expect to escape too well, compared with the other countries the armies must traverse on their return home. We have ordered the Prussian Governor-General to give way to the Austrian General Vincent. Under his protection justice will be done.

I am, dear Lord B., yours, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

The Deputies of Departments to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Paris, le 7 Mai, 1814.

Les députés des départements des Hautes et Basses Pyrénées, des Landes, du Gers, de la Haute Garonne, Lot et Garonne, et de Tarn et Garonne, ont eu l'honneur de se présenter chez Son Excellence Lord Wellington pour le remercier, tant en leur nom propre qu'au nom de leurs concitoyens, de la bonne discipline qu'il a fait observer à ses troupes, de la bonne justice qu'il a fait régner partout où il a passé, et de sa conduite noble et généreuse en tous points.

(*Here follow the signatures.*)

Brigadier-General H. Lowe to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

15, Boulevard des Capucins, Paris, 8th May, 1814.

Having reflected on the probable date of the letter your Grace did me the honour to communicate to me yesterday, and on my having had conversations in London with Colonel Bunbury which must have been *subsequent* to it, from which I was led to infer Lord Bathurst's idea of employing me on the staff of the expedition to America had been suspended, I am induced to request your Grace's indulgence in permitting me to remain here until I can communicate with England, or until I can receive replies to some letters I have already sent, which could not occasion a delay of more than six days, at the expiration of which I could either repair directly to Bordeaux or send an instant communication to the contrary. I am the more induced to make this request, as I have some real public business here (of which both Lord Cathcart and Sir Charles Stuart can inform your Grace) which would make it exceedingly inconvenient for me to depart at the present instant. The desire to meet your Grace's views and suggestions on the first occasion I had the advantage of being presented to you prevented me from obtruding any matter of this kind on your consideration, but reflection has since convinced me of the expediency of it, and I have only to pray your Grace's excuse for the intrusion which it has led to.

I have the honour to be

Your Grace's most obedient, most humble servant,

H. LOWE.*

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 9th May, 1814.

I find I have no time to-night for the ball. I send you some letters from your brother. You will see matters are in a critical state in Spain, and that your visit will be very opportune. I don't see how we can take upon us to advise the King to hazard a contest with the Cortes. If he feels himself strong enough, calling a new Cortes to revise the Constitution

* Afterwards Sir Hudson Lowe.

upon certain liberal and moderate principles promulgated by himself may be the best mode of curing the present evil. If you approve of this, I will write accordingly.

Ever yours, &c.,
CASTLEREAGH.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 11th May, 1814.

Apsley being desirous of seeing a little more of the Continent before he returns, I have charged him with my despatches to your brother, taking you in his way: his wish is to return by Paris. Nothing has passed of any importance since you left us. Buonaparte is arrived at Elba: during the voyage on one occasion his mind seemed still to cherish hopes as to France.

Talleyrand, in a conversation with Metternich last night, seemed a little inclined to raise his tone. We expect his *contre-projet* to-morrow.

Yours, my dear Lord, ever most sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

The King of France to the Prince Regent.

MONSIEUR MON FRÈRE ET COUSIN,

Paris, ce 12 Mai, 1814.

Plus de quinze jours sont déjà écoulés depuis que, venant de prendre congé de Votre Altesse Royale, je suis rentré dans ma terre natale, et le Roi de France n'a pas encore exprimé sa reconnaissance au Prince Régent d'Angleterre des puissans secours qu'il en a reçus, et comme individu je ne vous ai pas remercié des marques d'amitié dont vous m'avez comblé. Pour justifier un silence aussi extraordinaire, je n'imagine rien de mieux que d'informer Votre Altesse Royale d'un espoir que j'ai conçu, même avant mon départ d'Angleterre: c'est de la voir ici, réunie avec les Souverains ses alliés, et de payer ainsi à la fois le tribut de ma reconnaissance à tous ceux qui en sont les augustes objets. J'avois crû que mon sacre en pourroit offrir l'occasion, mais les préparatifs de cette cérémonie ne peuvent être faits assez tôt pour cela.

Heureusement une autre circonstance, non moins intéressante, est venue à mon secours. J'ai tout lieu d'espérer qu'avant le 22 de ce mois la paix sera faite, et j'ai déjà ordonné des fêtes pour la célébrer. C'est à ces fêtes, qui auront lieu dans la semaine qui commencera ce même 22, que j'invite, que je prie Votre Altesse Royale d'assister; et j'ai dû, pour ne pas abuser de ses momens, me taire sur mes sentimens jusqu'à ce que je pûsse lui faire cette demande. J'ajouterai que ce n'est pas en mon nom seul que je la fais: c'est au nom de toute la France, qui brûle de payer à la personne même de Votre Altesse Royale la dette que j'ai contractée envers elle et envers la nation Anglaise; c'est encore au nom des deux Empereurs et du Roi de Prusse, qui m'ont chargé d'exprimer à Votre Altesse Royale le désir qu'ils ont de la voir à ces fêtes.

Maintenant, si Votre Altesse Royale cède à tant de vœux réunis, je la conjure de me faire savoir dans quel port et quel jour elle compte débarquer, n'ayant rien tant à cœur que de lui rendre, tant qu'elle sera dans mes états, tout ce que me prescrivent et le devoir et le sentiment.

Je prie Votre Altesse Royale d'être bien persuadée de l'amitié vive et sincère avec laquelle je suis, etc.

Sir Charles Stuart to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 14th May, 1814.

As Lord Castlereagh's injunctions have caused me to suspend any immediate communication respecting public affairs with the persons who are supposed to enjoy the confidence of this Court, it is only in my power to write what I have heard through other channels since you left Paris.

After some hesitation the ministers have been permanently appointed; and as the reputation of the Abbé de Montesquieu and the Garde des Sceaux, who are considered to be the King's men, places them very high in the public esteem, it is fortunate that no predilection for the class who have followed his fortunes from the commencement of the revolution is traced in the choice.

A number of projets for the Constitution have been given in. It is, however, certain that the King himself is occupied in drawing up the proposition which is to be submitted to the consideration of the Senate and the Corps Législatif at the end of the month, after revision by a commission which is to be chosen directly for that express purpose. It is determined that the senators shall enjoy their present honours and emoluments under a re-appointment, omitting the names of the regicides, who are nine in number, and of whom several are already making arrangements to retire to Switzerland, as their situation under this appointment will be merely personal. They are to be succeeded by hereditary senators chosen by the Crown, whose rank is supported by no pecuniary allowance.

The tax of the droits réunis is confirmed for the present.

It is unlucky that the arrangements for reducing their naval force should have been made the subject of a proclamation. This false measure has kept alive a feeling against the British which I cannot but suspect entered the contemplation of the persons who recommended the publication of the King's orders in this form.

The ill humour of the army continues to embarrass the government. Among other modes of conciliating their goodwill the new ministers project to carry the number of the military force on foot to 200,000 men. I rather believe that the employment of troops in some endeavour to recover St. Domingo is among the motives for this increase of the war establishment.

At a conference two days since, the retrograde movement of the Allied army was considered. The necessity of checking the spirit which prevails among the troops, and in some degree supporting the existing government, was the subject of much discussion; and although it was determined that the French provinces which suffer materially from the continuance of the armies shall be very shortly evacuated, the Emperor of Russia will, I

hear, retain a large body of troops close to the frontier eight or nine months after the conclusion of the treaty which is the subject of the present negotiation.

As the arrangements in Germany and Poland are not considered to come within the limit of the negotiation with France, some strong observations brought forward by the French ministers respecting the projected extension of the Russian frontier in Poland, and the acquisitions expected by Austria and Prussia in Saxony, have not been attended to. The right of France to send a minister to the congress which is to settle these matters after the conclusion of a general peace does not, however, appear to be disputed.

I have not hitherto obtained a house which I think will suit you. I have, however, seen a great many; and if I find that it is impossible to obtain the Elysée Bourbon on paying a rent to the government, I think that of the *Ministre de la Marine*, in the immediate neighbourhood, will be the best. As all the houses are unfurnished, I will hire furniture for a short time, leaving you at liberty to make arrangements hereafter.

Believe me, my dear Lord,

Ever your obliged and faithful

CHARLES STUART.

To Dom M. de Forjaz.

[762.]

SENHOR,

Toulouse, 15th May, 1814.

I have the honour to enclose a memorial for the Prince Regent, which Senhor Joaquin Paes has sent to me, with a desire that I should forward it to His Royal Highness; and although it relates to matters quite foreign to my business, I venture to draw the attention of the Governors of the Kingdom to its contents, and to request their recommendation of them, in consequence of the sense I entertain of the services and merits of that family throughout the war. Senhor J. Paes joined me before the battle of Vimeiro, at which he was present; and he and his family have upon every occasion that has come under my notice exerted themselves in favour of the just cause of their country and Prince, and appear to me highly deserving of His Royal Highness's favour.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LIVERPOOL,

Paris, 15th May, 1814.

Robinson is so fully aware of the state of things here, that I may refer you to him on all points. I hope you will be enabled to send me an immediate answer, and such as may enable me to sign without further reference.

I am to see the Emperor of Austria on his visit to England the day after to-morrow. I rather think the state of Italy and his affairs at home will oblige him to return direct to Vienna, in which case His Imperial Majesty will send Metternich on a special mission to make his excuses to the Prince Regent. I have very much encouraged this plan, as his presence in London would enable us (Hardenberg and Nesselrode being also there) to decide finally on several important points previous to the Congress at Vienna.

The Emperor of Russia wishes his means of embarkation to be ready at Boulogne the last day of May. His Majesty takes with him his Grand Maréchal Tolstoy, Platow, and four aides-de-camp. He said nothing of the two young Grand Dukes, and I said nothing. He expressed a wish to land quietly, and not to be received with form. When you can let us know what is arranged on your side, the plan can better be fixed here. The Emperor asked me to go with him; but if I can get the treaty signed, I will endeavour to precede him.

Yours, my dear Liverpool, faithfully (in haste),

CASTLEREAGH.

The Rector of the Academy of Toulouse to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

Toulouse, le 15 Mai, 1814.

Votre Excellence a accueilli avec tant de bonté les paroles que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui adresser comme Recteur de l'Université, et comme Président de l'Académie des Sciences, que je m'empresse de les déposer dans vos mains.

Si, après la lecture, j'avais le bonheur, Monsieur le Maréchal, d'obtenir votre approbation, ce serait pour moi un titre de famille dont je sentirais tout le prix.

Je suis, avec le plus profond respect, Monsieur le Maréchal,

De Votre Excellence

Le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

JAMME.

[ENCLOSURE.]

DISCOURS prononcés par M. JAMME à Son Excellence le Maréchal Marquis de WELLINGTON, en qualité de Recteur de l'Académie Royale de Toulouse et de Président de l'Académie des Sciences, Inscriptions, et Belles-Lettres : extraits du 'Journal de Toulouse,' Nos. 4 et 5.

Le Recteur et les Facultés de l'Académie de Toulouse ont été admis, le 23 de ce mois, à l'audience de M. le Feld Maréchal Wellington, etc., etc.

M. Jamme, Recteur, a porté la parole en ces termes :—

“ Monsieur le Maréchal,

“ Le Recteur et les principaux membres de l'instruction publique viennent porter à Votre Excellence le tribut de leur respect et de leur vénération.

“ Ne craignez pas d'être fatigué du récit de vos exploits militaires et de vos qualités personnelles : la renommée nous a appris que c'est la seule occasion où votre oreille se ferme à la vérité.

“ Eh ! que pourrions-nous vous dire, Monsieur le Maréchal, que ne vous aient déjà exprimé les acclamations universelles qui, en mêlant votre nom à celui des Bourbons, ont proclamé non-seulement le représentant de trois grandes puissances protectrices, et le libérateur de notre contrée, mais encore le conservateur spécial d'une vaste cité, dont, par une fatalité inconcevable, la ruine semblait amenée par l'intrépidité même qui devait la protéger et la garantir.

“ Cette cité célèbre, honorée depuis plusieurs siècles du titre de Palladienne, appelée par les modernes l'Athènes du midi, trois fois capitale de royaume, serait réduite en cendres, si votre main généreuse n'eût arrêté la foudre qu'une fausse confiance avait irritée.

“ Nous aimons à publier, Monsieur le Maréchal, que c'est à vous que cette ville doit le calme dont elle jouit, l'espèce de renaissance qu'elle éprouve, et que l'instant où vous êtes entré dans son enceinte a été l'aurore des jours paisibles et sereins que nous prépare l'autorité paternelle, dont le souvenir n'a été ni effacé ni affaibli par les horreurs de la révolution, et qui n'a jamais cessé de régner sur nos cœurs.”

L'Académie des Sciences, Inscriptions, et Belles-Lettres de Toulouse ayant eu l'honneur d'être admise auprès de Lord Wellington, M. Jamme, président de cette compagnie, a prononcé le discours suivant :—

“ Monsieur le Maréchal,

“ L'Académie Royale des Sciences, Inscriptions, et Belles-Lettres, accoutumée à apprécier les hommes, à confirmer ou à détruire les monumens élevés à leur gloire, et à refuser toute sanction que l'austère raison désavoue, s'empresse de venir mêler sa voix à celle de tous les ordres de citoyens, dont vous avez vu les transports, et entendu les éclats d'allégresse.

“ A votre aspect les entraves de la contrainte se sont brisées : l'homme d'état, le grand militaire, le héros bienfaisant, le libérateur de cette terre désolée, l'ange de paix, tout a été reconnu et célébré par le cri du sentiment, et votre nom a été porté jusqu'aux cieux, dans le temple même de la vérité éternelle.

“ Je ne pourrais, Monsieur le Maréchal, qu'affaiblir ce tableau ! L'Académie se borne à supplier Votre Excellence d'accepter l'offrande des recueils qu'elle a publiés dans le temps de ses prospérités, et sous la protection de nos Rois.

“ Ce sont les suffrages que l'Europe savante leur a accordés, qui nous ont encouragés à vous les offrir, comme un hommage rendu au génie de votre nation et au vôtre.”

[Write that I am very much obliged to him.

WELLINGTON.]

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,

Madrid, 15th May, 1814.

I have received your letter of the 30th of April,* and I am happy to hear that you have not refused the Embassy to Paris. After all you have gone through, you will find diplomacy very pretty amusement.

My despatches from Valencia, and that which I now send you, will apprise you of all that has passed up to this date. The King made his public entrance yesterday, and nothing was ever equal to the joy and enthusiasm with which he was received.

I wish to state to you that General Whittingham, who was here yesterday with his cavalry, has not acted from any suggestion or connivance of mine. If he received his orders to march previously to his quitting Valencia, he deceived me, as he told me that he was going back to Saragossa in order to be ready to obey any orders he might receive from you. As a Spanish or as an English officer I have no authority over him, but he was perfectly aware of my intentions not to interfere myself, and of my opinion that no Englishman should be concerned in this business. I mention this because it has been stated by some of the parties here that he acted under orders from me.

Everything is quiet here. I hope to see you soon.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Madrid, 15th May, 1814.

My despatches from Valencia will have apprised your Lordship of the substance of my conversations with the Duke of San Carlos, which will have prepared you for the event which I have now to announce, viz., the King's refusal to accept the Constitution.

I enclose a Proclamation in which His Majesty, after referring to the first events of the Revolution, objects to the mode in which the General and Extraordinary Cortes were assembled, as being wholly unprecedented, and condemns all their proceedings as illegal, and as tending to subvert the monarchy and to destroy the happiness of the people. His Majesty then proceeds not only to declare his determination not to swear to the Constitution nor to any decree of the General and Extraordinary Cortes, or of those actually assembled, which is subversive of the rights and prerogatives of the Sovereign as they are established by the Constitution and the laws under which the nation has so long existed, but pronounces them to be of no value or effect.

The King pledges himself, however, to assemble the Cortes according to the ancient laws of the kingdom, when the foundation of the prosperity of his subjects in the Old and the New World shall be established. He promises that his

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xi., p. 681.

subjects shall enjoy that degree of liberty which distinguishes a moderate government from an arbitrary despotism; that the freedom of the press shall be preserved, subjected, however, to such restrictions as shall prevent it from degenerating into licentiousness; and that, in order to remove all suspicion of misapplication of the public revenue, a fixed sum will be assigned for the expenses of the Crown, which will be separated from the other branches of the public expenditure.

These are the principal heads of the enclosed paper, which is dated the 4th of May, but which was not made public until the 11th, on which day I received it with a note from the Duke of San Carlos, of which a copy is enclosed.

When I left Madrid to meet the King at Valencia, I certainly was of opinion that he would act very imprudently if he refused to accept the Constitution. The grounds of this opinion have been stated in my despatches, and I still continue to think that the King will soon be exposed to considerable difficulties. But proofs now exist of the Constitution being generally unpopular not only in the provinces through which the King has passed in his way to the capital, but in those of the north and of the south of Spain. At Seville and at Cordova the public authorities nominated by the Regency have been suspended by the people, and others appointed to act until the King's pleasure shall be known; and this without any communication from His Majesty. In the northern provinces the Constitution has always been unpopular, and the disposition manifested by the army is still more decidedly adverse to it. With this general sentiment prevailing against the Constitution, it would have been dangerous for the King to have accepted it, even if he had been so disposed; and the revolution which has taken place may be considered more as an act of the nation itself than as one of arbitrary power on the part of the King.

A measure of precaution, however, was judged necessary upon publishing the enclosed Proclamation which I could have wished had been avoided, viz., the arrest of the members of the Regency, of most of the Deputies in Cortes composing the party called the Liberales, and of several other persons whose names are contained in the enclosed list. This was effected on the 11th, in the morning, without any resistance being opposed to the persons who executed the orders of the King; and so far from its exciting any popular commotion, the people manifested their joy at the downfall of the Jacobin party, and at the King's having rejected the Constitution. The Cardinal de Bourbon has been ordered to repair to Toledo, M. Agar to Ferrol, M. Ciscar and M. Luyando to Carthagen. All the Ministers have been removed, and their successors are the Duke of San Carlos as Minister of State, M. Macanaz Minister of Grace and Justice, General Freyre for the War Department, and M. Salazar for that of Finance.

From the repeated occasions which I have had to commend the conduct of M. Luyando while at the head of the Foreign Department, your Lordship will easily imagine how great must be my concern at his being involved in the disgrace of the government and of its supporters. In a conversation which I had with the Duke of San Carlos at Aranjuez, I lamented that any such measure as that of the arrest of so many persons should have been judged necessary; and I particularly expressed my concern, which I said would be equally felt by the British government, at M. Luyando having fallen under the displeasure of the King. The Duke of San Carlos said that the measures which they had adopted were absolutely necessary if the only object had been to save the individuals who had been arrested from falling victims to the fury of the populace, but that many of them would be put upon their trial, and it would then appear that the King proceeded upon justifiable grounds; that

overtures for a more confidential intercourse had been made to M. Luyando at Valencia, which he had rejected; but that his removal to Carthagena ought not to be considered as a mark of disgrace; that it should be recollected that he was only a captain of a frigate, and had been placed in a situation entirely out of the line of his profession. He gave me reason, however, to hope that at no very distant period the King might be induced to give him more of his confidence, and to place him in some situation where his talents might be employed in the service of his country.

Throughout all these proceedings I have strictly abided by the line of conduct which I informed your Lordship I should observe in my first communications to you from Valencia. I arrived at Madrid several days before the King, and went to Aranjuez on the 11th to meet him. I have reason to believe that His Majesty is aware of the delicacy of the situation in which I was placed, and is satisfied with the line of conduct which I have pursued.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

H. WELLESLEY.

[763.]

To Dom M. de Forjaz.

SENHOR,

Toulouse, 16th May, 1814.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 6th May. I will take care that your Excellency shall be regularly informed of the march of the Portuguese troops.

I have reason to believe that the two Portuguese frigates will afford sufficient tonnage to carry away all the Portuguese sick and wounded, and the stores which may remain in the Spanish ports; but there are no British transports that can be applied to that service.

I likewise beg to inform your Excellency, that although the Portuguese troops will have the use of the British magazines on the march, the issue will be made on account of the subsidy.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

MORNING STATE of the CAVALRY under the Command of his Excellency
Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Head-quarters, Toulouse, 16th May, 1814.

	British.	Portuguese.	Total.
Officers :—			
Field-Officers	29	10	39
Captains	109	18	127
Subalterns	221	58	279
Staff	95	43	138
Quartermasters of Cavalry	24	4	28
Serjeants :—			
Present	613	63	676
Sick :—			
Present	9	1	10
Absent	10	..	10
Command	57	28	85
Prisoners of War and Missing	7	..	7
Trumpeters :—			
Present	112	39	151
Sick :—			
Present	2	2	4
Absent	5	..	5
Command	1	10	11
Prisoners of War and Missing	2	..	2
Rank and File :—			
Present	8,088	961	9,049
Sick :—			
Present	172	10	182
Absent	354	57	411
Command	691	665	1,356
Prisoners of War and Missing	241	3	244
Horses :—			
Present	7,780	849	8,629
Sick	443	99	542
Command	345	405	750
Alterations :—			
Men :—			
Joined	7	..	7
Dead	3	..	3
Deserted	2	..	2
Horses :—			
Recruited	119	..	119
Dead	3	..	3

MORNING STATE of the FORCES under the Command of his Excellency
Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Head-quarters, Toulouse, 16th May, 1814.

	British.	Portuguese.	Total.
Officers :—			
Colonels	13	8	21
Lieutenant-Colonels	54	21	75
Majors	89	38	127
Captains	490	173	663
Lieutenants	1,041	198	1,239
Cornets or Ensigns	339	309	648
Staff	412	450	862
Quartermasters of Cavalry	24	4	28
Serjeants :—			
Present	2,966	1,309	4,275
Sick :—			
Present	92	37	129
Absent	434	175	609
Command	369	256	625
Prisoners of War and Missing	55	2	57
Trumpeters or Drummers :—			
Present	1,089	499	1,588
Sick :—			
Present	24	10	34
Absent	79	32	111
Command	21	53	74
Prisoners of War and Missing	37	7	44
Rank and File :—			
Present	40,967	19,869	60,836
Sick :—			
Present	1,625	489	2,114
Absent	8,752	4,590	13,342
Command	2,648	2,359	5,007
Prisoners of War and Missing	2,374	339	2,713
Horses :—			
Present	7,780	849	8,629
Sick	443	99	542
Command	345	405	750
Alterations :—			
Men :—			
Joined	8	27	35
Dead	29	4	33
Discharged	..	5	5
Deserted	11	2	13
Transferred	5	..	5
Promoted	6	1	7
Reduced	2	1	3
Horses :—			
Recruited	119	..	119
Dead	3	..	3

EDWARD PAKENHAM, Adjutant-General.

Admiral Lord Keith to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Bordeaux, 16th May, 1814.

After congratulating your Grace most sincerely upon your late advancement in dignity, and also upon all the preceding events to which your Grace has so largely contributed, I beg to state that my great anxiety to get quit of Pasages, in addition to the great expense of shipping there, is that Mr. Arnold, agent for the Transport Board, informed me that several attempts had been made to set the ships on fire by throwing combustibles from the windows into them. In so confined a space the consequences would be dreadful.

I have the honour to be, with the most sincere regard,

Your Grace's most obedient, most obliged, humble servant,

KEITH.

Memorandum respecting the Cavalry.

Horse Guards, 16th May, 1814.

A question having arisen as to the amount of cavalry force proposed to be maintained upon a peace establishment, it becomes necessary to give some further detailed explanation respecting its distribution.

It has been already proposed to preserve the regiments in India upon the present establishment of five squadrons of 200 each; that the 1st Dragoon Guards shall be five squadrons of 120 each, of which number 20 men in each squadron shall be dismounted; and that every other regiment of Dragoons in the service shall consist of four squadrons of the same number of mounted and dismounted men, with the exception of the Life Guards, in which corps it is not proposed to have any dismounted men. The following are the number of regiments proposed to be kept up, viz. :—

2 Regiments of Life Guards.		
1	Do.	Royal Horse Guards.
7	Do.	Dragoon Guards.
4	Do.	Hussars.
20	Do.	Dragoons.

In all 34 regiments of cavalry; and the following will be their distribution :—

				Men.	Horses.
5	Regiments in India	..	..	5000	5000
1	Do.	Cape of Good Hope	..	480	400
2	Do.	Canada		480	400
10	Do.	Ireland		4800	4000

No question can be entertained as to the propriety of those 17 regiments being employed in the above manner, and it is to be explained how the remaining 17 regiments are to be distributed in Great Britain :—

	Rank and File.	Horses.
2 Regiments of Life Guards to be quartered in London	800	800
1 Regiment of Royal Horse Guards at Windsor	480	400
1 Regiment of Dragoons at Hounslow, to furnish the King's escort, &c.	480	400
1 Regiment to take the duty along the whole coast of Kent, from Ramsgate to Rye..	480	400
1 Regiment in reserve at Canterbury, and occasionally to take the coast duty ..	480	400
1 Regiment to take the duty of the whole coast of Sussex, from Rye to Havant ..	480	400
1 Regiment to take the duty of the whole coast of Hants and Dorset, from Havant to Weymouth	480	400
1 Regiment from Weymouth to the Land's End, including Truro and the mine duties of Cornwall	480	400
1 Regiment at Exeter, which will take the duty along the coast of the Bristol Channel	480	400
2 Regiments to take the duties of Liverpool, Manchester, Nottingham, Lichfield, Birmingham, and Coventry	960	800
2 Regiments for Newcastle, York, Hull, Huddersfield, Leeds, and all the adjacent coast duties	960	800
2 Regiments for Ipswich, Colchester, and the coast duty from the Thames to the Humber	960	800
2 Regiments for the duty of North Britain..	960	800
18	8480	7200

The distribution of cavalry duties and cantonments will thus appear to amount to *one regiment* more than is provided for by the peace establishment: and it is to be observed that in this distribution it is only proposed to leave two regiments in reserve, including the corps at Hounslow; a number which will certainly not be considered an unreasonable proportion to the extent of force so widely cantoned all over the country, and which it will be necessary to relieve occasionally from duties of so detailed, and, consequently, so destructive a nature to the discipline of the troops. The Blues will, however, take their turn as usual of the interior duties, and therefore one of the regiments stated to be required in reserve will be dispensed with; leaving the distribution of cavalry duties to correspond with the proposed establishment as stated in the margin; and which is certainly not more than is essentially necessary for the protection of the revenue and the internal security of the country.*

In considering this question it must be recollected that the extensive lines of coast in this country require a greater degree of vigilance in time

	Rank and File.	Horses.
* 15 Regiments for S. Britain, consisting of	7040	6000
2 Regiments for N. Britain, consisting of	960	800
	8000	6800

of peace than in war, in proportion to the increased facilities to smuggling on the one hand, and the diminution of naval force on the other; and thus a more detached distribution of cavalry is necessary during a period of peace. It may also be observed that the great manufacturing towns, as being more populous and liable to tumult during a peace, require the control of a cavalry force to a greater degree than in war. If those duties could, in any case, be performed with equal promptitude and effect by infantry, double the amount of the latter description of force would not suffice to accomplish the purposes to which a cavalry force is applied; but for the prevention of smuggling and the quelling of tumult a small body of cavalry may be effectual where a large force of infantry might totally fail. And though it would be harassing and destructive to the latter arm to be applied to the services reserved for cavalry, yet if what is considered the necessary amount of the latter force be curtailed, it must unavoidably lead to a much higher establishment of infantry than is proposed.

Thus it will appear that although it is necessary and politic to keep up a force of cavalry in a certain proportion to the aggregate establishment of our army, and to the scale which is usually observed in other nations between this and other branches of a military force, yet it will be difficult to point out a superfluous corps in the proposed peace establishment of cavalry, or that the total number is greater than what the duties and security of the country call for.

In this arrangement it is proposed to place a regiment of cavalry permanently in America, which has never been the case hitherto; and for which it is not intended to make any increase to the establishment.

In this calculation of cavalry it must also be observed that no allowance is made for the relief of the regiments in India; and in the case of the 22nd, 24th, and 25th Dragoons, which have been in that country for twenty years, such relief will, on many accounts, be expedient and necessary.

FREDERICK.

To Major-Gen. Sir George Murray.

[764.]

MY DEAR MURRAY,

Rabastens, 17th May, 1814.

I enclose a letter for Suchet, which I beg you to peruse and forward, after Burgh will have taken a copy of it; two from General Clinton; and one to Lord Castlereagh, which you will likewise peruse, and beg Burgh to forward it to Paris without loss of time.

In giving the orders for the expedition I forgot hospital stores and bedding, which I beg you will desire Dr. M'Grigor to take care that they have; and shoes and camp equipage, of which they ought to have a full proportion. I spoke both to Fane and Pakenham about the horses for the 14th Light Dragoons, but I believe the orders for the drafts ought to be given immediately. Burgh will find in the letter from the

Duke of York the number of horses stated to which the regiment is to be completed. I think it is 640; and I beg that orders may be given forthwith that they may be completed to that number of serviceable horses from the 12th, 13th, and 16th Light Dragoons, and that the horses may be forthwith handed over to the 14th, together with such horse appointments from those several regiments as the 14th may require to complete that number of horses.

I beg you to write to Torrens to let him know that I have given these directions in addition to those I have communicated to the Commander-in-Chief.

I omitted to mention to you that Wimpffen wrote to General Freyre to inform him that when you would acquaint him with the evacuation of Figueras by the French, you would send him a route for the march of his, Morillo's, Don Carlos's, and Mina's troops into the Spanish frontier; and I shall be obliged to you to do so.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The force ordered to embark for America is detailed in the following letters.

The Duke of York to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Horse Guards, 14th April, 1814.

His Majesty's government having decided upon sending a force to America whenever circumstances may admit of its being spared from the army under your Lordship's command, I am to acquaint you that the Prince Regent has been pleased to approve of the corps stated in the margin * being selected for this service.

* Artillery :

4 Companies.

Cavalry :

14th Light Dragoons 640

Infantry :

3rd Foot, 1st Battalion 900

5th Do. 1000

6th Do. 1000

9th Do. 1000

27th Do. 1000

28th Do. 800

29th Do. 1000

37th Do. 1000

39th Do. 900

40th Do. 800

44th Do. 1000

58th Do. 1000

81st Do. 1000

82nd Do. 1000

Infantry 13,400

It is intended that, besides a detachment of artillery and four squadrons of cavalry, the force to be employed upon this occasion shall consist of 12,000 infantry; and I may conclude that the aggregate strength of the corps may amount pretty accurately to that number. In case, however, that the severity of service which the troops have recently undergone should have caused an inefficiency in numbers since the last returns, which cannot be calculated upon here with any accuracy, your Lordship will be pleased to select any other corps you may think proper to make up the amount of the force required by government for the service of America; and to enable your Lordship to judge accurately on this subject, I transmit a return of the detachments which will be given from the depôts in this country for the regiments specified in the margin.*

A sufficient number of dismounted men will be embarked from hence to complete the 14th Dragoons to four squadrons of 160 rank and file each; and your Lordship will be pleased to complete the corps to that strength by the transfer of the required number of horses from other light cavalry regiments.

Your Lordship will be pleased to cause the 1st battalions of the 27th and 58th regiments to be completed to 1000 men each, from the 2nd battalions also under your command. The 29th regiment has been included in the annexed list, in consequence of its having been ordered to join you from Gibraltar; but should it not arrive before these arrangements are completed, other measures will be taken to attach that corps to the force destined for America.

In the communication which your Lordship will receive from the Secretary of State upon the subject of this expedition, you will be made acquainted with the wishes of government respecting the officer who should command it; and if you will inform me, with your earliest convenience, which of the three officers named by Lord Bathurst will accept it, I shall take the necessary measures for procuring his commission, and for communicating upon other military details regarding his command.

In the meanwhile, as it is essential that no time should be lost in the selection of the General Officers and Staff, I have to acquaint your Lordship that the Prince Regent has been pleased to approve of the infantry being formed into two divisions of 6000 men each, and 3 brigades in each division; and the following are the officers whom it is proposed to attach to those respective commands:—

To Command Divisions.

Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Clinton.
Major-General Sir George Murray.

To Command Brigades.

Major-General Kempt.
,, Robinson.
,, Barnes.
,, Pack.
,, Ross.
,, Power.

* 14th Light Dragoons, 3rd Foot, 5th, 6th, 9th, 28th, 29th, 37th, 39th, 40th, 44th, 81st, 82nd.

- 1 Deputy-Adjutant-General.
- 2 Assistants Do.
- 2 Deputy-Assistants Do.
- 1 Deputy-Quartermaster-General.
- 2 Assistants Do.
- 2 Deputy-Assistants Do.
- 1 Inspector of Hospitals.
- 2 Deputy Do.
- 6 Staff-Surgeons.
- 12 Hospital Mates.
- 1 Deputy-Commissary-General.
- 2 Assistants Do.
- 4 Deputy-Assistants, with the usual proportion of Clerks.

I leave it to your Lordship to appoint the officers to the Staff of the Adjutant and Quartermaster General's Departments, either according to your own selection, or in communication with the officer going in command, as you may think proper; and although I have specified a certain number of officers of the Commissariat and Medical Departments to be employed, yet I request your Lordship will authorize the heads of those departments, as well as that of the Pay Department in your army, to make such other provision for this service as may be thought necessary, in proportion to the force employed.

I have to request that your Lordship will order a Captain's detachment of the Royal Staff Corps to be attached to this force, and you will probably receive a communication from the Master-General of the Ordnance relative to the details of the Artillery and Engineer officers to be employed upon this occasion.

I am, my Lord, yours sincerely,

FREDERICK, Commander in Chief.

P.S. Since writing this despatch an arrangement appears to have been made for stopping the 29th in its course from Gibraltar and sending it to Canada. I have, therefore, to request that your Lordship will select a corps of equal strength to accompany this force in its stead.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Horse Guards, 14th April, 1814.

Return of Detachments which will be ordered to join the undermentioned corps :—

					Rank and File.
14th Light Dragoons	..	..	..	..	100
3rd Foot, 1st Battalion		..	..	..	70
5th Do.	..	..	..	..	200
6th Do.	..	..	..	..	180
9th Do.	..	..	..	..	130
28th Do.	..	..	..	..	30
37th Do.	..	..	..	..	200
39th Do.	..	..	..	..	100
40th Do.	..	..	..	..	100
44th Do.	..	..	..	..	160
81st Do.	..	..	..	..	100
82nd Do.	..	..	..	..	100

Colonel Torrens to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Horse Guards, 14th April, 1814.

In reference to the Duke's official letter of to-day, His Royal Highness desires me to acquaint you, that in the event of the General officers whom he has named to the command of divisions in the force destined to America not wishing to proceed upon that service, he leaves it to you to make any other appointments you may think proper. His Royal Highness would wish to have Pakenham employed upon this service, provided an acceptable command could be procured for him. But as there was a difficulty in naming him to a division, His Royal Highness thought it better not to mention him officially at all. But should Sir Henry Clinton and Sir G. Murray not wish to proceed upon the service offered to them, an opportunity will in that case offer of placing Pakenham in the command of a division.

Should any of the Major-Generals whom His Royal Highness has named also not be forthcoming, His Royal Highness requests you will supply the deficiency, reporting their names to him.

What a glorious and wonderful termination of the affairs in France! All this country are still lost in astonishment at events so unlooked for; and all concur in attributing the change which is so likely to establish peace and good order in the world to the able and distinguished conduct which has marked your career from the day you landed in Portugal.

This is so self-evident that no one will accuse me of flattery in declaring a truth so universally acknowledged.

Ever, my dear Lord,
Yours most faithfully and sincerely,

H. TORRENS.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

War Department, London, 18th May, 1814.

My despatch No. 27 conveyed instructions to your Grace to cause a large body of infantry to be assembled in the neighbourhood of Bordeaux, and to be prepared for embarkation. I have now to desire that your Grace will cause four of the strongest battalions of this infantry, together with one company of artillery, to be embarked immediately on board of the best coppered transports, and to sail as soon as sufficient convoy shall have been appointed for their protection. It is desired that one Major-General should accompany this division of troops, and you will furnish the Major-General whom you may select for the service with sealed instructions, which are not to be opened until the fleet shall have got out of the Bay of Biscay.

One week after the sailing of this first division of troops, your Grace will be pleased to cause a second division to put to sea, likewise under sealed orders. This corps is to be composed as the first of four battalions, (of which the 5th battalion of the 60th Regiment should be one) and a company of artillery. It is desired that Major-General Kempt should be placed in command of this second division.

A brigade of field artillery and a reserve of musket ammunition should accompany each division of troops.

A third corps is to be embarked exclusively on board of King's ships, fitted for the reception of troops. It is to consist of three of the best and most experienced regiments amongst those which your Grace had been instructed to prepare for embarkation. These three battalions, together with a proportion of artillerymen, sappers, and rocketmen, are to be placed under the command of either Major-General Barnes or Major-General Ross; they are to be embarked as soon as there are troop-ships ready for their reception, and will sail as the others under sealed orders.

The outline of the sealed instructions with which the General officers commanding are to be furnished severally is contained in the accompanying memorandum, marked "most secret."

It is desirable that the expedition No. 3 (commanded by Major-General Barnes or Major-General Ross) should be accompanied by a transport laden with rockets, by four light field pieces and two howitzers, a proportion of intrenching tools, and a large reserve of musket ammunition.

I have the honour to be

Your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

BATHURST.

P.S. Your Grace will be pleased to inform me as soon as possible what regiments are to be employed upon each of these services, in order that the detachments belonging to each, and now in England, may have their directions accordingly.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

1st Division.

The Major-General in command of this division will receive orders to proceed with the troops under his command direct to Quebec, and there place himself under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost.

2nd Division.

Major-General Kempt will receive similar orders in every respect.

3rd Division.

The officer in command of this division will receive orders to join the fleet under the command of Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane, employed upon the coasts of the United States. A regiment of infantry and a company of artillery have been ordered from Gibraltar to Bermuda, which the General officer proceeding in command of this division will be ordered to take under his command on his arrival at Bermuda. This third division will not wait for the departure of the two other divisions, but will proceed as soon as the troops can be embarked.

II.

H. Goulburn, Esq., to Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie.

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 19th May, 1814.

I am directed by Lord Bathurst to transmit under cover to your Lordship a despatch addressed to the officer commanding the British army in France,

under the impression that the absence of the Duke of Wellington and of Lord Hill may have left you in that situation. His Lordship is extremely anxious that the service to which the enclosed despatch relates should be executed with the least possible delay, and has therefore directed me to request that in the event of his supposition with respect to the Duke of Wellington and Lord Hill being correct, you will immediately take measures for executing the orders addressed to the Duke of Wellington; or in the event of either of them being present with the army, that you would forward the despatch with the greatest possible expedition.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,
HENRY GOULBURN.

III.

Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

Bordeaux, 25th May, 1814.

I hasten to send off a bag of despatches just received by packet from Falmouth, and by the *Whiting* schooner, bringing duplicates.

I shall proceed according to Lord Bathurst's instructions, and I conclude the three divisions will have sailed by the time specified, "a week hence."

Upon the despatch of His Royal Highness I do not venture to proceed, but enclose it to the decision of your Grace.

I should think myself acting uncandidly if I did not say to your Grace that I should be truly sorry that the duty of the Court Martial fell to my lot, but farther I will not presume to say a word.

The despatch of His Royal Highness in reference to the expedition is not important, merely stating that Lieutenant-General Sir H. Clinton will not be required in the arrangements for the expedition, and pointing out General Robinson as desirous of serving abroad. He is not yet arrived here: if he comes in time, he shall go; if not, General Power.

I have the honour to be
Your Grace's most faithful and obedient,
DALHOUSIE.

IV.

STATE of DIVISIONS formed in consequence of Lord Bathurst's Despatch dated 18th May, 1814.

1st Division.

Major-General ROBINSON or Major-General POWER.

3rd or Buffs	..	..	..	..	..	750
5th	..	..	..	..	..	800
27th	..	..	..	..	..	1000
58th	..	..	..	..	..	700
						3250

2nd Division.

Major-General KEMPT.

9th	..	..	..	..	..	..	900
37th	..	..	..	..	..	..	800
44th	..	..	..	..	..	..	700
60th, 5th Battalion			..	..	..	..	350
							2750

3rd Division.

Major-General ROSS.

4th	..	..	..	..	..	..	700
81st	..	..	..	..	..	..	800
85th	..	..	..	..	..	..	570
							2070

DALHOUSIE.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Fife House, 19th May, 1814.

I foresee that we shall have most serious difficulties on the subject of the article relative to the slave trade in this country, and I am sincerely of opinion that the French government have taken a mistaken view of their own interest on this question.

If they were prepared to say that they had no intention of agreeing to the abolition of the slave trade, considering the continuance of that traffic as indispensable to their colonies, their policy would be intelligible; but if they are prepared, as appears by your communication, to condemn the principle of the trade and to stipulate for its eventual abolition, I am convinced they would have less embarrassment in abolishing it immediately than at the end of three or five years.

I wish you to consider that the slave trade has now been abolished with regard to their colonies for the last six or seven years, as well as with respect to our own; that the immediate abolition would be only a continuance, therefore, of a system which now exists, and to which for a considerable space of time they have been accustomed. But if they are to suffer the slave trade to revive as to their own colonies—if they are to permit the inhabitants of those colonies again to taste of the advantages of that trade, the government will at the end of the period have to meet it as a new question; speculations will have been formed which will be disappointed; new capital will be embarked in consequence which cannot be withdrawn without great loss and inconvenience; and they will have all the clamours to meet, not only of the West India colonists, but of the merchants and inhabitants of the seaport towns who may embark their capital in the trade to Africa. In short, it appears to me to be much more easy and prudent to continue the abolition than to revive the trade and abolish it a few years hence. I wish you would bring these considerations seriously under the view of the government. If they are weighed dispassionately, I am satisfied they will be found to be just.

I cannot but hope that the prejudice which exists upon this subject has been hastily imbibed, and that if the French government would avow the principle upon which they are disposed to act, and state it to be a policy which they had adopted in conjunction with Great Britain, Holland, Denmark, and Sweden, the difficulties which they suppose they would have to encounter would in a great measure vanish.

Might not their feelings in some degree be reconciled to the question if it were made a part of the stipulation in the treaty that we should restore the colonies to Holland, upon the condition that the slave trade should be abolished by the Prince of Orange, in the same manner as by the British and French governments?

LIVERPOOL.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Fife House, 19th May, 1814.

In a letter which I wrote to you some time ago, I directed your attention to the large sum of money due from the French government to the British for the maintenance of prisoners of war.

You are of course aware that an article to liquidate these debts has usually been inserted in all treaties of peace. I do not believe that in the present case such an article would be likely to give us the money, and certainly could not give it without material pressure and inconvenience to the French government. It occurred to me, therefore, that there might be some grace in abandoning it, and that the honour of the French government might perhaps be saved on some other points by a formal relinquishment of this claim in an article of the treaty.

I can assure you that I feel sincerely desirous to see the credit of the French government upheld as far as we can contribute to it without the sacrifice of our public principles or of our essential interests.

You will see that we have lost no time in returning an answer to your despatch by Robinson. I trust the extravagant pretensions they have brought forward on the subject of the fisheries can raise no serious difficulty. We are ready to place them in this respect where they were in 1792, and that is all they can expect from us. In short, we demand nothing which is of any value to them except the Mauritius; for there is not a Frenchman in the island of Tobago, and the only value of St. Lucie is its port, which they do not want, having a much better in Martinique. Our moderation indeed is great compared with that of any of our Allies. This consideration cannot too often be brought under the view of the French government. I am anxious on this account, I confess, for the signature of the peace, as I am confident that both Great Britain and France will be able to speak with much more authority on many points when all our respective differences are adjusted.

LIVERPOOL.

Address from the Municipality of St. Jean de Luz to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MONSEIGNEUR,

19 Mai, 1814.

La première entrée de Votre Excellence dans nos murs fut un jour de gloire pour elle, de triomphe pour le gouvernement Britannique, d'anxiété pour nous, mais bientôt nous fûmes rassurés par la discipline sévère de l'armée. Son chef illustre ne tarda pas à justifier tout ce que la renommée se plaisait à publier de sa personne. Il nous montra dans la distribution de la justice l'impartialité la plus scrupuleuse, dans ses rapports avec nous la plus attrayante affabilité, dans la grandeur cette simplicité si méconnue, et qui pourtant en est le vrai caractère. La réunion de ces hautes qualités nous inspira les sentimens qu'elle ne manque jamais de produire. Nous avons dû en différer l'expression. Aujourd'hui nous jouissons de la manifester, avec la France entière, dans toute l'effusion de nos cœurs.

C'est à cette époque mémorable que nous avons eu le bonheur de posséder S.A.R. Monseigneur le Duc d'Angoulême, dont Votre Excellence a si puissamment concouru à replacer la dynastie sur le trône. C'est dans notre temple, construit il y a plus de trois siècles par les Anglais, célébré par le mariage de Louis XIV., que ce Prince, après de longs malheurs, a rendu au Tout-Puissant les premières actions de grâces de son retour dans sa patrie, sur le sol de l'héritage de ses pères. Ce Prince rivalisait de vertus avec Votre Excellence. Tant et de si précieux souvenirs se perpétueront dans la postérité. Ils se confondront, Monseigneur, dans notre mémoire comme se confondent dans nos cœurs avec l'amour pour nos augustes Souverains, les sentimens de reconnaissance, de respect, et de vénération que nous avons voués à Votre Excellence.

Les Membres de l'Administration Municipale
et les Notables de la Ville de St. Jean
de Luz et de Siboure.

(Here follow the signatures.)

Major-Gen. Sir G. Murray to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Toulouse, 19th May, 1814.

I received this morning your letter of the 17th from Rabastens, and the enclosures for Lord Castlereagh and for Marshal Suchet have been forwarded.

Amongst the steps taken on the first intimation of the intended expedition, I had requested Dr. MacGrigor to arrange a supply of medical stores for it, which was accordingly ordered, on the scale of twelve months' supply of stores for 15,000 men, and two months' supply of medicines besides, for the voyage, in possession of each battalion.

Major-General Fane had made an arrangement for completing the 14th Light Dragoons with horses and equipments from the two regiments of German Light Dragoons, but they have been now ordered to be completed from the 12th, 13th, and 16th regiments, which alteration can be made without any difficulty.

The expedition will be supplied with all articles of field equipment, as I directed the Commissary-General on the 4th of May to order round into the Garonne a sufficiency for 12,000 men. There were then but 500 tents in store, but they can have in addition some of the best of those now in use.

Believe me, my dear Lord, very faithfully yours,

G. MURRAY.

Sir C. Stuart to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 19th May, 1814.

Nothing of moment has occurred at Paris since I had the honour of writing. The Commission which is to approve the Constitution has lately been the principal object of consideration. The Crown, the Senate, and the Corps Législatif will, it is determined, each name three persons. The former has chosen the Chancellor, Garde des Sceaux, M. d'Ambray, the Abbé Montesquieu, and Ferrand the historian. The election of the remaining six can only take place after the convocation of the Senate and the Corps Législatif, which is fixed for the 31st May.

The irritation of the army has, I fear, not been adverted to by the French Princes, who desire to retain the great military offices they held before the Revolution. In distributing the rank of Colonel-General of the different arms among the numerous individuals of the Royal Family, the Generals Grouchy, Belliard, and Nansouty have been deprived of situations which did not exist in 1792, for which they have been offered inspectorships as an indemnity. General Grouchy, whose differences with Napoleon had placed him very high in the public esteem, after consulting Belliard, has, I understand, sent in the resignation of their different appointments. General Nansouty is absent, but will probably do the same.

The pretension of the Court of Vienna to improve the frontier of Germany on the Upper Rhine by the acquisition of a part of Alsace, and at least the demolition of Landau and Huningen, at the price of giving up Luxembourg and part of Hainault or Flanders, has been the subject of a great outcry among the partisans of the House of Orange.

Ever, my dear Lord, sincerely yours,

CHARLES STUART.

The Honourable R. Gordon to Earl Bathurst.

MY LORD,

Paris, 19th May, 1814.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's several despatches up to the 14th instant, the contents of which have been duly communicated to the French government and to Viscount Castlereagh.

Your Lordship will see, by the enclosed copy of a despatch which I addressed on the 10th instant to M. le Comte de la Forest, that your orders expressed to me in yours marked No. 4, with regard to the repre-

sentation to be made upon the subject of captures by American privateers, have been anticipated.

Although I have as yet received no official answer to the enclosed, I have learnt, in an interview which I demanded of Comte de la Forest, upon the receipt of your Lordship's despatch to me, that the French government is disposed to acknowledge the illegality of the condemnation by a French tribunal of such captures as may have been made by American vessels upon British property subsequent to the signing of the convention between Great Britain and France, and also of the arming and equipment of American privateers in the different ports of France for the express purpose of molesting the trade of Great Britain.

Comte de la Forest farther promised that, previous to the resigning of his office, he would urge the Prince of Bénévent to take the whole subject into consideration; and I have no doubt but that His Highness will arrange with Viscount Castlereagh the measures which they may both judge it most necessary to have carried into effect.

I have the honour to be, with great truth, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

R. GORDON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

The Honourable R. Gordon to the Comte de la Forest.

SIR,

Paris, 10th May, 1814.

It is with considerable regret that I have again to address myself to your Excellency upon the subject of prizes made by the American privateer *Prince of Neufchatel*, which, from the ready asylum found in the ports of France, and from the permission granted to such vessels by the French government there to unload, condemn, or otherwise dispose of their prizes, has been materially assisted in her depredations upon British property. I am induced to call the attention of your Excellency now the more forcibly to the question, from the hopes which you allowed me to entertain at a former period that certain measures had then been taken to prevent the continuance of these depredations, arising out of the spirit of accord and amity which so happily influences the governments of England and France.

I have before stated to your Excellency that several British vessels have been captured by the *Prince of Neufchatel* and carried into Havre de Grace. Among the last cases of this description which have come under the knowledge of the British government are those of the London packet, the *Farnley*, a vessel with government stores, and a Dutch and a Swedish vessel under the British flag.

I trust the French government will not hesitate, even under its existing relations with that of the United States, to acknowledge the right of reclamation on the part of Great Britain upon this point; for supposing that for a limited period after the signing of the convention between Great Britain and France, it be lawful for French vessels to make prizes and condemn them in French ports, it does not appear that America is entitled by the law of nations to the same privilege, since she has not been the ally of France in the war against Great Britain.

It may be said that the definitive arrangements of peace are not yet established; but a line of conduct has nevertheless been invariably adopted since

the signing of the conventions between the two nations, which appears to have been influenced in no manner by a distinction made between the two periods. Should the ports of France continue to afford an asylum to which American privateers may safely bring their prizes to be condemned and sold, Great Britain, by raising the blockade of these ports, will appear to have weakened her means of opposition to such hostile depredation, and consequently to have exposed her merchant trade to increased dangers and loss. Confident that this can never enter into the views of H.C.M. the King of France, I have to request your Excellency, in the name of the British government, to take such measures as may not only lead to the restitution of the vessels in question, but that immediate orders may be given to the authorities in the several ports of France not to admit American privateers to bring in such prizes as they may make hereafter, and to order out those already there as soon as the legitimate causes of their entry shall have ceased, without permitting any of their prizes to be unladen, condemned, sold, or otherwise disposed of.

I am induced to hope, from the conversation which I had the honour to hold with your Excellency in confidence upon this subject, that I shall shortly have the satisfaction to acquaint my government of the most efficient steps having been taken in consequence of the representation which I have now the honour officially to lay before you.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest truth,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

R. GORDON.

To Major-Gen. Sir George Murray.

[765.]

MY DEAR MURRAY,

St. Jean de Luz, 20th May, 1814, 7 A.M.

I enclose a letter from Lord Keith. I shall be obliged to you if you will consult the Commissary-General, commanding officer of artillery, and Dr. M'Grigor, regarding his Lordship's proposition respecting the ships, and signify to his Lordship my consent to what he proposes as far as those authorities concur.

In regard to the Spanish clothing, tell the Commissary-General that I beg the whole may be landed at Pasages, and that he will send me an account by the first messenger of what clothing this is, when it arrived, &c., &c.

I am just setting off.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

I answer that part of Lord Keith's letter regarding messes.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Admiral Lord Keith to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

Bordeaux, 16th May, 1814.

Having arrived in this city on the evening of the 10th instant, for the purpose of facilitating the preparation and departure of the men-of-war and transports intended to receive the troops destined to act in America, as well as for that of making arrangements for the removal of the remainder of the army to England as soon as orders to that effect arrive, I was in hopes that I should have had an opportunity of meeting your Grace here and communicating with you in person on these important objects; but as I understand from Lieutenant-General the Earl of Dalhousie that other avocations have not permitted you to visit Bordeaux, I have availed myself of his offer to send this letter by express, in the hope of its meeting your Grace at Bayonne.

Everything is in a forward state of preparation for the American expedition so far as depends upon the means to be provided by me, and I have reason to expect the arrival of other men-of-war and transports from England every moment.

Whenever orders arrive for the remainder of the army to return to England, I propose that the baggage and sick should be embarked here, and the troops at Pouillac, if your Grace approves of it; and as there are several empty vessels already in the river, as well as men-of-war continually passing and repassing, that are capable of containing many of the articles that will hereafter require to be removed, it would be desirable, if possible, that these opportunities should not be lost.

In case that part of the army to return to England is to be embarked in the Gironde, it will be important to remove everything from Pasages without loss of time; and as it appears by the last returns from the agent for transports there that there is in that port the number of transports described in the margin,* I propose to your Grace that the ships with ordnance stores which you may be of opinion are not likely to be wanted, as well as all other vessels not required for the army, should be sent to England under convoy as soon as possible, and that the other vessels having on board bread, forage, and other articles that may be useful here, should be removed to this river in like manner. And I beg particularly to draw your Grace's attention to the eleven vessels said to have on board clothing for the Spanish army.

It will also be desirable to break up the different establishments at

	No. of Vessels.					
* Ordnance stores	..	..	..	..	..	46
Bread	..	..	..	..	..	27
Corn	..	..	..	..	..	6
Hay	..	..	..	..	..	12
Hospital ships	..	..	..	..	..	2
Purveyor's stores	..	..	..	..	..	1
Moveable hospitals	..	..	..	..	..	2
Spanish clothing	..	..	..	..	..	11

Santander in like manner, and to concentrate everything as much as possible.

I am not without apprehension that difficulty will arise with regard to the reception on board King's ships of the field officers who are destined to act in America; for by a regulation between the Treasury and Board of Admiralty, dated 17th January, 1812, an extract of which I enclose, all officers of the army below the rank of Brigadier-General are either to provide their own mess, or to arrange for the expense thereof with the officers of the ship to whose mess they may be admitted. Officers of the army not having the rank of field officers will of course arrange in either of these ways that may be most agreeable to themselves; but in case the field officers are ordered to be received and entertained at the tables of the captains of the men-of-war, the latter will be disinclined to allow them to arrange for the expense of their mess; and your Grace will observe that I am strictly forbidden to make any deviation from the rule laid down. Under these circumstances I propose, with a view of obviating every difficulty, that your Grace should request me, in writing, to order the field officers to be received and accommodated by the captains; and if you consent to this proposal, and will, in consequence of the peculiarity of the service, join with me in a letter upon the subject to His Majesty's government, I will take upon myself to give the necessary orders, and an assurance to the captains that a reasonable remuneration will be made to them at the public expense.

I have the honour to be

Your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

KEITH.

II.

Extract of an Additional Instruction relating to His Majesty's Service at Sea. Printed in 1813.

"Whereas we have by our Secretary's minute, dated the 17th January, 1812, which has received the concurrence of the Lords of the Treasury, directed that the undermentioned allowances, and none other, shall be made to the captains and commanders of His Majesty's ships and vessels for the expenses incident to the passage of civil or military officers of high rank on the public service:

"In such of His Majesty's ships and vessels as are fitted for the conveyance of troops, and in any other of His Majesty's ships of war in which troops may be embarked with their officers, the passage only of officers of, or above, the rank of Brigadier-General shall be paid for; all other officers of the army shall either provide their own mess, or arrange for the expense thereof with the officers of the ship to whose mess they may be admitted.

"These rules will be most rigidly adhered to, and if any officer shall act inconsistently with them, he must himself be liable for every expense incurred."

Viscount Castlereagh to Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST,

Paris, 20th May, 1814.

I forward the letters enclosed just received from Lord Wellington. Unless you have some particular motive for pressing it, I am disposed to think it, under all circumstances, unadvisable to move the infantry through France. The length of the march and the consequent delay are objections, and as the necessity is not so apparent with respect to the infantry as the cavalry, it might create observation; the protracted presence of foreign troops being a topic amongst the discontented.

I am, my dear Lord, yours, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

I shall not make the application for the infantry unless I hear from you again.

The Prince de Bénévent to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Paris, le 20 Mai, 1814.


J'ai reçu la note et les divers documents que V.E. m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser hier relativement à l'introduction dans les ports de France et à la condamnation de plusieurs prises faites par les Américains sur les sujets Britanniques.

Sa Majesté s'était occupée de bonne heure de la position de neutralité où la France allait incessamment se trouver replacée entre la Grande Bretagne et les Etats-Unis. Ayant à tracer aux officiers résidant dans ses ports les règlements qu'ils ont à suivre envers les puissances belligérantes, elle a cherché à s'arrêter aux principes qu'une longue expérience avait consacrés et qui lui paraissaient les plus propres, soit à empêcher que ses sujets ne prissent part aux hostilités, soit à concilier le système d'impartialité qu'elle doit suivre envers les belligérans avec les devoirs de l'humanité, avec ses sentiments d'amitié envers Sa Majesté Britannique et de justice envers le gouvernement Américain; enfin, avec le désir de leur épargner mutuellement, autant qu'il est en elle, les maux de la guerre.

Les premières dispositions prises dans cette vue par Sa Majesté sont que pendant toute la durée de la guerre entre la Grande Bretagne et les Etats-Unis aucun bâtiment ne puisse être armé dans les ports du royaume pour le compte des puissances belligérantes; qu'aucun sujet de Sa Majesté ne puisse prendre intérêt dans leurs armements; qu'il ne soit permis de commettre aucune hostilité, soit dans les ports du royaume, soit à vue de ses côtes, et dans l'étendue de sa juridiction territoriale; que la vente de toutes les prises conduites dans ses ports soit provisoirement suspendue.

Des ordres conformes à ces dispositions ont été expédiés dans les différents ports. Sa Majesté n'a voulu mettre aucun délai à faire connaître, sur des questions si importantes, les principes de modération et d'équité qui dirigeront constamment sa politique envers les puissances belligérantes.

Ces mesures seraient néanmoins incomplètes, et ne s'appliqueraient point à tous les cas, s'il ne leur était pas donné quelques développements dans l'exécution. Il est arrivé dans cette guerre, comme dans toutes les guerres



antérieures, que quelques armements ne pouvant retourner directement avec leurs prises dans les ports d'expédition, soit par cause de tempête ou d'avarie, soit pour échapper à d'autres dangers imminents, étaient dans le cas de gagner un port neutre et de s'y trouver retenus plus ou moins de temps. L'humanité ne laisse, à leur égard, qu'une conduite à suivre, et la même hospitalité doit être également offerte à l'un et à l'autre belligérant ; mais il fallait aussi s'assurer qu'à l'époque où leurs bâtiments pourraient reprendre la mer, ils observeraient les uns envers les autres les principes de la neutralité, dans un temps et dans des limites déterminées. L'abri qu'ils reçoivent ne doit pas leur laisser la facilité de se tendre un piège. De sages réglemens y avaient pourvu à diverses époques, et Sa Majesté croit prudent d'ordonner qu'aucun armement des puissances belligérantes ne puisse sortir des ports du royaume, où diverses circonstances l'aurait conduit, qu'après s'être engagé à ne point attaquer les bâtiments qu'on aurait déjà signalés, ou qui seraient en vue, ou qui ne seraient sortis des mêmes ports que dans les 24 heures.

A la question des armements se trouve étroitement liée celle des prises, que Sa Majesté a également jugé digne d'une haute attention. Quelques principes généralement reconnus, et qu'on peut regarder aujourd'hui comme la base du droit commun, se trouvent heureusement établis à cet égard. L'examen des affaires de prises a toujours relevé des tribunaux et des autorités du capteur, sauf quelques circonstances d'exception telle que celle où il y aurait eu de sa part violation de neutralité. Hors de ces cas, les autorités du port neutre où une prise a été conduite ne peuvent ni connaître de sa validité ni en disposer. Cette maxime, constamment suivie en France, entre également dans les intérêts des belligérans, et tout le système de la course tomberait si les prises pouvaient être jugées ou attaquées par une autorité étrangère.

L'une des conséquences de cette règle et l'un des devoirs et des principes de la neutralité sont, lorsqu'une prise a été conduite dans un port neutre, qu'il ne soit mis aucun obstacle à son libre envoi dans les lieux indiqués par les commissions d'armement.

Mais lorsqu'il y a avarie dans les marchandises capturées, ou danger imminent, soit de les garder à bord, soit de les remettre sous voile, il a toujours été généralement admis d'en permettre le débarquement en entrepôt, jusqu'au moment où elles peuvent être envoyées à leur destination. Si la puissance neutre n'est point appelée à discuter et à fixer entre les belligérans le droit de propriété, du moins le droit d'occupation se trouve confié à sa sauve-garde, et son but doit être que la position du capteur et celle du capturé restent les mêmes jusqu'à ce que les autorités compétentes aient prononcé.

Celle de ces autorités à laquelle appartiennent l'administration et l'instruction des prises est le consul du capteur, et tant qu'il se renferme dans les limites de cette attribution, qui lui est généralement accordée, il ne peut pas être mis obstacle à l'exercice de ses fonctions. Néanmoins, comme son opinion dans les procédures de prises n'a point le caractère d'une décision définitive, les mesures qui peuvent en résulter ni doivent pas l'avoir d'avantage, et les intérêts de chaque partie doivent être conservés intacts, ou couverts d'une garantie suffisante, jusqu'au moment où un véritable jugement sera intervenu. C'est sans doute en ce sens que V. E. a demandé



que désormais aucune prise ne fut condamnée dans les ports de France où on l'aurait conduite.

Dans cette situation provisoire, et tant que le consul du capteur est chargé de l'administration des prises, il peut sans doute, d'après les règlements et les usages généralement admis, faire effectuer des ventes partielles, soit pour assurer l'entretien de l'équipage quand tout autre moyen est épuisé, soit en cas d'avarie, et sous caution ; mais Sa Majesté, déférant aux désirs de S.M.B., veut bien n'admettre que ces deux cas d'exception, et elle consent qu'à l'avenir aucune autre vente de prises conduites dans les ports du royaume n'y soit effectuée. Les capteurs privés de cet avantage ne pourront cependant pas être contraints d'emmener leurs prises dans un délai déterminé, et malgré l'imminence des périls. Mais pour s'assurer que la vente n'aura pas lieu, il est réservé de tenir ces prises en entrepôt dans les ports où elles auront été conduites, jusqu'au moment où les capteurs pourront les faire remettre en mer.

Sa Majesté ne se dissimule pas que les principaux avantages des dispositions auxquelles elle a cru devoir s'arrêter appartiendront à l'Angleterre ; mais ayant à s'attacher aux principes d'une exacte impartialité, elle a cherché les moyens qui pouvaient le mieux s'adapter à son désir de ne pas porter une nouvelle irritation dans une guerre qui survit malheureusement à la pacification de l'Europe. Sa Majesté enfin se persuade que les Etats-Unis, en remarquant le désavantage qui peut résulter pour eux de l'application de ces mesures, ne le croiront pas moins justes dans leur principe, et n'attribueront cette inégalité de résultats qu'à la différence des positions géographiques.

V.E. permettra que cette réponse à la note qu'elle m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser hier s'applique également à celle de M. Gordon du 10 de ce mois.

Je prie V.E. d'agréer, etc., etc.

Major-Gen. Sir G. Murray to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Toulouse, 20th May, 1814.

The officer who went yesterday with your Grace's letter to Marshal Suchet returned this evening with the enclosed answer. He brought me a message from Marshal Suchet to open the letter, which I had proposed at all events, indeed, to have taken the liberty of doing.

Believe me, my dear Lord, very faithfully yours,

G. MURRAY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Marshal Suchet to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Au Quartier Général de Carcassonne, le
20 Mai, 1814.

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

Je viens de recevoir la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 17 de ce mois. J'ai prévenu les désirs de Votre Excellence. J'ai répondu au Général Copons, et j'ai ordonné que toutes les difficultés fussent levées. Le Général Robert doit arriver le 22 à Villafranca. J'ai prescrit aux gouverneurs

des autres places de remplir strictement les clauses de notre traité. J'aurai l'honneur de vous dire à cet égard, Monsieur le Duc, que le Général Robert avait raison dans ses prétentions, et qu'il n'exigeoit rien que ce qui est tracé dans la convention faite le 19 Avril entre vous et moi. Il est textuellement exprimé que la garnison de Tortose doit se rendre à Perpignan par la grande route, et M. le Général Copons voulait qu'elle passât par les montagnes dans des chemins impraticables aux voitures. Le Général Robert invoquait encore cette convention au sujet des moyens de transport. M. le Général Copons exigeait qu'ils fussent payés ; les difficultés venaient donc toutes de ce dernier. Afin de lever cet obstacle et tous les autres, j'ai envoyé en Catalogne le Général de Division Comte Valée, commissionné par le Roi pour la remise des places ; je lui ai donné des ordres pour faire cesser toute contestation, et je suis assuré que rien ne s'opposera plus à ce que cette opération ne se termine promptement. J'espère même sous très peu de jours informer M. le Général Murray de la remise du fort San Fernando de Figuières, et de la rentrée en France de cette garnison.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, Monsieur le Duc,

De Votre Excellence le très humble serviteur,

SUCHET.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,

Madrid, 20th May, 1814.

This morning I received your letter from Toulouse of the 14th, announcing your return to that place, and your intention of coming to Madrid. The mules are posted as you desire. O'Lawlor, who will set out to meet you this evening or to-morrow morning, will tell you everything about your house, &c. I informed the King this morning that you were to arrive on the 23rd, and he seemed highly pleased.

You will find Madrid perfectly quiet ; more so than I have ever seen Madrid, or any other place in Spain. I am glad, however, that you are coming, in order that these people (I mean the King and his friends) may profit of any advice you may have to give them, which they certainly stand in great need of. I hope the messenger delivered my letter to you of the 15th, which would have apprised you of the state of affairs up to that period, since which there has been no alteration whatever.

The Conde de la Bisbal arrived this morning, and says that in the country through which he has passed there is not an individual who is not delighted at the King's proclamation. At Cadiz there has not been any resistance, and the command has been quietly resigned into the hands of Villa Vicencio.

Still, however, I dread the difficulties which the King will have to encounter, and I see no one about him capable of meeting them.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

I hope that Pole will come, everything here being perfectly quiet.

I have just been informed from the Palace that you are to be received with the same honours as the King, and that the Prince of Peace's house,

near the Palace, is prepared for you. I am sorry the house is so far from mine. Pray send back the courier immediately, in order that I may know about what time you will be near Madrid on the 23rd, as I shall go out to meet you.

O'Lawlor goes to meet you to-day.

[766.]

To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley.

MY DEAR HENRY,

Babon, 22nd May, 1814, $\frac{1}{2}$ past 9 P.M.

I received about an hour ago on the road your letter of the 20th, and I hope that you will have received mine of yesterday from Mondragon in time not to come out to meet me to-morrow.

I could not arrive at Madrid till very late to-morrow night; and I propose, therefore, to sleep to-morrow either at Buytrago, Cavanillas, or St. Augustin, so as to arrive at Madrid early on the 24th.

I shall be obliged to you if you will find out whether it is the King's wish that I should go to him first, or first to the house which I am to occupy, as I must be prepared accordingly; also whether he has abolished the Order of San Fernando as well as other decrees of the Cortes.

I don't know whether Pole is coming or not. I believe Sydenham is, but he will not be at Madrid till the 26th. I believe Pole is with him, but I have not heard of him since he left Paris the day after me. He passed by Bordeaux.

I have with me Alava, Lord FitzRoy, and Lord Apsley.

As I am to be so far from you, pray have a carriage got for me, and some servants.

Ever yours, my dear Henry, most affectionately,

WELLINGTON.

I believe I forgot to tell you I was made a Duke.

Sir C. Stuart to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 22nd May, 1814.

No material event has taken place since I wrote last.

The Allied troops, with the exception of the Guards and the garrison of Paris, have begun to move towards the frontier. The vexations which have been complained of during their stay have been trifling, compared with the enormous requisitions exacted to facilitate their departure. The

prefects of several departments have even come to Paris for the express purpose of representing the extreme difficulty of facing such demands.

I find that not only the commissioners on the part of the Crown who are to revise and examine the Constitution, but that the members of the Senate and Legislative body selected for that purpose, are to be chosen by the King.

The Constitutionals gain strength by the delay of a definitive arrangement, or at least they speak their sentiments with a freedom I did not observe at the period of my arrival in Paris.

M. d'Argenson, who was appointed last week to a prefecture on the part of the King, refused the office, alleging that his nomination could not be valid until the King had accepted and sworn to maintain the Constitution which shall be determined on.

Ever, my dear Lord, your faithful and obliged,

CHARLES STUART.

Major-Gen. Sir G. Murray to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Toulouse, 23rd May, 1814.

I received your letter of the 20th from St. Jean de Luz this morning. The enclosed is a copy of one which I have since written to Lord Keith, and send open to Lord Dalhousie.

I send also a letter I have had to-day from Lord Dalhousie, chiefly on account of what it contains about the battalions of militia, which does not agree with what your Grace mentioned to me respecting the period of their embarkation. However, I do not suppose it is a matter of much consequence.

I sent your Grace a few days ago Marshal Suchet's answer to your letter of the 17th from Rabastens. He stated his having sent General Valée into Catalonia to do away all difficulties respecting the evacuation of the fortresses, and that he reckoned upon the garrison of Tortosa being at Villafranca on the 22nd. I think this will bring it to the last days of May before I can have an intimation of the giving up of Figueira.

There is no answer yet from the Minister at War to the communications forwarded to Paris on the 15th instant about the march of the cavalry.

Believe me, my dear Lord, very faithfully yours,

G. MURRAY.

Lieutenant-Colonel Waller reports that the French garrison of Santoña embarked on the 15th, and sailed the day following.

G. M.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Major-Gen. Sir G. Murray to Admiral Lord Viscount Keith.

*

MY DEAR LORD,

Toulouse, 23rd May, 1814.

I received yesterday afternoon the letter which your Lordship was so good as to write to me on the 20th instant, but I deferred doing myself the honour

to acknowledge it until this morning, in the expectation that the Duke of Wellington might probably transmit me some instructions from St. Jean de Luz, which I have just now received.

The Duke has enclosed to me your Lordship's letter to his Grace of the 16th instant.

In compliance with your Lordship's desire, the Commissary-General has been directed to have the eleven vessels lying at Pasages, with Spanish clothing on board, immediately unloaded, that these vessels may become disposable. The Commissary-General has already made arrangements for sending away also all the supplies that can as yet be spared, and I find that he has addressed an application to Admiral Penrose for the ships with these supplies being sent to England.

Directions will be given for the removal of everything from Santander and Bilbao, with the exception of the supplies of provisions and forage which are in depôts on shore in those places.

There are at Santander four or five ordnance transports, which may also be sent to England whenever your Lordship may think proper.

The commanding officer of the artillery has received instructions to expedite, as much as possible, the embarkation, on board of the ordnance transports at Pasages, of the battering train, and the other artillery which is to be put on board there; as also of the depôts of ammunition and stores which are in the vicinity of Pasages, at Socoa, or upon the banks of the Adour. It is proposed that these latter should be sent to Pasages in small craft, or on board of such vessels as may happen to be already in the river Adour.

There will be no inconvenience in your Lordship's sending away the ordnance transports from the harbour of Pasages to England, in proportion as their loading is completed; it being understood, of course, that the selection of the ordnance equipments destined to accompany the expedition to America has been previously completed.

In regard to the Medical Department, I have to observe to your Lordship that the situation of our principal hospitals at Orthez, the neighbourhood of Bayonne, St. Jean de Luz, Fuenterrabia, and Pasages, renders it in some degree a matter of necessity that the embarkation of the sick should take place in the port most contiguous to those places.

It would have been convenient if the sick and wounded from Orthez and Bayonne (about 800) could have had water conveyance from the mouth of the Adour; but in consequence of the difficulty and risks which are represented as attending the use of that place of embarkation, arrangements will be made for the removal of these men by land-carriage from Bayonne to St. Jean de Luz.

The Inspector of Hospitals has received instructions respecting the allotment of a proportion of stores of his department for the American expedition, which will be accompanied by some of the portable hospitals. He will make an allotment to go home in each of the ships employed in the conveyance of sick and wounded to England; and whatever vessels remain after these allotments, with stores of the Medical Department on board, will be disposable to be sent away whenever your Lordship directs.

In a letter which I wrote to Lord Dalhousie on the 18th instant, I stated that it would be very desirable that the 1st and 5th divisions of the army, and a few other battalions of infantry, near Bayonne and St. Jean de Luz, should be embarked somewhere in that neighbourhood. Your Lordship will best judge whether the ports of St. Sebastian, Pasages, or Fuenterrabia would answer, however, for that purpose.

By embarking the troops at those places we should be able to send away

from thence all their Spanish and Portuguese followers, and all the *attirail* which accumulates about an army upon service, and which it would be impossible to separate from the troops until they reached Bordeaux, in case they proceed by land to that place. I may further add that there will be a great facility in supplying these troops, till the moment of their embarkation, where they now are, from the dépôts which already exist upon that part of the coast; whereas, if they are to march to Bordeaux, the supplies must be purchased in the country.

Believe me, &c.,

G. MURRAY.

Major-Gen. Sir G. Murray to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington. *

MY DEAR LORD,

Toulouse, 24th May, 1814.

I enclose a copy of the communication I have received to-day from the French Minister at War in answer to your Grace's letter to him of the 14th instant. A copy of the letter which I have written to General Dupont in reply is also enclosed. I shall send copies of these papers likewise to Lord Dalhousie.

Although the delays in Catalonia have retarded a little the general movement of the infantry, I thought it unnecessary to put off any longer the sending away the artillery. The guns and carriages of the two troops of horse artillery in this neighbourhood are embarking therefore to go down the river to Bordeaux, and orders have been given for the movement of the other brigades of artillery also towards the coast.

Believe me, my dear Lord, very faithfully yours,

G. MURRAY.

The French Minister at War does not appear to make use of the words division and column in the same manner we usually do, nor to make use of them in the same sense throughout.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

The Ministre de la Guerre to Major-Gen. Sir G. Murray.

Paris, le 20 Mai, 1814.

Général Lord Wellington m'adressé, en date du 14 Mai, copie des itinéraires proposés pour la marche des deux colonnes de cavalerie Anglaise, qu'il désire faire diriger sur Mantes, pour aller de là s'embarquer sur les côtes de la Manche.

Le Roi ayant approuvé ce mouvement, je m'empresse de vous en prévenir. Je donne des ordres sur les deux routes que ces colonnes doivent suivre, afin qu'on prépare les vivres et les moyens de transport nécessaires.

Je n'ai fait aucun changement aux itinéraires proposés par Lord Wellington, si ce n'est de substituer à quelques lieux de logement, où il ne se trouve ni manutention ni approvisionnement, les véritables gîtes d'étape établis sur les

mêmes directions, et dans lesquels il existe des ressources pour les besoins des troupes en marche. Je vous envoie les deux itinéraires ainsi rectifiés.

Quant à l'époque du départ, je pense qu'elle peut être fixée au 1 Juin ; d'ici-là mes ordres seront parvenus sur tous les points, et l'on aura pu prendre des mesures préparatoires. Mais il est un objet sur lequel je dois appeler l'attention de Votre Excellence, c'est la nécessité de ne pas faire marcher chaque division en une seule colonne.

Lord Wellington, dans la lettre qu'il m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser, a présenté lui-même que cette force de 5000 à 6000 chevaux pouvait être trop considérable ; en effet, comme ces divisions ont à traverser des pays fatigués par le séjour prolongé d'un grand nombre de troupes, et particulièrement des chevaux, il serait nécessaire que chaque division marchât en quatre colonnes successives à 24 heures de distance l'une de l'autre. Ainsi le départ de chaque division pourrait s'effectuer en quatre portions à peu près d'égale force, les 1, 2, 3, et 4 Juin. Par cette disposition on prévient l'encombrement ; les moyens de transport seront plus facilement assurés, ainsi que la distribution de vivres et de fourrages. Je prie Votre Excellence de vouloir bien donner ses ordres en conséquence.

J'expédie ce soir tous mes ordres et avis sur les deux routes. J'engage Votre Excellence à faire précéder chaque colonne d'un officier ou commissaire qui vienne à l'avance dans chaque lieu de logemens militaires annoncer sa force, et concerter avec les autorités locales toutes les mesures relatives au logement, aux subsistances, et aux transports. Pour faciliter d'autant plus tous ces détails de service, je pense qu'il sera utile, et Votre Excellence le jugera sans doute convenable, de faire marcher un commissaire ou officier Français avec chaque colonne. Dans ce cas, Général, je vous engage à demander à M. le Maréchal Suchet le nombre d'officiers ou commissaires Français nécessaires.

Je recommande aux généraux commandant les divisions militaires que doivent parcourir les divisions Anglaises de veiller pendant leur passage à ce que rien n'altère l'harmonie et la bonne intelligence que doivent régner entre les troupes des deux nations.

Veillez agréer, Général, l'expression des sentimens de ma haute considération.

LE COMTE DUPONT.

II.

ITINÉRAIRE que suivra la Division de Droite de Cavalerie Anglaise, marchant en quatre colonnes successives, à 24 heures de distance l'une de l'autre, savoir :—

	Chevaux.
La brigade de hussards	2000
Cavalerie de la maison du Roi	1400
La brigade commandée par le Major-Général Ponsonby	1400
La brigade commandée par le Major-Général Fane	900
Chevaux du train	300
	6000

	1e Colonne.	2e Colonne.	3e Colonne.	4e Colonne.
Grisolles	1 Juin	2 Juin	3 Juin	4 Juin
Montauban	2	3	4	5
Caussade	3	4	5	6
Cahors	4	5	6	7
Séjour à Cahors ..	5	6	7	8
Fressinet	6	7	8	9
Souillac	7	8	9	10
Brives	8	9	10	11
Séjour à Brives ..	9	10	11	12
Uzerche	10	11	12	13
Pierre Buffière ..	11	12	13	14
Limoges	12	13	14	15
Séjour à Limoges ..	13	14	15	16
Bessines	14	15	16	17
St. Benoît	15	16	17	18
Argenton	16	17	18	19
Châteauroux	17	18	19	20
Séjour à Châteauroux	18	19	20	21
Vatan	19	20	21	22
Vierzon	20	21	22	23
Salbris	21	22	23	24
La Ferté Senneterre	22	23	24	25
Orléans	23	24	25	26
Séjour à Orléans ..	24	25	26	27
Artenay	25	26	27	28
Angerville	26	27	28	29
Etampes	27	28	29	30
Séjour à Etampes ..	28	29	30	1 Juillet.
St. Arnoult	29	30	1 Juillet	2
Montfort	30	1 Juillet	2	3
Mantes	1 Juillet	2	3	4

Où elles recevront de nouveaux ordres.

III.

ITINÉRAIRE que suivra la Division de Gauche de la Cavalerie Anglaise marchant en quatre colonnes successives, à 24 heures de distance l'un de l'autre, savoir :—

	Chevaux.
La brigade commandée par le Colonel Arentschildt ..	1100
La brigade commandée par le Général Vandeleur ..	1500
La brigade de cavalerie de la Légion Hanovrienne ..	900
Chevaux du train	2000
	5500

106 MARCH OF BRITISH CAVALRY TO MANTES. MAY, 1814.

	1e Colonne.	2e Colonne.	3e Colonne.	4e Colonne.
St. André	1 Juin	2 Juin	3 Juin	4 Juin
Monlieu	2	3	4	5
Barbezieux	3	4	5	6
Angoulême	4	5	6	7
Séjour	5	6	7	8
Mansle	6	7	8	9
Ruffec	7	8	9	10
Couhé	8	9	10	11
Poitiers	9	10	11	12
Séjour	10	11	12	13
Châtellerault	11	12	13	14
St. Maure	12	13	14	15
Tours	13	14	15	16
Séjour	14	15	16	17
Châteauregnault	15	16	17	18
Vendôme	16	17	18	19
Cloye	17	18	19	20
Bonneval	18	19	20	21
Chartres	19	20	21	22
Séjour	20	21	22	23
Epernon	21	22	23	24
Houdan	22	23	24	25
Mantes	23	24	25	26

Où ces colonnes recevront de nouveaux ordres.

IV.

Major-Gen. Sir G. Murray to the Ministre de la Guerre.

M. LE COMTE,

Toulouse, le 24 Mai, 1814.

J'ai reçu ce matin la lettre que Votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser de Paris le 20 Mai, avec les itinéraires pour la marche de la cavalerie Anglaise ; et les ordres seront donnés en conséquence pour ce mouvement.

La division de droite marchera comme Votre Excellence le désire en quatre colonnes qui partiront le 1, 2, 3, et 4 de Juin, en suivant exactement l'itinéraire désigné par Votre Excellence. D'après cet arrangement deux de ces colonnes se trouveront réunies dans le même endroit chaque fois qu'il y aura un jour de repos ; mais si Votre Excellence trouve que cette réunion pourroit occasionner aucun inconvénient, je la prie de vouloir bien m'en faire avertir, et on y remédiera en mettant un jour d'intervalle entre le départ de chaque colonne.

Il n'est pas possible à présent de fixer d'une manière si positive les mouvements de la division de gauche. Le délai survenu dans l'évacuation des places de la Catalogne a dû retarder un peu le départ des troupes qui doivent rentrer en Espagne, ce qui a empêché le mouvement général de l'armée vers la côte ; et comme la division de gauche de la cavalerie doit être accompagnée par la plus grande partie des chevaux du train, ces chevaux ne seront disponibles pour commencer leur marche que lorsqu'ils auront déposé le matériel de l'artillerie dans les environs des lieux d'embarquement.

On prendra des mesures cependant, autant que les circonstances les permet-

tront, pour empêcher tout délai dans les mouvements de la division de gauche. Cette division marchera aussi en quatre colonnes, en suivant exactement pour les étapes aussi l'itinéraire fixé par Votre Excellence, et j'aurai l'honneur de prévenir Votre Excellence du jour de départ de chaque colonne de cette division aussitôt qu'il pourra être fixé définitivement.

J'aurai soin, d'après les instructions du Duc de Wellington, de faire précéder chaque division par un officier de l'état-major, accompagné d'un officier du département des vivres, pour se concerter avec les autorités locales sur tous les objets indiqués dans la lettre de Votre Excellence; et j'aurai l'honneur de m'adresser immédiatement à Monsieur le Maréchal Suchet, pour le prier de vouloir bien faire marcher un commissaire ou officier Français avec chaque colonne, comme Votre Excellence l'a proposé.

Monsieur le Maréchal me fera sans doute savoir si je dois communiquer directement avec le Général Decaen pour ce qui concerne les commissaires ou officiers Français qui marcheront avec la colonne de la division de gauche.

Pour ce qui regarde le maintien de l'harmonie et de la bonne intelligence qui doit régner entre les troupes des deux nations, Votre Excellence peut compter parfaitement sur les bonnes dispositions de tous les officiers de l'armée Anglaise à cet égard.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, Monsieur le Comte,

Votre très obéissant serviteur,

G. MURRAY.

The Commissioners for Prize Money to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Bordeaux, 24th May, 1814.

We have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Grace's letter of the 14th inst. appointing us Commissioners in concert with the Commissary-General to ascertain the amount of the enemy's property captured by the army under your Grace's command, and we beg to assure your Grace that we shall lose no time in taking the necessary steps to execute this trust.

We have also received and perused with great attention the copy of your Grace's letter to the Commissary-General, and the copy of the letter from your Grace to His Royal Highness the Duc d'Angoulême.

We transmitted the latter document to Mr. Commissary Ogilvie, and on the authority thereof he has reported to the préfet of this department that he was ready to deliver up the tobacco, salt, and colonial produce of every description in the magazines at Bordeaux on payment of the duties recently laid on these articles by the French government, or upon security for the payment of them.

We have called on the Commissaries at Bordeaux and Langon for returns and certificates of the quantity and species of the enemy's stores taken possession of by them respectively, and we shall forward these documents to the Commissary-General to enable him to prepare for your Grace the return required by the Secretary of State.

In obedience to your Lordship's orders, founded on the opinion of the King's Advocate, we observe that we are to consider as booty to the army only: first, the enemy's magazines; secondly, the duties levied or payable

to the enemy's government on goods kept in magazine as security for these duties ; thirdly, ships belonging to the French government, whether afloat or on the stocks, it being understood that the former were captured ; fourthly, ships of war or private ships belonging to individuals of a nation at war with any of the Allies with the merchandise on board.

We shall not fail to attend to that part of your Grace's orders which directs us to make a distinction between the ships captured before and after the period at which the squadron entered the Gironde, and we shall report to your Grace any difficulties which we may experience in the execution of the instructions with which your Grace has honoured us.

We have the honour to be, with the greatest respect,

My Lord,

Your Grace's most obedient and most humble servants,

J. OGILVIE.

N. ECKERSLEY.

Sir Charles Stuart to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 26th May, 1814.

The measures which have been adopted by the Court during the last week are not, I think, calculated to maintain the opinion which the moderation and prudence manifested by the King during the first days of his residence here had acquired.

Though the King appointed the deputies of the Senate and of the Corps Législatif who are to compose the Commission for examining the Constitution, he kept his intentions a profound secret even from his ministers until the day that the nomination was published. He then increased the number to nine from each body, thus making the whole Commission twenty-one ; and among the persons selected he included several (among others Boissy d'Anglas) whose sentiments upon the question they have to consider are well known to be adverse to the Court.

They met for the first time on the 22nd, when it appeared that the very groundwork of the Constitution is yet unformed, since the discussion of the principles upon which it is to be drawn up lasted during the greater part of the session. A proposition from the Abbé de Montesquiou that the election of the members of the Corps Législatif shall not be vested in their constituents, but that it shall be left to the Crown, has been rejected by the Commission with some alarm and ill-humour, which was not diminished by a subsequent attempt from the same source to acquire the *initiatif des loix*, by which the proposition of every law which can be the subject of discussion or can be voted in the Senate and Legislative Body must emanate from the Crown.

The Crown has lost popularity by these failures ; and the Commission has likewise lost so much valuable time in the discussions to which they have given rise, that it is very probable nothing will be finally determined before the 31st, when the Senate and the Corps Législatif are to assemble, and consequently the government will be exposed to the very inconvenience which the appointment of the Commission was intended to obviate.

The persons who were employed under the late government complain bitterly that the emigrants and the Faubourg de St. Germain possess unbounded influence over the councils of Louis XVIII., and that all the measures of the Court tend to the re-establishment of the order of things which existed in 1786, and to the prejudice of those who have served under the successive governments since that period. The emigrants who do not consider that their sufferings and services have been adequately rewarded are equally discontented, and the deputation which lately arrived from La Vendée expressed their feelings upon this subject before they quitted Paris, in terms which cannot but be extremely grating to the Court.

M. de Blacas, who has lately been named Grand Maître de la Garderobe, is generally understood to enjoy the principal share of the King's confidence.

The treaty is nearly brought to a conclusion, and if it will be signed this evening or to-morrow, as there is every reason to expect, it is probable that the Emperor of Russia will leave Paris on Monday. Letters he has received from his sister the Duchess of Oldenburg, who it appears has lately taken a very decided part in the questions which are agitated at Carlton House, will induce him to carry over his two younger brothers, the Grand Dukes Michael and Nicholas.

The impatience of the Prince of Orange upon the subject of the Low Countries, and the repugnance which the Princess Charlotte has lately manifested to the projected marriage with his son, have suddenly brought him to Paris. He will return after the treaty is signed.

It is somewhat remarkable under these circumstances that Sir T. Tyrwhit should have been sent here to carry over the Queen's nephew, the young Prince of Mecklenburg Strelitz.

Though government have not availed themselves of the present opportunity to settle the Catholic question by an agreement with the Court of Rome, the Catholics have been more attentive to their interests. Dr. Milner, whose character is well known, came over to Calais on his way to Rome, about ten days ago.

Believe me, my dear Lord, ever very sincerely yours,

CHARLES STUART.

*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, or
Officer commanding the British Army.*

MY LORD,

Downing Street, 26th May, 1814.

His Majesty's government having deemed it advisable still further to reinforce the army under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, I have to desire that your Grace will cause four of the most effective regiments of infantry which may have been assembled in the neighbourhood of Bayonne,* together with one company of artillery, to be embarked immediately on board of coppered transports, and to sail either in company with the second division of troops specified in my despatch marked "Secret" of the 18th inst., or as soon after the departure of that division as convoy shall have been appointed for their protection.

* Bordeaux probably is meant.

110 FRENCH COUNTER-PROJECT ON SLAVE TRADE. MAY, 1814.

One Major-General will be selected by your Grace to accompany this division of troops, who will be furnished with sealed instructions, in every respect similar to those given to the officers in command of the first and second divisions specified in my despatch of the 18th inst., to which I have already referred.

As it is extremely important that the reinforcements intended for Canada should reach their destination without delay, your Grace will not consider it necessary to detain the second division for the purpose of its being accompanied by the third. For the same reasons it will be desirable that the third division should, if possible, be ready to sail by the time fixed in my former despatch for the departure of the second.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Grace's most obedient, humble servant,

BATHURST.

P.S.—Your Grace will take the earliest opportunity of informing me of the particular regiments which you may think proper to select for this service, in order that measures may be taken for forwarding their several detachments from this country to the point of their destination.

[We must have a return of the regiments, &c., and General officers embarked with each of these divisions, the time when sailed, &c.]

WELLINGTON.]

Viscount Castlereagh to the Prince de Bénévent.

Paris, 26th May, 1814.

The undersigned, &c., has, in conformity to his assurance to that effect, submitted to the consideration of his government the counter projet received from the Prince of Bénévent on the subject of the slave trade. He has not failed to do justice to the several arguments upon which His Highness felt it necessary to propose to postpone for a period of five years giving effect to the benevolent views of his government.

The undersigned cannot dissemble from His Highness the deep disappointment this intimation has occasioned, and the conviction felt by the Prince Regent and his Ministers that it would be preferable, even for the interest of the French colonies now about to be restored, to stand wholly excluded from a traffic which for eight years has been found unnecessary to their prosperity than to encourage a revival of the trade, and afterwards to arrest and relinquish it.

Lord Castlereagh had this morning an occasion, in conjunction with his colleagues, of pressing with every possible earnestness the subject of immediate and general abolition, but more especially in the islands to be ceded by Great Britain to France. He cannot but still flatter himself that the considerations urged in this conference may have had their weight upon reflection, and that the auspicious resumption of the throne of his ancestors by the present benevolent Sovereign of France may not be marked by a

renewal of this detested commerce in colonies where its baneful influence has long been happily unknown.

The undersigned is commanded to bring this subject again under the consideration of His Most Christian Majesty, and to entreat His Majesty would at once adopt the measure of absolute and immediate abolition, which has been productive of none of those commercial calamities to Great Britain which were predicted from it. If His Most Christian Majesty, however, cannot reconcile himself to this decisive act of moral justice, Lord Castlereagh is directed to entreat that His Majesty would adopt at least the modifications contained in the enclosed article.

The undersigned has the honour to transmit the Address of both Houses of Parliament to the Prince Regent on this subject, to which he feels it his duty to request the particular attention of the French government.

The undersigned, &c. &c.

CASTLEREAGH.

[ENCLOSURE.]

The Prince de Bénévent to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Paris, le 26 Mai, 1814.

J'ai l'honneur d'envoyer à Votre Excellence une nouvelle rédaction de l'article sur le commerce des Noirs. C'est l'ancien article, auquel j'ai seulement fait deux additions.

Votre Excellence verra qu'au lieu d'un engagement de la part du Roi d'abolir la traite, il en renferme actuellement deux, l'une implicite, mais qui n'est pas le moins fort puisque c'est un engagement d'honneur résultant des termes dans lesquels Sa Majesté parle de ce genre de trafic : l'autre explicite, et exprimé par les mots, *ainsi qu'elle* (l'abolition) *sera prononcée par S.M.T.C.* Il nous faut, My Lord, vous en êtes vous-même convenu, et vous y avez consenti, il nous faut, dis-je, une forme de rédaction qui présente l'engagement du Roi sur une chose de cette nature comme l'effet d'une détermination entièrement libre et volontaire. Or la rédaction proposée est absolument la seule qui réponde à cette vue.

Vous voudriez, My Lord, que la traite ne peut subsister encore que pendant trois ans. Nous persistons à en demander cinq. Que V.E. veuille bien considérer que ces cinq ans se réduiront de fait à quatre, puisque vous ne nous rendez nos colonies d'Amérique et nos comptoirs d'Afrique qu'au mois de Septembre, et qu'alors la saison trop avancée forcera les spéculateurs à renvoyer leur expédition à l'année suivante. L'opinion générale en France à l'égard de la traite est loin d'être ce qu'elle est en Angleterre. Il est donc nécessaire de la réconcilier avec un mesure qui dans le premier moment sera, certainement, considérée comme désastreuse. Des opinions enracinées par un long usage ne cèdent point à un premier choc. Elles ne cèdent guères à des raisonnemens s'ils ne sont appuyés de l'expérience, et certes une expérience de cinq années dans une pareille matière doit paraître bien courte.

Quant à la condition de ne point faire la traite entre le Cap Blanc et le Cap de Palmas, elle est totalement nouvelle. Il n'en avait pas été question à Châtillon ; il n'en avait pas été question ici. C'est depuis hier seulement que vous la proposez. Elle est aggravante : on peut dire qu'elle est en contradiction avec la clause qui permet la traite pendant un tems donné. Car ce commerce on ne se pourrait pas faire du tout ou ne se fera point avec quelque avantage sur des côtes que l'on n'a point fréquentées, que l'on ne connaît point,

où l'on est inconnu, et où il faudrait avant tout établir des relations qui ne peuvent s'établir que peu à peu, et que la brièveté des délais accordés ne donnerait pas le tems d'établir. Ainsi, avec cette condition nouvelle, on aurait la faculté de faire la traite, et les moyens de la faire seraient ôtés.

Vous partagez sûrement, My Lord, l'opinion de ceux qui pensent que, en fait de prohibition quand il y a divers moyens d'arriver au même but, des moyens directs et d'autres qui ne le sont pas, ceux-ci doivent être préférés, comme plus doux et peut-être aussi comme plus sûres.

Vous assurez, my Lord, que les colonies que vous nous restituez n'ont pas besoin d'un nombre de Noirs plus grand que celui qu'elles ont maintenant. La conséquence qu'il en faut tirer c'est qu'on n'y en achètera pas. Car ce n'est pas pour le plaisir qu'on les achète, mais pour le besoin. Les marchands d'esclaves ne pouvant y en vendre, n'y en portèrent pas. Donc, si la France défend à ses sujets d'en importer et d'en vendre ailleurs que dans ses colonies, où ils ne peuvent espérer d'en vendre, ils abandonneront d'eux-mêmes un commerce qui ne leur offrirait plus que des pertes à essayer, et l'on aura obtenu par cette simple restriction l'effet complet ou à peu près complet d'une prohibition absolue. Or cette restriction est l'objet de la seconde addition que j'ai faite à l'article sur la traite.

J'ose donc me flatter que dans son état actuel Votre Excellence n'y trouvera rien à désirer.

Agréez, my Lord, etc., etc.,

LE PRINCE DE BÉNÉVENT.

Viscount Castlereagh to the Prince de Bénévent.

Paris, 27th May, 1814.

The undersigned, &c. has the honour to acknowledge the Prince of Bénévent's note of yesterday with its enclosures. Lord Castlereagh begs His Highness will be assured that, in the performance of what he considers a sacred act of public duty, it is not less his desire than consistent with the pleasure of the Prince Regent that he should, in the mode of effectuating a common purpose, accommodate as far as possible to the sentiments and feelings of His Most Christian Majesty.

In this view he cannot hesitate to accept the article in the form His Highness has transmitted it, with the alteration since made, if he may be permitted to understand that His Majesty will feel himself not less the guardian of the interests of humanity with respect to this question during the period that is to elapse before the trade shall be absolutely and finally prohibited to French subjects.

The undersigned cannot avoid, however, again calling His Highness's attention to the two objects to which his former note was specially directed.

The first is, as to the prevention of the revival of this commerce on that part of the coast of Africa between Cape Palmas and Cape Blanco, where, in consequence of its suspension for a length of time, considerable progress has been made in introducing commercial intercourse with the natives of Africa.

The second is, with respect to the colonies which Great Britain is to restore to France, and from whence, without prejudice to their prosperity, this commerce has been long excluded.

If the undersigned may consider these possessions as confided to the benevolent care of His Most Christian Majesty in this respect, he will not further decline on the part of Great Britain to acquiesce in the proposed arrangements.

CASTLEREAGH.

The Prince de Bénévent to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Paris, le 27 Mai, 1814.

Je m'empresse de répondre à la note en date de ce jour que V.E. m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser.

Elle sait qu'en demandant pour l'abolition finale et absolue de la Traite des Noirs un délai de cinq années notre principal motif a été de prévenir l'effet de cette mesure comme subite, but qui ne pourrait pas être atteint, si, pendant la durée du délai, la traite pouvait se faire sans restriction. Il s'ensuit que le Roi a dû nécessairement se proposer de la restreindre graduellement, et autant qu'il le pourra faire sans produire l'inconvénient qu'il a voulu et dû vouloir éviter.

L'importation des esclaves dans les colonies que vous nous aurez restituer sera découragée par l'état même de ces colonies, qui selon l'opinion de V.E. la leur rend inutile. Le Roi s'attachera à la décourager encore.

Sa Majesté sent combien il serait triste que ce genre de trafic se renouvelât sur des points où il a depuis longtemps cessé, et où l'on est parvenu à y substituer un commerce d'une autre et meilleure nature. V.E. indique comme étant dans ce cas la partie de la côte d'Afrique comprise entre le Cap des Palmes et le Cap Blanc. Sa Majesté apportera tous ses soins à décourager les tentatives que quelques-uns de ses sujets pourraient vouloir faire pour y renouveler la traite.

Vous voyez, my Lord, que, à cet égard, les intentions du Roi s'accordent entièrement avec les désirs de S.A.R. le Prince Régent; et puisque V.E. me fait l'honneur de m'annoncer qu'elle n'attendait que d'en avoir la certitude pour consentir à l'arrangement proposé, je dois maintenant le regarder comme admis.

Agréez, My Lord, etc.,

LE PRINCE DE BÉNÉVENT.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Fife House, 27th May, 1814.

Hamilton will write to you on the subject of the article respecting property in France belonging to British subjects, &c. As it stands, we do not comprehend it; and I confess I rather wish the articles in the Treaty of Amiens, on the same subject, had been inserted instead of it. I am apprehensive that this article may give rise to claims upon the British government hereafter, if the French government do not satisfy their demands. However, you must now do the best you can on this head. The only point I think very material is, that the contracting parties should distinctly

understand what they respectively mean, and that if it is too late to make the article clear in the treaty, some declaration in writing should be made respecting it.

The only other point on which I am desirous of troubling you is the insertion of some words in the secret article respecting the Low Countries on the subject of the free navigation of the Scheldt. If it is meant that the Scheldt is to be open for the benefit of Brabant and the Low Countries, I entirely approve of the object; but I think it would require much consideration before you would give to all neutral states a right to the free navigation of that river, independent of the sovereign authority of the state to which both banks of it will belong. At all events I think this object would be better omitted in the treaty of peace with France, and it might be made the subject of discussion afterwards, when the Low Countries are annexed to Holland by distinct and positive stipulation in a public treaty.

I think it not improbable that your treaty may be signed before you receive this letter; but I thought it nevertheless better to trouble you with these observations on the two articles in question.

Believe me, &c.,
LIVERPOOL.

Major-Gen. Sir George Murray to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Toulouse, 28th May, 1814.

Colonel Ricard has just brought me a letter from Marshal Suchet, of which the enclosed is a copy. Although it is, strictly speaking, prospective only in regard to the evacuation of Figueras, I see no reason to delay acting upon it; and I shall therefore proceed to put the troops in motion conformably to the instructions which your Grace left with me.

I shall be able to forward to your Grace to-morrow a copy of the routes issued for the several corps. The Portuguese will immediately follow the Spanish troops; and as Brigadier-General D'Urban is desirous of halting the several brigades for two days in the neighbourhood of Oyarzun, it would be convenient that General Freyre should continue the movement of the fourth Spanish army when it gets within the frontier, if it can be so arranged.

Believe me, my dear Lord, very faithfully yours,
G. MURRAY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Marshal Suchet to Major-Gen. Sir George Murray.

MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

Au Quartier-Général de Carcassonne,
le 27 Mai, 1814.

Je vous envoie le Colonel Ricard, officier de mon état-major, pour vous faire part de la remise de Figuières aux troupes Espagnoles. Le Général Comte Valée, que j'ai chargé, par ordre de mon gouvernement, de cette remise, m'écrit qu'elle a lieu aujourd'hui, 27; que demain, 28, la garnison Française, sortie de la place, arrivera à Perpignan; que le Général en Chef Copons ayant fait

cesser tout retard et toute difficulté dans la marche de nos troupes, la garnison de Tortose arrivera à Perpignan le 1 Juin, celle de Barcelonne le 4, et les petites garnisons de Sagonte, Peñiscola, et Hostalrich bientôt après.

Je transmets tout de suite cet avis au Ministre de la Guerre de France.

Je vous prie, Monsieur le Général, de vouloir bien vous entendre avec le Colonel Ricard, et lui faire connoître, ainsi qu'il est convenu, le départ, la marche, et la direction des troupes alliées, pour évacuer le territoire Français, afin que je puisse, par des mouvemens successifs, combiner avec les vôtres faire occuper le territoire à mesure que vous vous en éloignerez.

Je vous renouvelle mes instances pour accélérer le moment où tous les Portugais et Espagnols repasseront les Pyrénées.

Recevez, Monsieur le Général, l'assurance de ma parfaite considération.

SUCHET.

Major-Gen. Sir George Murray to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Toulouse, 29th May, 1814.

I forwarded to your Grace yesterday the copy of a letter which I received from Marshal Suchet, dated on the 27th instant, acquainting me that the evacuation of Figueras by the French garrison would take place on that day. I enclose the copy of my answer to the Marshal, and send also a memorandum of the movements which have been ordered to take place.

Some instructions have been received at Bordeaux, direct from England, respecting the expedition, but I have not heard the particulars of them. It appears, however, that the troops have begun to embark.

Believe me, my dear Lord, faithfully yours,

GEORGE MURRAY.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Major-Gen. Sir George Murray to Marshal Suchet.

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

Toulouse, le 29 Mai, 1814.

Le Colonel Ricard me remit hier la lettre que Votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser le 27 Mai pour me communiquer que la remise de Figuières aux troupes Espagnoles devoit avoir lieu ce jour même.

En conséquence j'ai expédié tout de suite les ordres pour faire commencer la marche de tous les corps Espagnols qui se trouvent encore en France pour repasser la frontière. Les troupes Portugaises suivront immédiatement la marche des Espagnols, et les divisions Anglaises chemineront en même temps vers la côte.

La dernière division de l'infanterie Anglaise partira de Toulouse le 5 Juin, et dès le 3 de Juin il n'y aura plus de troupes en avant de Castanet sur la route de Carcassonne.

Votre Excellence me permettra de remarquer que la communication qu'elle a bien voulu me faire n'étant encore que prospective pour ce qui regarde la remise de Figuières, j'aurois dû, en suivant à la lettre les ordres que m'a laissé le Duc de Wellington, attendre la remise actuelle de cette place aux troupes Espagnoles avant que de faire commencer les mouvemens de l'armée alliée.

Je suis persuadé cependant que j'agis parfaitement dans le sens des intentions du Duc en faisant commencer tout de suite ces mouvemens ; et je prendrai la liberté seulement de vous prier, Monsieur le Maréchal, de vouloir bien me donner connoissance de l'évacuation actuelle de Figuières par les troupes Françaises quand Votre Excellence en aura reçu le rapport.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, etc.,

GEORGE MURRAY.

II.

MEMORANDUM OF THE MOVEMENTS OF THE ALLIED ARMY.

Toulouse, 29th May, 1814.

Fourth Spanish Army.

The 4th Spanish Army will march from Tarbes, &c. in three divisions on the 30th and 31st May and 1st June, and will arrive at Irun on the 7th, 8th, and 9th June,

Portuguese Division and Lieutenant-Colonel Arentschildt's Portuguese Artillery.

The Portuguese division under Major-General Le Cor will march in two bodies on the 31st May and 2nd June, and will arrive at Oyarzun on the 17th and 18th June,

Portuguese Cavalry.

The 6th regiment of Portuguese cavalry will march from Montrejeau on the 2nd June by Tarbes, Barcelonne, and Dax, and will arrive at Oyarzun on the 15th June.

The 1st and 12th regiments of Portuguese cavalry will march from St. Gaudens on the 2nd June, by Pau and Peyrehorade, and will arrive at Oyarzun on the 13th June.

The 4th and 11th regiments of Portuguese cavalry will march from Pau on the 5th June, and will arrive at Oyarzun on the 12th June.

Fourth Division.

The 4th division will march from Condom, &c., on the 31st May and 1st June, and will arrive at Bordeaux on the 6th June.

The Portuguese brigade, 4th division, will separate from the division at Bazas, and will arrive at Oyarzun on the 16th June.

Sixth Division.

The 6th division will march from Auch on the 2nd June, and will arrive at Bordeaux on the 10th June.

The Portuguese brigade, 6th division, will separate from the division at Bazas, and will arrive at Oyarzun on the 20th June.

Third Division.

The 3rd division will march from Grenade, &c., on the 1st June, and will arrive at Bordeaux on the 12th June.

The Portuguese brigade, 3rd division, will separate from the division at Bazas, and will arrive at Oyarzun on the 21st June.

Light Division.

The Light division will cross the Garonne and move into the cantonments of the 3rd division on the 1st June; it will march from thence on the 3rd and 4th June, and arrive at Bordeaux on the 14th June.

The Portuguese regiments, Light division, will separate from the division at Bazas, and will arrive at Oyarzun on the 23rd June.

Second Division.

The 2nd division will march in two bodies on the 3rd and 5th June, and will arrive at Bordeaux on the 17th June.

The Portuguese brigade, 2nd division, will separate from the 2nd division at Bazas, and will arrive at Oyarzun on the 26th June.

Head-quarters will move as follows:—

4th June	..	..	..	L'Isle en Jourdain.
5th	„	..	..	Auch.
6th	„	..	..	Condom.
7th	„	..	..	Halt.
8th	„	..	..	Castel Jaloux.
9th	„	..	..	Langon.
10th	„	..	..	Bordeaux.

G. MURRAY.

General Freyre has been requested to send the necessary communications to the Spanish troops before Bayonne and St. Jean Pied de Port, and also to those at Ascaïn; as likewise to give notice to the Prince of Anglona that he may put the 3rd army in motion according to his instructions.

The orders for the Portuguese troops near Bayonne, and for the Portuguese brigade of the 7th division, have been deferred for the present.

G. M.

To Major-General Ross, or the Officer commanding the Troops.

SIR,

Bordeaux, 29th May, 1814.

I have it in command from Earl Bathurst, His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Department of War, to direct that you do proceed with the troops placed under your command,* and join the fleet under the command of Sir Alexander Cochrane, employed upon the coasts of the United States.

On your arrival at Bermuda, you will take under your command a regiment of infantry and a company of artillery that have been sent from Gibraltar for this purpose.

I have, &c.,

DALHOUSIE, Lieut.-General,
Commanding in absence of Field Marshal
the Duke of WELLINGTON.

* 4th, 44th, 85th, Artillery, Sappers, Rocket men.

The Quartermaster-General to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Toulouse, 30th May, 1814.

I enclose a letter which I have received this morning from Lord Dalhousie, and copy also of one which I have had from Lord Keith.

I sent your Grace yesterday a note of the movements ordered to take place in consequence of Marshal Suchet having intimated that Figueras would be evacuated on the 27th instant.

As Lord Keith seems to have no objection to embarking the 1st and 5th divisions near where they are, I have told General D'Urban he may regulate the going away of the Portuguese brigades of that part of the army at whatever time will best suit his own arrangements.

In order that the Portuguese brigade of the 7th division may take away with it all the straggling followers who cannot be dismissed before reaching Bordeaux, I have proposed to Lord Dalhousie to let it move last; and it will be in time enough to join in with the rear of the other brigades, though it should not reach St. Jean de Luz till the 26th of June.

Believe me, my dear Lord, very faithfully yours,

G. MURRAY.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie to the Quartermaster-General.

MY DEAR MURRAY,

Bordeaux, 27th May, 1814.

The day before yesterday I received despatches for the Duke of Wellington, and duplicates for myself, with orders to act in the event of his absence. Lord Keith being here has enabled me to make the arrangements at once; but that has not allowed me an hour to write you upon the subject.

The former plan of expedition has been abandoned, and instead of it three divisions of troops are ordered off without delay, a Major-General in command of each. I enclose a state as now proceeding.

The details I cannot at present enter into, but reserve them for you, as I now hope there is a probability of you and also the Adjutant-General's Department of Head-quarters coming here. Things go on very awkwardly, and the whole pressure of the army crowding upon us makes the absence of the chief a matter of great regret, while their presence is one almost of necessity.

The cavalry routes, &c., &c., I have received this morning. De Lancey is preparing that of the left, which he proposes to start on 3rd June. He begs me to say that, if you have nothing more important for him, he wishes you to allow him to proceed in charge of the Quartermaster-General's Department with that left column of cavalry.

Pray let me know if there is any chance of the Quartermaster-General's and Adjutant-General's Departments coming here.

Yours most truly,

DALHOUSIE.

Sir Henry Clinton remains in command of the remainder of the force in camp.

II.

STATE OF DIVISIONS FORMED IN COMPLIANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS FROM EARL BATHURST, DATED 18TH MAY.

First Division, Major-General Power.

3rd Buffs	..	..	..	..	750
5th	..	..	..	..	800
27th	..	..	..	..	1000
58th	..	..	..	..	700

A Brigade of Field Artillery.

One Company of Artillerymen.

Second Division, Major-General Kempt.

9th	..	..	..	..	900
37th	..	..	..	..	800
81st	..	..	..	..	800
60th, 5th Battalion	..	..	..	..	350

A Brigade of Field Artillery.

One Company of Artillerymen.

Third Division, Major-General Ross.

4th	..	..	..	..	700
44th	..	..	..	..	700
85th	..	..	..	..	570

A Brigade of Field Artillery.

Two Companies of Artillerymen.

One Company of Sappers.

Two Bomb Vessels, and a Ship laden with Rockets.

DALHOUSIE.

Sir Charles Stuart to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 2nd June, 1814.

I am to acquaint your Lordship that the treaty, of which I enclose the printed copy in the 'Moniteur,' was signed the night before last by the English, Austrian, Russian, and French plenipotentiaries. The difficulty of completing the necessary number of written copies for the day appointed has occasioned the French to defer signing with the plenipotentiaries of Spain, Sweden, and Portugal.

As the Spanish Minister had actually suggested that the signature of the treaty should be deferred until the arrival of fresh full powers signed by Ferdinand VII., the ill humour he has manifested upon this occasion is the more unreasonable.

The French complain bitterly of the cession of Tobago and St. Lucie in the West Indies, and their partisans rest their arguments for the restoration of all their colonial possessions on the policy of giving every possible outlet to a redundant population which can divert their attention from continental war.

Lord Castlereagh left Paris the night before last.

The dislocation of the troops hitherto cantoned in the provinces of France still continues. Several columns have already passed the Rhine.

The Russian Guards have received their orders to march, and it is calculated that on Friday they will all have left Paris.

The meeting of the Corps Législatif is deferred till Saturday.

As the labours of the Commission which was appointed to examine the Constitution are finished, the government are now making arrangements to exclude from the different bodies those members whose presence is disagreeable to the Court.

Upon the principle they have established, all the regicides, with the exception of Fouché (who purposes nevertheless to retire from public affairs), have been omitted in the special summonses which have been circulated.

Though the Deputies in the Corps Législatif who represent provinces which have been ceded in the treaty are likewise excluded, they will retain the appointments to which the former regulations had entitled them.

The influence of the persons who are supposed to enjoy the immediate confidence of the King has been manifested by the nomination of M. Blacas to the situation of Minister of the Household.

Ever, my dear Lord, faithfully yours,

C. STUART.

P.S.—As I presume Lord Castlereagh will have sent you the secret articles, they do not accompany the enclosure of this day.

DEFINITIVE TREATY OF PEACE AND AMITY BETWEEN HIS
BRITANNIC MAJESTY AND HIS MOST CHRISTIAN MAJESTY,
SIGNED AT PARIS, THE 30TH DAY OF MAY, 1814.*

In the Name of the Most Holy and Undivided Trinity.

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and his Allies on the one part, and His Majesty the King of France and of Navarre on the other part, animated by an equal desire to terminate the long agitations of Europe, and the sufferings of mankind, by a permanent peace, founded upon a just repartition of force between its States, and containing in its stipulations the pledge of its durability; and His Britannic Majesty, together with his Allies, being unwilling to require of France, now that, replaced under the paternal government of her Kings, she offers the assurance of security and stability to Europe, the conditions and guarantees which they had with regret demanded from her former Government, their said Majesties have named Plenipotentiaries to discuss, settle, and sign a Treaty of Peace and Amity; namely,

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Right Honourable Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, one

* This Treaty, with a slight variation in the wording, was also signed on behalf of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, with Additional Articles referring to each of those States. See *Annual Register* for 1814.

of His said Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Member of Parliament, Colonel of the Londonderry Regiment of Militia, and his Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, &c. &c. &c.; the Right Honourable George Gordon, Earl of Aberdeen, Viscount Formartine, Lord Haddo, Methlic, Tarvis, and Kellie, &c., one of the sixteen Peers representing the Peerage of Scotland in the House of Lords, Knight of His Majesty's Most Ancient and Most Noble Order of the Thistle, his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty; the Right Honourable William Shaw Cathcart, Viscount Cathcart, Baron Cathcart and Greenock, one of His Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Knight of his Order of the Thistle, and of the Orders of Russia, General in His Majesty's Army, and his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias; and the Honourable Sir Charles William Stewart, Knight of His Majesty's Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Member of Parliament, Lieutenant-General in His Majesty's Army, Knight of the Prussian Orders of the Black and Red Eagle, and of several others, and his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the King of Prussia; and His Majesty the King of France and Navarre, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand Perigord, Prince of Bénévent, Great Eagle of the Legion of Honour, Knight of the Black and Red Eagle of Prussia, Grand Cross of the Order of Leopold of Austria, Knight of the Russian Order of St. Andrew, and His said Majesty's Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; who, having exchanged their full Powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:—

ARTICLE I.

There shall be from this day forward perpetual peace and friendship between His Britannic Majesty and his Allies on the one part, and His Majesty the King of France and Navarre on the other, their heirs and successors, their dominions and subjects, respectively.

The High Contracting Parties shall devote their best attention to maintain, not only between themselves, but, inasmuch as depends upon them, between all the states of Europe, that harmony and good understanding which are so necessary for their tranquillity.

ARTICLE II.

The Kingdom of France retains its limits entire, as they existed on the 1st of January, 1792. It shall further receive the increase of territory comprised within the line established by the following Article:—

ARTICLE III.

On the side of Belgium, Germany, and Italy, the ancient frontiers shall be re-established as they existed the 1st of January, 1792, extending from the North Sea, between Dunkirk and Nieuport, to the Mediterranean between Cagnes and Nice, with the following modifications:

1st. In the department of Jemappes, the Cantons of Dour, Merbes-le-Château, Beaumont, and Chimay shall belong to France. Where the line of demarcation comes in contact with the Canton of Dour, it shall pass between that Canton and those of Boussu and Paturage, and likewise fur-

ther on it shall pass between the Canton of Merbes-le-Château and those of Binch and Thuin.

2. In the department of Sambre and Meuse, the Cantons of Walcourt, Florennes, Beauraing, and Gedinne shall belong to France; where the demarcation reaches that department, it shall follow the line which separates the said Cantons from the department of Jemappes, and from the remaining Cantons of the department of Sambre and Meuse.

3. In the department of the Moselle, the new demarcation, at the point where it diverges from the old line of frontier, shall be formed by a line to be drawn from Perle to Fremersdorff, and by the limit which separates the Canton of Tholey from the remaining Cantons of the said department of the Moselle.

4. In the department of La Sarre, the Cantons of Saarbruck and Arneval shall continue to belong to France, as likewise the portion of the Canton of Lebach which is situated to the south of a line drawn along the confines of the villages of Herchenbach, Ueberhofen, Hilsbach, and Hall (leaving these different places out of the French frontier) to the point where, in the neighbourhood of Querselle (which place belongs to France), the line which separates the Cantons of Arneval and Ottweiler reaches that which separates the Cantons of Arneval and Lebach. The frontier on this side shall be formed by the line above described, and afterwards by that which separates the Canton of Arneval from that of Bliescastel.

5. The fortress of Landau having before the year 1792 formed an insulated point in Germany, France retains beyond her frontiers a portion of the departments of Mount Tonnerre and of the Lower Rhine, for the purpose of uniting the said fortress and its radius to the rest of the kingdom.

The new demarcation from the point in the neighbourhood of Obersteinbach (which place is left out of the limits of France) where the boundary between the department of the Moselle and that of Mount Tonnerre reaches the department of the Lower Rhine, shall follow the line which separates the Cantons of Weissenbourg and Bergzabern (on the side of France) from the Cantons of Permasens, Dahn, and Annweiler (on the side of Germany) as far as the point near the village of Vollmersheim where that line touches the ancient radius of the fortress of Landau. From this radius, which remains as it was in 1792, the new frontier shall follow the arm of the river de la Queich, which on leaving the said radius at Queichheim (that place remaining to France) flows near the villages of Merlenheim, Knittelsheim, and Belheim (these places also belong to France) to the Rhine, which from thence shall continue to form the boundary of France and Germany.

The main stream (Thalweg) of the Rhine shall constitute the frontier; provided, however, that the changes which may hereafter take place in the course of that river shall not affect the property of the Islands. The right of possession in these Islands shall be re-established as it existed at the signature of the Treaty of Luneville.

6. In the department of the Doubs the frontier shall be so regulated as to commence above the Rançonnière near Locle and follow the crest of Jura between the Cerneux, Pequignot, and the village of Fontenelles, as far as the peak of that mountain situated about seven or eight thousand feet to the

north-west of the village of La Brevine, where it shall again fall in with the ancient boundary of France.

7. In the department of the Lemman, the frontiers between the French territory, the Pays de Vaud, and the different portions of the territory of the Republic of Geneva (which is to form part of Switzerland) remain as they were before the incorporation of Geneva with France. But the Cantons of Frangy and of St. Julien (with the exception of the districts situated to the north of a line drawn from the point where the river of La Laire enters the territory of Geneva near Chancy, following the confines of Sesequin, Laconex, and Seseneuve, which shall remain out of the limits of France, the Canton of Reignier (with the exception of the portion to the east of a line which follows the confines of the Muraz Bussy, Pers, and Cornier, which shall be out of the French limits), and the Canton of La Roche (with the exception of the places called La Roche and Armanoy with their districts) shall remain to France. The frontier shall follow the limits of these different Cantons, and the line which separates the districts continuing to belong to France, from those which she does not retain.

In the department of Montblanc, France acquires the sub-Prefecture of Chambéry, with the exception of the Cantons of L'Hôpital, St. Pierre d'Albigny, la Rocette, and Montmelian, and the sub-Prefecture of Annecy, with the exception of the portion of the Canton of Faverges situated to the east of a line passing between Ourechaise and Marlens on the side of France, and Marthod and Ugine on the opposite side, and which afterwards follows the crest of the mountains as far as the frontier of the Canton of Thones; this line, together with the limit of the Cantons before mentioned, shall on this side form the new frontier.

On the side of the Pyrenees, the frontiers between the two kingdoms of France and Spain remain such as they were the 1st of January, 1792, and a joint commission shall be named on the part of the two Crowns for the purpose of finally determining the line.

France on her part renounces all rights of sovereignty, suzeraineté, and of possession over all the countries, districts, towns, and places situated beyond the frontier above described, the Principality of Monaco being replaced on the same footing on which it stood before the 1st of January, 1792.

The Allied Powers assure to France the possession of the Principality of Avignon, of the Comtat Venaissin, of the Comté of Montbeilliard, together with the several insulated territories which formerly belonged to Germany, comprehended within the frontier above described, whether they have been incorporated with France before or after the 1st of January, 1792. The Powers reserve to themselves, reciprocally, the complete right to fortify any point in their respective states which they may judge necessary for their security.

To prevent all injury to private property, and protect, according to the most liberal principles, the property of individuals domiciliated on the frontiers, there shall be named, by each of the states bordering on France, Commissioners, who shall proceed, conjointly with French Commissioners, to the delineation of the respective boundaries.

As soon as the Commissioners shall have performed their task, maps shall

be drawn, signed by the respective Commissioners, and posts shall be placed to point out the reciprocal boundaries.

ARTICLE IV.

To secure the communications of the town of Geneva with other parts of the Swiss territory situated on the lake, France consents that the road by Versoy shall be common to the two countries. The respective Governments shall amicably arrange the means for preventing smuggling, regulating the posts, and maintaining the said road.

ARTICLE V.

The navigation of the Rhine, from the point where it becomes navigable unto the sea, and *vice versâ*, shall be free, so that it can be interdicted to no one; and at the future Congress attention shall be paid to the establishment of the principles according to which the duties to be raised by the States bordering on the Rhine may be regulated, in the mode the most impartial and the most favourable to the commerce of all nations.

The future Congress, with a view to facilitate the communication between nations, and continually to render them less strangers to each other, shall likewise examine and determine in what manner the above provision can be extended to other rivers which, in their navigable course, separate or traverse different States.

ARTICLE VI.

Holland, placed under the Sovereignty of the House of Orange, shall receive an increase of territory. The title and exercise of that Sovereignty shall not in any case belong to a Prince wearing or destined to wear a foreign Crown.

The States of Germany shall be independent and united by a federative bond.

Switzerland, independent, shall continue to govern herself.

Italy, beyond the limits of the countries which are to revert to Austria, shall be composed of Sovereign States.

ARTICLE VII.

The Island of Malta and its dependencies shall belong in full right and Sovereignty to His Britannic Majesty.

ARTICLE VIII.

His Britannic Majesty, stipulating for himself and his Allies, engages to restore to His Most Christian Majesty, within the term which shall be hereafter fixed, the colonies, fisheries, factories, and establishments of every kind which were possessed by France on the 1st of January, 1792, in the seas and on the continents of America, Africa, and Asia, with the exceptions, however, of the Islands of Tobago and St. Lucie and of the Isle of France and its dependencies, especially Rodrigues and Les Séchelles, which several colonies and possessions His Most Christian Majesty cedes in full right and Sovereignty to His Britannic Majesty, and also the portion of St. Domingo ceded to France by the Treaty of Basle, and which His Most Christian Majesty restores in full right and Sovereignty to His Catholic Majesty.

ARTICLE IX.

His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway, in virtue of the arrangements stipulated with the Allies, and in execution of the preceding Article, consents that the Island of Guadaloupe be restored to His Most Christian Majesty, and gives up all the rights he may have acquired over that island.

ARTICLE X.

Her Most Faithful Majesty, in virtue of the arrangements stipulated with her Allies and in execution of the 8th Article, engages to restore French Guyana as it existed on the 1st of January, 1792, to His Most Christian Majesty, within the term hereafter fixed.

The renewal of the dispute which existed at that period on the subject of the frontier being the effect of this stipulation, it is agreed that that dispute shall be terminated by a friendly arrangement between the two Courts, under the mediation of His Britannic Majesty.

ARTICLE XI.

The places and forts in those colonies and settlements which, by virtue of the 8th, 9th, and 10th Articles, are to be restored to His Most Christian Majesty, shall be given up in the state in which they may be at the moment of the signature of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE XII.

His Britannic Majesty guarantees to the subjects of His Most Christian Majesty the same facilities, privileges, and protection, with respect to commerce and the security of their persons and property within the limits of the British sovereignty on the continent of India, as are now or shall be granted to the most favoured nations.

His Most Christian Majesty, on his part, having nothing more at heart than the perpetual duration of peace between the two Crowns of England and of France, and wishing to do his utmost to avoid anything which might affect their mutual good understanding, engages not to erect any fortifications in the establishments which are to be restored to him within the limits of the British sovereignty upon the continent of India, and only to place in those establishments the number of troops necessary for the maintenance of the police.

ARTICLE XIII.

The French right of fishery upon the Great Bank of Newfoundland, upon the coasts of the island of that name, and of the adjacent islands in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, shall be replaced upon the footing in which it stood in 1792.

ARTICLE XIV.

Those colonies, factories, and establishments which are to be restored to His Most Christian Majesty by His Britannic Majesty or his Allies in the Northern Seas, or in the seas on the continents of America and Africa, shall be given up within the three months, and those which are beyond the Cape of Good Hope within the six months, which follow the ratification of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE XV.

The High Contracting Parties having, by the 4th Article of the Convention of the 23rd of April last, reserved to themselves the right of disposing, in the present definitive Treaty of Peace, of the arsenals and ships of war, armed and unarmed, which may be found in the maritime places restored by the 2nd Article of the said Convention; it is agreed that the said vessels and ships of war, armed and unarmed, together with the naval ordnance and naval stores, and all materials for building and equipment, shall be divided between France and the countries where the said places are situated, in the proportion of two-thirds for France, and one-third for the Power to whom the said places shall belong. The ships and vessels on the stocks, which shall not be launched within six weeks after the signature of the present Treaty, shall be considered as materials, and after being broken up shall be, as such, divided in the same proportions.

Commissioners shall be named on both sides to settle the division and draw up a statement of the same, and passports or safe conducts shall be granted by the Allied Powers for the purpose of securing the return into France of the workmen, seamen, and others in the employment of France.

The vessels and arsenals existing in the maritime places which were already in the power of the Allies before the 23rd April, and the vessels and arsenals which belonged to Holland, and especially the fleet in the Texel, are not comprised in the above stipulations.

The French Government engages to withdraw, or to cause to be sold, every thing which shall belong to it by the above stipulations within the space of three months after the division shall have been carried into effect.

Antwerp shall for the future be solely a commercial port.

ARTICLE XVI.

The High Contracting Parties, desirous to bury in entire oblivion the dissensions which have agitated Europe, declare and promise that no individual, of whatever rank or condition he may be, in the countries restored and ceded by the present Treaty, shall be prosecuted, disturbed, or molested, in his person or property, under any pretext whatsoever, either on account of his conduct or political opinions, his attachment either to any of the contracting parties, or to any government which has ceased to exist, or for any other reason, except for debts contracted towards individuals, or acts posterior to the date of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE XVII.

The native inhabitants and aliens, of whatever nation or condition they may be, in those countries which are to change Sovereigns, as well in virtue of the present Treaty as of the subsequent arrangements to which it may give rise, shall be allowed a period of six years, reckoning from the exchange of the ratifications, for the purpose of disposing of their property, if they think fit, whether it be acquired before or during the present war; and retiring to whatever country they may choose.

ARTICLE XVIII.

The Allied Powers, desiring to offer His Most Christian Majesty a new proof of their anxiety to arrest, as far as in them lies, the bad consequences of the disastrous epoch fortunately terminated by the present peace, renounce all the sums which their governments claim from France, whether on account of contracts, supplies, or any other advances whatsoever to the French Government, during the different wars which have taken place since 1792.

His Most Christian Majesty, on his part, renounces every claim which he might bring forward against the Allied Powers on the same grounds. In execution of this article, the High Contracting Parties engage reciprocally to deliver up all titles, obligations, and documents which relate to the debts they may have mutually cancelled.

ARTICLE XIX.

The French Government engages to liquidate and pay all debts it may be found to owe in countries beyond its own territory, on account of contracts or other formal engagements between individuals or private establishments and the French authorities, as well for supplies as in satisfaction of legal engagements.

ARTICLE XX.

The High Contracting Parties, immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty, shall name commissioners to direct and superintend the execution of the whole of the stipulations contained in the 18th and 19th Articles. These commissioners shall undertake the examination of the claims referred to in the preceding articles, the liquidation of the sums claimed, and the consideration of the manner in which the French Government may propose to pay them. They shall also be charged with the delivery of the titles, bonds, and the documents relating to the debts which the High Contracting Parties mutually cancel, so that the approval of the result of their labours shall complete that reciprocal renunciation.

ARTICLE XXI.

The debts which in their origin were specially mortgaged upon the countries no longer belonging to France, or were contracted for the support of their internal administration, shall remain at the charge of the said countries. Such of those debts as have been converted into inscriptions in the great book of the public debt of France shall accordingly be accounted for with the French Government after the 22nd of December, 1813.

The deeds of all those debts which have been prepared for inscription, and have not yet been entered, shall be delivered to the governments of the respective countries. The statement of all these debts shall be drawn up and settled by a joint commission.

ARTICLE XXII.

The French Government shall remain charged with the reimbursement of all sums paid by the subjects of the said countries into the French

coffers, whether under the denomination of surety, deposit, or consignment.

In like manner all French subjects, employed in the service of the said countries, who have paid sums under the denomination of surety, deposit, or consignment, into their respective territories, shall be faithfully reimbursed.

ARTICLE XXIII.

The functionaries holding situations requiring securities, who are not charged with the expenditure of public money, shall be reimbursed at Paris with the interest, by fifths and by the year, dating from the signature of the present Treaty. With respect to those who are accountable, this reimbursement shall commence, at the latest, six months after the presentation of their accounts, except only in cases of malversation. A copy of the last account shall be transmitted to the government of their countries, to serve for their information and guidance.

ARTICLE XXIV.

The judicial deposits and consignments upon the *caisse d'amortissement* in the execution of the law of 28 Nivose, year 13 (18th January, 1805), and which belong to the inhabitants of the countries France ceases to possess, shall, within the space of one year from the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty, be placed in the hands of the authorities of the said countries, with the exception of those deposits and consignments interesting French subjects, which last will remain in the *caisse d'amortissement*, and will only be given up on the production of the vouchers resulting from the decisions of competent authorities.

ARTICLE XXV.

The funds deposited by the corporations and public establishments in the *caisse de service* and in the *caisse d'amortissement*, or other *caisse*, of the French Government, shall be reimbursed by fifths, payable from year to year, to commence from the date of the present Treaty; deducting the advances which have taken place, and subject to such regular charges as may have been brought forward against these funds by the creditors of the said corporations, and the said public establishments.

ARTICLE XXVI.

From the 1st day of January, 1814, the French Government shall cease to be charged with the payment of pensions, civil, military, and ecclesiastical, pensions for retirement, and allowances for reduction, to any individual who shall cease to be a French subject.

ARTICLE XXVII.

National domains acquired for valuable considerations by French subjects in the late departments of Belgium, and of the left bank of the Rhine, and the Alps beyond the ancient limits of France, and which now cease to belong to her, shall be guaranteed to the purchasers.

ARTICLE XXVIII.

The abolition of the *droits d'Aubaine*, de *Détraction*, and other duties of the same nature, in the countries which have reciprocally made that stipulation with France, or which have been formerly incorporated, shall be expressly maintained.

ARTICLE XXIX.

The French Government engages to restore all bonds and other deeds which may have been seized in the provinces occupied by the French armies or administrations; and in cases where such restitution cannot be effected, these bonds and deeds become and continue void.

ARTICLE XXX.

The sums which shall be due for all works of public utility not yet finished, or finished after the 31st of December, 1812, whether on the Rhine or in the departments detached from France by the present Treaty, shall be placed to the account of the future possessors of the territory, and shall be paid by the commission charged with the liquidation of the debts of that country.

ARTICLE XXXI.

All archives, maps, plans, and documents whatever, belonging to the ceded countries, or respecting their administration, shall be faithfully given up at the same time with the said countries; or if that should be impossible, within a period not exceeding six months after the cession of the countries themselves.

This stipulation applies to the archives, maps, and plans which may have been carried away from the countries during their temporary occupation by the different armies.

ARTICLE XXXII.

All the powers engaged on either side in the present war shall, within the space of two months, send Plenipotentiaries to Vienna, for the purpose of regulating in general Congress the arrangements which are to complete the provisions of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE XXXIII.

The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged, within the period of fifteen days, or sooner if possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed and affixed to it the seals of their arms.

Done at Paris the thirtieth of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fourteen.

(L. S.) CASTLEREAGH.

(L. S.) LE PRINCE DE BÉNÉVENT.

(L. S.) ABERDEEN.

(L. S.) CATHCART.

(L. S.) CHARLES STEWART, Lieut.-Gen.

ADDITIONAL ARTICLES.

ARTICLE I.

His Most Christian Majesty, concurring without reserve in the sentiments of His Britannic Majesty with respect to a description of traffic repugnant to the principles of natural justice and of the enlightened age in which we live, engages to unite all his efforts to those of His Britannic Majesty, at the approaching Congress, to induce all the Powers of Christendom to decree the abolition of the Slave Trade, so that the said trade shall cease universally, as it shall cease definitively, under any circumstances, on the part of the French Government, in the course of five years; and that during the said period no slave merchant shall import or sell slaves except in the Colonies of the State of which he is a subject.

ARTICLE II.

The British and French Governments shall name, without delay, Commissioners to liquidate the accounts of their respective expenses for the maintenance of prisoners of war, in order to determine the manner of paying the balance which shall appear in favour of the one or the other of the two Powers.

ARTICLE III.

The respective prisoners of war, before their departure from the place of their detention, shall be obliged to discharge the private debts they may have contracted, or shall at least give sufficient security for the amount.

ARTICLE IV.

Immediately after the ratification of the present Treaty of Peace, the sequesters which since the year 1792 (one thousand seven hundred and ninety-two) may have been laid on the funds, revenues, debts, or any other effects of the High Contracting Parties or their subjects, shall be taken off.

The commissioners mentioned in the 2nd Article shall undertake the examination of the claims of His Britannic Majesty's subjects upon the French Government for the value of the property, moveable or immoveable, illegally confiscated by the French authorities, as also for the total or partial loss of their debts or other property illegally detained under sequester since the year 1792 (one thousand seven hundred and ninety-two).

France engages to act towards British subjects in this respect in the same spirit of justice which the French subjects have experienced in Great Britain; and His Britannic Majesty, desiring to concur in the new pledge which the Allied Powers have given to His Most Christian Majesty of their desire to obliterate every trace of that disastrous epocha so happily terminated by the present peace, engages on his part, when complete justice shall be rendered to his subjects, to renounce the whole amount of the balance which shall appear in his favour for support of the prisoners of war, so that the ratification of the report of the above commissioners, and

the discharge of the sums due to British subjects, as well as the restitution of the effects which shall be proved to belong to them, shall complete the renunciation.

ARTICLE V.

The two High Contracting Parties, desiring to establish the most friendly relations between their respective subjects, reserve to themselves, and promise to come to a mutual understanding and arrangement, as soon as possible, upon their commercial interests, with the view of encouraging and increasing the prosperity of their respective States.

The present Additional Articles shall have the same force and validity as if they were inserted word for word in the Treaty Patent of this day. They shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged, at the same time.

In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed and affixed to them the seals of their arms.

Done at Paris, the thirtieth day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fourteen.

(L. S.) CASTLEREAGH.	(L. S.) LE PRINCE DE BÉNÉVENT.
(L. S.) ABERDEEN.	
(L. S.) CATHCART.	
(L. S.) CHARLES STEWART, Lieut.-Gen.	

IDÉES sur l'Importance Militaire des CANTONS du TERRITOIRE BELGIQUE
cédés à la France par le Traité de Paris du 30 Mai, 1814. Par le
Chevalier Baron de VAUTHIER.

Les frontières qui séparent le midi de la Belgique de la France peuvent être divisées en trois lignes principales : la première comprend les frontières de la province de Luxembourg jusqu'à la Meuse au point d'Hermeton ; la deuxième comprend la frontière qui s'étend de ce dernier endroit jusqu'à la Scarpe ; la troisième part de cette rivière, et s'étend jusqu'à la mer.

La place de Luxembourg flanque l'extrême gauche de cette première ligne, dont le front est couvert par l'importante place de Bouillon (on suppose ici que le duché entrera dans le système politique des Pays Bas), par la Semoy, et la chaîne boisée des Ardennes.

Cette ligne, qui a un développement de 35 à 40 lieues, n'est accessible que par deux points, vers Bouillon par son centre, par Givet vers son extrême droite. Les superbes positions de Bouillon et de Mesnil St. Blaise, en avant de Falmagne, dans le canton de Beauraing, peuvent, étant occupées par de légers corps de troupes régulières ou de milice, mettre tous les pays Belges de la rive droite de la Meuse à l'abri d'une invasion ennemie. C'est l'opinion de tous les militaires instruits.

La cession des cantons de Gédine et de Beauraing à la France, en rompant cette première ligne vers le point le plus essentiel de la frontière, et en la privant des positions qui formaient ses points d'appui vers sa droite, ainsi que de la route militaire de Namur, par Dinant, à Luxembourg, met à découvert l'intérieur de Luxembourg et du comté de Namur, et toute la basse Meuse. Cette cession, qui procure à la place de Givet un rayon mi-

litaire formidable, qui permet maintenant aux plus grandes masses débouchant par cette importante tête de défilé de se déployer avec avantage, met au pouvoir de la France les hauteurs dominantes de Dinant, le cours de la Lesse, et l'immense plateau escarpé renfermé entre cette rivière et la Meuse, position éminemment forte et menaçante, d'où une armée ennemie peut, en se portant par la vallée qui commence à Beauraing, et qui s'étend du nord au nord-est à travers la Famène et le Condroz, intercepter à Ciney la vieille route de Namur par Marche à Luxembourg, et occuper les sommets et le versant oriental de la chaîne des montagnes qui longent la Meuse depuis Dinant jusqu'à Liège, et investir facilement par les deux rives de ce fleuve la place de Namur. C'est dans ces belles positions de la Lesse, qui peuvent servir dans toutes les hypothèses de guerre, qu'une poignée d'Autrichiens a contenu en 1789 tous les efforts de l'armée entière des insurgés Belges, qui voulait se porter sur Luxembourg.

Les immenses avantages que procure à la France l'acquisition de ces contrées, et qui lui permet, en cas de guerre, de porter le centre de gravité de ses forces agissantes sur un point objectif placé au centre de nos principales provinces, s'ils eussent été bien connus, auroient engagés les grandes puissances alliées, qui stipuloient dans l'intérêt du Prince futur des Pays Bas à resserrer plutôt qu'à agrandir le rayon militaire de la place de Givet-Charlemont, ou au moins à nous laisser nos anciennes positions de ce côté, qui nous mettraient à même de suivre de l'œil et d'arrêter tous les mouvemens ennemis qui auroient pu s'effectuer vers ce point. C'étoit pour contenir les armées Françaises, qui dans toutes les guerres des Pays Bas faisaient par les gorges de Rocroy et de Fumay des incursions dans le comté de Namur et le pays de Liège, que Charles Quint fit construire les places de Charlemont* et de Philippeville, places qui forment une barrière qu'on aurait dû conserver. C'était les vues de ce Prince qu'il fallait suivre en combinant dans le traité de Paris le système des limites des deux états.

La seconde ligne, qui s'étend de la Meuse à la Scarpe, est coupée en différens sens par la Sambre, les petites rivières d'Hermeton, d'Ives, d'Eau, d'Heure, de Biemell, et par les chaînes boisées qui se prolongent parallèlement au cours de ces rivières jusqu'à leur confluent dans la Sambre ou dans la Meuse, des forêts profondes, les rivières encaissées de Thur, de Beaumont, des mamelons formidables, les places de Beaumont et de Merbes le Château, position centrale et dominante, qui, située sur la Sambre au confluent de trois rivières, commande les grandes routes de Beaumont à Mons, de Beaumont à Binche et à Charleroi, couvrant le front de cette seconde ligne, qui a sa gauche appuyée à des hauteurs inaccessibles, et couronnées de forêts, et sa droite flanquée par la place de Mons.

Cette seconde division de nos frontières a derrière elle le point d'embranchement des routes militaires de Beaumont et Brunehault, dont la première conduit à Mons et la seconde à Maestricht,† la ligne secondaire de la Sambre Belgique, le défilé de Bouvignes, et la place de Walcourt, qui offre

* Dans les négociations qui eurent lieu en 1558 et 1559, et qui préparèrent la paix des Pyrénées, le Cardinal Mazarin offrit de rendre Thionville, d'Amvilliers, et Montmedy pour Charlemont. Mais on ne fut point d'avis en Espagne de donner Charlemont au Roi pour ces trois places ; le Marquis de les Balbazes ayant soutenu que cette place valoit seule une province.

† La majeure partie des forêts sont dépendantes du domaine de l'Etat.

une position importante et intermédiaire entre la tête de ce défilé et cette dernière ligne. Cette place, située sur une élévation au confluent des rivières d'Heure et d'Ives, qui coulent sur un fond marécageux, peut être fortifiée à peu de frais, et serait d'un grand poids dans le système général de défense. Elle pourrait devenir, avec Beaumont, dont on peut également relever les fortifications, place de première ligne, et on pourrait s'en servir comme bases d'opérations offensives, et à observer les garnisons de Philippeville et de Givet.

L'accroissement de territoire que l'on a donné à la France sur ce point, et qui consiste dans les cantons de Dour, Merbes le Château, Chimay, Beaumont, Walcourt, et Florenne, détruit vers le centre comme on voit l'ensemble de notre ligne générale de 1792.

L'agglomération de ces cantons à l'ancienne frontière de France, et qui enrichit cette puissance de la majeure partie de nos forêts,* et de toutes nos principales richesses minérales, en donnant à la frontière de ce côté une forme saillante vers le confluent de la Sambre et de la Meuse, ne nous laisse pas une seule position sur la ligne de la Sambre qui ne puisse être tournée. Maîtresse de toutes les gorges et des hauteurs dominantes de l'entre Sambre et Meuse, et de Merbes le Château, dont la conservation coûta tant de sang en 1794, une armée ennemie aurait l'immense avantage, en débouchant par ce dernier endroit, par un mouvement de flanc sur Binche et Fontaine l'Evêque de prendre à revers la chaîne des positions de la Sambre, et mettre l'armée qui y serait renfermée dans la triste alternative de combattre dans une situation désavantageuse et désespérée, ou de se retirer, en abandonnant les places de Charleroi et de Namur, qui, isolées dans un angle rentrant, et par leur défaut de liaison à un système général, seroient facilement investies, et ajouteraient par leur chute certaine au système des forces offensives de l'ennemi.

Le point décisif ou d'attaque de notre ligne de défense territoriale de 1792 considérée comme ligne d'opérations est placé au centre de cette ligne. Quelque soit la nature des guerres que les Pays Bas auront à soutenir contre la France, ce point ne variera pas depuis l'époque du traité des Pyrénées. Ce fut sur ce centre que les puissances belligérantes portèrent constamment leurs masses pour défendre ou envahir la Belgique. Les campagnes de Mons, les rives de la Sambre, les champs trop fameux de Fleurus virent dans toutes les guerres s'accomplir les destins des Pays Bas Catholiques. Cette importante vérité est attestée par les résultats des batailles de Rocroy, de Bossut, de Malplaquet, de Watignies, de Steinkerque, de Senef, de Jemmapes, de Merbes le Château, et de Fleurus. L'histoire militaire de ces différentes époques démontre à l'évidence que la seconde division de nos anciennes frontières forme le boulevard imposant et naturel de la Belgique, qui est à ce dernier pays ce que le Tyrol est à l'Autriche du côté de l'Italie.

Le traité de Paris, qui met la France en possession de ce boulevard bastionné, ne laisse plus à cette puissance aucun obstacle à surmonter pour arriver jusqu'au centre du Brabant et de la Flandre. "C'est de la position de cette ligne," dit Jomini, dans son *Traité des Grandes Opérations de la*

* La haute tactique tire un grand parti de la direction des routes dans les opérations offensives. Le secret de la guerre, disoit Napoléon, est dans le secret des communications.

Guerre, "que dépend la conquête des Pays Bas." Et il ajoute, "Le Général Pichegru commettoit une grande faute, et agissait contre les vrais principes, en se portant dans le cœur de la Flandre, où il s'aventurait, n'étant pas maître des points de Beaumont et de la Sambre." Aussi voyons nous toujours les armées Françaises partir de Valenciennes et de Maubeuge, et porter successivement leur point objectif sur Mons, Liège, et le cœur de la Belgique.

C'étoit pour compléter ses moyens d'invasion des Pays Bas que Louis XIV. fit plusieurs tentatives pour s'emparer des terres de Beaumont et de Chimay, par où il craignoit qu'on ne lui ferma le passage en établissant sur ce point des places fortes; mais le Ministère d'Autriche, qui en connaissait toute l'importance, préféra, dans la nécessité où était cette puissance de faire des concessions territoriales à la France, lui céder dans la Flandre d'autres parties de territoire. C'est dans les vues constantes de ce système que ce monarque, ennemi de notre repos, ne pouvant acquérir les places de Beaumont et de Binche, profita de ses succès pour les faire démanteler.

Cette ligne, où l'influence des positions balançait l'influence du système général des places fortes de France, ne nous était pas seulement avantageuse sous le rapport de la défensive. Sa direction et le vuide de la frontière opposée comprise entre Charleville et Maubeuge nous donnaient l'avantage de pénétrer par ce point vers le centre de la Champagne, et de prendre à revers les gorges de la Haute Meuse, et une partie de la ligne de Vauban. La preuve en est récente. C'est en prenant la direction de Beaumont et d'Avesnes que les armées alliées sous le commandement de Bülow et de Winzingerode se sont portés à Laon, Soissons, et Rheims, où ils n'auroient pu parvenir par d'autres points de cette frontière sans entreprendre des sièges. A l'appui de cette preuve, je pourrais encore citer l'opinion des généraux instruits qui ont écrit sur les événemens militaires des campagnes de la Révolution : tous sont d'avis que si les armées alliées se furent dirigés dans la campagne de 1792 des points de Bouillon et de Beaumont* par des mouvemens concentriques sur Rheims et l'Oise, elles eussent nécessairement obtenu des résultats décisifs.

La France, qui suit avec persévérance les vues de Richelieu et de Louis XIV., et instruite par l'expérience des dernières guerres, sentira sans doute la nécessité de se donner de nouvelles places de guerre au milieu des belles positions qu'elle vient d'acquérir, et qui sont une addition considérable à sa force réelle, et fortifiera probablement Beaumont et Merbes le Château. Elle s'est réservée ce droit par le traité de Paris.

Ces considérations générales, que je n'étendrai pas au delà de mon objet, fait sentir toute l'importance qu'on devait attacher à la conservation des huit cantons Belges, en même tems qu'elles expliquent le motif de l'intérêt que la France a mise à les acquérir : on doit les recouvrer à tout prix, ou sans cela point de sûreté pour l'Etat. Au début de chaque guerre nous serons toujours dans la nécessité, étant privés de nos positions centrales, de combattre en rase campagne contre les forces supérieures de l'ennemi. Je prévois l'objection, mais les armées Françaises sont en quelque sorte sur le champ de bataille, et dans ce cas, ne pouvant recevoir à temps les secours que peuvent nous promettre le système politique de l'Europe, nous devons toujours en-

* Les Français sentent depuis longtems la faiblesse de ce point important de ses frontières.

gager la lutte avec nos seules forces. L'intérêt de l'état exige donc que nous ayons un système de frontières fortement combiné, qui par sa force d'inertie puisse nous mettre à même de maintenir, en attendant l'arrivée des secours étrangers, le centre d'action général dans la zone de nos frontières ; mais nous ne pourrions établir ce système si on ne nous restitue ce qui nous a été enlevé par le traité de Paris. Car où est le moyen de résister avec le secours de notre ligne actuelle, si la France, en même tems qu'elle nous opposerait à la gauche de sa ligne d'opérations la résistance stationnaire et immuable de ces places fortes, nous attaquoit avec toutes ses forces actives sur notre centre, où il ne nous reste plus une seule position tenable ?

Mais que les secours que nous assure pour notre défense le système Européen ne nous fasse pas négliger l'occasion de recouvrer ce que nous avons perdu. Notre commerce, notre industrie, et par dessus tout notre sûreté, y sont liés. Nous devons être forts par nous-même, et compter subsidiairement sur les alliances qui peuvent être neutralisées par des diversions étrangères suscitées par l'ennemi. Les suites du traité de la triple alliance prouvent la justice de cette remarque. Ce traité apportait des obstacles aux projets ambitieux de Louis XIV. ; il l'attaqua par la voie des négociations, et le rompit, et entra ensuite dans la Belgique, dont il s'empara presque sans coup férir. *Victoria fuit introisse !*

Respectfully presented by

His Grace's very obedient humble servant,

DE BOUILLON.

*Nominal Return of General and other Staff Officers who have embarked
in the American Expedition.*

Bordeaux, 6th June, 1814.

1st Brigade.

Major-General Kempt. Lieutenant Hon. Charles Gore, 43rd Regiment, Aide-de-Camp. Major Campbell, 94th Regiment, Brigade Major. Lieutenant-Colonel Tryon, 88th Regiment, Assistant Adjutant-General. Captain Dumaresq, 9th Regiment, Deputy Assistant Q. M. G. Assistant Commissary-General James Laidley. Deputy Assistant Commissary-General Thomas Hill. Dr. Erly, Acting Deputy Inspector of Hospitals. Surgeon Caldwell, Staff Surgeon. Mr. Hoatson, Hospital Assistant. Mr. Haggarty, Hospital Assistant. Mr. Rendall, Assistant Staff Surgeon. Rev. J. Mills, Chaplain to the Forces. Serjeant Stanway, Assistant Provost Marshal.

2nd Brigade.

Major-General Power. Lieutenant Peacocke, 55th Regiment, Aide-de-camp. Major Sparrow, 61st Regiment, Brigade-Major. Major Montgomery, 50th Regiment, Assistant Quartermaster-General. Deputy-Assistant Commissary-General Wybault. Surgeon Widmore, Staff Surgeon. Mr. Stewart, Hospital Assistant. Mr. Cousins, Hospital Assistant. Mr. Beyer, Hospital Assistant. Rev. George Jenkins, Chaplain. Serjeant Brooks, 7th Fusiliers, Assistant Provost Marshal.

3rd Brigade.

Major-General Ross. Captain Falls, 20th Regiment, Aide-de-camp. Captain Henry George Smith, 95th Regiment, Brigade Major. Lieutenant Evans

136 GENERAL AND STAFF OFFICERS SENT TO AMERICA.

3rd Dragoons, Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General. Deputy-Assistant Commissary-General Lawrence. Surgeon Baxter, Staff Surgeon. Mr. de Hueme, Hospital Assistant. Mr. Johnstone, Hospital Assistant. Rev. George Watson, Chaplain. Serjeant Smith, 45th Regiment, Assistant Provost Marshal.

4th Brigade.

Major-General Robinson. Ensign Robinson, 59th Regiment, Aide-de-camp. Major Anwyl, 4th Regiment, Brigade Major. Major Thorn, 3rd Regiment, Assistant Quartermaster-General. Deputy-Assistant Commissary-General Lemesurier. Surgeon McLeod, Staff Surgeon. Mr. Osborne, Hospital Assistant. Mr. Clancey, Hospital Assistant. Mr. Clarke, Hospital Assistant. Mr. Reid, Apothecary. Mr. Soare, Deputy Purveyor. Serjeant Johnstone, 9th Regiment, Assistant Provost Marshal.

Nominal List of the General and other Staff Officers originally appointed to accompany the Expedition, remaining undisposed of.

Bordeaux, 6th June, 1814.

Lieutenant-General Lord Hill, K.B., absent in England. Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B., proceeding to England. Major-General Barnes, absent in England. Colonel O'Callaghan. Colonel Keane.

Other Staff Officers.

Lieut.-Colonel Bouverie, Coldstream Guards, Deputy Adjutant-General, absent in England. Lieutenant-Colonel Stoven, 28th Regiment, Assistant Adjutant-General. Major During, King's German Legion, Assistant Adjutant-General. Captain Browne, 23rd Royal Welsh Fusiliers, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General.

Lieutenant-Colonel Jackson, Coldstream Guards, Deputy Quartermaster-General, absent in England. Lieutenant-Colonel Honourable A. Abercrombie, 28th Regiment, Assistant Quartermaster-General. Captain Forrest, 3rd Regiment, Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General.

Lieutenant-Colonel Goodman, 48th Regiment, Deputy Judge Advocate, not yet joined.

Captain Blair, 91st Regiment, Brigade Major, not yet joined. Captain Wyll, 7th Fusiliers, Brigade Major, not yet joined. Captain Blakeney, 66th Regiment, Brigade Major. Captain Dansey, Royal Artillery, Brigade Major.

J. Mackenzie, Deputy Commissary-General. James Dobree, Acting Assistant Commissary-General. Daniel Kearney, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General.

John Sage Jesse, Deputy Assistant Commissary of Accounts.

Sir James Fellows, Inspector of Hospitals, not yet joined. John Robb, Esq., Deputy Inspector of Hospitals. Charles Forbes, Esq., Deputy Inspector of Hospitals, not yet joined. Adam Neale, Physician. Edward Keating, Physician. J. McKenzie, Physician. William Robson, Physician, not yet joined. Job Dwyer, Physician. John Wasdell, Staff Surgeon. George Beattie, Staff Surgeon. William Spence, Staff Surgeon. Henry Forcade, Staff Surgeon. J. Du Moulin, Staff Surgeon. John Taberger, Staff Surgeon. John Carter, Apothecary. Edward Hodges, Purveyor to the Forces. 4 Deputy Purveyors. 1 Assistant Staff Surgeon. 6 Hospital Assistants. 1 Hospital Mate.

Rev. Dr. Symons, Chaplain, not yet joined.

Serjeant Partington, 45th Regiment, Assistant Provost Marshal. Serjeant Lindsay, 71st Regiment, Assistant Provost Marshal. Serjeant Barber, 9th Regiment, Assistant Provost Marshal.

E. PAKENHAM, Adjutant-General.

STATE of the Troops Embarked under the Command of Major-Generals
KEMPT, ROBINSON, ROSS, and POWER.

Head-quarters, Bordeaux, 6th June, 1814.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Horses.
Royal Artillery	32	27	10	919	369
Engineers	2	7	2	55	..
Major-General Kempt's Bri- gade	146	204	73	3,720	..
Major-General Robinson's Brigade	139	222	79	3,344	..
Major-General Ross's Bri- gade	112	151	50	2,501	..
Major-General Power's Bri- gade	145	203	77	4,080	..
Total	576	814	291	14,619	369

E. PAKENHAM.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,

Madrid, 6th June, 1814.

I saw the Duke of San Carlos yesterday, when he had not received your paper. He told me that he shall be prepared to converse with me upon the subject of our last conversation in a very short time, and that he was above all things convinced of the necessity of putting the commerce between Great Britain and Spain in the Peninsula upon a better footing. This looks a little as if he meant to avoid the other questions. We shall see what effect will be produced upon him by your paper. If I do not hear from him in the course of to-day, I shall send another note to him to-morrow. He appeared much displeased that Fernan Nuñez, although he had been detained at Paris to sign the peace, was not present at any of the conferences, and he counted much upon Labrador's reaching Paris before the signature of the treaty.

A courier was despatched to Paris on the 4th at night, and directed to proceed with all possible despatch.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

138 ORDERS OF ST. GEORGE AND OF THE GOLDEN FLEECE.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

War Department, 8th June, 1814.

I have had the honour of receiving and laying before His Royal Highness the Prince Regent your Grace's despatch, No. 61, of the 18th ultimo; and in answer I am commanded to convey to you His Royal Highness's permission for your Grace's acceptance of the Grand Cross of the Order of St. George, which has been conferred upon your Grace by the Emperor of Russia.

I have the honour to be

Your Grace's most obedient, humble servant,

BATHURST.

Sir C. Stuart to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 13th June, 1814.

I have been favoured with your letter of the 31st from Madrid. The accompanying packets were immediately forwarded to England.

The ratification of the British treaty will be sent away to-day.

Sweden and Portugal having already acceded, Spain alone remains, hitherto separated from all the Powers of Europe.

Though the appointment of M. Labrador is alleged to be the motive for not renewing the full power the Regency had given to Señor Fernan Nuñez, the intimacy of the Duke de San Carlos with Talleyrand, and the extreme anxiety the latter has manifested to avoid anything which can give umbrage to Spain in the course of the negotiation with Portugal, I think justify the suspicion that the Bourbons are already desirous to renew their family connexions abroad, and that the first diplomatic attempt to re-establish their diplomatic influence will be apparent in Spain.

I enclose a letter I send under flying seal to Sir H. Wellesley upon this subject, to which I request your Lordship will pay attention.

The Minister of the Marine has withdrawn the refusal of his house, which he had already given me.

I am now endeavouring to obtain the refusal of the Hôtel Borghese, where the Emperor of Austria was lodged.

Ever faithfully yours,

C. STUART.

The King of Spain to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MON BON COUSIN,

A Madrid, ce 15 Juin, 1814.

Ayant été informé que mes bons frères et cousins, Alexandre I., Empereur de toutes les Russies, Frédéric Guillaume III., Roi de Prusse, George Frédéric Auguste, Prince de Galles, ont pris comme un singulier honneur et faveur l'élection et nomination que j'ai fait de ces personnes pour les associer et ranger en la confraternité et amiable compagnie de mon Ordre

de la Toison d'Or, j'ai résolu d'en faire dresser commission sur vous pour les délivrer en mon nom le Collier du dit Ordre, et en ce observer les cérémonies accoutumées, en conformité des instructions ci-jointes. Je vous en charge, mon bon Cousin, d'entendre à cette fonction au plus tôt; et je prie Dieu qu'il vous ait en bonne santé et digne garde.

Votre bon Cousin,

FERDINAND.

JEAN PEREZ VILLAMIL, Greffier de l'ordre.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,

Madrid, 17th June, 1814.

I have sent home the projet of a Treaty, such as it is possible may be accepted here; but finding an insuperable objection on the part of this government to entering into a defensive alliance with Great Britain, which might hereafter involve Spain in wars for objects wherein she was not interested, I drew up the Article relative to the assistance which we were to afford to Spain in the event of her being invaded, in very general terms, as you will see in the projet, which will, of course, be communicated to you. I have, however, presented another projet to the Spanish government, omitting all the passages which you will find marked with inverted commas, but without any very sanguine hope that it will be accepted. I did not choose, without the consent of the British government, to pledge Great Britain to make war in the event of Spain being invaded, without any corresponding pledge on the part of Spain supposing war to be declared against Great Britain; although I apprehend that if Spain were to be attacked, it would be the policy of Great Britain to defend her.

Things are going on here *de mal en pire*. The Duke of San Carlos is getting very unpopular, and I think he will find it necessary to resign his office of Secretary of State, and to confine himself to his situation about the King's person, in order to guard against the intrigues of persons who are undermining him in the King's favour. He does nothing in his office, and I have not received an answer to any one note I have addressed to him. He lately sent a circular note, without a signature, to assemble the Grandees. He did not himself attend the meeting, so that no one knew what it was convened for; and it broke up after *Noodle, Doodle, and Foodle* had delivered their sentiments; Doodle having used some impertinent expressions to the Duke del Parque, for which he was very near being caned. This is *literally* what passed at the meeting, and you may imagine what a ridicule it has thrown upon the Grandees. The worst of all this is, that the King, with the best intentions, is involved in all the unpopularity resulting from these proceedings. I see every day more reason to wish myself away, and I hope that Lord Castlereagh will allow me to come away as soon as I have brought the business which I have now in hand to some kind of issue. One of the things which most distress me is the expense of this embassy, which is at least double the allowances, without its being possible for me

to lower it ; and, as I told you here, I have reason to believe that government is already displeased at the amount of my expenses.

Pray use your endeavours to have the projet sent back to me immediately, with such alterations as may be thought necessary. If the Spanish government agree to the projet which I have sent to them, I shall feel no hesitation in signing the Treaty immediately, because it would be all for our advantage. It would be right likewise that government should determine, without loss of time, upon the extent of the succours in money which they may be disposed to give to Spain : at present there is not a farthing in the treasury, and everybody crying out for money.

Everybody is against an alliance with France, and I do not think that the Duke of San Carlos would dare to venture upon it, even if he were to decline ours. I believe that the proclamation for assembling the Cortes will very soon be issued.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

I have enclosed you a copy of the projet. The article relative to the Slave-trade will certainly not be admitted in its present state ; but I hope to get it admitted in another shape : that is, I mean to try if they will agree to the gradual abolition, and to prohibiting the King of Spain's subjects from assisting the English in this traffic.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Projet.

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the King of Spain and the Indies, being equally animated by a desire to strengthen and perpetuate the union and alliance which have been the principal means of re-establishing the balance of power in Europe, and of restoring peace to the world, " and in order to provide for the future tranquillity and security of their respective States," have named , who, having communicated their respective powers, have agreed to and concluded the following Articles :—

ART. I.

There shall in future be a strict and intimate " defensive " alliance between His Catholic Majesty and His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, their heirs and successors ; and in consequence of this intimate union, the High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to forward by all possible means their respective interests.

His Britannic Majesty and His Catholic Majesty declare, however, that in drawing closer the ties so happily subsisting between them, their object is by no means to injure any other States.

ART. II.

" One of the principal objects of this Treaty being to provide for the future security of His Catholic Majesty's dominions in the Peninsula, His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland engages, in the event of the invasion of Spain by any foreign power, to furnish in aid of his Ally such assistance as circumstances may admit of."

ART. III.

His Majesty the King of Spain and the Indies engages "on his part" not to enter into any engagement with France of the nature of that known under the denomination of the Family Compact, nor to bind himself by any ties whatever beyond those usually subsisting between nations at peace with each other, but not connected by alliance.

ART. IV.

The present alliance shall in no way derogate from the Treaties and Alliances which the High Contracting Parties may have with other Powers, it being understood that the said Treaties are not contrary to the friendship and good understanding which it is the object of the present engagement to cement and to perpetuate.

ART. V.

It having been agreed by the Treaty signed at London on the 14th day of January, 1809, to proceed to the negotiation of a Treaty of Commerce between Great Britain and Spain as soon as it should be practicable so to do, and the two High Contracting Parties desiring mutually to protect and extend the commerce between their respective subjects, promise to proceed without delay to the formation of a definitive arrangement of commerce.

ART. VI.

In the event of the commerce of the Spanish American possessions being opened to foreign nations, His Catholic Majesty promises that Great Britain shall be admitted to trade with those possessions as the most favoured nation.

ART. VII.

His Catholic Majesty engages to prohibit the importation of slaves into his colonies, and to take effectual means in order to prevent his subjects from engaging in the traffic of negroes.

ART. VIII.

"It is hereby agreed that the Court of Portugal shall be invited to accede to this Treaty."

ART. IX.

The present Treaty of friendship and alliance, consisting of Nine Articles, shall be ratified, and the ratification exchanged, within the space of , or sooner if it can be done.

To Major-General Donkin.

[767.]

SIR,

No. 10, Rue des Capucins, 18th June, 1814, 10 A.M.*

In consequence of directions from the Secretary of State and the Commander in Chief, I had ordered that a General Court

* The Duke of Wellington proceeded to Paris in consequence of the following letter from Lord Castlereagh.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Marquess of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 13th April, 1814.

The compass of a letter is so inadequate to convey a just conception of the state of affairs here, that I have requested Charles to carry you the details, with which,

Martial might assemble at Tarragona immediately for the trial of Lieutenant-General Sir John Murray ; but upon finding that yourself and all the witnesses, excepting Admiral Hallowell, were in England or elsewhere, distant from Spain, I have suspended the execution of the order for the assembly of the General Court Martial till the directions of the Secretary of State can be received.

I recommend you, therefore, to apply to him for directions.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Ministre de la Guerre to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Paris, le 18 Juin, 1814.

Je m'empresse d'adresser à Votre Excellence un itinéraire pour la colonne de 1500 à 2000 chevaux qui doit partir de Bordeaux vers le 27 Juin, et se diriger sur Mantes, par la route qu'a suivie la division de gauche de cavalerie Anglaise, pour aller delà s'embarquer à Boulogne ou Calais. Je prie Votre Excellence de joindre cet itinéraire aux ordres de départ qu'elle adressera au commandant de cette colonne.

Je viens d'ordonner toutes les mesures nécessaires pour faire préparer sur cette route les vivres, les fourrages, et les moyens de transport, et je charge le Général commandant la 11e division militaire d'attacher à cette colonne un officier de l'état-major ou un commissaire des guerres Français pour l'accompagner.

J'ai l'honneur d'adresser aussi à Votre Excellence l'itinéraire pour la continuation de marche des deux divisions de cavalerie Anglaise de Mantes à Boulogne, et de là au point déterminé pour leur embarquement. Je donne pareillement des ordres pour que le service des subsistances soit assuré sur cette route. Cet itinéraire est tracé sur une seule direction, Votre Excellence n'ayant paru y trouver aucun inconvénient ; j'ai seulement substitué Neuchâtel et Blangis à Granvilliers et Ayraines, sur la route de Gournay à Abbeville, parceque ces deux gîtes d'étape offrent beaucoup plus de ressources et de moyens d'établissement pour les troupes en marche.

which, as well as with my sentiments, he is fully acquainted. He will explain to you the strong wish I personally entertain that you could make it consistent with your other duties to be present here for a short time : he will also mention to you the importance I should attach to your accepting the embassy, upon a peace, to Paris, if you have no other object immediately in view, repose after such exertions being in itself a very natural one. I should not perhaps propose this task to you, after the station you have filled, if I did not think the situation might derive an additional interest from the era at which we are arrived, and the authority your name and services would give, through this Court, to our general politics on the Continent. I need not assure you that, in suggesting this proposal for your consideration, I should wish to be understood as not for a moment interfering with any claim for your services that may arise at home.

Believe me, my dear Lord, ever faithfully yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

Je vous invite, My Lord, à donner vos ordres aux deux divisions de cavalerie Anglaise pour qu'elles continuent en conséquence leur mouvement après un jour de séjour à Mantes, dans l'ordre où elles vont y arriver, c'est-à-dire, chaque division marchant en quatre colonnes successives, à vingt-quatre heures de distance l'une de l'autre. Les commissaires des guerres Français qui leur sont attachés les accompagneront jusqu'au lieu de leur embarquement, afin de faire pourvoir à leurs besoins dans tous les lieux de logement militaire.

Agréez, My Lord, l'expression des sentiments de haute considération avec lesquels j'ai l'honneur d'être de Votre Excellence

Le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

LE COMTE DUPONT.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Paris, le 18 Juin, 1814.

ITINÉRAIRE que suivra une colonne de Troupes Anglaises, composée de 1500 à 2000 chevaux de cavalerie, du train d'artillerie, du train des équipages militaires, etc., pour se rendre de Bordeaux à Boulogne ou Calais.

Cette colonne partira de Bordeaux vers le 27 Juin, et ira loger à—

27 Juin ..	St. André de Cubzac.	
28	Monlieu.	
29	Barbezieux.	
30	Angoulême.	Séjour le 1 Juillet.
2 Juillet	Mansle.	
3	Ruffec.	
4	Couhé.	
5	Poitiers.	Séjour le 6 Juillet.
7	Châtellerault.	
8	St. Maure.	
9	Tours.	Séjour le 10 Juillet.
11	Châteauregnault.	
12	Vendôme.	
13	Cloye.	
14	Bonneval.	
15	Chartres.	Séjour le 16 Juillet.
17	Dreux.	
18	Houdon.	
19	Mantes.	Séjour le 20 Juillet.
21	Gisors.	
22	Gournay.	
23	Neuchâtel.	
24	Blangis.	
25	Abbeville.	Séjour le 26 Juillet.
27	Rue.	
28	Montreuil.	
29	Boulogne, et delà sur le point déterminé pour son embarquement.	

Le Ministre de la Guerre,

LE COMTE DUPONT.

II.

Paris, le 18 Juin, 1814.

ITINÉRAIRE que suivront les deux divisions de Cavalerie Anglaise pour se rendre de Mantes à Boulogne ou Calais.

Ces deux divisions marchent en huit colonnes successives, fortes chacune d'environ 1500 chevaux, qui iront loger dans les lieux ci-après désignés, aux époques suivantes, savoir :—

	Division de Gauche, arrivant à Mantes les 25, 26, 27, et 28 Juin, et y séjournant un jour.				Division de Droite, arrivant à Mantes les 1, 2, 3, 4 Juillet, et y séjournant un jour.			
	1e Col.	2e Col.	3e Col.	4e Col.	5e Col.	6e Col.	7e Col.	8e Col.
Gisors	Juin. 27	Juin. 28	Juin. 29	Juin. 30	Juillet. 3	Juillet. 4	Juillet. 5	Juillet. 6
Gournay	28	29	30	1	4	5	6	7
Neuchâtel	29	30	1	2	5	6	7	8
Blangis	30	1	2	3	6	7	8	9
Abbeville	1, 2	2, 3	3, 4	4, 5	7, 8	8, 9	9, 10	10, 11
Rue	3	4	5	6	9	10	11	12
Montreuil	4	5	6	7	10	11	12	13
Boulogne, et de là sur le point où ces troupes devront s'embarquer ..	5	6	7	8	11	12	13	14

Le Ministre de la Guerre,
LE COMTE DUPONT.

[768.]

To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley.

MY DEAR HENRY,

Paris, 20th June, 1814.

I enclose a letter from Sir Charles Stewart, which will give you an account of the state of affairs here.

I have seen Labrador three or four times, who is more moderate than I expected to find him ; and he tells me that if he can get the French government to promise their good offices to obtain Naples, Parma, &c., or compensation for them, and an engagement to restore sequestrated property, he will sign the treaty of peace. He wishes besides to have Louisiana, but he will not delay to sign on that account.

I don't think the French are now looking to the Spanish

alliance. They are very angry about the King's decree in regard to the adherents of King Joseph.

I don't think matters are in a very satisfactory state here. They *appear* smooth enough, but I understand there is a good deal of dissatisfaction among all classes; and I believe that the only security the government have is the fear all the other classes have of the military, and of their taking advantage of any disturbance to restore the authority of Buonaparte or of some other military chief.

Ever yours most affectionately,

WELLINGTON.

I go to England to-morrow.

To Major-Gen. Sir George Murray.

[769.]

MY DEAR MURRAY,

Paris, 20th June, 1814.

I enclose the route for the march of the cavalry from Bordeaux, under Scovell, as far as Boulogne; and the copy of those for the march of the two other columns which De Lancey has taken to Mantes. You'll observe that they go in one column from Mantes.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Will you tell Scovell to take my horses on with him as far as Chartres, and to send them from thence to Paris by easy stages, directed to Sir Charles Stewart, No. 10, Rue des Capucins, Place Vendôme.

MÉMOIRE PRÉSENTÉ AUX PUISSANCES ALLIÉES PAR LES
MEMBRES DE LA NOBLESSE DES ÉTATS DES PROVINCES
BELGIQUES.

*A Leurs Majestés l'Empereur d'Autriche, l'Empereur de Russie, et le Roi
de Prusse, et au Prince de Galles.*

22 Juin, 1814.

Les peuples des Pays-Bas Catholiques, connus par leur loyauté et leur bonne foi, attendent avec confiance l'accomplissement des promesses sacrées que Vos Augustes Majestés ont renouvelées si souvent, soit dans leurs manifestes, soit dans leurs proclamations. En effet l'article 1 de la con-

vention de Reichenbach du 14 Juin, 1813, entre S.M. Britannique et S.M. le Roi de Prusse, porte "que le but de la guerre actuelle étant de rétablir *l'indépendance des états opprimés par la France*, les deux hautes parties contractantes se sont en conséquence engagées à diriger toutes les opérations vers ce but."

S.M. l'Empereur de Russie, dans sa proclamation donnée à Fribourg le 6 Janvier, 1814, s'exprime ainsi : "Puisse la tranquillité et le contentement revivre dans l'univers entier ; puisse chaque état recouvrer le bonheur sous ses anciennes loix et son ancien gouvernement ; puisse dans tous les pays fleurir la religion." S.M. déclare de plus, ainsi que le Feld-Maréchal Comte de Bellegarde lorsqu'il prit le commandement en Italie, que "les Souverains viennent protéger les droits légitimes, et *rétablir ce que la force avait détruit.*"

L'Art. 1 du traité d'alliance conclu à Chaumont le 1 Mars, 1814, par l'Autriche, la Russie, la Grande Bretagne, et la Prusse, consacre de nouveau le but "de se procurer à elles-mêmes et à l'Europe une paix générale sous la protection de laquelle les droits et la liberté de toutes les nations puissent être établis et assurés."

Lord Bentinck, dans sa proclamation aux Etats de Gênes, du 27 Avril, 1814, dit en termes exprès que "les puissances alliées ont adopté *comme loi invariable* de rendre à tous les peuples *leurs anciens droits et privilèges.*"

S.A. le Duc de Saxe-Weimar et le Général Bülow ont dès leur entrée dans les Pays-Bas Catholiques, et plusieurs fois depuis, publié et proclamé dans toutes nos cités les mêmes promesses, les mêmes garanties. Nos cœurs, pleins de confiance en ces promesses, se sont abandonnés avec joie à l'espoir de les voir se réaliser prochainement.

Cependant des bruits inquiétans paraissent se répandre et élever dans quelques esprits des doutes sur le maintien de notre antique constitution.

En vain répondons-nous que l'expérience de ce que Vos Majestés ont effectué chez les autres peuples doit démentir ces fausses rumeurs ; que déjà une partie des Etats de l'Italie est remise en possession de ses anciennes loix ; que S.M. le Roi de Sardaigne vient de les rétablir dans ses états ; que l'Espagne reprend également avec enthousiasme ses antiques institutions, dans lesquelles ses enfans ont puisé cette énergie et ce dévouement à toujours mémorables que la crainte n'obtient jamais, et que le désir seul de la conservation de ses droits peut inspirer à un peuple ; en vain répondons-nous que la France elle-même a été laissée maîtresse de son sort pour se donner la constitution qu'elle voudrait adopter.

Les Belges sont trop attachés à leur constitution formée par la sagesse de leurs arrières aïeux, et sanctionnée par toutes les races suivantes, ainsi que par tous leurs Souverains, ils connaissent trop son prix inestimable, pour que le moindre doute n'éveille point aussitôt leur inquiétude.

Dans cette position (où la brièveté du tems empêche de consulter quelques membres qui se trouvent trop éloignés) nous, anciens membres de la noblesse des Provinces Beligiques, qui était appelée à former avec le clergé et le Tiers-Etat la totalité de la représentation nationale, nous, à qui nos compatriotes étaient habitués de donner leur confiance, croyons calmer un peu leurs inquiétudes en portant au pied de vos trônes l'expression de nos vœux ; nous croyons remplir notre devoir et nos obligations en mettant respectueusement sous les yeux pénétrants de Vos Majestés, et dans son vrai jour, la

preuve de ce que l'expérience de tant de siècles nous donne la confiance de représenter à de si grands monarques, à l'Europe, aux conseils de toutes les puissances, à savoir qu'il est impossible de trouver un moyen plus propre à concilier et à consolider les intérêts des Pays-Bas Catholiques, ceux de leur Souverain futur, et ceux de la politique des autres états, que de nous conserver nos anciennes loix.

Que voulons-nous ? Vivre heureux et tranquilles sous la protection d'un bon Prince et de notre constitution, qui assure la conservation de toute la pureté et de tous les droits de notre religion, et le retour certain d'un bonheur stable ; car maintenant nous l'apprécions encore mieux cette sage et vénérable charte depuis les essais malheureux de cette innombrable multitude de constitutions si vantées, qui, promettant partout le bonheur à l'univers, partout en préparaient la ruine.

Que doit vouloir celui qui sera appelé à régner sur nous ? Se procurer la garantie la plus assurée de l'affermissement de son trône et de la stabilité de son état. Mais un Souverain peut-il tirer de ses sujets une garantie plus forte que celle de leur amour et de leur dévouement ? et peut-il être plus assuré de ces sentiments de la nation qu'en lui laissant dans toute son intégrité ce qu'elle estime par-dessus tout ? C'est par cette juste et louable condescendance que cet amour et ce dévouement croissent à mesure que le tems s'écoule. Mais le ressort de la violence et de la contrainte s'affaiblit, ou se brise tôt ou tard ; quelques fois d'abord, quelques fois au bout d'un certain nombre d'années ; et que sont quelques années dans la durée d'un Etat ? La violence et la contrainte n'arracheront jamais ce que produisent l'amour et le dévouement. Les Rois d'Espagne et de Prusse ne régneraient plus si leurs peuples avaient été malheureux. Ce n'est, et ce ne pouvait pas être la force de la contrainte, mais la force du dévouement, qui ont fait faire à tant de milliers d'Espagnols et de Prussiens les efforts héroïques qui ont sauvé l'Etat, le Prince, et l'Europe entière. Il n'a servi de rien à Buonaparte d'avoir sacrifié plusieurs millions d'hommes pour établir son règne, pour satisfaire son ambition, et pour se maintenir sur le trône. Personne dans le monde n'a réuni autant de moyens, et cependant son incroyable puissance ne parvint ni à écraser la Prusse ni à subjuguier l'Espagne, ni même à se soutenir dans son usurpation. Dès que vous voulûtes, O Rois ! l'attaquer sérieusement et de concert, il succomba et il fut abandonné seul à son destin. Mais si, au lieu d'être des libérateurs, vous eussiez été des tyrans ; si, au lieu de la certitude de renverser les loix du despotisme, les Français avaient eu à défendre un bon Roi et des loix *comme les nôtres, telles qu'aucunes autres n'eussent pu leur procurer autant de bonheur*, permettez-nous de vous le dire, nous croyons que les forces immenses que vous avez déployées n'auroient point suffi, et qu'il eut fallu de longs et grands efforts pour les vaincre. Ce que douze à quatorze millions d'Espagnols libres et dévoués ont pu faire, Napoléon, traînant après lui quarante millions d'hommes réduits en servitude, n'a pas pu l'effectuer.

Que veut la politique des autres Etats ? Qu'une forte barrière s'élève dans la Belgique contre la France. Mais n'est ce point encore le bonheur et le contentement dont nous jouirons, qui seuls peuvent entièrement remplir ce but ? Pourquoi nous défendrions-nous, et que défendrions-nous, si nous sommes malheureux ? Si la force seule nous contraignait à nous défendre, il se pourrait que par la suite des tems une force plus consi-

dérable nous attaquat. Qui peut répondre de ce que feraient alors des peuples ulcérés et toujours prompts à croire les promesses dont on les flatte-rait ? N'est-il pas plus magnanime, n'est-il pas plus sûr de conserver à ces peuples des institutions, éprouvées par l'expérience de plusieurs siècles, qui les mettent, si nous ôtons-nous exprimer ainsi, à l'abri de la corruption ? de les laisser dans une position telle qu'ils ne puissent que perdre au changement ? C'est bien alors que la barrière sera réellement élevée.

C'est donc par la conservation de notre constitution que ces trois buts seront atteints. C'est sur ce palladium sacré que reposent notre bonheur, la sûreté de notre Prince futur, et la garantie de la politique des autres nations. L'amour des peuples pour leurs institutions antiques est le gage le plus certain de leur soumission et de leur tranquillité. Quelle confiance, quelle estime auraient-ils pour de nouvelles institutions ? Ne croiront-ils pas toujours que d'autres plus nouvelles viendront bientôt les renverser ? Quel champ pour les intrigues et les cabales ! Ces antiques monuments, ainsi que votre noblesse, O Princes, sont d'autant plus environnés du respect des peuples, qu'ils remontent plus haut dans l'origine des nations, et qu'ils se sont conservés avec plus de pureté et d'intégrité.

Enfin il nous reste à vous demander, monarques puissants, que notre territoire demeure intact, et que notre commerce soit libre. Déjà nous avons vu avec une profonde douleur cette France si puissante s'agrandir encore d'une portion précieuse de nos provinces, ainsi qu'elle l'a fait si souvent. Aurions-nous encore à craindre d'autres morcellements ? Si, par une politique que nous ne pénétrons point, vous n'avez pas jugé devoir nous rendre puissants pour tenir la France en échec, au moins ôtons-nous réclamer contre le démembrement ultérieur de notre patrie infortunée ? Nous porter ce coup si sensible c'est retomber dans la plupart des inconvénients que nous avons pris la respectueuse liberté de mettre sous vos yeux.

Voilà, Princes, ce que des peuples que vingt années d'esclavage n'ont point abatardi jusqu'à méconnaître les principes que nous venons d'exposer, vous expriment respectueusement par nos bouches. Voilà ce que nous dirions dans vos conseils, si nous y étions appelés.

Quand le malheur des circonstances fit signer à S.M. l'Empereur d'Autriche le traité par lequel elle céda ces provinces, elle ne peut céder que ce qu'elle possédait. L'usurpateur du trône des Bourbons ne peut acquérir que ce qu'elle avait à lui transmettre, c'est-à-dire, un pays jouissant d'une constitution qu'elle avait juré de n'altérer jamais. Aucun de vous, O Rois ! n'est capable d'imiter ce conquérant farouche, pour qui rien de ce qui existe entre le ciel et la terre ne fut sacré. Vous dédaignez le titre avili de conquérant, vous voulez être nos bienfaisants libérateurs.

François, nous nous adressons à vous. Vous avez juré après tous vos ancêtres de conserver nos droits et nos constitutions. Nous nous fions entièrement à vos serments, à vos promesses. En nous jetant dans vos bras, nous croyons nous jeter dans les bras d'un père protecteur.

Alexandre, nous nous adressons à vous. Vous avez voulu faire le bonheur des Français, qui vous ont insulté du haut du Kremlin, de dessus les ruines fumantes de Moscow. Vous ne voudriez point qu'un peuple ami fut malheureux.

Frédéric, nous nous adressons à vous. Loin de vous laisser abattre par les malheurs affreux de tout genre que les Français ont répandu sur vos

Etats, votre courage se développa plus brillant que jamais. Couronné par la victoire, vous ne vous abandonnâtes point à la vengeance, vous vous plûtes à oublier leurs offenses et à les pardonner. Vous daignerez donc accorder votre protection efficace à un peuple qui dès leur arrivée dans ces contrées reçut vos soldats au bruit de ses acclamations et en vrais libérateurs.

Généreux Prince de Galles, nous nous adressons à vous. Vous avez consacré pendant tant d'années les ressources de vos Etats à la délivrance du monde. Vos guerriers ont livré tant de combats sanglants pour les Espagnols, qui ne se battaient eux-mêmes que pour leur religion, leur Roi, et leurs loix. Votre peuple n'aurait pas son énergie, il n'aurait pas été à l'abri des menées de la France, s'il n'avait été imbu de son inviolable attachement à votre personne et à sa constitution. Non, vous sentez trop la force et surtout la ressource d'un peuple persuadé que son bonheur repose sur sa constitution, pour que nous puissions douter un instant de votre puissante intercession pour nous conserver la nôtre.

Et vous, Prince Souverain des Pays-Bas-Unis, dont les aïeux ont si souvent défendu et garanti nos droits, nous nous adressons également à vous. Vous ne vous départirez point d'une politique qui a produit des effets aussi utiles à votre Etat qu'au nôtre.

Nous ôtons vous le demander, O grands et magnanimes Souverains, qui allez régler le sort de la Belgique, peut il exister ce doute, quand vos proclamations annoncent en termes exprès que vous avez adopté *comme loi invariable* de rendre à tous les peuples *leurs anciens droits et privilèges* ?

Les anciens droits des peuples des Pays-Bas Catholiques leur ont été jurés par l'auguste Empereur d'Autriche, leur Souverain, et par tous ses prédécesseurs. Ils ont été stipulés, assurés, et garantis par l'Angleterre, la France, la Prusse, et la Hollande, dans tous les traités qui depuis plusieurs siècles sont été conclus pour assurer la jouissance de la Belgique à la maison d'Autriche.

Fondé sur ces engagements solennels et sur les promesses réitérées qui les ont suivis durant cette guerre, l'espoir de recouvrer la constitution antique, qui depuis des siècles a fait le bonheur des Belges, ne saurait être déçu.

Ne connaissant point encore le Prince qui doit nous gouverner, nous ne pouvons pas lui faire parvenir l'expression de notre vœu ; mais qu'il l'apprenne par vous, qui fixent les destinées de l'Europe ; par vous, que votre sagesse et votre prudence rendent si dignes de commander aux hommes et de servir de modèle aux Rois.

Nota.

La pièce ci-dessus fut faite en 4 doubles entièrement semblables pour être envoyés à chacune des puissances rapportées en tête. On fit une cinquième pièce mot à mot conforme aux 4 autres, excepté le passage ci-après, pour être envoyée au Prince d'Orange. En tête est écrit, "A LL.MM. l'Empereur d'Autriche, l'Empereur de Russie, et le Roi de Prusse, et à leurs AA.RR. le Prince de Galles et le Prince Souverain des Pays-Bas-Unis."

Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

Bordeaux, 28th June, 1814.

A packet sailing to-day, I have only to report to your Grace that no shipping whatever has arrived this last week. The troops continue in camp; the German Legion pitched their tents there yesterday.

The two brigades of Guards are the only troops in Bordeaux. The 2nd Caçadores marched this morning for Bayonne, and the last column of Artillery horses and the Staff Corps, according to route, through France.

Lieutenant-General de Blainac, appointed to the military command of La Gironde, has in a very obliging manner halted those French troops ordered to Bordeaux, at Langon and La Réolle, until further orders. The temper and conduct of the inhabitants have much changed towards us, without any cause whatever, except that they are evidently jealous of us remaining so long here.

The quiet, soldier-like conduct of the Guards gives me the utmost confidence in assuring your Grace that there is no fault to be found with our military conduct.

The 200,000 dollars have been sent to Major-General Ross, on board the *Scamander* frigate, and there is on board also an officer of the Paymaster-General's department.

I have the honour to be

Your Grace's most obedient and faithful,

DALHOUSIE.

H. Goulburn, Esq., to W. Hamilton, Esq.

SIR,

Downing Street, 29th June, 1814.

I am directed by Lord Bathurst to transmit to you the enclosed letter from the African Company, stating some points upon which it appears to them desirable, both with a view to their own interests and to the repression of the slave trade, that a negotiation should be entered into with France, and to request that you would call the particular attention of Lord Castlereagh to the subject.

I am, &c.,

HENRY GOULBURN.

[ENCLOSURE.]

The Secretary of the African Company to Earl Bathurst.

MY LORD,

African Office, Frederick's Place, Old Jewry, 22nd June, 1814.

We had the honour of addressing your Lordship on the 23rd of April, when the treaty with France was under discussion, stating the conditions which, in our opinion, it appeared to be necessary to obtain for the protection of the British interest on the Gold Coast of Africa. Since that date the treaty has been signed and published, and we observe with considerable alarm that the 8th Article, instead of specifying the possessions and assigning the limits within which the French are to be allowed to carry on the slave trade on the coast of Africa, allows them generally to resume all the possessions which they held in the year 1792.

The French have at all times evinced the greatest anxiety to erect forts and to obtain a share of the trade on the Gold Coast; while this country uniformly refused to grant them any establishment there, and even in time of peace has driven off their ships and excluded them from all participation

in that trade. By the general terms in which the above-mentioned article of the treaty is expressed, France will not only be enabled to renew her attempts upon the trade, but unfortunately the settlement of Amakow,* which, without any right, they established about the year 1786, was, notwithstanding the remonstrances of this committee, and their applications to government for its removal, suffered to exist long subsequent to the year 1792. At that time the settlement was, perhaps, thought by government too trifling to be worth a dispute with France, as it admitted them only to a small share of a trade in which we had a preponderating interest and control. Your Lordship will, however, perceive that the matter now stands upon very different grounds. The French being allowed to renew the slave trade, which is interdicted to the subjects of this country, this station, in the very centre of the British possessions on the Gold Coast, will become immediately the emporium of that commerce; so that the questions now will be, whether we shall be compelled to relinquish settlements of long establishment, of considerable extent and value, and an infant trade, annually increasing, in which the nation feels particularly interested, by suffering them to renew a settlement formed in defiance of the rights of this country, and of our existing treaties with the natives, and to renew (on a part of the coast from which they have been now for some time excluded) a traffic declared by both nations to be repugnant to the principles of national justice.

We have before stated to your Lordship that this traffic and the British commerce cannot exist together, and that the lives even of the persons in our forts will not be in safety while the slave trade is carried on in their neighbourhood.

We cannot quit this subject without earnestly entreating your Lordship's attention to that part of our letter of the 23rd April which relates to the Dutch forts, a subject now become of greatly increased interest by the prospect of an universal extinction of the slave trade at a certain fixed period; an event which, provided the slave trade be not allowed to interfere with them, must greatly enhance the value of our settlements.

Having thus stated to your Lordship the grounds upon which we deem it so greatly important that the slave trade should not be resumed upon the Gold Coast, we now take leave to solicit your attention to another point which to us appears to be no less deserving of consideration. By the first additional article of the treaty France engages that the slave trade shall on her part cease definitively in five years. Although this stipulation of a definite period when the French slave trade shall cease does not appear to satisfy the wishes of the British public, it will nevertheless, we apprehend, be found of invaluable importance, provided only that its performance can be relied on. But it will be obvious to your Lordship that France at the expiration of five years (a period too short for the re-establishment of her colonies, but sufficiently long to convince her of the value of this trade) will probably feel little disposed to pass laws for its abolition. It was in contemplation of a possible existence of a state of things in which it might have been left to France to enforce a system so directly at variance with her own interest that in our former letter we were induced to suggest the expediency that the States agreeing to abolish the slave trade should grant to each other the power of enforcing the laws enacted, or to be enacted, for that purpose. If France could have been induced to decree the immediate abolition, this agreement could only have been a desirable admission of a right of which, as your Lordship is aware, we have already assumed the exercise; but under the existing circumstances, we submit to your Lordship, it will be extremely desirable that an agreement should be entered into between this country and France, that after the expiration of five years it shall be lawful for the ships

* Amakow is about 4 leagues to the eastward of Cape Coast Castle.

of either power to capture vessels and cargoes engaged in the slave trade, unto the subjects of whichever state belonging. By these means the onus of insisting on a termination of the French trade at the end of five years will be removed from this country, and the performance of the stipulations will be most effectually secured.

Understanding that the opportunity is not yet entirely lost, we confidently trust not only that the security of the British possessions on the Gold Coast will be fully provided for in the treaty to be signed with the Sovereign of the Netherlands, but that the two points which we have therein ventured to suggest as necessary to be required of France will still be obtained; the first being no more than an equitable explanation of the 8th Article of the Treaty already entered into, and France being incompetent, as it appears to us, to refuse the second without falsifying her solemn condemnation of the slave trade, and avowing in the face of all Europe in congress assembled her intention or desire to avoid the performance of her engagements.

It would, indeed, be of invaluable advantage to the British trade, and especially to the valuable interests connected with the settlements on the Windward and Gold Coasts, if the French government could be induced to agree that their settlements at Goree, Senegal, and Whydah should henceforth be confined exclusively to a trade similar to that now carried on with the British settlements, and that their slave trade should be wholly with places to the southward of the Line, which regulation, as the French formerly had comparatively but very little trade in slaves at their settlements above-mentioned, having imported almost the whole of the slaves for the French West India colonies from the coast of Angola (which are greatly preferred by the French colonists to those from ports to the northward), it is to be hoped would not be deemed objectionable by France, the more especially as the coast to the southward furnishes the far greater number of slaves at present exported from Africa; and the beneficial effects of the abolition of the slave trade, in the introduction of a different species of commerce, have already become apparent at places to the northward of the Line, but not at all to the southward.

Should this proposition be fortunately agreed to by France, we beg to add, it will be important that a similar understanding should take place with regard to the rights of each power to make captures of vessels engaged in the slave trade within the proscribed limits, as we have taken leave to suggest will be expedient at the termination of the period of five years.

I have, &c.,

S. COCK.

Señor P. G. de Labrador to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Paris, ce 30 Juin, 1814.

Mes espérances de terminer aussitôt ma négociation se sont évanouies d'une manière bien singulière. J'étois d'accord avec Monsieur de Bénévent sur tous les articles additionnels; nous avons même levé des difficultés de rédaction, quand M. de Bénévent me proposa un article sur la rentrée en Espagne des proscrits que la législation actuelle exclue. Je suis plus que persuadé que les trois cents ou quatre cents individus, de toute âge et sexe, que le décret du 30 Mai dernier bannit d'Espagne, doivent embarrasser le gouvernement Français. Je crois aussi que le nombre des bannis pourroit encore être réduit de façon que la peine ne tombât que sur les personnes les plus marquants; mais je soutiens qu'un pareil sujet ne sauroit pas être l'objet d'un article d'un traité de paix sans donner à une puissance étrangère une intervention directe dans les affaires domestiques d'Espagne. Par conséquence j'ai proposé à M. de Bénévent de signer le traité sans y faire men-

tion, et de me passer une note une demie heure après si on le veut, soit en se plaignant de l'embarras qui donnent tant d'étrangers, soit en intercédant en leur faveur. Alors je me compromettrai à obtenir de mon gouvernement l'adoucissement des peines portées, et la grâce de retourner en Espagne pour un grand nombre d'individus, car pour tous ce sera impossible, la mémoire de leurs forfaits étant encore si récente. Comment d'ailleurs seroit possible de faire rentrer un Ainbas, Ministre de Police, souillé du sang de tant de bons Espagnols ; un Almenara, bâtissant des maisons, plantant des jardins, transformant même des églises en salons de bal, quand les habitans de Madrid mourroient de faim au milieu de la rue ; d'autres enfin qui ont saccagé les maisons de leurs compatriotes, ou brûlé leurs campagnes et commis plus de crimes que les hordes mêmes de barbares dont le courage des armées alliées, conduites par un héros, ont enfin nettoiyé mon pays ? Il est encore bien extraordinaire que M. de Bénévent, qui n'a pas osé proposer aux plénipotentiaires Anglais la rentrée des Irlandais-Unis, ni au plénipotentiaire Portugais celle des Portugais bannis de leurs pays, veuille absolument que le Roi d'Espagne s'eugage à permettre le retour de personnes infiniment plus criminelles et plus odieuses. Enfin je suis persuadé que tout ce qu'on peut faire là dessus doit se faire par les moyens de l'intercession, de la recommandation, ou quelque autre voie détournée ; mais que c'est vouloir se mêler du gouvernement intérieur d'un état que de prétendre exiger de lui des engagements de déroger des lois qui concernent des sujets du même état ? Je ne sais point encore si je réussirais à faire entendre raison à M. de Bénévent. Je le souhaite de tout mon cœur pour avoir la facilité de faire mon voyage à Londres pour l'objet dont j'ai eu l'honneur de parler à V.E.

Je vous prie, My Lord, d'excuser une si longue lettre, et une lettre si mal tournée ; et d'être persuadé que personne au monde n'admire ni n'aime V.E. davantage que

Son très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

P. GOMEZ LABRADOR.

Sir R. H. Kennedy to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

Bordeaux, 3rd July, 1814.

I have received since your Grace left Bordeaux memorials from several villages in the neighbourhood of Salamanca for compensation for damages sustained by them in the passage of the Allied troops during the campaign of 1812.

I have the honour to enclose a statement of these claims, amounting together, according to certificate and sworn declarations produced, to the sum of 227,636 dollars.

These villages, I beg to observe, were not included in the claims which your Grace decided upon at St. Jean de Luz, and for which 32,463 dollars were paid by Mr. Dalrymple, under your Grace's authority.

As many of the Commissariat officers who were with the army in 1812 are now in England, and as the provision accounts for that year have all been rendered, and are in the Account Office at Lisbon, it is out of my power to ascertain whether all the forage due to the army at the periods referred to by the memorialists was issued by the Commissariat or not ; and indeed could even that be determined, in order to enable the Commissaries to pass their receipts for any forage which was issued, although due, and which the army may have taken from these villages, the Commissaries

should for that purpose be furnished with corresponding regimental returns and receipts, which now it would be impossible to obtain.

The Arapiles claims I should have discharged, in compliance with your Grace's memorandum, on the back of a letter from General O'Lawlor, which reached me with the claims about ten days ago; but the man who brought them to me has no written authority to receive the award, and appears so ignorant, and so unacquainted with the contents of the paper, that it would not be safe to confide the money to his care: but I shall write to General O'Lawlor immediately respecting it.

I have informed the memorialists that I would submit their claims immediately to the consideration of your Grace, and that they would do wisely to return to their homes, and that your decision I would communicate to them as soon as possible. In the mean time I would venture (and I have done so) to give each village a sum on account (as per accompanying statement), which, I trust, your Grace will approve of.*

The indemnification which you may direct for these villages I will make arrangements for being carefully paid to the claimants.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

R. H. KENNEDY.

Lord Palmerston to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD,

Cambridge, 3rd July, 1814.

I enclose a paper showing the expense which would be produced by some alterations in our proposed arrangements for the half-pay and General officers, which I would beg strongly to recommend to your favourable consideration, and which, I think, would if adopted get rid of all the objections and difficulties that have been started upon these subjects in the House of Commons.

1. It has been much urged by many that some distinction ought to be made between the General and the Lieutenant-General; that without it a man who is not likely to get a regiment has nothing more to look to in life after he is made Lieutenant-General; that this is the only step which does not give some little increase of pay; and that, as a man cannot be General till he has been forty years in the army, they cannot last very long afterwards, and the number of full Generals without regiments cannot ever be great. I should propose therefore to give them, not the pay of a full Admiral, 2*l.* 2*s.* a day, but an intermediate sum, 1*l.* 17*s.* 6*d.* or 1*l.* 18*s.*, which would be an increase of 5*s.* or 5*s.* 6*d.* upon the pay of Lieutenant-General, but would still leave the whole annual amount sufficiently below the emoluments of a regiment.

2. Great objections have been made to our plan in as far as it bears upon Major-Generals who are Lieutenant-Colonels of cavalry. It has been urged that by taking from them their regimental commission, and giving them the General officers' pay, we give them an unsaleable annuity instead of a saleable one of very nearly the same amount, and that of course the value of an annuity that can be sold at pleasure is greater than that of one which cannot be so disposed of. The most obvious mode of getting over this difficulty would have been to have left the whole arrangement optional, allowing those who chose it to retain their commissions and give up their claim to the General officers' pay; but this the Duke of York, for reasons

* *Mem.*—This statement has been approved of by the Duke of Wellington.

which I own are strong ones, will not agree to; and therefore it seems to me that the only other way of obviating the difficulty is to give to these particular officers an increased rate of pay while they are Major-Generals, and to allow them, if they should at any time wish it, to sell an *unattached* commission of Lieutenant-Colonel of cavalry: and 5s. a day seems to be a sufficient addition, and would, I believe, satisfy them. This measure should, however, be confined to those who are now Lieutenant-Colonels of cavalry, and have a sort of vested right to all the existing advantages of the commission; those who may succeed to that rank hereafter cannot of course have the same claim.

3. It is undeniable that our arrangement would bear very hard upon the Guards; and the Duke of York is most particularly anxious that they should not be excepted from its operation; but upon the best calculation which we can make, the average amount of the pay and emoluments of the officers of the Guards seems to be as follows:

	Per annum.
The Lieutenant-Colonels	800 <i>l.</i> each
The 1st Major of the 1st regiment	900 <i>l.</i> „
The 1st Major of the 2nd and 3rd regiments	800 <i>l.</i> „
The remaining Majors	700 <i>l.</i> „
The Captains	500 <i>l.</i> „

It is evident that they would be considerable losers by giving up their commissions in the Guards for 450*l.* per annum as Major-General, and 593*l.* per annum as Lieutenant-General; and the Duke proposes therefore to make up their pay as General officers, according to their rank, to the above-stated sums; still in this case, however, acting upon the principle that the existing interests only are to be considered, and that those who succeed to the vacancies produced by this arrangement will have gained so much in rapidity of promotion, that they will have no claim when they are made General officers to anything beyond the established pay of their rank.

4. An additional shilling was given, when Mr. Windham was Secretary-at-War, to every Lieutenant after seven years' service. I omitted to notice this circumstance to you when we were discussing the subject of the half-pay, but I should imagine you would not object to let the distinction arising from length of service attach to the half-pay as well as to the full pay, and to add sixpence to the half-pay of Lieutenants of more than seven years' standing, the expense of which will, as you see, be very trifling.

5. Several officers and members have attacked me about the proposed rate of half-pay for Ensigns; and I think it would give great satisfaction if we were to give the Ensign the odd 2*d.*, and make his half-pay 3*s.* instead of 2*s.* 10*d.*, which would still be leaving him sufficiently below the Lieutenant, to whom we give 4*s.* a day. Neither of these last propositions could at all affect the naval scale, as they have no rate so low as either would even then be.

I was not able to get this calculation made so as to show it you before I left London yesterday morning, and I shall not be able to leave this place till Tuesday evening; but as the resumed debate upon the Estimates is fixed for Wednesday next, I will call upon you in the early part of Wednesday to learn your determination upon these several points.

My dear Lord, yours very faithfully,

PALMERSTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

War-Office, 2nd July, 1814.

ESTIMATE of the Expense of certain Alterations in the Arrangement for Increasing the Pay of General Officers, and the rates of Half-pay, respectively.

	Per annum.	
	£.	s.
1. By increasing the pay of 14 Generals not having regiments from 1 <i>l.</i> 12 <i>s.</i> 6 <i>d.</i> per diem (593 <i>l.</i> 2 <i>s.</i> 6 <i>d.</i> per annum) to 1 <i>l.</i> 17 <i>s.</i> 6 <i>d.</i> per diem (684 <i>l.</i> 7 <i>s.</i> 6 <i>d.</i> per annum), the annual difference for each being 91 <i>l.</i> 5 <i>s.</i>	1277	10
(Agreed.)		
2. By increasing the pay of 32 Major-Generals, being Lieutenant-Colonels * of cavalry regiments, from 1 <i>l.</i> 5 <i>s.</i> per diem (456 <i>l.</i> 5 <i>s.</i> per annum) to 1 <i>l.</i> 10 <i>s.</i> per diem (547 <i>l.</i> 10 <i>s.</i> per annum), the annual difference for each being 91 <i>l.</i> 5 <i>s.</i> ..	2920	0
3. By increasing the pay of General officers, who are Field officers, in the Foot Guards, viz. :		
The Lieutenant-Colonels of the three regiments (who now possess the rank of General or Lieutenant-General) each from 1 <i>l.</i> 12 <i>s.</i> 6 <i>d.</i> per diem to 800 <i>l.</i> per annum, the difference for each officer being 206 <i>l.</i> 17 <i>s.</i> 6 <i>d.</i>	620	12 6
The 1st Major of the 1st regiment (a Lieutenant-General) from the like rate to 900 <i>l.</i> per annum	306	17 6
The 1st Majors of the 2nd and 3rd regiments to 800 <i>l.</i> per annum each :		
One being a Lieutenant-General, from 593 <i>l.</i> 2 <i>s.</i> 6 <i>d.</i>	206	17 6
One being a Major-General, from 456 <i>l.</i> 5 <i>s.</i>	343	15 0
The remaining Majors to 700 <i>l.</i> per annum each :		
Three being Lieutenant-Generals — difference each, 106 <i>l.</i> 17 <i>s.</i> 6 <i>d.</i>	520	12 6
One being a Major-General—difference ..	243	15 0
The Captains to 500 <i>l.</i> per annum each. There are 24 Major-Generals † who are Captains : the difference for each is 43 <i>l.</i> 15 <i>s.</i> —in all ..	1050	0 0
		3292 10
Increase of half-pay :		
4. Suppose that 100 Lieutenants of 7 years' standing will be reduced, the expense of adding 6 <i>d.</i> per diem more to their retired pay (making 4 <i>s.</i> 6 <i>d.</i> in all) would be, after deducting poundage	889	13
(Agreed.)		
5. Assuming that 800 Ensigns will be reduced, the expense of adding 2 <i>d.</i> per diem more to their retired pay (making 3 <i>s.</i> in all) would be	2372	10
Total	10,752	3

* There are also 5 Major-Generals who are only Majors of Cavalry.

† There are also 2 Lieutenant-Generals who are only Captains.

To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley.

[770.]

MY DEAR HENRY,

London, 4th July, 1814.

I have received your letter of the 17th, with the treaty, &c., and I saw Lord Castlereagh this morning, who had not had time to peruse your despatches, and could give no opinion about the treaty.

I spoke to him about your leave, which he promised me should be sent to you to be used at your discretion, with directions not to use it till you shall have brought to a conclusion the negotiation on which you are at present employed.

I mentioned to him likewise your salary, upon which he said that if you would send home an official statement upon the subject, which would justify him before Parliament, he would arrange the matter in a manner that should be satisfactory to you.

I have not time now for other matters; but I'll press forward the orders upon the treaty as soon as possible.

Ever, my dear Henry, yours most affectionately,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Liverpool to Lord Palmerston.

MY DEAR LORD,

Fife House, 5th July, 1814.

I have given every attention in my power to your paper on the subject of some alterations in the proposed arrangement of half-pay, and have conversed with Mr. V. upon it, whose sentiments very much concur with my own.

With respect to the 1st article, the increase to the half-pay of Lieutenant-Generals when they become Generals, we see no objection to it to the extent proposed, and it may therefore be considered as agreed upon.

Upon the 2nd article we feel very considerable objections. We do not see the soundness of the principle upon which this could be confined to those who are actually Lieutenant-Colonels of cavalry, as persons who hold subordinate commissions in that description of force may consider themselves as having entered into the service with the same expectations. We do not think it moreover politic to increase the advantages of this description of officers over those of the line, particularly when they come to be indiscriminately classed as Major-Generals. Officers of cavalry have, under the present arrangements of the army, many essential advantages over those of infantry; and we do not think it would be prudent to augment them. The only mode therefore of getting over the difficulty appears to us to be by making the arrangement optional; and whatever inconvenience this may occasion, it is an inconvenience already existing in the service, and which in time of peace will be of less consequence than it has been.

Upon the 3rd article our objections are of the same nature as upon the 2nd. Indeed they are rather stronger. We see still less in this instance than in the former how it would be practicable to confine it to the existing cases only; and the many advantages which the Guards possess over other branches of the service, and the description of persons who usually accept commissions in them, would render such a distinction in their favour, when they become General officers together with others, very invidious.

Upon the 4th article, for giving an additional shilling to Lieutenants after seven years' service, there is no objection.

Upon the 5th article we have only to say that there is more objection to the principle than to the amount of the increase proposed. The youngest Ensigns are of course those who would be put on half-pay; most of them will be boys, and at a time of life to enter into other professions. We do not think it wise in principle to make the first step in this or any other profession too beneficial. The half-pay at first proposed appears to bear a full proportion to that of the Lieutenants, whilst the difference of their situation and future prospects ought not to be lost sight of.

I am, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

The Duke of San Carlos to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MOST EXCELLENT SIR,

MY DEAR COUSIN AND FRIEND,

Madrid, 6th July, 1814.

I avail myself of the opportunity offered me by your brother, the Ambassador, to write to and congratulate you upon the treaty of amity and alliance* which we have signed in the name of the King my master and His Britannic Majesty. I know how much you will rejoice at this intelligence, and hope that you will do me the justice of believing that it fills my heart with the sincerest joy.

You so warmly interest yourself in whatever has any reference to Spain, which by this time you look upon as your own country, that I need take no pains to request your attention in favour of the subject which I am going to mention: indeed the King is confident that the least intimation concerning it is sufficient to induce you to make it your business with the best success.

You well know how unfortunate Spain has been ever since the 2nd of March, 1808. You are likewise not ignorant that other misfortunes of long standing afflicted her. All this was followed by the cruel war, and by the other evils consequent upon His Majesty's absence: from both these circumstances it has resulted that the Treasury is greatly exhausted, and His Majesty is grieved not to be able to meet the urgent necessities of the State. In this situation he gladly recurs to His Britannic Majesty's government, through the medium of your brother the Ambassador, for the loan of ten millions of dollars. His Majesty, who is resolved religiously to fulfil his engagements, binds himself punctually to reimburse this sum in the space of ten years, and by equal instalments; as also to pay in the

* See p. 140.

mean time the interest that may be agreed upon ; pledging for the whole the revenue of tobacco, which is the best and the most secure of his Crown.

It would be fruitless, dear Cousin and Friend, to use any further motives to interest you in this business with that alacrity which you discover on every subject relating to the affairs of your beloved Spain. I certainly entertain this hope, and most earnestly entreat your concurrence, being ever ready to oblige you, and evince myself your affectionate cousin and sincere friend,

THE DUKE OF SAN CARLOS.

The King of Spain to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MON BON COUSIN,

A Madrid, ce 8 Juillet, 1814.

Ayant été informé que mon bon cousin le Prince d'Orange a pris comme un singulier honneur et faveur l'élection et nomination que j'ai fait de sa personne pour l'associer et ranger en la confraternité et amiable compagnie de mon Ordre de la Toison d'Or, j'ai résolu d'en faire dresser commission sur vous pour le délivrer en mon nom le Collier du dit Ordre, et en ce observer les cérémonies accoutumées en conformité des instructions ci-jointes. Je vous en charge, mon bon Cousin, d'entendre à cette fonction au plus tôt ; et je prie Dieu qu'il vous ait en bonne santé et digne garde.

Votre bonne cousin,

FERDINAND.

Le Greffier de l'Ordre,
JAUQUES DE LA QUADRA.

Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

Bordeaux, 9th July, 1814.

I had yesterday the honour of your Grace's letter of the 26th, and in consequence have ordered the officers of the General Court Martial to England. I am glad to find the removal of the German Legion, which I had taken upon myself, will meet your approbation.

The whole of the 3rd division has now been sent off, and six sail of the line already arrived will take about 4000 more ; there will therefore only remain about 13,000, of which 4000 for Ireland, and the remainder for England.

Your Grace does not mention the instructions respecting the Brunswick regiment, nor the Chasseurs Britanniques. I conceive, however, that I cannot be guilty of any great fault by sending these foreigners also with the German Legion : the former is reduced to about 400 men, the other to 180 rank and file.

The hospital is entirely embarked here, except twelve cases of bad wounds, whom I shall leave in the care of the French General in command.

The garrison intended for Bordeaux was halted on their march, and I am happy to acknowledge to your Grace the greatest disposition on the part of Lieutenant-General de Blainac and the government here to accede to every arrangement we have had occasion to propose to them.

Several ships are still expected, but it is the opinion of Lord Keith that we must wait the return of six of the line-of-battle ships, now about to sail, before the whole of this part of the army is removed.

I have the honour to be
Your Grace's most obedient and most faithful

DALHOUSIE.

Viscount Castlereagh to M. Gries.

SIR,

Foreign Office, 11th July, 1814.

I received the honour of your letter of the 26th of June, enclosing an Address from the City of Hamburg to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, praying H.R.H.'s interference for the restoration of the funds of the Bank of Hamburg.

H.R.H. is truly anxious that this useful establishment should be replaced in its ancient state of activity and vigour, and he has no doubt that the French government will exert itself in fulfilling its engagement respecting it.

Upon this point Sir Charles Stuart, His Majesty's Minister at the Court of the Tuileries, has received instructions to promote the measures which the city of Hamburg has a right in justice to claim, and he will attend with readiness to any representation which you shall make to him on the subject.

I have the honour to be, with every due consideration, Sir,

Your most obedient and humble servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Article additionnel et secret du Traité de Paix entre la Grande Bretagne et la France, signé à Paris le 30 Mai, 1814.

Le gouvernement Français ayant offert par l'article secret de la Convention du 23 Avril de faire restitution, et d'employer tous ses efforts pour retrouver les fonds de la Banque de Hamburg, promet d'ordonner les perquisitions les plus sévères pour découvrir les dits fonds, et de poursuivre tous ceux qui pourraient en être détenteurs.

En foi de quoi, etc.

II.

Article Secret.

Paris, le 11 (23) Avril, 1814.

Les places fortes qui doivent être évacuées par la France étant débloquées aussitôt après la signature de la présente convention, toutes les réquisitions de la part des commandans de ces places auront à cesser.

Les propriétés publiques et particulières des dites places seront conservées intactes ; celles qui auraient été distraites et qui existent encore en tout ou en partie seront restituées.

Cette dernière stipulation est particulièrement applicable à la Banque de Hambourg.

Le gouvernement Français s'offre de donner les ordres nécessaires pour l'exécution de cet article.

Le présent article secret aura la même force et valeur comme s'il étoit textuellement inséré à la convention de ce jour.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signé, et y ont fait apposer le cachet de leurs armes.

The Chancellor of the University of Oxford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Camelford House, 13th July, 1814.

The University of Oxford has been anxious to testify to your Grace, in concurrence with every other description of our fellow subjects, those sentiments of high respect and gratitude which we all entertain in common for the great and splendid services which you have rendered to our country. Far removed from the habits and perils of war, and cultivating in peaceful security the arts of religion and literature, we have not presumed to think that our suffrage could add any thing to the glory of those exertions which have so eminently contributed to the successful issue of so important and arduous a contest. But we are not the less sensible that it is to the skill and valour of those who have triumphed in the cause of our country that we owe, under Providence, that happy tranquillity which in these times of universal convulsion no other nation has been permitted to enjoy; and if we cannot in any manner discharge even the smallest part of that debt of gratitude which we owe to your Grace, we are at least anxious not to be wanting in the acknowledgment of it.

It is in this view that I am commissioned to request your Grace's acceptance of the Degree conferred in the enclosed diploma, which was read and unanimously voted in our House of Convocation in the presence of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, and of their Majesties the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia. To your Grace it may be not unsatisfactory, and it will at least be gratifying to our feelings, that you should know that there is not, as far as we can trace, any other instance in our records of such an honour conferred upon a British subject in the presence of the Sovereign, and that it was with a view of rendering it less unworthy of your acceptance that the time and manner of it were in this instance so arranged.

It is impossible for me to conclude this letter without assuring your Grace of the great personal pleasure which I derive from being the channel of this communication, and from being allowed to avail myself of any opportunity of adding to the general voice of my country the assurances of the sincere admiration, respect, and regard,

With which I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Grace's most faithful and most obedient, humble servant,

GRENVILLE,

Chancellor of the University of Oxford.

Viscount Castlereagh to Earl Bathurst.

DEAR LORD BATHURST,

Paris, 14th July, 1814.

I hope we are going on as you wish us ; but you must give us time, and we must do nothing to destroy the King's authority, which it is our first object to create. The question of securities is not the first in order ; it is, in fact, the last. It is enough now to keep the principle sufficiently open ; nothing can be decided at present upon its application, nor can it indeed be properly judged of till the moment arrives for retiring our armies. It is upon the then state of things this question can alone be negotiated ; and so long as we have 500,000 or 600,000 men in France, we need not be afraid of not having sufficient means to enforce any proposition which we should deem it wise or becoming to propose for the King's adoption.

I have the satisfaction of assuring you that the Duke and I are perfectly agreed upon the mode in which the business shall be conducted here. Whilst the war is going on, notwithstanding our amicable relations with the *de jure* Sovereign, we are of opinion that the military and political authorities should be kept quite distinct, and the armies, with their chiefs, be controlled by their respective Cabinets. This control is very unimportant as applied to the Duke and his army, which is a model of conduct as well as bravery, and is considered as such by all the Powers ; but it is everything to restrain others. When the moment comes that we may venture to proceed to frame that act, which, if not an actual treaty of peace with Louis XVIII., with whom we are already both at peace and to a certain degree in alliance, is to regulate the future relations of France with Europe, the Duke has consented that his name should be included with mine in the full powers for signing, in conjunction with the Allies, this settlement. This will produce no confusion in our ordinary relations, and it will afford me not only the most important assistance, but I shall feel it an additional honour, to have my name associated with the Duke's in winding up what he has achieved. In the mean time I shall not be deprived of the aid of his important assistance, as the Duke will assist at our conferences whilst his military duties do not call him from Paris.

Believe me, dear Lord Bathurst, ever faithfully yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

Viscount Castlereagh to the Prince de Bénévent.

(Extract.)

St. James's Square, 16th July, 1814.

You will perceive how severely my endeavours to conciliate your feelings on *one subject* have hung about me in all our discussions about the peace. You will do me the justice to admit that I did not exaggerate the difficulties I should have to contend with in this country on the subject of the Slave Trade, and to which I was willing to expose myself rather than attempt to press painfully upon France an immediate abolition ; but as this question is become really an embarrassment to us here, I must entreat your Highness, cordially and confidentially, to lend yourself to the means of reconciling national feelings on both sides. When we meet I must also earnestly

press you to assist in reconciling *me* with my nation in this instance. In the mean time pray consider of the practicability, by an ordinance of your own, to confine the immediate trade of your African settlements north of the Line to that species of innocent commerce to which they have been accustomed whilst in our possession, and which may be extended, if you do not revive in the natives the taste for exporting each other. You may permit your slave traders to frequent these settlements upon giving security that they will proceed to the southward of the Line for their cargo: this will impose but a small additional expense upon them, whilst it will enable us to try the effects of civilization upon an extended scale in Africa. I press this with the more earnestness, as the Portuguese are bound by treaty with us not to resort to this coast for the purchase of slaves whilst other nations abstain. If, therefore, for the small comparative convenience of taking in a cargo near your own possessions, you wholly throw open the trade, you will inflict upon this hitherto protected coast an indefinite extent of evil; whereas the demand on the part of the Spaniards and Portuguese having been uninterruptedly continued throughout the war on the coast to the southward of the Line, matters are there in their old state. The supply of slaves is abundant, and the addition of your wants may to a certain extent augment the mischief, but cannot essentially alter its nature and consequences. Before I have an occasion of addressing your Highness officially on these subjects, I cannot avoid endeavouring to interest your feelings, and, if I might venture to state it as a motive, in personal friendship to myself, to prevail upon you to give the subject your particular attention.

I have, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,

Madrid, 22nd July, 1814.

I have received your letter of the 4th instant.

I hope the treaty which I have sent home will be approved, and I suppose it will be, if it is still considered of importance to keep Spain out of the hands of France.

I send you a very curious book written by Escoiquiz the priest, and also a manifesto signed by several Deputies of the late Cortes, and presented to the King at Valencia.

Things are going on much as usual: a good deal of grumbling, and much intriguing against San Carlos. This state of things, however, is preferable to Jacobinism. San Carlos still assures me that the Cortes will be assembled, and that the King will propose to them the plan of a Constitution. They are in terrible want of money, and I do believe that we might gain a great deal from them in the way of commerce by assisting them with a loan. I must repeat that I hope there will be no difficulty about the remainder of the subsidy for the present year.

Castañes is made a Councillor of State, and is very well pleased.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

Major-General H. Fane to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE, Leeds House, St. James's Square, 22nd July, 1814.

My command having ceased by the arrival of the cavalry in this country, I deem it my duty, in conclusion, to report to your Grace that the conduct of the troops during their long march through France has been for the most part remarkably good; and that I have received every support and assistance from the General officers and commanding officers of the several corps marching with me.

The arrangements made by the Adjutant and Quartermaster-General's departments were such as to give me perfect satisfaction; and the business of the Commissariat was so well done as to prevent the troops having experienced the smallest want.

We were so fortunate as not to have occasion to leave a single sick man behind us.

A few claims have been made upon the Commissariat officer marching in rear of the column; but as none of them have appeared to me reasonable, I have not ordered them to be discharged. If your Grace will permit me, I will forward them to Lord FitzRoy Somerset, to be laid before you.

I have the honour to be

Your Grace's most obedient servant,

H. FANE.

[771.]
*

To Earl Bathurst.

MY LORD, London, 27th July, 1814.

I have the honour to enclose returns of the property belonging to the French government captured by the army, and two letters from the Commissary-General, and one from the Commissioners whom I appointed to take charge of this property, to all of which I beg leave to draw your Lordship's attention.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

William Hamilton, Esq., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD, Foreign Office, 27th July, 1814.

Just as the messenger is going off I have received notice from the Admiralty, that in compliance with the wishes of the French government, expressed in M. Jaucourt's note to your Grace, the necessary orders have been issued for substituting Basque Roads for the Isle of Aix as the rendezvous for the homeward bound trade from the ports in the Bay of Biscay.

I am, my dear Lord, your Grace's faithful servant,

WILLIAM HAMILTON.

To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley.

[772.]
*

MY DEAR HENRY,

London, 29th July, 1814.

I have had several conversations with the ministers and others here regarding your treaty with Spain, and one in particular with Lord Castlereagh this morning, in the course of which he showed me the despatches which are going to you.

Your treaty is highly approved of as far as it goes. There was a disposition in some to cavil at the engagement not to renew the Family Compact being in a secret article ; but neither Lord Castlereagh nor Lord Liverpool participate in this feeling. They, on the contrary, rather approve its being in a secret article, although they are sensible that the advantage of this concession will thus not be known, and will not be felt by the public.

I was not aware till I had been some time here of the degree of frenzy existing here about the slave trade. People in general appear to think that it would suit the policy of the nation to go to war to put an end to that *abominable* traffic ; and many wish that we should take the field on this new crusade. All agree that no favour can be shown to a slave-trading country ; and as Spain next to Portugal is supposed to be the country which gives most protection to this trade, the interests and wishes of Spain are but little attended to here. Besides, it is not easy to describe the unpopularity attached to the King's name from the occurrences at his return to Madrid. The newspapers afford some specimen of it ; but at a late dinner at Guildhall I recommended the Lord Mayor to drink the King of Spain's health, and he told me that he was become so unpopular in the City he was afraid that if the toast were not positively objected to, it would at least be received with so much disgust as to render it very disagreeable to me and to every well-wisher to the Spanish government.

Under these circumstances you will not be surprised that the government should have refused at present to allow the payment of subsidy beyond the end of July, and that they should have attached to the advance of the subsidy to the end of the year the condition that no slave trade shall be carried on north of the Line, and that Spain shall engage to abolish it entirely at the end of five years. I wished to get the arrear for the year 1814 for the first of these conditions only, as I understood from Kilbee that he thought that the King would consent to that stipula-

tion; but I could not succeed, and you will find yourself authorised to advance the remainder of the subsidy from August, which will be about 800,000*l.*, only in case you can procure the conditions above referred to.

In regard to the loan of ten millions of dollars, it will be granted only if the slave trade is immediately and entirely abolished; but I believe every facility to it will be given if the two first conditions are complied with, and if the King should perform his engagements to his people, and should liberalise his system of commerce a little.

Upon this last point I suggested to Lord Castlereagh to inquire whether it would not be possible to arrange a system of duties on the commerce of British subjects to America, which might be collected here on export, and transmitted hence to the Spanish treasury. This would give the King a certain revenue, which it is probable he would not get from America. Lord Castlereagh promised me to inquire and to instruct you on the subject.

If I can find out how much subsidy we have paid in this year before I close this letter, I will let you know it. The subsidy is two millions for the year 1814, including stores. As the Spaniards have had no stores in that year excepting provisions, almost the whole is due in money; and I should think that even to the 1st of August the King must now have 400,000*l.* or 500,000*l.* due to him.

Lord Liverpool told me yesterday that the King was to have the Garter, and I'll try to have it sent to him by Kilbee.

In regard to your own concerns, I spoke to Lord Castlereagh again about them this morning. He sends a discretionary leave of absence, but delays to settle about your salary till you will arrive here. He talks of giving you the full ambassador's salary, and he says that the exchange has fallen and is still falling to such a degree as to make your income nearly double what it was before. He also says that you still draw your extraordinary expenses, to the amount Hamilton did, of between 4000*l.* and 5000*l.* for the last quarter, which I told them was that in which the King came. Lord Castlereagh seems to think that you would gain in pension by being put on the full ambassador's salary; and he thought that the best mode of improving your situation on that account.

Under all these circumstances you will observe that although

government, particularly Lord Liverpool and Lord Castlereagh, are perfectly satisfied with you, this is not the best time to desire that a mark of the King's favour should be conferred upon you; and I have thought it best not to say anything upon the subject, though I think I shall to both Lord Liverpool and Lord Castlereagh before I shall leave England.

I'll write an answer to San Carlos by Lord Castlereagh's messenger.

I hope to leave London at the end of next week.

Your boy Gerald is quite well, so is Charlotte. The other two come from school to-morrow.

I shall see you at Paris, and can talk to you about them. I can take them both without any inconvenience, and will take care of them with pleasure.

Ever yours most affectionately,

WELLINGTON.

I enclose a rough account made up from my warrant-book of what has been paid the Spaniards in hard cash. There are, besides, provisions to a considerable amount, and your payments to Whittingham's and Roche's corps, and some provisions and stores recently given over.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Foreign Office, 6th Aug., 1814.

As we must be prepared for a reluctance on the part of certain Powers to adopt even the limited measure to which France has given her concurrence—I mean the abolition of the slave trade at the end of five years, it becomes necessary to consider how the interest of those Powers may be made to operate in support of their duties, or, in other words, how they can be deprived of the unjust advantage of profiting by the sacrifices and forbearance of other states, who, from a sense of moral duty, forsake this species of commerce.

Nothing seems more likely to have this effect than for the Powers acting in concert for effectuating this great object to prohibit the importation into their respective dominions of colonial produce grown within the territories of Powers refusing to enter into the proposed concert.

This measure will leave them in possession of their own market, whilst it takes from them an unjust motive for augmenting their cultivation in counteraction of the general system. It is also calculated to put the sincerity of the Powers who are favourable to the cause of abolition to the test.

I should wish your Grace to sound the Prince of Bénévent's sentiments

upon this subject. The impression here is very strong in favour of its efficacy and perfect justice.

I have the honour to be, with great truth and respect, my Lord,

Your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Foreign Office, 6th Aug., 1814.

The Prince Regent having selected your Grace to fill the situation of His Majesty's Ambassador to the King of France, I herewith transmit your instructions under the sign manual, also your letter of credence to His Most Christian Majesty.

Your Grace will, on the occasion of presenting your credentials, assure the King of France of the sincere and cordial friendship of the Prince Regent, and that His Royal Highness has no object more warmly at heart than to cultivate the best understanding with the French nation and with His Majesty.

You will further acquaint His Majesty that your instructions enjoin you to concert with the French government upon the principles of a common interest with respect to the preservation of that peace in Europe which has been the immediate fruits of His Majesty's auspicious restoration to his Throne; upon which it is the fervent wish of the Prince Regent that he may be long and firmly established, not only for the happiness of his own subjects, but for the peace and welfare of Europe, which cannot fail to profit from the sway of so just and mild a Sovereign.

I have the honour to be, with great truth and respect,

My Lord,

Your Grace's most obedient, humble servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

General Instructions.

In the name and on the behalf of His Majesty.

GEORGE, P. R.

Instructions for our Right Trusty and Right entirely Beloved Cousin and Councillor Arthur, Duke, Marquess, and Earl of Wellington, Marquess Douro, Viscount Wellington of Talavera and of Wellington, and Baron Douro of Wellesley; a Peer of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, one of His Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Field Marshal of His Majesty's Forces, Colonel of the Royal Regiment of Horse Guards, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, Duke of Ciudad Rodrigo, and a Grandee of Spain of the First Class, Duke of Vitoria, Marquess of Torres Vedras, and Conde de Vimeiro in Portugal, Knight of the Most Illustrious Order of the Golden Fleece, of the Spanish Military Order of St. Ferdinand, Knight Grand Cross of the Imperial Military Order of Maria Theresa, Knight Grand Cross of the

Imperial Russian Order of St. George, Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Portuguese Military Order of the Tower and Sword, and Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Swedish Military Order of the Sword, whom we have appointed His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to our good Brother and Cousin the Most Christian King.

We, reposing the highest trust in your fidelity, prudence, abilities, and zeal for His Majesty's service, have thought proper to appoint you to be His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to our good Brother and Cousin His Most Christian Majesty, and to give you the following instructions for your guidance :—

1. You are upon the receipt of these our instructions and letter of credence to proceed with all convenient speed to Paris, and being arrived there, you will demand an audience in the usual manner of His Most Christian Majesty, at which you will present your credential letter, and will add to the assurances therein given all such further expressions as may tend to evince our sentiments of particular esteem and regard for His Majesty, and our earnest desire to contribute as far as in our power to the security of his throne, and the permanent tranquillity of his dominions.

2. You will carefully observe the motions and intentions of the French government with respect to His Majesty's dominions, and whether they are entering into any and what leagues or engagements with other Powers which may be prejudicial to His Majesty, or endanger the tranquillity of Europe.

3. You will use your utmost endeavours to discover what plans or secret designs that government may have formed, or may be forming, in the East or West Indies; what number of ships of war or land forces may have been sent or be destined for foreign service; what orders may from time to time be sent to the commanders of the French forces at their several settlements; and generally what plans they may have in contemplation for the acquisition of new colonies, or for improving or fortifying those which may be restored to them in consequence of the recent treaty of peace.

4. You will make it an object of your very particular attention to discover whether any and what treaties are either in agitation or actually entered into between France and any other European state; and in either case you will take every measure in your power to be informed of the nature and extent of such treaty or treaties, and to procure and transmit correct copies thereof.

5. You will endeavour to be informed as accurately as possible at all times of the number of foreign ships of war which may arrive in the ports of France, as well as of their force and destination.

6. You will assist and countenance His Majesty's subjects trading to any of the dominions of France, who may have any suits or pretensions depending there, procuring for them good and speedy justice and all the favour you are able; yet, for our honour and your own credit, you must not engage yourself in any complaints which may raise clamour, without a justifiable cause or legal proofs, but only such as may deserve the interposition of His Majesty's name for the relief and support of His Majesty's subjects in their rights.

7. You will constantly correspond with His Majesty's several ministers employed in foreign courts during your residence in France for your mutual information and assistance; but you are on no account to communicate with your private friends on public affairs, or permit any person connected with your mission so to do.

8. You will in general be extremely attentive in making yourself master of the interior state of the government of France, in studying the dispositions and interests of the several persons of both sexes who are or may be in the

confidence of the King, and in making the closest inquiries possible into the views and character of the Ministers of State, not only in regard to their pacific or warlike inclinations, but to their particular connexions with one another, their opinions, their abilities, their power, and the degree of influence each has or may have with the King.

9. As it is essentially necessary to His Majesty's service to be as accurately informed as possible of the interior state of France, you will not fail to pay attention to the proceedings of the several constituted authorities throughout France, and you will use your endeavours to obtain an accurate knowledge of the character and views of the persons who may have the lead in the respective departments, and of the factions which may prevail therein; and you will regularly transmit to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs all such accounts upon this subject as may appear to you to be interesting for our information.

10. On your arrival at Paris you will receive from His Majesty's minister there the whole of his correspondence, and you are to consider the instructions contained therein as the rule of your conduct as far as the present circumstances will admit, and you will also at the expiration of your mission either deliver to your successor or transmit to the office of His Majesty's aforesaid Secretary of State the originals of the official papers in your custody and your official correspondence.

11. You will make the commercial interest of this country an object of your constant attention, and will take an early opportunity to enter into discussion with the French government upon such matters arising out of the definitive treaty of peace as may require speedy adjustment, and which may hereafter lead to arrangements of a more extensive nature for the mutual advantage of the two nations.

12. You will use your best endeavours to procure us as exact an account as possible of the countries under the dominion of France, particularly as to the state of their defence, accompanied with accurate descriptions of their fortifications, and also as to the number and condition of the forces by land and sea of the French Empire, and the means of augmenting the same upon occasion.

13. You are likewise to inform yourself accurately of the ordinary expenses of the government, of the particulars, the amount, and the state of the revenue, and whence it arises, and of the resources which the government may have for levying any and what extraordinary supplies.

14. You are further to procure an account of the population of the dominions of France, of the extent and nature of the commerce and manufactures carried on in the different parts of that country, and of the situation and treatment of British merchants resident therein.

15. You will from time to time impart to us all such intelligence as you can procure on the several points prescribed to you in these instructions, or on any others not particularly specified herein which may relate to His Majesty's service or to the advantage of his kingdoms. But you will send your accounts of the dominions, forces, revenues, expenses, and resources of the dominions of France, and of the population and commerce of its subjects, in separate letters confined to these matters only, and addressed to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; and in order that our instructions may be transmitted to you with greater security, and also for the better conduct of your correspondence, as well with His Majesty's Secretary of State as his ministers residing in foreign parts with respect to such matters as may require particular caution and secrecy, we have ordered to be delivered to you proper cyphers and decyphers, which you will keep carefully deposited under

secure locks, and use every other precaution to guard against their being discovered, which would be so highly prejudicial to His Majesty's service.

16. Whereas by an Act passed in the 22nd year of His Majesty's reign, for regulating the payments out of His Majesty's Civil List revenues, it is amongst other things enacted that receipts from His Majesty's ministers, commissioners, and consuls in foreign parts shall be filed in His Majesty's Exchequer for all sums of money which shall be issued and paid to His Majesty's Principal Secretary or Secretaries of State for foreign secret service, and which shall be sent or given by such Secretary or Secretaries of State to any of His Majesty's said ministers, commissioners, or consuls respectively, for the said purpose, an oath according to the form in the said Act prescribed should be taken by them within one year after their arrival in Great Britain: We, to the intent that the provisions in the said Act in this respect should be strictly observed, have directed an extract thereof to be delivered to you with these instructions, and we do hereby strictly require and command that you punctually conform yourself thereto upon all occasions which may arise during your employment abroad.

17. We have also directed to be delivered to you herewith a printed extract of an Act, passed in the fifth year of His Majesty's royal predecessor King George the First, to prevent the inconveniences arising from seducing artificers out of His Majesty's dominions. It is our Royal will and pleasure that you take proper steps to procure exact information respecting all persons of that description who may be resident in France, and that you use your best endeavours to induce them to return, strictly conforming yourself to the provisions of the said Act for this purpose.

18. At your return we shall expect from you a narrative in writing of whatever may have happened at Paris worthy our notice, together with such observations on the situation and views of France as your knowledge of them shall enable you to make.

Given at the Palace of Carlton House, the ninth day of August,
One thousand Eight hundred and Fourteen, in the fifty-fourth
year of His Majesty's Reign.

GEORGE, P. R.

II.

The Prince Regent to the King of France.

SIR, MY BROTHER AND COUSIN,

Having made choice of the Duke of Wellington, Field Marshal of His Majesty's Forces, one of His Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, a Peer of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, and of various other illustrious Orders, to repair to your Royal Court with the character of His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, I have charged him to deliver this letter to your Majesty. From the experience I have had of his distinguished talents and zeal for His Majesty's service, I entertain no doubt that the choice which I have made of the Duke of Wellington upon this occasion will be perfectly agreeable to your Majesty. I request that your Majesty will give entire credence to all that he shall communicate to you on my part, more especially when he shall convey to your Majesty the assurances of my sincere esteem and affection for your person, and of my ardent desire to cement more closely the union and

good understanding which at present so happily subsist between the two Crowns.

Being, my good Brother and Cousin,

Your Majesty's affectionate Brother and Cousin,

GEORGE, P. R.

Given at my Palace of Carlton House, the 8th of August, 1814.

III.

ANNO QUINTO GEORGII REGIS.

CAP. XXVII.

An Act to prevent the Inconveniences arising from seducing Artificers in the Manufactures of Great Britain into Foreign Parts.

WHEREAS divers ill-disposed persons, as well foreigners as subjects of this kingdom, by confederacy with foreigners have of late drawn away and transported, and have also made divers attempts to entice, draw away, and transport, several artificers and manufacturers of and in wool, iron, steel, brass, and other metals, clock-makers, watch-makers, and divers other manufacturers of Great Britain, out of His Majesty's dominions into foreign countries, by entering into contracts with them to give them greater wages and advantages than they have or can reasonably expect within this kingdom, and by making them large promises, and using other arts to inveigle and draw them away : And whereas there is great danger that, by means of these and such like practices, many great and profitable branches of the trades and manufactures of this kingdom may be transplanted into foreign countries : Therefore, for the preventing the like practices for the future, be it enacted by the King's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, That if at any time hereafter any person or persons shall contract with, entice, endeavour to persuade or solicit any manufacturer or artificer of or in wool, iron, steel, brass or any other metal, clock-maker, watch-maker, or any other artificer or manufacturer of Great Britain, to go out of this kingdom into any foreign country out of His Majesty's dominions, and shall be lawfully convicted thereof upon any indictment or information which shall be preferred or brought against him or them in any of His Majesty's courts at Westminster, or at the assizes or general gaol-delivery, or quarter sessions of the peace for the county, riding, or division where such offence shall be committed, the person and persons so convict shall be fined any sum not exceeding one hundred pounds for such first offence, according to the discretion of the court in which such conviction shall be, and shall be imprisoned for the space of three months, and until such fine shall be paid ; and if any person or persons, having been once convict as aforesaid, shall offend again, and be so convict a second time of the like offence, then and in such case the person so convict a second time shall be fined at the discretion of the court where such conviction shall be, and be imprisoned for twelve months and until such fine shall be paid.

II. Provided nevertheless, That no person or persons shall be prosecuted for any of the offences aforesaid unless such prosecution shall be begun within the space of twelve months next after such offence shall be committed.

III. And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That if any of His Majesty's subjects within this kingdom, being such artificer or manufacturer as aforesaid, shall, at any time after the first day of May in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and nineteen, go into any country out

of His Majesty's dominions, there to use or exercise, or to teach any of the said trades or manufactures to foreigners, or [in case any of His Majesty's subjects now being, or who hereafter shall be, in any such foreign country out of His Majesty's dominions as aforesaid, and there using or exercising any of the said trades or manufactures hereinbefore mentioned, shall not return into this realm within six months next after warning shall be given to him by the ambassador, envoy, resident, minister, or consul of the Crown of Great Britain in the country in which such artificer shall be, or by any person authorized by such ambassador, envoy, resident, minister, or consul, or by one of His Majesty's Secretaries of State for the time being, and from thenceforth continually inhabit and dwell within this realm; then and in such case every such person or persons shall be from thenceforth incapable of taking any legacy that shall be devised to him within this kingdom, or of being an executor or administrator to any person or persons within this kingdom, and shall be incapable of taking any lands, tenements, or hereditaments within this kingdom, by descent, devise, or purchase, and also forfeit all his lands, tenements, hereditaments, goods, and chattels within this kingdom, to His Majesty's use, and shall from thenceforth be and be deemed and taken to be an alien, and shall be out of His Majesty's protection.

IV. And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That from and after the said first day of May one thousand seven hundred and nineteen, upon complaint made upon oath before any justice or justices of the peace, that any person or persons is or are endeavouring to seduce or draw away any such manufacturer or artificer as aforesaid out of His Majesty's dominions for any the purposes aforesaid, or that any such manufacturer or artificer as aforesaid hath contracted, promised, or is preparing to go out of His Majesty's dominions for any of the purposes aforesaid, then and in such case it shall and may be lawful to and for the justice or justices of the peace unto whom such complaint shall be made, to send forth his warrant to bring the person and persons so complained of before him or them, or some other of His Majesty's justices of the peace for the same county, riding, division, or city; and if, when such person or persons shall be so brought before such justice or justices, it shall appear to such justice or justices, by the oath or oaths of one or more credible witness or witnesses, or by the confession of the party or parties so brought before him or them, that the party so complained of was guilty of any of the said offences, then and in such case it shall and may be lawful to and for such justice and justices to bind the person so charged to appear at the next assizes, general gaol delivery, or quarter sessions of the peace for the county, city, riding, or division where such offence shall be committed to answer the premises, with reasonable sureties for such his appearance; and in case such person or persons shall refuse or neglect to give such security, then and in such case it shall and may be lawful to and for such justice and justices to commit the person or persons so refusing to the county gaol, there to be kept until the next assizes or next quarter sessions of the county, city, riding, or division where such commitment shall be, at the election of such justice of the peace, and until he, she, or they shall be delivered by due course of law; and in case any such artificer or manufacturer shall be convict upon any indictment to be preferred against him at such assizes or general gaol delivery, or quarter sessions of the peace as aforesaid, of any such promise or contract, or preparation to go abroad beyond the seas, for any of the purposes aforesaid, then and in such case the person so convict shall give such security to His Majesty, his heirs and successors, not to depart out of His Majesty's dominions for any of the purposes aforesaid, as such court shall think reasonable, and shall be imprisoned until such security shall be given.

V. And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That if any of the above-mentioned offences shall be committed in that part of Great Britain called Scotland, the same shall be prosecuted in the Court of Justiciary or the circuits there.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Foreign Office, 6th Aug., 1814.

I am to signify to your Grace the commands of the Prince Regent that you do take the earliest opportunity, after your arrival at Paris, to call the attention of the French government to the important question of the slave trade.

That your Grace may be fully possessed of the present state of the discussions with the French government on this point, I send your Grace a variety of documents according to the annexed schedule.

It having been my duty to press the immediate abolition to the utmost in repeated conferences with the Prince of Bénévent, you will find the topics only cursorily alluded to in the notes and letters which passed between that minister and myself. This correspondence will serve, however, to prove to your Grace that the British government has every reason to expect the cordial co-operation of the government of France in gradually circumscribing and, at the latest, at the end of five years, absolutely abolishing this offensive traffic.

That your Grace may enter upon the discussion of this subject with the weight and solemnity with which the Prince Regent, the Parliament, and the British nation regard it, you will solicit a particular audience from His Most Christian Majesty for the purpose of presenting the accompanying letter. You will support the earnest representations therein contained with such arguments and facts as your Grace's knowledge of the public feeling and of the state of the trade may warrant you in laying before His Majesty ; and you will feel yourself enabled to press the measure with the more earnestness from the sacrifice made in negotiating the peace by the British government to what the King of France considered to be due to his own situation under the extent of prejudice amongst his subjects against an immediate abolition.

Upon the subject of immediate abolition, the voice of the nation will not permit me to omit instructing your Grace to make another effort.

Your Grace will again urge all the arguments resulting from the experience of this country in respect to the safety of the measure of abolition. You may represent that it will be easier to prevent the revival than to terminate it when once recommenced ; and, above all, you will suggest that as one of the strong objections brought forward by the government of France, namely, their repugnance to have a stipulation of this nature in appearance forced upon them, is now wholly at an end, France having made its peace, can, at the present moment, with the highest character and true glory, yield that to a principle of humanity which she would not concede as the condition of peace and of the restoration of her colonies.

Should your Grace unfortunately fail in this attempt, you will try what can be effectuated in reduction of the import into the French colonies. If

the French government can be prevailed on to confine the import of slaves to the making good the deficiencies in the gangs required for the existing plantations, much would be gained. This might be regulated by licences, to the exclusion of import for breaking up and cultivating fresh ground.

I send your Grace an Order in Council for the registration of slaves in the island of Trinidad. It is intended, without delay, to extend this measure to the colonies lately ceded by France to Great Britain. You will see the importance of some regulation of this nature to check the illicit introduction of fresh slaves into the French colonies where this traffic may either be prohibited or limited.

But the measure to which, in failure of absolute abolition, I am, above all others, to direct your attention, is the preventing the revival of the trade on the coast of Africa north of the Line. With the exception of some very slight attempts made by the Portuguese near Whydah, on the Gold Coast, I believe I am warranted in stating that during the war the whole north-western coast of Africa has been freed from this traffic, and has, in consequence, made a certain progress towards a social and civilizing system of commerce.

Your Grace will press the importance of an early decree on this subject on the part of the French government. If the traffic is once suffered to revive on this coast, even for the shortest time, it may estrange the natives from their industrious habits and renew their taste for those crimes which slave trade generates. The nearer you can carry the point of demarcation to Cape Lopez the better. It must not be farther to the westward than Cape Formosa, else the current of supply from the interior will only take another direction, and vent itself between Cape Palmas and Cape Formosa.

To guard against illicit trading, vessels found with slaves on board within a certain distance of the coast to the northward of the point named should be seizable. Without this precaution they will run down the coast from Senegal and Goree, and receive the slaves on board by boats from the shore, without the necessity of entering a port. Such a regulation is, in fact, no hardship, as the course to the West Indies for vessels having taken on board slaves in the ports to the southward of the Line is large to the westward, and does not require them to recross the Line till far advanced on their voyage.

A second regulation, highly important, is to prevail upon France to accede to a reciprocal permission to our respective cruisers, within certain latitudes, to visit the merchant ships of the other Power; and if found with slaves on board, in contravention of the law of their particular state, to carry or send them in for adjudication. To soften the exercise of this power, perhaps it might be expedient to require the sentence of condemnation to be passed in the Courts of Admiralty of the country to which the ship detained belongs; the proceeds, if condemned, being divided between the captors and the State. Some power of this nature within the track of the slave trader is of the first importance.

Your Grace will urge the French Minister to take a decisive measure at least for the protection of the north-western coast before he leaves Paris for the Congress. The season for vessels fitting out for this traffic approaches. It is besides important that the voice of His Most Christian

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Majesty should make itself publicly heard on this question without loss of time. Such a demonstration of sentiment is of great moment, as well to give weight to the mediation of the French negotiator at Vienna, as to create a public sentiment in France upon a subject to which their Sovereign has solemnly vowed his unremitting protection.

I am, with great truth and respect, my Lord,

Your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

P.S. I also transmit for your Grace's information copy of a letter received from the War Department and of the letter therein referred to from the Secretary to the African Society respecting the slave trade.*

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Foreign Office, 6th Aug., 1814.

I have the honour to acquaint your Grace that I have received the commands of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent to set out shortly for the Continent, in order to assist as His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at the approaching Congress of Vienna.

It is His Royal Highness's pleasure that you still continue, as on the former occasion, to address your despatches to me at the Foreign Office, sending duplicates of such as you may be of opinion ought to be made known to me without delay to Vienna.

Your Grace will conduct your correspondence with me at Vienna by the most favourable opportunities which may offer; but you will avoid incurring any unnecessary expense by sending messengers on occasions which do not appear to you to require immediate despatch.

I am, with great truth and respect, my Lord,

Your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

The Prince Regent to the King of France.

SIR, MY BROTHER AND COUSIN,

Your Majesty's long residence in this country has enabled you to appreciate the sentiments of the British nation on the subject of the slave trade. The King's Ambassador at your Majesty's court will lay before your Majesty the successive and solemn appeals made to me by both Houses of Parliament, and the assurances I have given them of my unremitting endeavours to deliver Africa from the long train of sufferings inseparable from this inhuman traffic.

However long rooted in the system of the world, your Majesty's benevolent heart, I well know, recoils from the continuance of a trade which

* See page 150.

checks all prospect of civilization and improvement in one great continent on the globe, and I entreat your Majesty to employ your powerful endeavours to accelerate the moment of its universal extinction. The voice and example of your Majesty will in itself be productive of the most decisive and happy consequences in behalf of these suffering people.

Anxious in all matters to concert my measures with your Majesty for the common peace and happiness of mankind, I own it would afford me the highest of all possible gratifications were we enabled together to efface this painful and disgusting stain, not only from the practice of our own, but of all the other states with whom we are in friendly relations.

Entreating your Majesty's favourable reception of the representations which the Duke of Wellington is instructed to lay before you on this, to me and to the nation, most interesting subject,

I am, with the warmest and most respectful affection,

Sir, my brother and cousin,

Your Majesty's good brother and cousin,

GEORGE, P.R.

Given at my Palace of Carlton House, the 9th day of August, 1814.

H. Goulburn, Esq., to Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD,

Ghent, 9th Aug., 1814.

We arrived here as we expected on Saturday, and found the American Commissioners, with the exception of Mr. Russell, waiting our arrival with some anxiety. We have had two conferences with them, and as far as I can judge from the mode in which they have been conducted, I believe that they are sincere in their wish to re-establish peace between the two countries. They have conducted themselves with more candour and openness than I had expected to find from them, and I might say with as much as could have been expected by any one. You will learn from our public letter that they are instructed upon all the points put forward by us, except the Indian boundary, upon which I think there is but little hope of their concluding anything without the receipt of instructions from America. I cannot better explain the grounds upon which I have formed this opinion than by enclosing you an abstract of the conversation which we had with them to-day.

I believe that they do not mean to put forward any claim to fish within the maritime jurisdiction of the British North American territories, or to dry their nets and fish upon the shores. At least Mr. Adams, who is the spokesman of the American Commission, contented himself merely with stating that on that point they had no instructions; and as he never again recurred to the subject, upon which (if America had intended to insist) she must have instructed her Commissioners, I conclude that we shall not be troubled on that score.

We have been particularly careful to say nothing in these preliminary proceedings which could in any degree cause irritation on their part, and have therefore rather let any observation of the Americans which gave an opening for a sharp answer pass without observation, than get into a

squabble which could lead to no object. To this, if we continue our negotiations, we intend to adhere. Whether they will be continued or not must depend upon your decision whether we shall proceed to discuss our other points of difference in the uncertainty in which the Americans are with respect to Indian boundary, or whether we shall suspend all our proceedings.

Believe me, my dear Lord, yours most faithfully,

HENRY GOULBURN.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Substance of Conference on 9th August.

Mr. Adams stated that—

1. On the points of impressment and allegiance they had instructions to negotiate.
2. On an Indian boundary they had none.
3. On the British boundary they had instructions.
4. On the fisheries they had none.

Mr. Adams and occasionally the other American Commissioners stated that it could not be expected that the American government should have furnished instructions on the point No. 2, as it was one never contemplated by them as being in dispute. No European power had ever considered the Indian nations as Great Britain appeared now to consider them. He hoped that the British government, as so much nearer the seat of negotiation, would so modify the instruction as to this point being a *sine quâ non* as not to preclude discussion on the other points, in which there might be much use.

To these observations it was generally answered that it might happen on some of the grounds stated that the American Commissioners might not be furnished with instructions on this point; but that as each power had made treaties with the Indians, and some of them were the Allies of Great Britain, it could not be wholly out of contemplation that Great Britain should stipulate for them in any treaty with the United States. That though Great Britain was nearer the seat of negotiation than the seat of the American government, that consideration might facilitate communication, but must not induce any expectation that such a facility would produce any fundamental change. That there would be difficulty even in sending a despatch to the British government which announced a mere discussion without any prospect of terminating it by at least a provisional article, and it would be very satisfactory to know how far they felt themselves authorised to conclude an arrangement of this latter kind, although not furnished with specific instructions.

To this it was replied: That the extent of their discretion on this point had not been considered by them. That any provisional arrangement must be on their own responsibility, and their government might not give effect to it. That by discussion such views of the subject might appear as would make such a provisional arrangement unnecessary, especially if they were brought clearly to understand the view with which the British government made it a *sine quâ non*.

To this it was answered: That a provisional article on such contingencies as were stated was the least the British Commissioners could hold out to their government as the object of the discussion proposed, because the other points were made to depend upon this. The general views of Great Britain were to procure to her Allies a peace as permanent as that procured for themselves,

and to establish the Indian nations as a sort of barrier between the two States, to prevent their future collision.

Mr. Bayard observed this effect would result from a treaty of peace between the United States and Great Britain, which would be immediately followed by peace between the United States and the Indians, for negotiating which Commissioners had already been appointed, and that this latter peace would certainly fix limits to their territories.

To this it was said that Great Britain wished to judge of the prospect of the permanency of the peace made with the Indians.

Mr. Bayard asked whether it was intended to restrain the Indians from alienating their own lands?

It was answered that the restraint need not be on the Indian right of alienation, but on the right of the United States or Great Britain to acquire those lands by purchase or cession.

Mr. Clay stated in strong terms his sense of the extreme difficulty of any article being framed on the subject which would be acceded to by the American government.

Mr. Adams stated that the United States had some topics of their own to bring forward for discussion :

1st. Blockades, belligerent and neutral rights.

2nd. Claims for captures.

3rd. Treaty of commerce.

To which it was stated that we had no instructions on the latter point, our powers extending only to concluding a treaty of peace and amity. If we made that, there was nothing in its conclusion that precluded the discussion of a commercial treaty.

The conference broke up with mutual expressions of satisfaction at the candour shown by the other.

Rear-Admiral T. B. Martin to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Antwerp, 11th Aug., 1814.

In consequence of your Grace's questions respecting Antwerp (which I, of course, consider as confidential), I beg to transmit an extract of a letter which I wrote to Lord Castlereagh on the 4th instant; and I have since employed myself in ascertaining what will be most essential to be done with a view to the destruction of Antwerp as a naval port, and I shall be prepared to give a full statement on this subject when I return to England.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, my Lord,

Your Grace's obedient, humble servant,

T. B. MARTIN.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Extract of a Letter from Rear-Admiral Martin to the Viscount Castlereagh, dated at Antwerp, the 4th August, 1814.

"An examination into the capacity of this port and its local advantages as a naval establishment has shown them to an extent of which I had no conception; and although it is evident your Lordship is aware of its importance, yet,

being on the spot, I venture to allude to it, lest on any future occasion its effectual dismemberment as a place of naval equipment should come under consideration; and my personal observations justify me in saying that the peace which reduces Antwerp simply and completely to a commercial port is an event as interesting to Great Britain as any its history can produce.

"The artificers employed in the yard amounted to upwards of 4000 besides labourers; and, had not two-thirds of them been called to the army and lost in the late battles, it was intended that eight sail of the line should be launched this year and ten the next. And the establishment, still progressing to the maturity chalked out by the genius of Buonaparte, would, in a very little time, have given an annual augmentation to the fleet to an extent which, considered only as auxiliary to their efforts at other ports, would have outstripped the best means and exertions of England to produce a corresponding augmentation of force.

"I beg to send your Lordship a map of Antwerp wherein are shown the basins for the reception of the ships of war in the winter; and while they remain, the port retains its capacity to become as great as ever within a very short period."

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 14th Aug., 1814.

You will see from the enclosed Talleyrand has opened himself considerably to Sir C. Stuart on the views of his Court. You can best judge, on your arrival, how far my passing a day or two at Paris, on my way to Vienna, is likely to be well taken. It may possibly be desired to remove any impression of councils *to the exclusion of France*. If you deem it advisable, I can easily separate from Lady C. at Brussels, pass by Paris, and meet her at Dijon, on the route of Switzerland. Forty-eight hours is the utmost I should think it advisable to remain at Paris under present circumstances. Send me your opinion without delay to Brussels, where I shall be about the 20th.

I am, my dear Lord, ever most sincerely yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

I shall send a copy of this letter to Sir C. Stuart, that he may send us his opinion to Brussels in the event of business having detained you in the Low Countries.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Sir C. Stuart to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Paris, 1st Aug., 1814.

Since I had the honour to address your Lordship, the Prince de Bénévent has resumed his conversation with me upon the subject of the negotiations which may be expected to take place at the Congress; and although he says that his correspondence with your Lordship gives him every reason to flatter himself that the result will be such as the interests of France in particular

and Europe in general require, yet the state of affairs in Russia and in Austria cannot but occasion the utmost inquietude to Powers which are in danger of being mutually involved in their quarrels; that the concession of every object in the North of Germany my Court can desire is much the interest of France, because the influence which Russia proposes to establish by the extension of the territory belonging to the Duke of Oldenburg on the frontiers of Holland will give that power a weight in the affairs of the North of Germany from which it is alike the desire of France and Great Britain that she should be excluded.

The Prince de Bénévent said he had witnessed with satisfaction the feeling which not only Austria but even the Russian nobility had expressed respecting the plans the Emperor of Russia is generally supposed to meditate in Poland. He observed that so long as the Polish question was confined to a definition of frontier, it could not produce any material effect upon the affairs of Europe; but that the instant the principle of independence should be set afloat, and the possible establishment of a Polish kingdom, with its correspondent forms and institutions, should be contemplated, though its limits should not reach the present frontier of the Russian empire, a germ of discord both in Russia and in the rest of Europe would be formed, by which the interests of all parties would eventually be more or less equally affected.

He said that the probable substitution of Polish authorities for the Russian governors, &c., in all the provinces which have been successively dismembered from that ancient monarchy had already created a feeling which rendered the Emperor's return to his own dominions very necessary, and that if the influence derived from the late auspicious events should enable His Imperial Majesty to overcome this feeling, it will only lead to a more difficult struggle at Vienna with the ministers of all the principal Powers in Europe. That as the efforts of both France and England must be equally directed to the maintenance of tranquillity, it is materially necessary that the two Courts should thoroughly understand each other upon this subject, and thus enable their ministers cordially to cooperate in defeating a system so obviously inexpedient.

The establishment of the kingdom of Poland with the extension the natives generally appear to expect being very nearly the perfection of the system formerly laid down by France for excluding Russia from all interference in the politics of Europe, induced me to assent to the arguments the Prince of Bénévent brought forward, and to consider them worthy to be placed before your Lordship.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

C. STUART.

II.

Sir C. Stuart to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Paris, 8th Aug., 1814.

This government expect with very great anxiety the account of the Emperor of Russia's arrival at St. Petersburg, as they consider that the feeling which prevails in his own Court will materially affect the resolution of that Sovereign respecting the affairs of Poland.

The Prince de Bénévent, with reference to this question, told me yesterday that he considered the old division to form so essential a part of the politics of Europe, that he was anxious to ascertain if my Court coincided in the same opinion.

He said that the immediate interests of France would point out that the King of Saxony should be King of Poland; but that the discord which must inevitably follow the establishment of a Polish kingdom, however inconsiderable, was so dangerous to other States, that he had no hesitation in abiding by the old arrangement, which he considered to be infinitely better calculated for the preservation of general tranquillity. He thought that the question had been lightly considered by the Emperor of Russia, whose mode of viewing Polish affairs was the greatest proof of youth manifested by that Sovereign during his stay in France. He therefore conjures my government, if, as he does not doubt, our interests on this important subject should coincide with the views of France, to weigh seriously the necessity of adverting to Polish affairs as a mere arrangement of limits, whenever it shall be the subject of consideration at Vienna, in which endeavour I may be assured that Great Britain will rely on the support of all the Great Powers, and but a feeble opposition on the part of the Russian ministers themselves, who do not consider the re-establishment of a Polish kingdom to be by any means a Russian object.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

C. STUART.

III.

Sir C. Stuart to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Paris, 8th Aug., 1814.

The Prince de Bénévent informs me that he has received a very strong letter from the Queen of Sicily, commenting in the most severe terms on the conduct of the Court of Vienna towards the family of Ferdinand IV., and declaring that the total abandonment of her interests by the Emperor of Germany only permits her to look forward to the support of the other branches of the House of Bourbon and His Majesty's government to bring about the restoration of Naples to the legitimate Sovereign of that country.

M. de Bénévent said that the separation of Naples and Sicily had been a great oversight on the part of all the Powers concerned in the late negotiations, and he was anxious to know if the Duke de Campo Chiaro had received any encouragement from His Majesty's government, or that the hope of any engagement which could induce him to go to England had been held out.

After I had given him the most positive assurances to the contrary, and had related the circumstances which preceded M. de Campo Chiaro's demand of a passport, he represented in strong terms the inconvenience of Murat's continuance on the throne of Naples, and expressed his conviction of the necessity that King Ferdinand should be re-established in terms which convince me that the interests of that Sovereign is one of the principal questions which will be brought forward in the ensuing Congress.

I could merely satisfy his inquiries respecting the feelings of my Court upon this subject by referring him to the language which had fallen from your Lordship in the House of Commons, and which I considered must be so perfectly in unison with the feeling of this government as to preclude the necessity of any further comment.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

C. STUART.

IV.

Sir C. Stuart to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Paris, 8th Aug., 1814.

I had yesterday a conversation with the Prince de Bénévent upon the subject of the negotiations about to take place at Vienna, which I consider very materially affects the best interests of my Court. The Prince told me that, according to the reports which had been received by the French government, a Russian force of nearly 200,000 men continues in the Duchy of Warsaw; and that so far from a reduction of her armies within the bounds which the state of her finances, not less than the termination of hostilities, would have caused him to expect, active preparations were continued in the military department at Vienna, which indicated the prospect of new troubles arising out of the negotiation about to commence, and already had materially affected the exchange of that country.

In the hope that, under these circumstances, ministers of the two principal Powers which do not take a direct part in the questions at issue between Russia and Austria may perfectly understand the line it may be necessary to adopt before they meet at Vienna, and that, in cases of greater interest than any which at any period have been discussed, nothing may depend upon the eventual changes which may take place, he thought it necessary to assure me, in the King's name, that as it is the sole interest of France to see the tranquillity of Europe established on a permanent basis, His Most Christian Majesty had determined neither to ask nor to accept any advantage to himself; and as the interest of my Court is absolutely the same, he flatters himself that such a clear proof of perfect adhesion to the views of Great Britain would naturally lead to a line of conduct on the part of her plenipotentiaries analogous to the same system.

Under the impression of the advantage which the high character of arbitress would give to Great Britain, and the benefit her impartial intervention would ensure to the world, he said that he had heard with pain a variety of reports that my Court leaned with a partiality towards the politics of Austria, which he did not consider the conduct of that Power, and particularly her views, as represented by her diplomatic agents, could by any means justify, because he appealed to me, if, the instant any foreign influence whatever should appear to prevail, Great Britain does not at once lose the greater part of the advantage which he conceives both that Power and France would derive from such a character in so important a negotiation.

To convince me of the disinterested sincerity of His Most Christian Majesty's professions upon this subject, he had received orders to tell me, in the name of his Sovereign, that France had not contracted and would not contract any engagement or form a connection with any Power in Europe, and that His Most Christian Majesty would not listen to or make any proposition to contract engagements of any description whatever, until the Congress should be terminated.

In the hope that neither France nor England should be deprived of the precious advantages attached to the characters of joint mediators, he was authorised to propose that any object the course of events might induce either Power to bring under consideration should not be submitted to the Congress directly by their respective ministers, but that each should render a Court of the second order the organ through which her proposals are to be made known, and whose suggestions would be supported by the united interests of both. He cited, for instance, though he desired me to observe that he did not insist upon

either in particular, that the plenipotentiary of Portugal should be the channel through whom all propositions which may be desired by Great Britain should be brought forward, while that of Spain should render the same service to the Court of France.

M. de Bénévent then said that all the arrangements would be more completely understood if it were possible for him to communicate personally with your Lordship before the meetings at Vienna, and appeared particularly desirous that your Lordship should pass through Paris on the road, and stay a short time in this city for that purpose.

He promised in the mean time to obtain very ample powers on the part of his Sovereign to enable him to act up to the language he had held to me in its fullest extent, in the expectation that they will be met by reciprocal authorizations to your Lordship having the same effect.

The Prince urgently requested to know whether I personally felt the justice and the prudence of the system he had chalked out; and on my reply that it had formed nearly the substance of the letters I had already addressed to your Lordship, and that I had reason to believe, from the language which the Duke of Orleans had held to the King of France on his return from England, that his suggestions are perfectly in unison with the sentiments of my Court, he said that my assurance held out the most favourable prospect of a satisfactory result terminating the most important negotiation which Europe had ever witnessed.

As the Prince de Bénévent appeared particularly anxious that the substance of this discourse should be faithfully reported to your Lordship, I have communicated this despatch to that minister; upon which occasion he not only confirmed all the sentiments he had expressed on the preceding day, but again repeated the desire of the King to facilitate, by every means in his power, such territorial arrangements as the interests of His Majesty's Hanoverian dominions may render desirable in the present situation of affairs in the North of Germany.

I have the honour, &c.,
C. STUART.

V.

Sir C. Stuart to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Paris, 9th Aug., 1814.

The Prince de Bénévent yesterday again lamented to me the unpleasant situation of affairs in the Low Countries, and requested that I would, in the course of my correspondence with your Lordship, advert to the intrigues which were going on among the different parties at Brussels, and which he begged leave to assure me had been at no period encouraged by France.

He had reason to believe that the Prince of Orange had not been received in that city as could be wished; that his partisans are few in number, and do not consist of persons enjoying either influence or consideration in the country.

He said that the intrigues of the persons who were attached to the Austrian connection had raised a party amongst the clergy which was daily growing more numerous, and which, notwithstanding the assurances of the Court of Vienna, he has reason to believe is countenanced and encouraged by that power. However extraordinary it might appear, he could assure me that the bad impression which the spoliation of the family of Parma had created renders the Court of Vienna desirous, by every possible means, to procure an indemnity for the Queen of Etruria, which could not affect her views or interests in Italy, and that it was to this source that he must trace an unaccountable feeling in

favour of that Princess which has lately arisen in the Low Countries, and which meets considerable support from the remnant of Austrian and Spanish interest still existing.

I have the honour, &c.,

C. STUART.

VI.

Viscount Castlereagh to Sir C. Stuart.

MY DEAR SIR,

Foreign Office, 13th Aug., 1814.

The disposition evinced by the French government is highly important and satisfactory, and we shall be most desirous of turning it to the best account; but the Prince of Bénévent, if he wishes us to do good, must not expect us to separate from our *old connections* in the midst of our concert. We have no partialities that he need be jealous of; and if he desires to render our influence a salutary check upon improvident schemes and undue pretensions, in whatever quarter they may be found to exist, he must allow me to work this out without doing violence to habits established under circumstances to which we owe the blessing of having a government in France to which we can feel ourselves associated in common views of policy and interest.

If it is thought desirable, I shall be perfectly ready to confer with him on my way to Vienna, and to look without reserve at the difficulties we shall have to deal with at the Congress; but he must not expect me to depart from my engagements to meet my former colleagues at Vienna about the 10th of September, nor must he interpret unfavourably our previously conferring upon the system which has grown out of engagements which subsisted long before we could reckon France amongst the number of our friends, and which the Prince himself proposed should be taken as the basis of our discussions at Vienna.

CASTLEREAGH.

VII.

Viscount Castlereagh to Sir C. Stuart.

SIR,

Foreign Office, 13th Aug., 1814.

From the confidence the Prince de Bénévent so justly reposes in you, His Highness has no doubt apprised you of the answer which I addressed on the
* to a letter received from him.

You will, in confirmation of the sentiments expressed in that letter, assure His Highness of the gratification derived by the Prince Regent and his ministers from the enlarged and liberal policy which appears to actuate the councils of His Most Christian Majesty. You may assure him that this Court will be prepared to act in the spirit of those views, and has no other object than to see the peace of the Continent firmly established under a system just and honourable to all States.

You will express to the Prince of Bénévent my sense of the candour with which he has opened himself to you. I had directed the Duke of Wellington on his arrival to invite this confidence, that I might not find myself at Vienna in ignorance of the views of France. Having confided these preliminary explanations to his Grace, and in the prospect of meeting the Prince so soon at Vienna, it did not occur to me that my presence at Paris could be requisite in my route; but you will see from the enclosed letter to the Duke that if for any

* Blank in manuscript.

reasons his Grace should be of a different opinion, or if in his Grace's absence you should, upon further consideration, deem it right for me to take Paris in my way, I can have no difficulty in conforming to such a proposal.

I should wish you to address yourself to me (in the absence of the Duke of Wellington) at Brussels. As my stay there will not exceed two days, you will send a messenger, so that he may arrive there between the 20th and 22nd.

CASTLEREAGH.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

St. James's Square, 14th Aug., 1814, at night.

I have seen the Duke de Berri this morning: his visit is intended to remove any impression of alienation, and to second Talleyrand's overture. As he professed not to be charged with any diplomatic business, our conversation was general, full of professions on His Royal Highness's part that the King of France considered the interest of the two Courts as one and the same. When I touched upon my intended avowal at Vienna, I thought he seemed a little disturbed at the idea of preliminary communications. I mention this, as it may render a short visit to Paris possibly the more advisable; and if it is expedient to open to the French government at present the impressions and views of the British government, I had rather do it in a short discussion than commit myself upon them in a despatch.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.

DEAR LIVERPOOL,

Paris, 17th Aug., 1814.

I took the opportunity since I last wrote of a representation received from the King of the Netherlands, enclosing a list of the works of art carried away by the French from Holland and the Low Countries, to bring this subject under the consideration of the Allied Ministers. We were all of opinion that something must be done, and it was agreed to consider what principle of restitution it was best to adopt. Upon those taken from Holland there seemed no doubt the disposition was to do a good deal, but not to sweep away all. What was conquered, as distinguished from what was *ceded by treaty*, or *bought*, affords a line; and yet Buonaparte's treaties, as for instance that of Tolentino, were not inferior in immorality to his wars. There seemed also a question whether the spoils of countries the cession of which to France had been recognised by all Europe, as for example the Low Countries at the Peace of Amiens, did not stand on somewhat a better title. No decision was come to, and the subject was taken ad referendum.

I am, dear Liverpool, faithfully yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

Viscount Castlereagh to Earl Bathurst.

DEAR LORD BATHURST,

Paris, 17th Aug., 1814.

I have delayed saying anything on Barbary politics, upon which I have some doubts, but no strong opinion. I am afraid as soon as we embark in the task of protecting the Western Powers, that every other Power, even the Americans, will rely upon us for destroying or keeping in port the Barbary Corsairs, and that the whole charge of the police of the Mediterranean will fall upon us.

The only thing I particularly wish is, that nothing should be done or said upon this subject till the point of the Ionian Islands is finally settled. The great motive the Ionians have to become our subjects is our flag being now the *only one* respected. If the idea transpires that we are disposed to protect Allies or dependent States, you will have them all for the old republic with a British garrison. This is the more material, as Capo d'Istria, notwithstanding his explanations to Lord Clancarty appeared quite satisfactory, has been throwing out this as a basis of settlement. I repeated to him the original declaration I made to the Emperor at Vienna, that this was an arrangement to which we must object, in whatever hands the sovereignty might be placed. I have given him the projet, but have not yet received an answer.

Lord Melville adverts to your having probably informed me of the determination taken with respect to Savary, L'Allemand, &c. As this may bear upon the line to be observed by other powers towards persons who, being proscribed by the French government, have sought shelter in their states, I should be glad to know what has been the decision, and on what principles founded.

I am, dear Lord Bathurst, yours sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

To Earl Bathurst.

[773.]

MY DEAR LORD,

Courtrai, 20th Aug., 1814.

I am just setting out for Paris, where I must arrive to-morrow, in order to obey my instructions. The recent correspondence between Lord Castlereagh and Talleyrand renders my arrival there more necessary, more particularly if Lord Castlereagh should not come himself, which I have strongly advised.

I have seen a good deal of the country, and will send you my report from Paris. I wish I could have passed a week more here, but I have desired Colonel Chapman and Colonel Pasley to look at some points which I have not been able to see, and

the former to come to me to Paris ; and after seeing him, you shall have my report.

Lord Lynedoch is going to England, and takes this letter.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

P. S. Whatever may be the military consequences of our tour, we have made noise enough in the country, and the people are convinced of our intention to defend it.

The Hereditary Prince came with me, and was remarkably well received everywhere, and I think the people in general well inclined to the House of Orange.

He has told me he does not intend to go to St. Petersburg ; and as to our young Lady, he appears not disinclined to wait a reasonable time for her mind to change again in his favour.

We have not yet received the Riband, so that you must get Lord Clancarty, or his father, to invest him.

H. Goulburn, Esq., to Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD,

Ghent, 21st Aug., 1814.

Lord Castlereagh arrived here at a very late hour on Thursday, and left us again on Saturday morning. He was the bearer of an instruction to us much more agreeable to my own feelings than the one with which we were provided on leaving London, as I confess I did not then understand that it was in contemplation to make America disarm on the Lakes and on the shores of them. We communicated this to the American Commissioners in a note which we addressed to them on the subject of Indian pacification and boundaries, and are now waiting for the answer which is to decide the length of our stay at Ghent. I should not have troubled you with a letter before that answer had been received, if it had not been for one circumstance in our new instruction, which, although, as Lord Castlereagh informed us, it had been discussed and decided by the Cabinet, I think yet requires reconsideration. In our communications with the American Commissioners I have uniformly stated our view in fixing an Indian boundary to be this, that neither party should acquire within that boundary any territory by purchase or *otherwise*. To the word *otherwise* Lord Castlereagh objected, as he said that it was not intended to preclude the Americans from conquering the Indians who might be at war with them and acquiring territory by conquest, as a restriction of this nature would expose them to invasion from the Indians, for which there would be no redress. He therefore desired that if the point were brought into discussion, we should disclaim such a view of the subject. I confess it appears to me that if it is the intention of the government to admit the acquisition of Indian territory by

conquest, there is no difficulty in settling that question. The Americans will, I am sure, be ready to assign a boundary, if they are told that they may conquer though they may not purchase the territory within it. Causes of war will always be found, for they almost always exist; and the only difference in the situation of Canada will be, that its frontier will be laid open by a conquering American army under General Harrison, instead of by treaties for sale, as heretofore. I must own that I do not quite see the justice of Lord Castlereagh's distinction. The ground upon which we prohibit the purchase of territory is to provide a barrier between the two States. In other instances in which barriers of a similar kind have been created (in the Low Countries for instance), it was never conceived that either country could destroy that barrier by conquest, whatever injuries she might sustain from the inhabitants within it; and surely if the Indian territory is made a barrier, it ought to have a similar exemption. America has modes of punishing the Indians more effective than the occupation of their territory: indeed the occupation of territory is no punishment, for an Indian nation has always heretofore been in the habit of indemnifying itself for an encroachment of this nature by invading any neighbouring nation more remote from the original encroacher. The arrangement, too, will operate unfairly against us. If an American-Indian nation injures us, we cannot attack them, because they are within the limits of the United States, and remonstrance is our only mode of obtaining redress; and if we call upon the United States to punish, they may avail themselves of our requisition to conquer their territory and bring themselves on our frontier. Our barrier, therefore, will be reduced to that portion of Indian territory within our own limits which we may set apart for that purpose; and this we may do as well without a stipulation as with it.

I have troubled you more at length than I intended; but I really think the point of very great importance, and do not like the idea of doing what I of course must do if the question is asked on the part of the American Commissioners, viz. acquaint them that Great Britain does not prohibit their acquisition of territory by conquest. Of course you will have the goodness to consider this quite as private, and as offered more for your consideration than for the purpose of altering any decision which the government may have come to.

Believe me, my dear Lord, yours ever most faithfully,

HENRY GOULBURN.

I ought to add that hitherto the American Commissioners have not taken any objection to the latitude of our demand. How far ought we to reduce our demand if they do not make the objection?

H. Goulburn, Esq., to Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD,

Ghent, 23rd Aug., 1814.

We are still without any answer to the note which we addressed to the American plenipotentiaries on Friday last. We have, however, met them to-day at dinner at the intendant's, and it is evident from their conversation that they do not mean to continue the negotiations at present. Mr. Clay,

whom I sat next to at dinner, gave me clearly to understand that they had decided upon a reference to America for instructions, and that they conceived our propositions equivalent to a demand for the cession of Boston or New York; and after dinner Mr. Bayard took me aside and requested that I would permit him to have a little private and confidential conversation. Upon my expressing my readiness to hear whatever he might like to say to me, he began a very long speech by saying that the present negotiation could not end in peace, and that he was desirous of privately stating (before we separated) what Great Britain did not appear to understand, viz. that by proposing terms like those which had been offered we were not only ruining all prospects of peace, but were sacrificing the party of which he was a member to their political adversaries. He went into a long discussion upon the views and objects of the several parties in America, the grounds upon which they had hitherto proceeded, and the effect which a hostile or conciliatory disposition on our part might have upon them. He inculcated how much it was for our interest to support the Federalists, and that to make peace was the only method of supporting them effectually; that we had nothing to fear for Canada if peace were made, be the terms what they might; that there would have been no difficulty about allegiance, impressment, &c.; but that our present demands were what America never could or would accede to. This was the general tenor of his conversation, to which I did not think it necessary to make much reply, and which I only mention to you in order to let you know at the earliest moment that the negotiation is not likely now to continue. Mr. Clay informed me that we should have their note to-morrow or the day after; but that where there were so many to consult, it was not easy to compose an answer. When we get it, we will lose no time in forwarding it.

Believe me, my dear Lord, yours ever most faithfully,

HENRY GOULBURN.

As I find upon reading over what I have written that I have drily stated what the American plenipotentiaries said to me, I cannot let it go without adding that it has made not the least impression upon me or upon my colleagues to whom I have reported it. It will be now unnecessary to trouble you for any answer to my former letter, as the question of acquiring Indian territory by conquest can hardly come under discussion.

H. Goulburn, Esq., to Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD,

Ghent, 24th Aug., 1814.

I was in hopes that I should not again have been under the necessity of troubling you for further instructions, at least until some progress had been made in the negotiation; but the enclosed note, which we have just received from the American plenipotentiaries, appears to render your instructions necessary to our further proceeding. The case of their not accepting the basis of *uti possidetis* even for a provisional article is not provided for in our instructions; and though we have little doubt that the spirit of them would warrant us in declining to proceed in the negotiation unless that

basis was admitted, yet we do not like thus to break off entirely without a previous certainty that you coincide with us in opinion that the only step which remains to be taken is to acquire peremptorily such an admission. Therefore, though we are aware that there is inconvenience in deferring an answer to such a note, we have preferred doing so until we can hear from you on this point.

Another reason which in some degree influences us is the desire of giving time for the Americans to receive those instructions from their government which you mention in your private letter to have reached England.

In replying to their note, it may not be improper to observe that their proceeding throughout this part of the negotiation has been nothing more nor less than a dictation to Great Britain of the status ante bellum as the only terms upon which peace can be made; or in other words is saying that although America declared war for the sake of annexing our dominions, yet she will cede nothing which can contribute to increase their security or difficulty of annexation at a future time.

That part of the note which repeats the request for a delivery of projets appears undeserving of notice. To accede would only be to give them a chance of making from the disclosure of our terms a better case for themselves on the rupture of the negotiation.

We send a special messenger by way of Calais as the more certain route. If he is fortunate in his passages, he may be with us by Saturday, as a single line informing us whether you break off or not is all that we require.

Yours ever most faithfully,

HENRY GOULBURN.

Would you make my apologies to Lord Liverpool for not answering by the present opportunity his private letter. I will do all in my power to carry his wishes into effect. In the event of our negotiation continuing, can you send us a map on which there is a river called the Passamaquoddy? We cannot find such a river marked in any of the maps we have.

To Earl Bathurst.

[774.]

MY LORD,

Paris, 25th Aug., 1814.

I enclose a letter from Mr. Dalrymple, the Commissary-General, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will have this gentleman knighted when his superior will be made a baronet.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LIVERPOOL,

Paris, 28th Aug., 1814.

I send you a despatch and two private letters received from Ghent, also my reply to Goulburn, and some observations upon the documents referred to.

During my stay of the greater part of two days at Ghent I did not see any of the American Commissioners. They did not call upon or desire to see me, and I thought my originating an interview would be considered objectionable and awkward by our own Commissioners.

When I left them, they inferred, from the manner in which their verbal explanations had been received, that the American Commissioners were disposed both to treat and sign on the frontier and Indian arrangements. No surprise or repugnance was at the moment disclosed to any of the suggestions.

If I had been to prepare the note given in on our part, I should have been inclined to state the proposition as to Indian limits less peremptorily; but the Commissioners appeared to attach so much importance to the not weakening, in this stage of their discussions, the ground which they had previously taken up upon this point, that I acquiesced in the expression "it is equally necessary," &c., which is very strong. I cautioned them, in reasoning on the words purchase or *otherwise*, not to commit themselves, without further authority, to mean thereby to negative the possibility of conquest in a war justifiably declared, however open such a principle might be to evasion. The absence of any such right of acquiring territory being at this moment the state in which Great Britain and America stand mutually with respect to each other's Indians, each power would repel any attack, and follow the Indian enemy within the lines of the other State, would extinguish the tribe if possible, and destroy their towns, but their right of war would not extend to acquisition of territory beyond their own boundary. It is a right of reprisal rather than a perfect right of war.

The whole seems a question of expediency, and not of principle, as the American Commissioners have endeavoured to make it. There is nothing demanded which is not, or may not be made, consistent with reciprocity; nor does it follow, because in the year 1783 the two States, not, perhaps, very justly, took a common boundary, thereby assuming a sort of sovereignty over the Indians, that they may not mutually recede from that boundary if a frontier conterminous with that of the Indians is preferable to one with each other, and special exceptions might be introduced in favour of existing settlements on either side, which had given birth to rights of property.

It is extremely material to answer fully the American note, as it is evidently intended to rouse their people upon the question of their independence. As I leave Paris in a few hours, I have not time to suggest a sketch for your consideration, and can only send a few rough materials for you and my colleagues to work upon.

The substance of the question is, are we prepared to continue the war for territorial arrangements? and if not, is this the best time to make our peace, saving all our rights and retaining the fisheries, which they do not appear to question (in which case the territorial questions might be re-

served for ulterior discussion), or is it desirable to take our chance of the campaign, and then to be governed by circumstances?

If the latter is advisable, we have the means of doing so, as the American Commissioners give us no room to expect any pacific stipulation whatever in favour of what they call their Indians, without now putting the war solely and avowedly on a territorial principle, which I think it would be imprudent to do: on the other hand, if we thought an immediate peace desirable, as they are ready to waive all the abstract questions, perhaps they might be prepared to sign a provisional article of Indian peace, as distinct from limits, and relinquish their pretensions to the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay, and possibly to admit minor adjustments of frontier, including a right of communication from Quebec to Halifax across their territory. But whilst I state this, I feel the difficulty of so much letting down the question under present circumstances upon the chance of such a body containing all the varieties of American party agreeing amongst themselves to any measure of responsibility, and further, upon the imperfect security that if they did so it would be approved at home.

Whilst I have been otherwise engaged, Cooke has thrown together, in the shape of a note, such points as have occurred, for your consideration.

I shall reserve for a future letter the report of my visits to Brussels and Paris. They will be, upon the whole, favourable.

I am, dear Liverpool, in haste,

Ever faithfully yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

I shall set out this evening for Dijon, where I expect to find Lady C., and proceed on to Geneva.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

H. Goulburn, Esq., to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR LORD,

Ghent, 26th Aug., 1814.

I have already apprised you privately of the expected rupture of our negotiations. That rupture, in effect, has taken place by the answer of the American Commissioners, received yesterday afternoon, a copy of which is enclosed. It rather appears to me, and those associated with me, that some reply should be given to this document, and the projet of such a reply is herewith sent.

Our public despatch of this day's date carries the account of our proceedings down to the receipt of the American answer, and encloses a copy of it. We have not thought it right to state in the despatch anything connected with a reply, not knowing whether the government would choose to issue a public declaration, or upon other grounds would wish a reply to be dispensed with.

Time will hardly allow of sending to London for any direction as to what such a reply (if sent at all) ought, or ought not, to contain. Should that which we enclose, or any other approved by your Lordship, be sent, our next public despatch will of course contain a copy.

I will write to Lord Bathurst to-day to apprise him that we shall take the benefit of communicating with you concerning our reply, otherwise he may feel some surprise that we should have made no statement of our instructions

with respect to it. You will much oblige us by sending us as early an answer as possible, as the reply will come with better grace if sent promptly.

We have not been a little embarrassed in a most material part of this reply by finding that the words "perfect reciprocity," said to be contained in your letter to Mr. Monroe of the 4th November, 1813, do not actually occur in the document from the Foreign Office, dated the 30th October, 1813, with which we were furnished as containing a copy of that letter. If the Americans have
 2 quoted fairly, we can only account for the omission by supposing that the words were added subsequently to the 30th October. If you can recollect how this matter was, we should be obliged to you to state it, as, if the words were not contained in the letter, a statement to that effect in our reply would be obviously better than any arguments to apply the words to the general scope and not to the particular clauses of the treaty. We have written this morning to the Foreign Office for a correct copy of the letter of the 4th November, but think we ought to send the reply before an answer from the Foreign Office can be expected to arrive.

H. GOULBURN.

II.

The British Commissioners to the American.

26th Aug., 1814.

The undersigned have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note of the American plenipotentiaries, dated the 24th inst.

The undersigned cannot but regret that the pacific views of their government should have been frustrated by the note of the American plenipotentiaries, who have taken upon themselves not to suspend the negotiation, but finally to determine it.

It is the duty of the undersigned to conform themselves to this state of things, but they by no means admit it to have been the reasonable result of the propositions which they had the honour to offer.

It was to be expected that the American plenipotentiaries would have been instructed, as they state themselves to have been, "to enter into discussion upon all points which might hereafter tend in any degree whatever to interrupt the harmony of the two countries," but it was little to have been expected that the points connected with the Indian pacification and boundary should have been excluded from this description.

It has been asserted by the American plenipotentiaries that Great Britain has advanced novel pretensions on this subject, contrary to the acknowledged principles of public law and the practice of civilized nations, when she has actually advanced no pretensions at all, but has confined herself to a statement that she feels it incumbent upon her to provide at the peace for the permanent security and tranquillity of nations who had been her allies in the war, an object equally compatible with public law and the most approved practice of nations. As to the recognition of the independence of those Indian nations which such a proposal is considered to assert or imply, it is surely not novel in principle or in practice for contracting parties to regard any nation as independent when by treaties principally made with it each has regarded it in the same light.

His Majesty's government has long regarded that of the United States as eager to extend their dominions on all sides, and has viewed with particular uneasiness the conduct of that government in possessing itself of the American dominions of Spain.

His Majesty's government has always considered and does still consider the

war between Great Britain and America as declared by the United States in the spirit of aggression and aggrandizement; and after the public declaration of the American government of their views with regard to Canada, feels the mutual assignment of boundaries to be the just and proper termination of such a war, whatever were the declared subjects of difference antecedently to its commencement. The resistance to definite boundaries now manifested by the American plenipotentiaries confirms the opinion entertained by Great Britain as to the real character of the war.

The policy of the United States towards the Indians has been described by the American plenipotentiaries as liberal. Great Britain deems it inconsistent with honour and justice to leave those who have been her allies in the war dependent on any policy which the United States may see fit to adopt towards them. Antecedently to the declaration of war against His Britannic Majesty by the United States, that government was at war with those nations upon grounds with which Great Britain had no concern, and in respect of which she observed towards the United States a very amicable line of conduct.

The note of the 4th of November last, signed by Lord Castlereagh, has been treated as inconsistent with the propositions recently submitted on the part of His Majesty's government.

It is altogether novel to consider a note expressing a willingness to enter into direct negotiation as any basis of the negotiation itself, or as describing all the points to be agitated in the course of it.

The points connected with Indian boundary which have been recently submitted to the American plenipotentiaries are in strict consistency with public law, and were considered as subjects of difference when that note was written, though not specifically stated as such in a document containing no specifications whatever.

It is no less novel to treat the words "perfect reciprocity" quoted as from that note (which must have been to characterize the general spirit of the intended treaty) as inconsistent with any particular proposition afterwards offered.

So far as regards an Indian boundary, the undersigned see nothing like an inconsistency of this kind in the propositions they submitted in order to effect a barrier between the dominions of the two countries, not, as repeatedly asserted, from the dominions of one of them, but from the territories of the two.

So far as regards a revision of the boundary line between the British and American dominions and the military occupation of the Western Lakes by Great Britain, it is to be observed that a treaty may be founded on terms generally reciprocal, though in relation to one subject a security is demanded by compact, and the same species of security is not mutually offered; for it may happen that one party shall be sufficiently secure without compact, and that the other party can be made equally secure by compact alone. The undersigned stated such to be their view of the subject of the Western Lakes. It was left open to discussion, and put in a form of discussion, how far this view of the subject was correct.

The undersigned are at a loss to discover how the security of the United States could have been endangered, or their independence drawn into question, by their discussion of or their assent to any propositions offered by the British plenipotentiaries; and they are wholly unable to reconcile the express avowal of the plenipotentiaries on the part of the United States that they would at the first favourable opportunity have recourse to arms to recover anything yielded by stipulation to those maxims of good faith upon which the compacts of nations and individuals ought to be founded. They regard the propositions which they have had the honour to submit as what ought not to have been

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unexpected by the United States on any other grounds than that they might not have expected Great Britain to abstain from demanding such an accession of territory to herself as she felt necessary for her security, and some disavowal of unjust principles striking at the maritime rights and strength of the British Empire, instead of leaving it open for America to reassert such principles as causes or pretexts of war, when they might be more embarrassing to Great Britain than at the present time.

The undersigned, regretting, in common with the plenipotentiaries of the United States, the failure of the negotiation, declare nevertheless that unless the American government are content to negotiate upon principles very different from what are contained in the note of the 24th inst., the pacification will be much more remote than their government had earnestly hoped and expected to find it.

III.

Viscount Castlereagh to H. Goulburn, Esq.

MY DEAR GOULBURN,

Paris, 28th Aug., 1814.

Considering the note to be given in by the British Commissioners in answer to that of the Americans as the only manifesto (though not immediately to be made public) which it would be advisable to put forward under existing circumstances, I deem it of importance that your reply should be made under the instructions of Cabinet, and that you should await at Ghent their directions.

I have therefore to request that you will simply acquaint the American Commissioners verbally that you mean to reply to their note, but that before you do so on a communication of such importance you have thought it your duty to refer it for the previous consideration of your government.

You will feel that your answer will acquire rather than lose weight from this interval, and from your being enabled to speak under the special sanction of your Court, and that no time will in fact be lost, as you could not break up the conferences and return home without express authority.

That no unnecessary delay may take place, I shall send your despatch, private letters, and projected answer direct to London, with such remarks as occur to myself, and you may expect shortly to receive from your government directions for your guidance.

I have, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH,

INSTRUCTIONS BY FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON TO COLONEL CHAPMAN, AND HIS REPORT ON THE DEFENCES OF THE NETHERLANDS.

Paris, 1st Sept., 1814.

Instructions.—To visit Ghent, and see whether it would be possible to re-construct the fortifications of the town and re-establish the inundations at a reasonable expense; and whether it would be possible in that case to hold the town with a small force.—W.

Report.—Ghent is a large city, with a population of 60,000 souls: it is a place of great importance, and has vast resources. It was formerly fortified with a citadel and an irregular enceinte of nineteen bastions. The citadel is partly in a moderate state, the ditches and ramparts of the body of the place

can be traced, and there is generally about five feet water in the ditches. A great part of the environs can be inundated; but of the contour, which is about six miles and a half, there is a total of about two miles which should be well fortified: the remainder, being covered by inundation, might have respectable earthen redoubts on the sites of the old bastions, and Ghent might then be deemed tolerably protected: but even this would require a considerable expense, and a garrison of 10,000 or 12,000 men.

The parts to be well fortified are, in front of the citadel, Muyde Port, Bruges Port, Courtray Port, and Bruxelles Port.

The means of inundation are by the Lys and Scheldt rivers, which pass through the city, and these rivers can fill the ditches everywhere except for an extent of about 600 yards east of the Courtray gate.—C.

Instructions.—Likewise visit Dendermonde with a view to fortifying that place, and making a tête de pont on the Scheldt.—W.

Report.—Dendermonde is a large town with a population of 5000 souls. It was formerly fortified in an irregular manner, with redans and ravelins: no trace, however, is left except the ditches, which are overgrown with rushes. Its strength depended, not on its fortifications, but on its powers of inundation; for the Dender coming in on the south side, and the Scheldt passing close to the town on the northern side, the environs can soon be inundated.

The first bridge on the Scheldt is at Dendermonde.

The town can be put into a respectable state of defence at a moderate expense, and would require a garrison of 2000 men.

There was formerly a detached ravelin on the road to Ghent: it was also protected by a covert way and glacis. There was also a detached ravelin on the left bank of the Scheldt with a covert way and glacis, forming a tête de pont to the bridge across the river, and which was further strengthened by two small detached redoubts.

Its means of inundation are by shutting the sluices of the Dender and opening those of the Scheldt, by which not only the environs will be overflowed, but also the chaussées.

Dendermonde was besieged in 1745; and although the inundation had taken place, yet, by cutting the dyke in two places near the Chaussée de Malines, the water was partly drawn off. I am, however, of opinion sufficient water could have been introduced by opening the sluices of the Scheldt each tide: this would have proved a great obstacle. But to deprive an enemy of the power of cutting the dykes, I would recommend the village of Vlassenbrooke to be covered by a strong work. The bridge should also be covered on the left bank of the Scheldt. By these means Dendermonde will be a strong post, and thus become an excellent tête de pont. It has the advantage of not being commanded, and requires no revetments.—C.

Instructions.—Also the line of the Dender from Dendermonde to Ath.—W.

Report.—The sluices at Dendermonde being shut, the country (up the valley) can be inundated as far as Weise, near which village is a lock (or sas) with large sluices. The Dender serves as a canal from Alost to Dendermonde: at Weise I was informed that, the sluice being shut, the valley would be overflowed as far as Alost. The tide would reach as far as Weise; so that the inundation above that sluice depends upon the back-

water, or water of the Dender, and I am apprehensive it might be necessary to cover that sluice by a work. There is no bridge between Dendermonde and Alost: those towns are about seven miles distant from each other, and Weise seems to be about midway between them.—C.

Instructions (continued).—Particularly Alost, with a view to fortifying it.—W.

Report.—Alost is a large town, situated on the left bank of the Dender; its population about 12,000 souls. It was formerly fortified; but there are now scarcely any traces of its works further than very narrow ditches. The country on the east might be inundated nearly so as to cover the town on that side: it is moderately commanded on the left bank of the river, and between the chaussée to Bruxelles and the Ninove and Grammont roads. This command is not of so much importance; but to make Alost either a fortified town, or as a tête de pont, would require a range of 4000 yards to be well fortified, of which about 2000 yards should be revetted; and such an extent of works would require a large garrison.

The river Dender comes in on the south-east side of the town, and at the northern extremity may be said to cease as a river, and becomes a canal. Between these two extremities there are three bridges across the river, and two sluices; but I doubt whether an inundation of much importance up the river could be effected, for the banks of the river are not higher than the common level of the meadows.

In tracing up the river, the first bridge is that of Erembodeghem, which will allow carriages to pass. The roads to it are not paved, and this bridge might be destroyed without inconvenience: it is of wood, and is about one mile and a half above Alost.

The next bridge above is a very narrow one, and only used for cattle being sent across the river to graze in the meadows.

The bridge next above is that which communicates between the villages of Denderleuwe and Liedekucke: it is of wood, and carriages pass over it. Near the bridge is a mill with a small sluice. This bridge is about five miles above Alost, and about that distance below Ninove; and if a communication were required between those two towns, it would be advisable, with a view to inundation, to run a dam across the valley, which is here about 300 yards wide. I should have observed in the same building with the mill is the sluice of the river: it is about 15 feet wide, and the backwater doors might be heightened about 5 feet 6 inches; and it is in this space that the barges pass up and down the river. The village of Denderleuwe is close to the mill on the left bank of the river, and the ground rises immediately above it for about 1000 yards; and in the event of its being deemed advisable to preserve this bridge, and to defend the dam, I would recommend three or four respectable redoubts to be constructed on the slopes of the hills, and distant from the top of the range about 500 or 600 yards. There is an advantageous situation for a redoubt on the right bank of the river: it is the site of a very ancient castle, and is within 200 yards of the bridge. The village of Liedekucke is well situated as a support to these works.

At a short distance above Alost, on the right bank of the river, the hills commence: there was not time to examine them in detail, but their general appearance is favourable. Just below Denderleuwe the little river Belle runs into the Dender. There is a road from Liedekucke which leads by a

bridge across the Belle to Teralphine : there is a branch of this road which crosses the Belle about a mile farther up ; but the ground above both these bridges is strong. That behind Liedekucke connects pretty well with that of Teralphine, and the Bois de Liedekucke, immediately behind the village, is about three miles in length, and stands upon commanding ground. This, viewed as a position, may be deemed rather favourable ; but it might probably be turned by the road leading from Ninove.

Ninove is a moderate sized town, having about 3000 inhabitants. It is situated on the left bank of the Dender, and commanded by high ground to the northward at a short distance. Just on the skirts of the town, and on the slope of the high ground, stands a very large building with a fine church : this, as a sort of blockhouse, might serve as a temporary protection ; but the town would soon be in the hands of an enemy, which would give him the possession of the bridge (which is of wood, and might therefore easily be destroyed) : consequently its destruction would only be a temporary embarrassment to an enemy.

The ground on the right bank is low, and unfavourable for the defence of the town of Ninove, or passage of the bridge.

Above it, about one mile and a quarter, is a lock with a good sluice and basin. The water is here stopped by timbers prepared for that purpose : it is about 800 yards from the rising ground on the right bank, and is commanded on the left bank by ground about 300 yards distant ; so that to cover the sluice, one or more works must be constructed on the enemy's side ; but as I do not think this sluice would produce any inundation, it would perhaps be as well to be prepared to destroy it. It is called the sluice of Pollacre.

At some distance above the sluice of Pollacre is the bridge of Sandberghen, which will allow carriages to pass : the piers are stone. The river here runs nearest to the range of high ground on the eastern side, the valley being about 600 yards across. The rising ground on the enemy's side is very tame, and the slope begins about 500 yards from the river. It might probably be of importance to have a communication across the Dender in this part of the country ; and if so, the bridge could be covered by a tête de pont, the works of which would not be expensive. Good earthen works with broad and deep ditches could here be formed, and these might be strengthened from the opposite side, for the village itself (on the right bank) and ground about it are favourable for the purpose. The village contains 800 souls. A sluice might here be made ; and, as the valley is narrow, a dam might be run across and defended easily, which, from the appearance of the valley above, would inundate and perhaps do away the necessity of having a sluice at Eydeghem. If this should be found to be the case on a more minute examination, the bridge and proposed sluice of Sandberghen would be of importance, as the valley might be overflowed so as to cover the right flank of some strong ground behind the town of Grammont.

The sluice of Eydeghem is about three miles above the bridge of Sandberghen : it would be difficult, without considerable expense, to defend it, as it is commanded at the distance of about 300 yards, where the ground takes its rise. It does not appear to be well placed for the purpose of inundation.

A short distance above is a bridge for cattle: it is not broad enough for carriages, and is commanded by hills 300 yards distant.

The next bridge above is that of Schendelbecke, over which carriages can pass. It leads only to the marshes, and is commanded by ground on the left bank in three places, at the distances of 150, 200, and 300 yards.

There are two bridges at Grammont; the lowest of one arch, and the other has three arches: they are both stone bridges. Above them are two large mills with backwater doors, so as to keep a large body of water for the purposes of grinding, and which assist in the navigation. Above these mills the Dender divides into two streams: the one supplies the mills, and the other passes through a large basin used as a lock, and to which are two sluices for navigation. The fall of water is here about seven feet; and, if the gates of the sluices were heightened, an inundation might probably be formed above the town, and the valley dammed across, it being narrow; but this would make it necessary to occupy the town, or to cover it with works.—C.

Instructions continued.—And Grammont with a view to the establishment of a work on the top of the height which commands the town on the right bank of the river.

And will look at this river, with a view to its becoming a line of defence; and will report particularly which of the bridges it would be necessary to retain, and, of course, to fortify, and which to destroy.

Likewise attend to the defence of the sluices, which must be on the river.—W.

Report.—Grammont is a large town, having a population of about 6000 souls: it is divided into two parts, upper and lower. It is à cheval on the Dender.

The upper town is situated on the right bank of the river, on the western slope of the heights, its nearest part being at some distance from the summit. The lower town is on the left bank of the river; and although it stands on a hill, yet it is much commanded by the high ground on its front at a short distance. There are yet the traces of Grammont having been fortified; but it would be impossible to take up the old front, so as to make it strong, without a much greater expense than the importance of the place merits, and to occupy the hills beyond the enceinte would require several redoubts to be constructed. Viewing Grammont as a post, not fortified, but with the position along the heights, and having the town in front, it becomes very strong, whether with or without the means of inundation; and, under this impression, it might be advisable to have a strong work on the summit of the heights, which is very favourable for the purpose. It domineers the country in its neighbourhood, and is seen from most of the principal towns for many leagues: it would be an admirable station if a system of telegraphs were established. It is the centre of a very strong position as a field of battle. The distance from the summit (on which is the chapel of Notre Dame) to the right is about one mile and a half, the slopes rather steep, and seen to the bottom; about half this distance is wood (underwood, with trees) favourable for defence, the slopes being very steep, and the upper margin of the wood commanding: it closes well on the

right below the church of Onckerzele. For the first mile and a half from the left of Notre Dame the ground is very strong: beyond this is wood on the slopes of the heights (a part strong underwood, and the remainder more open); the left closes also very well, for the Dender comes round the extremity of the left, and the Marcq (a small river) runs into the Dender at this point, and is a further protection to the turning of this flank. Close at the extremity of the left is a wooden bridge with stone abutments, and 100 yards above is a sluice, the distance being a little more than two miles from Grammont.

About one mile above Grammont is the bridge of Boulau: the timbers are supported by stone abutments and a stone pier. It is for carriages, and there is a paved road across the valley: the distance between the rising ground on each side is about 800 yards. The bridge is commanded on the left bank within 50 yards: as relating to the position, it would be one to be destroyed, and the paving broken up.

The bridge next above is that at the extremity of the position of Grammont. The backwater doors of the sluice close above it might be heightened, as I am of opinion the valley beyond might thereby be inundated to some extent.

The village of Acreen is about a mile above the left of the position, and in this distance there are two mills and a sluice: the village is on the left bank of the Dender. There is here a wooden bridge with stone abutments; and as the ground in front is not favourable for defence, without considerable expense being incurred, this bridge would probably be destroyed on the approach of an enemy. This, however, unless the valley were overflowed, would be no serious obstacle, as there is timber sufficient on the spot; and two or three pontoons would easily effect a passage across the river. Above Acreen, about one mile and a half, is the town of Lessinnes.

Lessinnes is a moderate sized town, with a population of about 3600 souls. At the lower side is a mill with backwater doors: just below the mill the two branches of the river unite, and at the point of junction stand another mill, and the lower sluice of a very fine basin and lock; the opening is 16 feet, and the water was 9 feet 6 inches deep. The river branches off just above the town, and is crossed by two stone bridges: that to the eastward has one large arch, and the other has three arches. The town stands on the left bank of the river, on rising ground, which increases in height to the westward: the slopes are gentle.

Should it be deemed advisable to cover the town and its two bridges, I am of opinion that it might be pretty well accomplished with about six redoubts, and the intervals managed by connecting with the houses and placing palisades where required. I would not advise the contour of the ground in front to be taken up for the two advanced redoubts, which would give a distance of about 500 yards from some cover in front.

The valley is narrow at Lessinnes; but I do not think any inundation could be formed here. The river is narrow, and the body of water not considerable.

About four miles above is a bridge leading to Isieres: the piers are of bad masonry. It is for carriages; but the timber-work requires repair. It could easily be destroyed. Between this bridge and Lessinnes there are

two sluices, Ollegnus and Papignus; but the general level of the valley is such that I do not think it could be overflowed.

The sluice of Isieres is next above the bridge. Beyond this is the mill of Tendre, which has backwater doors; a small distance from which is a sluice, with a drawbridge: the ground rises on both sides within 200 yards.

Farther up the river, and near Ath, is a mill with three backwater doors, and near the mill is a sluice. Close to Ath is a bridge over which passes a road which leads to the chaussée to Enghien. This bridge can at all times be destroyed, if found requisite.

The navigation of the Dender is confined to two days in the week. The cause of this restriction is from the want of a sufficient body of water during the summer months; and, from the inquiries I have made, I find the prevailing opinion is, that an inundation cannot take place in the valley of the Dender except in the winter months. It seems, however, probable that partial inundations may be made by increasing the height of the sluice-gates, cutting the banks, and by damming across the valley where narrow.

It seems advisable to fortify Ath and Dendermonde, not only in order to give strength to the line of the Dender, but also as places of considerable importance in a general point of view. Above Ath the Dender ceases to be of consequence; and indeed throughout the whole of its course temporary bridges might be thrown over its present channel without difficulty.—C.

Instructions.—Likewise examine the high ground between the Lys and the Scheldt, from Oudenarde on the Scheldt towards Harlebeke on the Lys, and that on the right of the Scheldt near Oudenarde, and opposite Avelghem.—W.

Report.—The only ground between the Lys and the Scheldt, as connected with Oudenarde, so as to keep up a communication by that town with the high ground opposite Avelghem, seems to be in the neighbourhood of Ghyselbrechtegem. This ground is about five miles to the westward and southward of Oudenarde. The village of Ghyselbrechtegem stands on the front of a range of moderately high ground of easy ascent, the part of which to be connected by the shortest line to the Scheldt, so as to secure the left flank, is about one mile and a half to the river: the range of high ground extends from the village about one mile and a half, where it descends with an easy slope to the level and enclosed country, reaching to the right bank of the Lys. The right of this ground could be attacked with advantage, or turned by Ansegem; and, as a position, it can only be considered strong against an enemy advancing upon the high road near the left bank of the Scheldt.

The high ground opposite Avelghem is very strong; but to occupy it as the left of a position would require an immense army for its defence: for instead of being a range of heights from thence towards Oudenarde, the country recedes from the Scheldt, presenting only points of high ground (distant from the river one, two, and three miles), and extensive valleys between them.—C.

Instructions continued.—And will see whether at Oudenarde a bridge could be secured, so as to connect the heights on both sides in one system of defence.—W.

Report.—The distance in a straight line from the left to Oudenarde is about nine miles and a half. The value, therefore, of Oudenarde as con-

necting the heights on both sides of the Scheldt in one system of defence is very much diminished. But in a more extended view it is of importance that Oudenarde should be fortified. Oudenarde is a moderate-sized town, with a population of about 4500 souls: it has a large church, convents, a very large and handsome town-house and barracks; the streets are good, with handsome houses.

The Scheldt, which enters on the south side, passes through the town: its shape is somewhat triangular. It was formerly well but irregularly fortified with four bastions, forming three fronts on the eastern side, with covert way and glacis, and an advanced ditch; a part near the Scheldt could be inundated, and the remainder of these fronts had an advanced covert way and glacis. The south-west side was enclosed by a long line of masonry, with round towers and a part en crémaillère, a broad and respectable ditch with covert way and glacis, the river passing along the foot of a part of the glacis, and the remainder protected by an advanced ditch: the whole of this side could be covered by inundation. The north-west angle of the triangle was covered by a pretty regular front, broad and deep double ditches, covert ways, and glacis: this front could not be covered by inundation. The remaining side (northern) of the triangle was enclosed with three irregular fronts: the part nearest the north-west angle was covered by double ditches, covert ways, and glacis; beyond this was an advanced line, and the whole side was protected by inundation. The whole of the eastern side is completely domineered by very high ground, distant about 700 yards.

The enceinte was about 3600 yards, of which about 2900 yards could be covered by inundation, and the remaining 700 yards had double ditches, covert ways, and glacis. Oudenarde is therefore very strong by nature, except on the eastern side. It may now be made a respectable place with good earthen works, broad and deep ditches, with the requisite outworks; and, instead of pushing the outworks forward so as to come the more closely under the command of the high ground, I would propose those heights to be occupied by a strong work, which should oblige an enemy to besiege and carry before he could attack the body of the place on the eastern side.

Oudenarde would form a good tête de pont upon the Scheldt, and if the inundation were completed, it would be well garrisoned with about 3000 men.

Its means of inundation is by opening the two sluices of the river, which are in the town: in half an hour (upon any sudden alarm) the ditches would have six feet depth of water, and in two hours the inundation would be complete with a general depth of from two to four feet in the winter months, and which was proved when General Maison attacked the place last spring.

Before I quit the subject of Oudenarde, I would observe that between the Scheldt and the Dender there are two great roads which lead to Oudenarde: one from Tournay, passing along the right bank of the Scheldt through the villages of Herinnes and Escanafle; and the other from Ath, leading in the first instance upon the chaussée to Tournay as far as Lense (a moderate sized town, about eight miles from Ath and ten miles from Tournay), when it turns suddenly in the town to the northward and passes through Renaix. This last road is newly paved, and is by far the best I have seen in the country. About eight miles from Lense, and behind Ellignus, is a strong position, the road passing at the foot of the right flank;

but as an enemy would attack and endeavour to force and turn this flank, by which he would gain the chaussée, it would perhaps only be of moment for a rear guard.

The town of Renaix is about fifteen miles from Lense and seven from Oudenarde: it is well built, and has a population of 9500 souls. At the entrance is a very large square château. Behind the town, about three quarters of a mile, is a very strong range of heights, extending from the chaussée to the right, which rests on the Scheldt, about five miles, and from the chaussée to the left is about two miles.

The slopes of this position are generally very long, with good flanking-points for artillery; a good deal of wood, with strong thick underwood. The high ground on the right, at the tower of the Bois de l'Enclus, is very strong, with steep slopes: the summit is planted with Scotch firs, generally about three or four feet high. The lower fall at a windmill is very strong, and commands everything towards the extremity of the right. There is a small rivulet from Renaix, which passes along the front; it joins another rivulet (the Ronne) which passes parallel to the position, and falls into the Scheldt; but the distance being generally about a mile, it is of no importance to the position. The left of the position is likewise very strong, and terminates on the very high ground marked Speelbergh, but by the country people called Balsambergh: it is also planted with firs, about 2 feet high. The slopes are long in front, with good flanking points, and the margins of the wood favourable. The turning of this flank is very favourable for infantry and artillery, and is further protected by an extensive wood, with strong underwood and trees. Should an enemy wish to attack and turn this flank, it must be done by a very wide movement, in which case there is favourable ground for a reserve of infantry and cavalry at the back of the Bois de Breckel, near the windmill of Caccamer. There is a good road of communication nearly along the whole range of these heights on the top, with several other roads slanting to the front. The only road by which an enemy can bring up his artillery is by the chaussée, which is enfiladed for three quarters of a mile, and it passes through ground which would be difficult to be forced.

There is some strong ground near to Oudenarde, which, under particular circumstances, might be advantageous: indeed the country between the Scheldt and the Dender is generally of a more marked character than any other I have passed through.

To the northward of Tournay, and distant about three miles, is strong commanding ground as a position: its right rests upon the Scheldt, near the windmill of Ormant, and, taking advantage of the houses which skirt the slope of the ground, makes the flank strong. The rising ground is favourable for artillery: it connects up towards the heights of St. Aubert dit-la-Trinité by a wood (strong underwood with trees) of a triangular form, the lower margin of which is favourable for defence; there are good flanking situations for artillery. The slope of the hill on which the church of La Trinité stands is very steep and strong; the churchyard has a surrounding wall of about 4 feet 6 inches high. The houses on the left of the church on the road leading to the village of Mourcourt have a complete command of the slope: to the front and beyond is a large wood which is favourable. This position is about three miles in extent. On its left and somewhat

advanced is the Bois de Miraumont, which is more than three miles and a half in length, and its flank is covered by some favourable ground, with good situations for guns to act in front of the village of Thimauges.

The great road from Tournay (on the right bank of the Scheldt) to Oudenarde passes through the right of the position, and there is a road passing through the left of the position to Renaix, which is paved for about a league beyond Mourcourt.

The position of St. Aubert la Trinité can be turned by the chaussée from Lense to Renaix.—C.

Instructions.—Likewise to visit Ypres.—W.

Report.—Ypres is a large and populous city, containing about 16,000 souls. Its enceinte is about 4800 yards, and of an irregular form. On the side of Courtray are three long fronts, with very flat bastions, having orillons and short concave flanks. The escarp is in pretty good order and about 27 feet high, and the ditches on this line are broad and deep. On the south and west sides there is an irregular ancient wall, great part of which is loop-holed, and the rest is flanked by small semicircular towers: a part of this wall, which is built on arches, has given way, and the breach is defended with palisades and fraises, at present in bad order. The north side is enclosed with two fronts, with orillons and short concave flanks. The great defence of the body of the place is its wet ditch, across which are several batardeaux, so that the water in the several ditches is in different levels. There are extensive outworks all round, generally of earth: some few have a low revetment. The south side round to the road to Bailleul can be inundated by means of an extensive lake to the southward of the city, and which, between the roads to Lille and Bailleul, is further covered by lines of a weak profile. The little river Yperle runs through the town, and goes out parallel to the Canal de Bausinger: a small inundation can be formed between the Canal de Bausinger and the road to Courtray. There are a few guns mounted upon the works, and about twenty field-pieces detained by the Prussians.

Ypres is a place of importance, and could be made in respectable condition at a moderate expense. It would require a garrison of about 6000 men.

The great roads from Ypres are to Lille, Menin, Rousbrugghe, and Roupelaire.—C.

Instructions.—To visit Fort Knocke and Rousbrugghe.—W.

Report.—About ten miles from Ypres, at the junction of the canal of Ypres and the Yser, is a spot which was once strongly fortified; and although there are now scarcely any traces of the works, yet the three houses there are called Fort Knocke. The Yser rises in France, and passes through Rousbrugghe. The only importance of Fort Knocke was from the command it had over the navigation from Ypres and Rousbrugghe. It possesses neither sluices nor the means of forming an inundation unless by running a dam across the marshy ground, which would be a work of considerable labour, and I am not aware of any advantage to be derived therefrom; for even if inundated beyond Rousbrugghe, the roads from Dunkirk and Bergues to Rousbrugghe and Paperinghe would be turned by the chaussée from those places which pass by Wormhout to Capel; for which reason it does not appear to me advisable that either Knocke or Rousbrugghe should be fortified.

The Canal of Ypres passes by Dixmude in its way to Nieuport.

Dixmude, which is a small town containing 1500 inhabitants, has the traces of having been fortified, and should it ever be deemed from its situation of any importance, it might be made a strong place ; for the command over it, if any, is of little consequence, and it might have wet ditches.—C.

Instructions.—To visit Furnes.—W.

Report.—Furnes is a moderate-sized town ; its population about 3000 souls. It is about fifteen miles from Dunkirk and Bergues, about eight miles from Nieuport, and about three miles and a half in a direct line to the sea : it has a navigable communication, by means of canals, with Dunkirk, Bergues, Rousbrugghe, Ypres, and Nieuport. Furnes was formerly fortified with eight bastions and strong outworks. The whole of the fortifications have been completely demolished, and the only remaining traces are the ditches, which are more than half filled up. The extent of the body of the place was about 3000 yards. It is not commanded, and if required it might be made respectable by earthen works and broad and deep ditches.—C.

Instructions.—To visit Nieuport.—W.

Report.—Nieuport is a small compact town, containing about 3000 inhabitants. The works surrounding it are very ancient and irregular, consisting of four small irregular bastions, and the enceinte flanked by small semicircular towers of a low profile : the body of the place is about 2800 yards in extent.

The Yperle, which passes on the north side to the sea, from which it is distant about two miles, forms the ditch. The ditches on the west, south, and east sides are broad and deep. On the north side is a work as a tête de pont to the river, and to cover a lock with flood gates on the canal of Bruges. On the west side, in front of the body of the place, are six small detached works, with covert way and glacis, beyond which is the Canal of Furnes, covered by some lines and outworks which extend towards the mouth of the river, and are closed by a square redoubt, called Fort de Wirvout. This work covers the sluice of Furnes.

The south side beyond the ditches of the body of the place is covered by three demi-lunes, with ditches, covert way, and glacis. The Canal de Furnes passes also round the glacis on this front.

The east front has likewise three demi-lunes, with ditches, covert way, and glacis, covered also by the Canal de Furnes, upon which are two detached redoubts, with a line of covert way and glacis. The Canal de Furnes, where it rounds on the west side, is also covered by five detached redoubts, with covert way and glacis, extending to the Fort de l'Ecluse, and thus connecting with Fort Wirvout. It is only on the west side and at Fort Wirvout that Nieuport can be attacked with advantage, for it is only in front of these parts that the inundation has not been effected, and I think it would be desirable to ascertain whether the inundation on the south side could not be connected with that of Wirvout by a cut through the tongue of low ground between those inundations.

The works are now in tolerable order, and by completing and repairing the palisades, and improving the communications and mounting guns where requisite, would be in a state to stand a siege, and, with a garrison of about 3000 men, ought to make a good defence.

Nieuport possesses great powers for inundating the country towards Ostend, Bruges, and Dixmude ; but it is only in the winter months that any dependence can be placed except by the introduction of salt water, which would cause the utmost distress to numerous families.—C.

Instructions.—To visit Ostend.—W.

Report.—Ostend is a large town, conveniently situated with the sea for trade, and has a population of about 11,000 souls. It was formerly fortified with eleven bastions ; but since that period the works on the west side were destroyed. The town has greatly increased in size, basins have been formed, extensive ranges of buildings erected, which, together with other improvements under Buonaparte, have made it a place of great importance. To cover the town on the west side, four strong fronts, of more than 200 toises each, have been constructed, so as to complete the enceinte : as far, therefore, as earthen works and broad ditches are concerned, the place may be deemed tolerably well fortified. The ditches are generally about 4 feet deep : a further excavation of 2 feet would be advisable, and the water can be increased in height about 2 feet. The counterscarp on the sea fronts is revetted with bricks. There is a small ravelin on the north-west front, and a large ravelin on the south-west front, beside which is a covert way and glacis. The berm of the body of the place is well palisaded, and the covert way is also well palisaded from the north side to the right branch of the covert way covering the right face of the south-west ravelin. There is a depôt of palisades apparently sufficient to complete the covert way, and for other purposes requiring to be done. There is a small harbour, which runs parallel to the works on the east side, and on the opposite side, at the end of the jetty, is Fort Napoleon, to defend the entrance. To the eastward of this long jetty is a large extent of sand, which is covered at high water, and distant from the works about 650 yards, and from hence there is a long range of sand-hills, serving as cover to an attack against the town. The French have erected an expensive work to protect the town on this side : it is called Fort Imperial, and is distant from the town about 1200 yards. It is a pentagonal work, with a very deep ditch, flanked by a bomb-proof caponnière on each side. The body of the work is bomb-proof, with loop-holes to fire upon the covert way from the casemates : above the casemates are also loop-holes to defend the covert way, and the top of the parapet (6 feet thick of brickwork) fires over the glacis. Four of the faces are mounted with 24-pounders, three in each face. There are five places of arms : that towards the sea is mounted with 48-pounders, and there is an 8-inch howitzer at the salient of the other places of arms. It has some faults, but is a very respectable work : its garrison is 450 men. The glacis is not finished. The French had begun a similar work on the west side of the town, on the sand-hills, at the distance of 1200 yards from the body of the place, and about 800 yards from the advanced lunette at the extremity of the sea dyke. There are some additions and improvements in this work, called Fort Royal ; for the caponnières are flanked by loop-holes in the counterscarp, and there seem to be the means of the troops retiring from the covert way, besides retreating through the only gateway and over the only drawbridge to the body of the place, as at Fort Imperial.

The arches over the caponnières and casemates in the counterscarp are turned, and the masonry is generally about 6 feet above the foundations.

It seems calculated for a garrison of 450 men. There is a small work at some distance from the town, to defend the great sluices of Sluykens on the Bruges Canal: this work does not, however, cover them; and as this is the most important sluice in the whole country, it ought to be well covered, and protected by a respectable work.

Ostend possesses the means of inundating the low ground for its own defence, as well as for Nieuport and the adjacent country; and it appears that since the French formed the Grand Basin and its magnificent sluice as a back-water to scour the harbour and channel, Ostend can be almost immediately inundated with fresh water in the winter months: for, by stopping the gates of this sluice, the sluices of Sluykens, and of other smaller sluices, and cutting their banks, the levels of the water will immediately be increased and a sheet of water spread over the low ground in the vicinity.—C.

Instructions.—To visit Bruges.—W.

Report.—Bruges is a large and populous city, containing 14,000 inhabitants: it was fortified in the ancient manner; a long line of ramparts flanked by a great many small towers, with a broad and deep ditch in front, to which outworks had been added. The enceinte is still visible. There is a second or outer enclosure, generally speaking parallel to the inner line; it had several small redans, with a small ditch, now narrow and choked with weeds. The outer line should be quite levelled, as it would give cover to an enemy, who would keep down the fire of the body of the place and prevent the use of artillery.

Bruges can only be looked upon as an intrenched camp, with such a ditch as could not be forced; its entrances being defended by respectable gateways. Its being occupied would give cover to the troops, and would protect the resources of the country.

There are good barracks for troops. It has the means, combined with Ghent, Ostend, Nieuport, and Furnes, of inundating the country to a great extent.—C.

Instructions.—The former system of inundation throughout West Flanders should likewise be an object for inquiry; and whether it would be possible to extend it further, and in what mode the existing or the new sluices to be formed could be best secured.—W.

Report.—All the rivers in the department of the Lys have been converted into canals, excepting the Lys and the Scheldt: they are retained by sluices at the ports of Ostend and Nieuport, and near L'Ecluse.

The canal from Ghent to Ostend is divided by means of sluices into three levels: 1st, that from Ghent to Bruges; 2nd, that portion which passes through Bruges; and 3rdly, from Bruges to the sluice of Sluykens, near Ostend. The water in the first portion is $3\frac{1}{2}$ feet higher than the second, and the second is $3\frac{1}{2}$ feet higher than the third level.

The canal which branches off to Nieuport is divided in like manner into two levels: the first portion, from Plaschendael to the sluice of Rattevalle, is usually on the same level with the Canal of Ostend; the second portion,

which extends from Rattevalle to what is called the sluice of Bruges at Nieuport, is 3 feet lower than the former.

During nine months of the year there is a great deal too much water in the different canals, so that it must be drawn off into the sea at low water, in order to prevent inundation taking place, and also to give vent to other smaller canals which correspond with the different levels above mentioned.

A considerable part of the interior of Bruges is very little higher than that level of the canal which passes through the city : therefore, if the water were raised to the height of Ghent Canal, great part of Bruges would be overflowed.

The canal from Bruges to Ostend is usually from 4 to 10 feet higher than the surrounding country.

The Nieuport Canal in its upper level is 2 feet higher than the surrounding country.

The dykes of the Ostend Canal being in many places only 3 feet high above the water, and those of the Nieuport Canal only from 1 to 3 feet high, it must be evident that if you raise the water of these canals to the level of the Ghent Canal, they will almost everywhere overflow their dykes ; so that with the assistance of cuts, made for the purpose beforehand, they would be able to inundate the neighbouring country. This inundation would take place, or at least render the ground impracticable, in the environs of the city of Bruges ; also in the communes of St. Michael, St. André, Varssenaeve, Snelleghem, Zilleghem, Elghem, Westkucke, Oudenbourg, Ghistel, Enegham, Jehtegham, Moere and Cookelaeve, Maerdyck, Zande, &c. ; Sevecote, Slype, Lessinghe, Marienkucke, and Steene ; where the greater part of the land is so low that the water passes through small aqueducts under the Canals of Ostend and Nieuport, from whence it is afterwards carried off into the sea by different sluices established at the port of Ostend. The second level of the Canal of Nieuport has got no dyke, except on a part of the left bank, which serves to prevent the sea-water from entering it at spring tides : the water in it is usually 2 feet lower than the right bank. The small canal of Vladsloo discharges itself into this level. If it were raised to the height of the Ghent Canal, the whole of its right bank, and the environs of Nieuport to the east of the harbour, with the exception of Lombarzide, would be inundated as far as Ostend.

To the left, or south side of the canal, the inundation would take place in the communes of Manne, Kensveere, St. Pierre Capelle, Zande, Leke, and Vladsloo, and would render impracticable much of the surrounding country. The whole of this inundation might be effected in the rainy season in a fortnight or three weeks by shutting the sluices of Sluykens and Watningher at Ostend, and the sluice of Bruges at Nieuport.

The Yser, formerly a river, has been converted into a canal, which extends from Nieuport to Fort Knocke, &c. : it is retained at Nieuport by the sluices of Niewendamme and Ypres. During six months of the year there is a quantity of superfluous water, which must be discharged into the sea at low water ; in that season the water stands 4 feet higher than the lower level of the canal from Nieuport towards Ostend and Bruges. By shutting the two sluices for about a fortnight or three weeks in the rainy season, the Yperle, the Yser, and other little canals of irrigation which communicate with them, would overflow their dykes, and, by assistance of cuts made for

the purpose, it would be practicable to inundate the communes of St. Ivoris, Ramscappel, Boetshock, Scheerwillam, Nieucapelle, Pervise, Oostkerche, Oudecapelle, Loo, and the environs of Knocke, Dixmude, Zarren, Handsaem, Woemen, Merckem, Essendamme, Oostvliteeren, and several other communes, the ground of which would be rendered impracticable as far as Ypres and Popperinghe. This inundation would be felt even in the environs of Mount Capel. The city of Bergues would also be affected by it in a great measure; but when the water rises so high around this place as to be on the point of cutting the communication between these two cities by the high road, a part of it may then be drawn off into the sea by means of the sluices of Dunkirk.

The canal from Nieuport to Furnes and Dunkirk is of one single level throughout; one sluice at Nieuport and another at Dunkirk serve to discharge the superfluous waters during six months in the year. This canal is usually 4 feet lower than the Yser. By shutting these sluices for a fortnight or three weeks, the ground between the sandhills and the canal from Nieuport to Furnes would be completely inundated; whilst, by means of the Yser, the whole of the country on the left bank of the canal as far as Furnes and Fort Knocke might also be laid under water. These inundations would be terrible if use were made of the sea, which rises a good deal above the level of the waters of the country. By opening the numerous sluices of Ostend and Nieuport at high water, the country might be rendered as it were totally impracticable, for the great square of Bruges is about 6 feet lower than the high water level; but if that measure were resorted to, upwards of 30,000 people would be driven from their homes, to whom a previous notice of at least three weeks ought to be given. The names of the sluices alluded to are as follows:—

At Ostend.—Sluice of Sluykens; New Ecluse de Chasse; sluice of Vingerhoek; Ecluse de St. Catherine; sluice of Nordhede; Ecluse bleue.

At Nieuport.—Sluice of Bruges; sluice of Niewendamme; sluice of Ypres; sluice of Furnes.

The information as to the extent of inundation was given by a Mr. Jaen de Brock, of Bruges, a young man who was employed by the French in the works at Ostend: he is now acting as director of the navigation of the Department of the Lys. From the short interview with him he appeared to be very intelligent, and would probably be very useful in assisting to carry on any military works that might be judged necessary for the defence of the frontier of the Netherlands.

There was another intelligent person at Ath, from whom I received much information respecting the Dender. He was employed by the former government in the department of Ponts et Chaussées; but I could not obtain an interview with Mr. Van Hoeren, who is at the head of these branches of the service, although I sent to his house repeatedly, and was detained one night at Ghent for the express purpose of seeing him, and I learned that he quitted his house early in the morning, apparently to avoid an interview.

In closing this long Report I hope I may be excused in noticing that I have received every assistance from Lieut.-Colonel Smith and Lieut.-Colonel Pasley; but the latter has been with me the whole time, and I am therefore the more indebted to him for his exertions and intelligence.

S. R. CHAPMAN.

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

[775.]

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 2nd Sept., 1814.

I send you some despatches from Spain. Mr. Clarkson told me this morning that he understood from some persons connected with the government, that if Great Britain would give such a proof of disinterestedness in desiring the abolition of the slave-trade as to sacrifice a colony in the West Indies as a compensation to France for what she might gain by carrying on the slave-trade for the next five years, the French government would consent to the immediate abolition.

Considering the mode in which St. Lucia came to remain in our possession, I don't believe the King and Talleyrand can entertain such a notion, and I confide in what they have said to you and to me.

However, I'll inquire into the matter and let you know the result. In the mean time I have informed Lord Liverpool of this notion, and have desired him to let me know what he feels about such a sacrifice to obtain immediate abolition by France.

The government were beat last night by a majority of 76 against 55 in the House of Peers on the preamble of the Press Law. The majority admitted the necessity of the law, but contended that, although necessary, it was contrary to the Constitution, and that the declaration of the preamble was contrary to the truth. On one of the clauses the government had a majority of one only, 66 to 65.

It is expected that the financial scheme will be thrown out of the Lower House.

Count Munster went on this evening to Vienna. He is perfectly satisfied with the communication he has had with the government here.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Fife House, 2nd Sept., 1814.

I am much obliged to you for your letter of the 28th ult., and am happy to find that your reception at Paris has been so satisfactory.

Castlereagh had only time to write before he left Paris on the American

question. He has promised to make his report on other points by a messenger he will despatch upon the road.

I am pleased, however, upon the whole, with the account Sir Charles Stuart gives of his conversation with Talleyrand in his Number 126. Upon the point of the Sardinian succession it is impossible not to concur with the French government. Our ideas likewise very much agree on the subject of Poland; and I feel as much anxiety as he has expressed for the removal of Murat from Naples, provided it can be done without a war; but the more I have reflected upon the subject, the more I am convinced that for all our interests, but especially for those of France, every effort must be made to prevent the sword being drawn in Europe, under any pretence, for a few years to come. I should hope, however, that the defect of Murat's title to the throne of Naples may induce him to accept of a compromise, particularly when he finds that the King of Sicily will consent to receive no indemnity for the crown of Naples; that the Kings of France and Spain will not acknowledge him; and that he may have the pledged faith of all the Powers of Europe for the alternative proposed to him.

Upon the subject of Austria and Prussia, one must always expect a degree of jealousy on the part of every French government. It is quite essential, however, to any balance of power, that these two monarchies should be made respectable. The principle recognised in the early part of this year, that Austria should have a population in the whole of about 27,000,000 of souls, and Prussia one of about 11,000,000, appears to be quite reasonable, and ought to give no umbrage to France, particularly when the extent and advantages of the French empire are considered on the one hand, and those of the Russian empire on the other.

With respect to the nature of the Germanic Constitution, that may, I think, be fairly left to the German Powers. It must be the interest both of Prussia and Austria, when their limits are once defined, that neither should encroach upon the subordinate states; and France and Russia will always be sufficiently powerful to prevent any projects of partition on the part of the preponderating German Powers. I see no serious difficulty, therefore, in an amicable arrangement of all these questions; and I should feel very much disposed to act with perfect frankness towards the French government upon all of them.

I congratulate you on the turn which affairs have taken in Norway. I am quite sure that, under all the circumstances, our policy was right on this question; but yet I felt events might take a course which would make it the most awkward and embarrassing of any in our European politics. The union of Norway and Sweden will, I hope, now take place without any further effusion of blood; but at all events the abdication of Prince Christian, the surrender of the fortresses, and the negotiation which the Swedish government have opened with the Norwegian Diet, relieve us from any further difficulty in the business. We may possibly be called in as mediators, but it cannot be expected that we should go to war with either party if they cannot now agree.

We had prepared an answer to the note of the American Commissioners before we received Castlereagh's letter, and very much in the spirit of the memorandum which he sent us. Copies of these papers shall be transmitted to you in a few days. Our Commissioners had certainly taken an

erroneous view of the line to be adopted. It is very material to throw the rupture of the negotiation, if it is to take place, upon the Americans, and not to allow them to say that we have brought forward points as ultimata which were only brought forward for discussion, and at the desire of the American Commissioners themselves.

The American note is a most impudent one, and, as to all its reasoning, capable of an irresistible answer, which, if it should be necessary to publish, will, I am persuaded, have its proper effect in America.

I do not think there is much chance of the negotiation proceeding at present, but I incline to think that after the answer we have now sent, the American Commissioners will refer to their government for further instructions: in this, however, I may be mistaken.

We shall anxiously await the progress of your negotiation on the abolition of the slave trade. I had a letter from Wilberforce yesterday, which proves to me that the Abolitionists in this country will press the question in every possible shape. We must do therefore all we can, and at least be able to show that no efforts have been omitted on our part to give effect to the addresses of the two Houses of Parliament.

Believe me to be, with great truth, my dear Duke,

Yours most faithfully,

LIVERPOOL.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Fife House, 2nd Sept., 1814.

I wish you joy of the termination of our difficulties as to Norway. I say termination, because as far as we are concerned I consider them as terminated. I sincerely hope and believe that the assembly of the Diet at Christiania will lead to the peaceable union of Norway to Sweden; but whether it does or not, we have fulfilled our engagements by continuing the blockade until Prince Christian had abdicated, until the Norwegian fortresses were in possession of the Swedish troops, and the government of Sweden brought fairly into communication with the Diet on the subject of their connection with Sweden, and with relation to their internal government. We not only have not guaranteed Norway to Sweden, but we declined doing so; and nothing can now prevent the union of the two countries but disputes upon internal points between themselves.

I am perfectly aware that it will be very desirable that nothing should be said at present as to this being our view of the question. It could answer no purpose. It might stimulate the party in Norway who are hostile to the union with Sweden to resistance, and preclude the advantage of any eventual mediation on our part.

I thought it might be material, however, that you should know my feelings on this subject, which are completely conformable to the line of argument which I adopted in the House of Lords in the last Session when the question of Norway was under discussion.

Though our policy respecting the union of Norway to Sweden has always appeared to me to be right, I confess I felt for some time that the question

was the most awkward and embarrassing of any in our European politics. I wish we may be able to get over the question of Naples as well. I shall be anxious to hear what passed between the King of France and yourself on this point, as it appears by one of Sir Charles Stuart's last despatches that it was one of the subjects on which His Majesty was desirous of having a personal communication with you.

LIVERPOOL.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Fife House, 2nd Sept., 1814.

Before we received your letters from Paris of the 28th ult., the Cabinet had considered the despatches and notes sent from Ghent, and had approved of the general outline of an answer.

We have had great satisfaction in observing, this morning, that it corresponds very much with the substance of the memorandum drawn up by Cooke. We hope to be able to send it to Ghent this evening, and a copy of it shall be transmitted to you by the messenger who goes to-morrow, or by the one of next week.

Our Commissioners had certainly taken a very erroneous view of our policy. If the negotiation had been allowed to break off upon the two notes already presented, or upon such an answer as they were disposed to return, I am satisfied the war would have become quite popular in America. I was the more surprised at this circumstance as I never read a paper more easy to answer, as to its reasoning, than the paper of the American Commissioners; and I think it is of the utmost importance that the rupture of the negotiation, if it is to take place, should be thrown upon the American Commissioners, and not upon us.

Supposing our original policy to be right, I do not think you will consider us as over-tenacious upon any of the points brought forward in our former note.

If the campaign in Canada should be as successful as our military preparations would lead us to expect, I do not think we should be justified in conceding more at present than we have done, especially after the demands already made. We have avoided as much as possible committing ourselves on anything which is likely to create embarrassment hereafter; and our reasoning on the subject of the avowed intentions of the American government to conquer and annex Canada can hardly fail to make a considerable impression on the reasonable people in the United States.

We cannot expect that the negotiation will proceed at present, but I think it not unlikely, after our note has been delivered in, that the American Commissioners will propose to refer the subject to their government. In that case the negotiation may be adjourned till the answer is received, and we shall know the result of the campaign before it can be resumed.

If our commander does his duty, I am persuaded we shall have acquired by our arms every point on the Canadian frontier which we ought to insist on keeping.

LIVERPOOL.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Madrid, 2nd Sept., 1814.

Having received instructions from Lord Castlereagh to propose to the Spanish government that an explanation should be given to the government of France, avowedly by common consent, of the nature of the alliance between Great Britain and Spain, and particularly of the tenor of the article relative to the non-renewal of the Family Compact, I mentioned the subject to the Duke of San Carlos, and found him fully disposed to give publicity to the Article in question; and indeed he appeared to consider this to be necessary, in order to afford a pledge to the Spanish nation of the King's determination to avoid any connection with France.

Your Grace will therefore perceive that the Article now stands as a separate Article; and it will of course be published with the rest of the Treaty.

I have troubled your Grace with this letter in consequence of Lord Castlereagh having desired that you should be apprised of the determination of the Spanish government, in order that you might hold such language upon the subject to the government of France as might appear to you to be advisable.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

H. WELLESLEY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Separate Article.

His Catholic Majesty engages not to enter into any treaty or engagement with France of the nature of that known under the denomination of the Family Compact, nor any other which may affect the independence of Spain, which may be injurious to the interests of His Britannic Majesty, or may be contrary to the strict alliance which is stipulated by the present treaty.

Signed at Madrid, July 5th, 1814.

H. WELLESLEY.

DUKE OF SAN CARLOS.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,

Madrid, 2nd Sept., 1814.

I have little or nothing to add to my despatches, which are left open for your perusal. Have the goodness to forward the duplicate to Lord Castlereagh. You will see that I have not been able to obtain any further concession with regard to the slave trade, notwithstanding the great want of money here, and the liberal offers of the British government, of which San Carlos would willingly have availed himself, but has not influence or firm-

ness enough to resist the powerful interest in favour of a continuance of this traffic, which after all, I believe, amounts to little or nothing in the hands of the Spaniards; and if my information be correct, which I have no reason to doubt, little more would be required than to enforce the stipulations of the Article as it now stands.

If you approve the Article relative to commerce, I shall be glad if you will say so to Lord Liverpool; for now that Lord Castlereagh is absent, I believe that I have but few friends in the government.

In my opinion, the Treaty, as it now stands, is as good a one as we could possibly have with Spain: perhaps, indeed, it is too favourable to us.

I understand that the Military Junta are likely to be disgraced. Palafox is to go to Arragon in a day or two.

There is much speculation and intrigue about the King's marriage. I am assured that the Infant Don Carlos has almost engaged himself to marry a Princess of Portugal, and a powerful interest is making to prevail upon the King to marry another. Those who are anxious to keep him out of the hands of priests, wish him to connect himself by marriage with Russia; but I should doubt whether this would quite suit us. I should like to know your sentiments upon this subject. I have not heard anything mentioned of a connection with Austria.

As soon as the ratifications of the Treaty are exchanged, I shall think of availing myself of my leave of absence.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

I hope soon to be able to tell you something satisfactory about your pictures.

W. Hamilton, Esq., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Foreign Office, 2nd Sept., 1814.

I beg to acknowledge your Grace's letter of the 29th ult., respecting the Borghese palace, the details of which, and your proposal respecting furniture, repairs, &c., are perfectly approved by Lord Liverpool.

He only objects to the amount of the rent to be deducted from the Ambassador's salary: though not perhaps inconvenient to you, he thinks 2000*l.* per annum more than it would be right to deduct as a general rule, and he therefore proposes to reduce it to some inferior sum, which he will settle at the Treasury, and your banker shall be advised of the same.

The despatch sent by this mail, No. 7, contains the original and official copy of the Regent's letter to the King of France, which you requested me to explain.

Mr. Halfhide, the engraver, begs to excuse himself for not being able to send the passports this week, but he promises them faithfully for Tuesday next. In the mean time Sir Charles Stuart might leave you some with his signature.

I remain, my dear Lord, your obedient humble servant,

WILLIAM HAMILTON.

H. Goulburn, Esq., to Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD,

Ghent, 2nd Sept., 1814.

I have this moment received your letter of the 31st, and have much satisfaction in thinking that you must have been relieved from all anxiety as to the nature of our answer to the American Commissioners before this note can reach you, as Lord Castlereagh forwarded our rough projet of an answer from Paris to you. We have some days since informed the Americans that we had deemed it necessary to refer our answer to the government previous to sending it to them; and although they pressed for the earliest possible answer, yet they had nothing to say to this communication. Some one or other of them have called daily since to know if we had got an answer. Indeed, their only anxiety appears to be to get back to America. Whenever we meet them they always enter into unofficial discussions, much of the same nature as the conversation with which Mr. Bayard indulged me; but we have given no encouragement to such conversations, thinking that they are liable to much misrepresentation, and cannot lead to any good purpose. All that I think I have learnt from them is this: that Mr. Adams is a very bad arguer, and that the Federalists are quite as inveterate enemies to us as the Madisonians. Those who know anything of America or Americans probably knew this before.

We await with some anxiety your note.

Believe me, my dear Lord,

Yours ever most truly,

H. GOULBURN.

The Prince de Bénévent to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Paris, ce 3 Sept., 1814.

Le Prince de Bénévent a l'honneur d'adresser à Son Excellence Lord Duc Wellington la copie de la réponse du Roi à la lettre que le Prince Régent d'Angleterre avait écrite à Sa Majesté sous la date du 9 du mois passé, et qui lui avait été remise par Son Excellence. Il prie Lord Duc Wellington de faire parvenir à Son Altesse Royale la réponse de S.M., et d'agréer les assurances réitérées de sa haute considération.

[ENCLOSURE.]

The King of France to the Prince Regent.

MONSIEUR MON FRÈRE,

Paris, 2 Sept., 1814.

Le Duc de Wellington m'a remis la lettre par laquelle vous m'engagez à joindre mes efforts aux vôtres pour hâter le moment de l'abolition totale de la traite des nègres. J'ai pris aussi connaissance des différentes pièces qui se rapportent au même objet, et qui il était chargé de me communiquer. Vous rendez justice aux sentimens de mon cœur en me croyant disposé à adopter toutes les mesures propres à assurer le repos et le bonheur de l'espèce humaine, et en particulier à concourir à l'extinction d'un commerce qui la flétrit; et c'est surtout lorsqu'il s'agit de me concerter avec vous pour atteindre un but

aussi salulaire que vous me trouverez toujours empressé de vous seconder. Assuré comme vous l'êtes déjà que d'accord avec vous sur le principe je n'ai dû mettre un délai à l'abolition finale et absolue de la traite des noirs en ce qui concerne la France que pour prévenir l'effet de cette mesure comme subite, vous pouvez l'être encore que pendant ce délai même la traite n'aura lieu que sous des restrictions graduelles que soit dans nos colonies, soit dans cette partie de la côté d'Afrique où l'on est déjà parvenu à y substituer un commerce d'une autre et meilleure nature, je porterai mes soins à la décourager ; et que les moyens dont je m'occupe pour parvenir à la fin que nous nous proposons vous en offriront sous peu la preuve la plus convaincante. Enfin, regardant comme celui de l'humanité entière l'honorable intérêt que vous et votre nation prenez à l'accomplissement de cette noble entreprise, je me trouverai heureux de pouvoir dans cette occasion vous donner un nouveau témoignage de l'inaltérable amitié et de la parfaite estime avec lesquelles je suis, Monsieur mon frère,

Votre bon frère,
LOUIS.

[776.]

To the Prince de Bénévent.

À Paris, le 3me Sept., 1814.

Le Duc de Wellington a l'honneur d'accuser la réception de la note de son Altesse le Prince de Bénévent dans laquelle son Altesse lui envoya une lettre de Sa Majesté au Prince Régent, et la copie, qu'il enverra de suite en Angleterre.

Il réitère les assurances de sa haute considération.

WELLINGTON.

[777.]

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Paris, 4th Sept., 1814.

I have the honour of enclosing a letter from His Most Christian Majesty to the Prince Regent on the subject of the slave trade, with a copy of it which I received last night from the Prince de Bénévent.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

CLAIMS OF MADAME DE STAËL ON THE FRENCH
GOVERNMENT.

Sept., 1814.

Madame la Baronne de Staël réclame l'application au paiement de la créance de Monsieur Necker de l'article 22 du traité de paix qui vient d'être conclu à Paris, ainsi conçu :—" Le gouvernement Français restera chargé, de son côté, du remboursement de toutes les sommes versées par

les sujets des pays ci-dessus mentionnés (les pays qui cessent d'appartenir à la France) dans les caisses Françaises, soit à titre de cautionnements, de dépôts, ou de consignations. De même, les sujets Français, serviteurs des dits pays, qui ont versé des sommes à titres de cautionnements, dépôts, ou consignations, dans leurs trésors respectifs, seront fidèlement remboursés."

La Suisse, et nommément la République de Genève, sont au nombre des Alliés dont les puissances contractantes ont stipulé les intérêts par le traité de paix du 30 Mai dernier, puisque le paragraphe 7 de l'article 10 détermine ce qui restera à Genève de son ancien territoire et ce qui en restera à la France : la République de Genève y est déclarée faire partie de la Suisse.

Ainsi les Suisses et les Genèveois font partie des sujets des pays mentionnés au dit traité, vis-à-vis desquels, suivant l'expression littérale des articles 19 et 22 de ce traité, le gouvernement Français reste chargé du remboursement de toutes les sommes par eux versées dans les caisses Françaises à titre de cautionnements, de consignations, ou dépôts, et de toutes les sommes qui se trouveroient dûes en vertu de contrats ou engagements formels passés entre des individus et les autorités Françaises à raison d'obligations légales.

Madame la Baronne de Staël, héritière de Monsieur Necker de Genève, supplie le gouvernement Français de vouloir bien, aux termes du traité de paix du 30 Mai dernier, faire liquider en principal et intérêts les deux millions restans dûs de 2,400,000 déposés en 1778 au Trésor Royal par Monsieur Necker contre une promesse signée de la main du Roi de lui restituer cette somme aussitôt qu'il la désireroit.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Note sur le Dépôt fait par M. Necker dans le Trésor Royal.

En 1778 M. Necker, Directeur-Général des Finances, déposa dans le Trésor Royal deux millions quatre cent mille livres, contre une reconnaissance signée de la main du Roi, avec promesse de restituer cette somme à M. Necker aussitôt qu'il la désireroit. A cette époque, où la guerre venoit d'éclater entre la France et l'Angleterre, les circonstances forçoient l'Etat à accorder à ses créanciers un taux d'intérêts fort élevé ; toutefois M. Necker, qui vouloit subvenir autant que sa fortune le lui permettoit aux embarras du Trésor Royal, et donner l'exemple d'une confiance qui seule pouvoit rétablir le crédit, se contenta de 5 pour cent pour l'intérêt de sa créance.

En 1781 il sortit du Ministère, après avoir servi le Roi pendant cinq années, en persistant (chose dont il n'y avoit pas encore eu d'exemple) à refuser les appointements de sa charge, qui se montoient alors à cent mille écus par an. Si dans ce moment M. Necker eut retiré son dépôt, comme ses amis l'y invitoient, l'exemple de défiance qu'il auroit donné eut pu être nuisible au crédit de l'Etat. Ce motif déterminâ M. Necker à laisser son dépôt au Trésor Royal jusqu'au moment où il rentra au Ministère au mois d'Août, 1788.

Une grande disette de bled menaçoit la France, et donnoit lieu aux intérêts qui ont commencé la Révolution. M. Necker fit venir des bleds de tous les pays de l'Europe. MM. Hope, d'Amsterdam, auxquels il s'adressa spécialement pour l'approvisionnement de Paris, lui déclarèrent qu'ils ne feroient les chargements de bleds qu'il leur demandoit qu'autant qu'il leur donneroit sa

garantie personnelle pour cet effet. Il leur offrit lui-même ses deux millions pour cette garantie; et lorsqu'il fut exilé, peu de mois après, craignant qu'à cette nouvelle MM. Hope ne suspendissent leurs envois, il leur récrivit de Bruxelles pour leur confirmer sa caution. Les historiens du tems ont relevé ce trait de générosité, qui mérite en effet d'être cité, et qui donne à la créance de M. Necker un caractère encore plus sacré.

Au mois de Septembre, 1790, M. Necker se détermina à quitter le Ministère, après avoir de nouveau servi le Roi pendant deux ans sans aucune espèce d'émoluments.

Mais comme ses comptes n'étoient pas apurés, et que l'Assemblée Constituante étoit fort sévère à cet égard envers les Ministres du Roi, M. Necker lui écrivit en partant une lettre, imprimée dans le *Moniteur* d'alors, pour lui annoncer qu'il laissoit son dépôt en gage (jusqu'à ce que l'examen de ses comptes fut terminé). Il se contenta de retirer 400,000 livres, ce qui réduisit la somme à deux millions.

Le Trésor public continuoit à payer à M. Necker 100,000 livres d'intérêts par année. Lorsque le procès du Roi eut lieu, alors M. Necker publia une défense de cet auguste Prince, qu'on ne peut lire encore sans une profonde émotion. Elle irrita la Convention, qui, au mois de Janvier, 1793 (époque de la mort du Roi), fit séquestrer les intérêts dûs à M. Necker, sous prétexte d'émigration. M. Necker réclama contre ce séquestre, et le Comité des Finances de la Convention lui même fit un rapport pour que le séquestre fut levé, mais les Jacobins s'y opposèrent. Les débats peuvent se lire dans le *Moniteur* du mois de Juillet, 1793.

Lorsque Genève fut réunie à la France M. Necker fut rayé de la liste des émigrés, et le Directoire lui offrit de lui payer le capital de son dépôt. Mais comme parmi les propositions qui lui furent faites, il y avoit d'être payé en biens nationaux, M. Necker aima mieux convenir que ce dépôt ne seroit acquitté qu'à la paix, ne voulant ni être remboursé avec des non-valeurs telles qu'étoient alors les fonds publics ni accepter des biens nationaux.

Sous le Consulat du Général Buonaparte, le Comte Barbé de Marbois, alors Ministre des Finances, offrit encore à M. Necker son remboursement avec les intérêts arriérés. Pendant que cette négociation avoit lieu, M. Necker publia un livre contre la constitution du Consulat, qui irrita vivement le Général Buonaparte. D'un autre côté, l'opposition de Madame de Staël, que ce Général essaya de vaincre plusieurs fois par diverses offres, acheva de le fâcher; et lorsque, après la mort de M. Necker, Madame de Staël réclama la dette de son père au nom de l'intérêt de ses enfants, M. de Fermond lui répondit *que sa créance étoit sans doute sacrée, mais qu'il ne pouvoit rien faire sans l'ordre de l'Empereur.*

Tel est le récit des circonstances de la créance de M. Necker. Elle a fait tant de bruit en Europe et en France qu'on en parle nommément dans l'histoire du 18^{me} siècle. Vingt et une années de séquestre des intérêts ont plus que doublé la somme primitive. La générosité du Roi peut seule décider ce qui doit être statué à l'égard de ces intérêts. Mais un motif auquel la bonté de Sa Majesté ne sauroit être étrangère, c'est que la persécution dont Madame de Staël a été l'objet l'ayant obligée à dénaturer sa fortune pour se sauver, cette opération lui a fait subir des pertes assez considérables pour qu'elle soit entièrement privée dans ce moment du capital nécessaire à l'établissement de ses enfants. Madame de Staël sait que sa demande est éminemment juste, mais sa reconnoissance n'en sera pas moins grande si Sa Majesté daigne y être favorable.

N. DE STAËL HOLSTEIN.

H. Goulburn, Esq., to Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD,

Ghent, 5th Sept., 1814.

The public despatch which accompanies this will convey the note which we delivered early yesterday morning to the American Commissioners. You will see that we availed ourselves of your permission to make some alterations in the style, and I hope you will not think that we have improperly exercised the discretion with which you had entrusted us. The substance of the note has, I think, undergone no change; and if we have in some parts altered the language, or made some additions to the argument, we have only done so with a view of rendering the note more consistent with what had been before expressed by us.

I confess that I have little hopes of its producing any change in the decision of the American plenipotentiaries. Many things have, ever since the commencement of the negotiation, shown that their government had no real intention of making peace, but had acceded to the proposal of negotiating with the sole view of deriving from the negotiation some means of reconciling the people of America to the continuance of the war. The Indian boundary appears to them calculated to answer this object, and their desire of negotiating is therefore at an end. Lord Clancarty sent us on Sunday the copy of a letter addressed by Mr. Crawford to Count Hoogendorf, which affords a strong confirmation of this supposition, which it will be difficult for the Americans to do away. It is dated the 22nd ult., and must have been written in ignorance of what our final propositions for peace might be, those having been made to the American Commissioners only on the 19th. Mr. Crawford must have been acting under instructions from his government dated in June or July last, and they must have acquainted him that the negotiations would not end in peace; otherwise he could hardly have been stirring the maritime questions which the American plenipotentiaries state themselves to be instructed not to insist upon, and pursuing on this subject a line of conduct so hostile to Great Britain, before he could know from anything that had passed at Ghent that there was any danger of the negotiation failing.

I am much disappointed by the account which you have given me of the amount of Lord Hill's force. Though a small force might gain possession of the point which they are destined to occupy, yet it will be difficult for a small force to retain it under the disadvantages of an unhealthy climate, and a constant reduction of numbers incident to its defence against the enemy. I am still more disappointed by the account of Prevost's indisposition to attempt anything. It appears to me, as it has always done, that the ascendancy upon the Lakes must be attained by military operations against the land side of the enemy's harbours. It is impossible for us to outbuild the Americans, whatever exertions we may make for the purpose of increasing our fleets; and unless Prevost will attempt something of this kind while the enemy's troops are raw, and their ports not completely fortified, Canada will always be kept in a state of anxiety, although the chance of its conquest may not be much increased.

I am sorry that I have been the cause of adding a shade of yellow to Bunbury's countenance. I had a note from him, in which he appeared to

bear my continued absence with much philosophy. I hope you will believe that I have not the least wish to leave Ghent a moment sooner than my presence here can be dispensed with without inconvenience; and I only mentioned my wish upon the subject in my former letter under the impression that the Americans were really on the point of setting out. They gave it out all over the town (previously even to sending their note) that the negotiations would end in nothing, and I have never met them anywhere without hearing their complaints at being detained here, and their wish to leave the place on the 1st of October at the latest. Some days since they gave their landlord notice that they meant to quit their house, and two of their private secretaries set out to make a tour in England before their note was written, one of whom openly stated to me that as they were on the point of returning to America, he wished, first of all, to see London.

I enclose a letter which I received last night from Mr. Clay. It refers to a conversation I had with him on Sunday, in which he wished to know how he, on his return to America, was to be secured from capture or detention by our cruisers. My promise was that the government would certainly do what was necessary to protect him; and that if he would make an application, stating what he wished, I would forward it home immediately. I therefore trouble you with it, and request that you will do what you consider proper, and communicate the result to us. I ought to add that the ground of his requiring a passport is his intention of returning in a different ship from that in which he came. The ship had a general passport to bring a cargo of plenipotentiaries and to take them back again, but the individuals on board had no passports.

Believe me, my dear Lord,

Ever yours most faithfully,

HENRY GOULBURN.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Foreign Office, 6th Sept., 1814.

I have the honour to transmit to your Grace, for your information, the copy of a Memorial left at this office by the Rev. Mr. Gordon, Principal of the Scotch Colleges in France, stating the wish of those persons most concerned in the prosperity and maintenance of these establishments respecting the property of the Scotch Colleges in France.

By Sir Charles Stuart's despatch No. 40, of the 23rd June, there was reason to expect that the French government were prepared to issue a decree for the restitution of the property of all the English and Scotch Colleges in France to the hands in which it was vested previous to the Revolution, or to their successors. But in a subsequent despatch, No. 105, it is stated that the decree which was issued continued the property in the same hands in which it had been placed by the Revolutionary government, in the Roman Catholics, natives of Ireland; and that the only redress to the Scotch contemplated by the Abbé de Montesquiou was by compelling the Irish to surrender the property so conferred on them.

If this should in fact be the only alternative left, it is the Prince Regent's pleasure that your Grace should take an early opportunity of urging the subject on the immediate attention of the government of His Most Christian Majesty, and that the decree effecting this restitution may also give permission to the Scotch proprietors to dispose of their property in such manner as they may judge expedient.

Their object in seeking this privilege is sufficiently evident from the enclosed memorial, but it may not be advisable to bring it forward until the negotiation is further advanced ; and I have only to add that the conduct of the Scotch Roman Catholics has for many years been so perfectly unexceptionable as to make them highly deserving of the countenance of His Majesty's government for the attainment of their present object.

I am, with great truth and respect, my Lord,

Your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Memorial.

Your memorialist begs leave to represent that in May, 1790, an official note, in favour of the Scotch College at Paris, was presented to the Count de Montmorin, Minister to Louis XVI. for Foreign Affairs, in the name of the King of Great Britain, by Lord Robert Fitzgerald, His Britannic Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of France, and in June, same year, to the French National Assembly, by the Archbishop of Bordeaux, then Garde des Sceaux, the tenor of which memorial was as follows :—

“Le soussigné, Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Britannique près S.M. très Chrétienne, conformément aux ordres de sa Cour, a l'honneur de représenter à M. le Comte de Montmorin que le Collège des Ecossois à Paris, fondé premièrement en 1325 par David, Evêque de Murray, en Ecosse, secondement en 1603 par Jaques de Bethemé, Archevêque de Glasgow, au même pays, doit absolument tout ce qu'il possède en France à la générosité des sujets de la Grande Bretagne, et qu'en conséquence les décrets de l'Assemblée Nationale relatifs aux biens ecclésiastiques, ou de mainmorte, ne pouvant affecter ce collège, il doit rester tel qu'il est.

“Si des circonstances impérieuses rendoient impossible l'existence de cet établissement sur le pied actuel, le soussigné a ordre de demander qu'il soit permis aux administrateurs actuels d'en vendre les biens mobiliers et immobiliers, et de se retirer ailleurs avec le produit.”

Nothing was definitively determined by the French government as to one or other of the alternatives specified in the memorial. The demand it contained was neither acceded to nor rejected.

To your memorialist it seemed inexpedient in the then existing circumstances to insist on an explicit answer, complying with or refusing in plain terms what was required.

The case is now different ; and in the present favourable state of things your memorialist ardently wishes that, dropping entirely the first alternative in the note presented by Lord Robert Fitzgerald, an assent to the second be insisted on till obtained.

It is not the wish of your memorialist only, it is also the wish of the respectable part of the Scotch Roman Catholic laity. The Scotch College at Paris was founded first at a time when religious differences did not exist in this part

of the world, and the first founder declares expressly in the Act of Settlement that it is intended for the maintenance only of students in "belles lettres and philosophy."

The second foundation, though it took place when these differences had come to a great height, was made precisely for the same purposes as the first.

If since the year 1688 students in divinity have been admitted to share in the benefits of this foundation, they have not been admitted exclusively, nor even preferably, to students in other branches of learning, as is the case in every other English, Scotch, or Irish seminary of education in foreign countries. Students in divinity have been, since 1688, admissible as students in the Scotch College at Paris, but not exclusively nor even preferably admissible.

For this reason the Scotch Roman Catholic laity have always regarded the Scotch College at Paris with a peculiar degree of favour, as being an institution specially established for their advantage, and are anxious it should be preserved on its ancient footing, and kept separate from other seminaries of education destined for purposes totally different.

While France retained its old monarchical constitution, while learning flourished there in all its branches, and while the Scotch Roman Catholic penal code continued with all its severity, no place seemed better fitted than Paris for promoting the ends for which the Scotch College was founded.

But since the fatal changes occasioned by the Revolution, and the great decline of learning of every species, chemistry excepted, and especially of classical learning, or the knowledge of the dead languages, Paris or any place in France is become very unfavourable to such seminaries as the Scotch College; and though in time, and under a settled government, learning may revive in France, it is a prevalent opinion in Scotland that the present quiet is very precarious, and a great unwillingness exists, and will continue to exist, among the Scotch Roman Catholics to send their children to be educated in a country which has been so long torn by factions, and of which the return is seriously apprehended.

The daily increasing spirit of toleration in Great Britain, and the mild forbearance of its government in not enforcing the execution of the penal statutes still unrepealed, point out therefore to the Scotch Roman Catholic laity their own country as the only proper place for restoring on its ancient footing a national establishment which from 1325 to this day, a period of nearly 500 years, has produced men of good abilities in Church and State, and to which, in the person of two of its alumni, the Universities of St. Andrew and Aberdeen owe their existence.

As by the laws of all Christian countries the civil power has a right to superintend colleges, the civil power in Great Britain will have the same right of superintendence over the Scotch College now at Paris when settled in Scotland, and to this right of superintendence all due regard must be paid in the framing of the rules by which it is to be governed, so as to answer the ends of the institution.

The reasons above assigned as inducing the Scotch Roman Catholic laity to wish the removal of the College from France to Scotland are not such as may be assigned to the French government. If any reason is to be assigned to the French government for that removal, besides the will and good pleasure of the British government, it must be the desire natural to every government that its subjects should be educated under its eye, and habituated from their youthful years to entertain sentiments of respect for and attachment to the laws and customs of a country which gave them birth, and where they are to spend their lives.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Fife House, 7th Sept., 1814.

I send you enclosed three letters : No. 1, from Mr. Wilberforce to myself ; No. 2, from Mr. Clarkson to the Duke of Gloucester ; and No. 3, from the Duke of Wellington.

I send you at the same time a copy of my answer to the Duke of Wellington, which so fully explains the opinion of such members of the government as were in town on the subject of these letters, as well as the grounds on which that opinion has been founded, that I should be only unnecessarily taking up your time by repeating them.

I certainly think that if the immediate abolition of the slave trade by France could be purchased by the cession of the island of Trinidad, and much more so by a sum of money, it would be well worth the price.

The reasons why that island has been selected are in part stated in the letter to the Duke of Wellington, and you will recollect that it was the cession which upon the whole we thought we could most conveniently make if it had been necessary to cede any British colony to Sweden.

I have the less difficulty in acceding to this proposition, in consequence of our intention of retaining Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice. Important as the retention of these colonies may be to us, it is impossible the Continental Powers should not look to it with some jealousy and distrust. With such a mass of colonial strength and power, we can afford some sacrifice.

I am at the same time strongly inclined to the opinion that the French government will not agree to an arrangement founded on either of the proposed principles ; but I conceive some advantage will arise from having shown a disposition to make some sacrifice of interest for an object which we profess to have so deeply at heart as an act of justice and humanity.

You will judge whether it will be better that the cession of the island should be brought forward at Paris, or at the time the subject is negotiated before the Congress at Vienna. I shall of course take care that Wilberforce and his friends shall know nothing of our intentions in this respect.

I believe I forgot to mention to you in my letters of last week that the Prince Royal of Portugal had expressed a desire to return to Europe, and that a British squadron might be sent to Rio de Janeiro to convey and escort His Royal Highness and the Royal Family. Sir John Beresford is therefore under orders to proceed on this service.

LIVERPOOL.

The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Fife House, 7th Sept., 1814.

I have received your letter of the 2nd inst., on the subject of the communication made to you by Mr. Clarkson respecting the slave trade. I enclose copies of two letters, one from Mr. Wilberforce to myself, and the other from Mr. Clarkson to the Duke of Gloucester, to the same effect.

The information respecting the disposition of the French government you will see comes from the same source. I am strongly inclined to

believe it to be erroneous; for I cannot conceive that in the confidential communications which have passed on this subject between yourself and the King, as well as between Lord Castlereagh and His Majesty, he would not fairly have explained himself in this way to both of you if such had been his feelings and sentiments. I think it unlike the King of France to convey this idea circuitously instead of doing it directly, particularly when he was so anxious to have a confidential explanation on all points of difficulty with Lord Castlereagh. I must further add that I believe the reason actually given by the King of France against the immediate abolition of the slave trade to be the true one, viz., that he must manage the prejudices and feelings of his own people. The West India body are the only body in France that have ever had any considerable political influence, and they are now very powerful in both the Assemblies, but particularly in the House of Peers. With them the question is not one of *Pride*, but of *Interest*; and it would be no satisfaction to them that France should acquire another colony if they were denied the means of cultivating their estates in the old colonies.

When I state these doubts as to the truth of the information, I am well aware that every due attention ought to be paid to it. The question of the abolition of the slave trade is become so embarrassing that it would be expedient to purchase it by some sacrifice, and perhaps even prudent to be enabled to say that we have offered the sacrifice, though it should be refused.

The objection to offering to cede an island for the abolition is obviously this: that when the principle is once admitted, where are we to stop? Mr. Wilberforce and his friends evidently think that the abolition of the slave trade is not only worth *one* island, but that it is worth anything and everything. The French government, when once they knew that we were ready to negotiate upon the principle of cession, would endeavour to make us pay, not what we were ready to give, but what they were ready to ask; and we should be exposed to considerable difficulties in the refusal.

Notwithstanding these considerations, however, we are willing to make the attempt. If the French government are disposed to abolish the slave trade for the cession of an island, would they not abolish it for a sum of money, part of which might be advanced to the West India planters themselves, to repair their losses and to set their concerns properly afloat? Would not a sum of money be a greater benefit to the planters than the continuance of the trade for only five years, when they must be so totally in want of capital?

I have no difficulty in authorising you to offer two millions sterling for this purpose, if you should think it likely to be effectual. We might perhaps even go as far as three millions.

If you should be of opinion that so liberal an offer of money for this object would not be accepted, we might then go so far as to reconcile ourselves to the offer of the cession of the island of Trinidad as the condition of the immediate abolition. We have fixed upon Trinidad rather than upon St. Lucia, because it is an island not necessary for the security of our ancient possessions. St. Lucia is of the utmost importance to us as long as the French possess Martinique and the Saints. It is the protection, in fact, of our Leeward islands. France does not want it, for she has a naval

station both at Martinique and at the Saints. We have none in those seas if we give up St. Lucia. We placed in our negotiation for peace the retention of Mauritius and St. Lucia, not on the ground of acquisition, but of security; and we can now best resist the cession of them for the abolition of the slave trade on the same grounds.

Trinidad is at least worth double the value of St. Lucia, has one of the finest harbours in the world, is not exposed to hurricanes, and is close to the coast of South America. No one could say therefore that it would not be a most liberal offer, and one that would be flattering to the pride of the French nation.

I have the less indisposition personally to make the offer of this cession as we intend to retain Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice. A grant, however, of money would be far preferable to any cession of dominion, and I think might be as acceptable to the French government. If the French West India planters really believe that their government will abolish the slave trade at the end of five years, I cannot but think that they would prefer a large sum of money to a temporary continuance of the trade.

I have thus stated to you fully my sentiments and those of my colleagues who are in town upon this subject. You will judge best of the use you can make of them.

I shall send a copy of this letter to Lord Castlereagh. The offer of money, if otherwise expedient, might be made without any previous communication with him. You might perhaps wish to communicate with him before you made the offer of the cession of Trinidad.

There will be this advantage in having made both the offers, even if they should be refused: that I think no reasonable person could then say that we have not done everything in our power for the accomplishment of the complete and immediate abolition of the slave trade.

If an arrangement should be made upon the basis of either of these propositions, it would of course be essential that the stipulations to effect the abolition should be in all respects satisfactory, and that the French government should unite their efforts with ours to procure the abolition by other states.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, very sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

P.S.—Of course no intimation will be given to Mr. Wilberforce or any of his friends that there is an intention on the part of government to agree to the cession of any colony to France for the abolition of the slave trade.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

W. Wilberforce, Esq., to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD L.,

Stanstead Park, 31st Aug., 1814.

The kindness with which your Lordship has always received me encourages me to execute a duty suggested to me by a letter I have just received from Paris. Knowing the value of your time, I will trespass on it for a very few moments, but indeed all I have to say may be almost immediately despatched.

It is this : that I am convinced, from the accounts I receive of the state of mind of the leading men in France (I include the King's in the number), that the fear of wounding the national pride is the most powerful of all the principles which oppose the consent of the French government to the proposal for an immediate abolition ; and if they could have some fair producible excuse for having acceded to our wishes, in short, if, to speak plainly, we would buy it of them by some adequate cession, I have no doubt of their assenting to the bargain. It was only because Lord Castlereagh, and I rather understood your Lordship also, would not have voted for any Address containing the intimation by Parliament of a wish that we should offer the French an equivalent, and because I saw the disadvantages under which I should lie in arguing such a question, that I did not insert it in our Address. I wished our Address to pass unanimously. But let me now earnestly conjure you, my dear Lord, to consider the subject, viewing it all round, and to look forward to all the consequences both to France and to ourselves, but above all to Africa, which may be prevented on the one side, and all the benefits which may be secured on the other, by the purchase which I recommend. I will not presume to point out any particular cession which I may conceive it would be expedient and most acceptable to ninety-nine hundredths of the community to make for the purpose of obtaining this great object, because, though I am not without particular ideas on the subject, it would be mere impertinence in me to trouble your Lordship with them. But the general proposition itself I could not but state to you ; and I can truly assure you that though undoubtedly the performance of an act so pleasing to God and so supereminently beneficial to man is my first motive, yet I can truly also, I repeat it, assure you that it is a real recommendation of the measure I have in view, that it would tend to add strength and celebrity to your Administration, and render your peace the most popular as well as the most beneficial and the most noble of any recorded in the history of the world.

I am, &c.,

W. WILBERFORCE.

II.

T. Clarkson, Esq., to the Duke of Gloucester.

Paris, Hôtel du Helder, Rue du Helder,
27th Aug., 1814.

I have the pleasure of informing your Royal Highness that I had a long interview yesterday with the Duke of Wellington. I was much pleased to find that his Grace had made himself master of the subject of the slave trade since he left England. He had read during his journey and since his arrival here my History of the Abolition throughout, also the Abridgment of the Evidence, also my 'Impolicy of the Slave Trade,' as well as Mr. Wilberforce's Letter to his Constituents, and every paper and memorandum furnished both by Mr. Macaulay and myself ; so that he wants little or no aid from me, as far as a knowledge of the subject is concerned.

The Duke has already had many conversations with the King of France upon the subject, and the last only last night. He conceives there will be no difficulty in getting a very considerable extent of coast entirely freed from the slave trade. He spoke indeed as if it had been determined upon, and entirely without reserve.

In speaking of St. Domingo, he said that he thought that the French government had given up all thoughts of the conquest of it.

The King told the Duke last night that the French people were very

ignorant of the subject of the slave trade, and also very indifferent about it; but that the merchants speculated upon rich harvests, and the planters upon the enlargement of their estates. Others promised themselves gain from breaking up new land and stocking it with negroes. These were the persons with whom he should have to contend, and they were together a powerful body. All these considered the question of the abolition, when mentioned to them, as an English and not as a French question. Here, then, great difficulties would lie. They would complain loudly, and the other French people hearing them, and not having any knowledge of the subject like the English people, would perhaps side with them, though indifferent at present. The King saw no way of opposing such as had formed expectations of gain from the traffic, but through the medium of public opinion. He said emphatically, "He could no more give up the trade, after it had been once promised, against popular opinion, than the King of England could continue it against popular opinion." But the Duke thought that His Majesty would have no objection to find a current strong enough to enable him to abolish the trade.

I asked his Grace what he himself thought ought to be done in this state of things to obtain our object. His answer was, to support the King of France, and this directly by creating a public opinion in Paris in behalf of the abolition. He was sure this might be done in a few weeks by publishing proper books and dispersing them among the known literary men there, whose voice was always heard, and would, he hoped, be heard successfully in the present case.

I asked him what books would answer the end in view. He said some person should write a small brochure on purpose to do away erroneous notions, such as confounding abolition with emancipation, and of giving other necessary information, both with respect to the inhumanity and the impolicy of the trade, and also to bring it from an English to a French question. He thought that my own 'Impolicy of the Slave Trade' ought at any rate to be one of the books published in French. He had read it through with attention. Nothing, he said, could be clearer or more convincing. I told him I feared my own name as the author would be in the way, and that I was fearful of injuring the cause by stirring public —. I had nothing to do but to give his Grace private information, and to leave the rest to His Majesty's Ministers. He said my fears were groundless, and that Mr. Wilberforce's name, and he condescended to say mine also, if put at the end of any work on this subject, would serve the cause among the *litterati* here, whose opinion would give the tone to Paris. He would be answerable for all the consequences. Indeed, he would take them upon himself, and whatever works he thought necessary he would print at the expense of his own government.

Upon this I took from my pocket my letter addressed to the different potentates, lately translated into French. He looked at it, and said he thought it was the very thing to begin with, and that it ought to be reprinted directly. He was of opinion, however, that as it related to the inhumanity and injustice of the trade solely, it ought to be followed by my 'Impolicy;' and that a third publication should follow, of the nature before described, viz., to remove erroneous notions, &c.

I have just received the following information from Lord Holland:—Talleyrand has called upon his Lordship several times, and he upon Talleyrand. During these interviews his Lordship lost no opportunity of talking on the subject of the slave trade. His Lordship says positively that Talleyrand is not hostile towards giving up the whole trade immediately, nor is the French government. You may have the whole abolition when you please, if you are serious in asking for it, and will give something in exchange. But something

in exchange is necessary to satisfy the French people, who would otherwise think their Monarch subservient to the commands of England and her allies. I entreat you to make Mr. Vansittart acquainted with this fact, and let him inform his colleagues in the Cabinet about it; for if it be so, and Lord Castle-reagh does not succeed, when the people of England are willing to make the sacrifice of an island and much more, woe be to the Administration.

I have but just time to say that I am, with great esteem, &c.,

THOMAS CLARKSON.

I have written by this post to Mr. Wilberforce.

MEMORANDA ON THE SLAVE TRADE.

1. From 1784 to 1789 the number of slaves taken by all nations from the western coast of Africa amounted to about 78,000. They may be thus apportioned, viz. :—

From the rivers Senegal and Gambia about	2000
Windward Coast :	
From the river Gambia to Cape Mount, in the latitude	
of about 7° N., about	3500
From Cape Mount to Cape Three Points, about	3500
Gold Coast :	
From Cape Three Points to the Rio Volta, about	10,000
Slave Coast :—	
From the Rio Volta to the Rio Palmar, including Popo,	
Whydah, Ardra, &c.	5000
Bight of Benin :	
From the Rio Palmar to Cape Formosa, in lat. 4° N.,	
including Benin and Lagos, about	6000
Bight of Biafra :	
From Cape Formosa to Cape Lopez, in 1° s. lat., includ-	
ing Bonny, New and Old Calabar, Cameroons, &c.,	
about	21,000
From Cape Lopez to Cape Negro, in lat. 16° s., includ-	
ing Loango, Congo, Malemba, Cabenda, Angola,	
and Benguella	27,000
	78,000

2. Of this number about 20,000 are supposed to have been carried off in French ships. The largest part of this export was drawn from places south of the Equator, from Congo, Loango, Malemba, Cabenda, and chiefly from Angola. The number taken from these different places may be estimated at about 12,000. From the Senegal and Gambia they drew not more than from 1200 to 1500 slaves. Their export from the coast between the river Gambia and Cape Three Points did not exceed 2000, and from the Gold Coast about 500. The remaining 4000 or 5000 were drawn from Whydah, Benin, Bonny, and Calabar.

Of the slaves carried from Western Africa during the same period by the Portuguese, three-fourths are supposed to have been drawn from Angola and Benguella, a few from the Windward Coast, and the rest from Whydah, Benin, Bonny, and Calabar.

From the above statement it will appear that the number of slaves taken from the part of the coast to windward of the Gold Coast was very small in proportion to its extent, when compared with the number exported from the Gold Coast itself, and from the parts of the coast to leeward of that district. This is to be attributed to the very depopulated state of the northern coast, which, being much more conveniently situated for a trade from Europe, was first drained of its inhabitants. The extent, however, to which it was carried on, on the Windward Coast, in the years 1784 to 1789, affords no criterion whereby to judge of the extent to which it will probably be carried on now in case of its revival by the French. The population is stated to have greatly increased along the whole range of coast extending from Senegal to the Rio Volta, and the facilities therefore of procuring slaves would be greatly increased. The Governor of Senegal is of opinion that from that river, which used to furnish 1000 or 1200 slaves annually, 20,000 might now be drawn in a single year. The river Senegal has enjoyed a longer cessation of the slave trade than any other part of the coast; its commerce having been interrupted for many years before the slave trade was abolished by Great Britain in consequence of its being in the hands of the French, with whom we were at war; and on this account its population may be much more dense than that of any other part of the Windward Coast. Still the probability is, that the slave trade from the whole of the Windward Coast would be much more extensive, were it now to be revived, than it was during the years 1784 to 1789.

3. The average annual value of the imports from Africa into Great Britain for twenty years, prior to the year 1787, fell short of 72,000*l.*; and even this small sum includes the imports from the whole of the African coast, not only from Benguella northwards to the Straits of Gibraltar, but from the Straits of Gibraltar eastward, along the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. The average value of the imports, during the years 1783, 1784, 1785, 1786, and 1787, was about 90,500*l.*; and if from this sum be deducted the value of the articles imported from Morocco and the coast of Barbary, there will be left somewhat below 70,000*l.* for the value of all our imports from the Western Slave Coast of Africa, namely, from between Cape Blanco in lat. 21° N., and Cape Negro in lat. 16° S., an extent of 4500 miles of coast, exclusive of the large rivers which occur in that space. And it is making a large estimate to suppose that the value of the exports from this country, which were required to purchase this 70,000 pounds' worth of African produce, amounted to 55,000*l.* What was the exact amount of the imports into this country from Africa during the twenty years which succeeded the year 1787, there are no documents before me to show; but there is no reason to apprehend that it had very materially increased during that period. There is no doubt, however, that, since the year 1807, the date of the abolition of the slave trade by Great Britain, the increase has been very considerable. The imports into Great Britain from the Gold Coast alone, an extent of about 250 miles, are valued by the African Company, and by Mr. Swanzey, who is not only a director of that Company, but is himself largely connected in trade with all parts of the Gold Coast, at 180,000*l.** The quantity of gold-dust alone brought to this country is stated to have

* This may be seen by a reference to a Memorial of the African Company lately presented to government.

increased thirty fold. Before the year 1807 the quantity imported seldom amounted to 1000 ounces in the year. It has gradually risen since that time to 30,000 ounces. What may have been the whole import into Great Britain from Africa, exclusive of gold-dust (which article is never entered at the Custom House), during the years which have elapsed since the abolition of the slave trade, I am not able to state. I have the means, however, of knowing that during the years 1812 and 1813 there was shipped from the river Sierra Leone alone to Great Britain, the West Indies, the Canary Islands, and Portugal, a quantity of rice, ivory, beeswax, dye-woods, gum copal, and palm oil, the produce of Sierra Leone and the neighbouring rivers, equal in value to the average annual import into Great Britain during the years 1783 to 1787 from the whole of the coast which extends from Cape Blanco to Cape Negro. I am unable to state the exact amount of the exports from this country to Africa since the abolition of the slave trade ; but I have no doubt it will be found on the average to be at least five or six times as large as was required in the years 1783 to 1787 for the produce trade of that coast, and which I have estimated on the average at 55,000*l*.

N. B. Since the above was written I understand that there has been laid on the table of the House of Commons an account of the exports from this country to Africa, and of the imports from Africa to this country, during the last six years. I have not seen it, nor do I know whether it be yet printed ; but a copy of it may, I apprehend, be easily obtained on application to the public offices.

The Prince de Bénévent to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Paris, le 7 Sept., 1814.

J'ai reçu la note que Votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser le 5 de ce mois pour me rappeler les objets de diverses communications qui m'ont été faites par M. le Chevalier Stuart, sous les dates des 5 et 20 Juillet, 10, 17, et 19 Août, et par vous, my Lord, sous celle du 26 du même mois.

Aucun de ces objets n'a été perdu de vue ; et si je n'ai pu faire connaître encore à la Légation de Sa Majesté Britannique les décisions auxquelles ils pourront donner lieu, c'est que je n'ai point encore obtenu sur ces différens points les informations que j'ai dû demander à plusieurs des Ministres-Secrétaires d'Etat du Roi. Je viens d'en renouveler les demandes, et dès qu'elles me seront parvenues je m'empresserai de faire part à Votre Excellence de ce qui aura été statué sur les affaires qu'elle a citées dans sa note.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec une très haute considération, my Lord,

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

LE PRINCE DE BÉNÉVENT.

W. Wilberforce, Esq., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Near London, 8th Sept., 1814.

I wished much, when your Grace was last in London, to request you to permit me to wait upon your Grace for a few moments; but my consciousness of the almost innumerable claims on your time, and my fear of intruding on you unnecessarily, prevented my gratifying my longing. I hope I shall not now subject myself to the imputation which I was then afraid of incurring, by begging your Grace to allow me to present to you a publication of mine on the abolition of the slave trade, which was drawn up (too hastily, I fear) and published as a summary of our case, for the use of the House of Lords, in 1807, when they were about to take the subject into consideration. Mr. Macaulay told me he sent it, but I hope I may be forgiven for wishing to have the honour of presenting it to your Grace myself. A great part of the work, I am aware, is more particularly suited to the meridian of this country, the peculiarities of our particular islands, &c.; yet some of these parts may afford useful hints, and a great part of it also is of general application.

Your Grace, I am aware, is possessed of Mr. Clarkson's valuable pieces, and also of that most useful compendium the Abstract or Abridgment of the Evidence. My own may be considered as a sort of commentary on these.

I have been partly encouraged to take the liberty I am now using with your Grace, by Mr. Clarkson's highly gratifying accounts of your Grace's taking so deep an interest in the issue of the great question which is now depending (your Grace will know too well what I have in my mind to require any other specification) as to satisfy me that you will not think my addressing your Grace to be an intrusion. I wish also to state to your Grace that Mr. Stephen drew up for Lord Castlereagh, by his Lordship's desire, the plan of a convention for carrying into execution an agreement to abolish the slave trade. I have been endeavouring to obtain a copy of it for your Grace's use.

I will only add that it would increase the pleasure I should receive from the consent of the French government to abolish the slave trade, if it should be effected through your Lordship's instrumentality, and if, through the goodness of Providence, this large addition should be made to the mass of obligation to perpetual veneration and gratitude under which your Grace has already laid, not myself or my own country only, but I may truly say the whole civilized and surely I may now add also the uncivilized world.

With the highest respect and attachment,

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Grace's most faithful servant,

W. WILBERFORCE.

P.S. I beg your Grace to excuse my interlineation. My eyes are weak, and time fails me, or I would write my letter over again.

[778.]

To the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 9th Sept., 1814, half-past 5 P.M.

I write to let you know that the Prince de Bénévent has just been here to let me know that he has been informed by telegraph that the Princess of Wales arrived this morning at Strasbourg, and he was anxious to know what it would be agreeable to the Prince Regent that the King should do.

I told him that the King would avoid a good deal of embarrassment by preventing her from coming to Paris; that she had lately been desired not to appear at Court; and that the King, according to his own rule, could not receive her at his Court.

He asked what pretence should be stated for stopping her. I answered that I could state none, and the Prince left me, determined, at all events, to stop her by telegraph.

If she should come here, I should wish to know how I am to act.

I send you some despatches from Spain. I propose to communicate the treaty to Monsieur de Talleyrand this night.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[779.]

To the Prince de Bénévent.

SIR,

Paris, 9th Sept., 1814.

Adverting to my letter to your Highness of this date, I have been directed to state to you, that in case His Majesty should feel any disinclination to allow the American vessels *Regina* and *Jane* to be taken from Bordeaux on account of delicacy towards the American government, the Prince Regent is desirous that His Majesty should allow the vessels to be broken up at Bordeaux, and the materials sold for the benefit of the captors; and that in case His Majesty should find it inconvenient to have such large sums issued from his treasury at Bordeaux as are claimed on account of the army, the Prince Regent's government will undertake, in the first instance, to advance the amount, His Majesty acknowledging the debt, and undertaking to repay it by quarterly instalments.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Munich, 9th Sept., 1814.

I enclose under a flying seal a private letter for your brother Henry, which I shall be obliged to you to forward by the first opportunity, apprising him of your progress on the slave question.

In all my discussions on the question of the slave trade, nothing ever dropped from either the King or M. de Talleyrand to countenance Mr. Clarkson's suggestion. I suspect the notion is picked up in some of those conversations which he provokes with the philanthropists at Paris, and is thrown out, *if not insidiously*, to force us into some offer of this description, in the vain hope of its being accepted. Mr. C. is not, as I believe, partial to the government, and extremely likely to impute to them the having fallen short in their exertions upon this point.

I am sorry to find the government has received a check in the Upper House. It was a foolish thing to hazard this idly upon a preamble, which is always of secondary importance.

I am going on to-night.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

The Prince de Bénévent to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Paris, le 9 Sept., 1814.

J'ai reçu avec la note que Votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser le 4 de ce mois les différentes pièces dont elle m'annonce l'envoi, et desquelles il semble résulter que les règles de neutralité prescrites pour les corsaires Américains sont mal observées dans quelques uns des ports de France.

Quoique je doive croire que d'après les ordres relatés dans mes lettres des 20 Mai et 15 Juin dernier, et renouvelés d'une manière plus précise encore dans le courant du mois de Juillet, les faits énoncés dans ces pièces manquent en général d'exactitude, cependant je viens d'en écrire au Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat de la Marine et des Colonies afin qu'il veuille bien me faire part de tous les renseignemens qu'il lui sera possible de recueillir à cet égard, et je m'empresserai d'en faire connaître le résultat à Votre Excellence aussitôt que je les aurai reçus.

Je vous prie, my Lord, d'agréer les assurances de ma très haute considération.

LE PRINCE DE BÉNÉVENT.

The Prince de Bénévent to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Paris, le 9 Sept., 1814.

J'ai reçu la lettre que Votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 1er de ce mois, et je lui adresse ainsi qu'elle le désire une copie de ma dépêche du 2 Juin concernant les bâtimens et marchandises séquestrées à Bordeaux par l'armée Anglaise.

Votre Excellence juge à propos de différer d'entrer en explication sur cette affaire, comme Ambassadeur Britannique, jusqu'à ce qu'elle ait reçu des instructions de sa Cour ; mais elle veut bien toutefois, comme commandant en chef de l'armée Anglaise, me communiquer quelques observations. Je la prie d'accueillir de la même manière celles que je vais avoir l'honneur de lui présenter.

J'ai cru devoir contester ainsi que je l'ai fait dans ma dépêche du 2 Juin l'application du droit de guerre à la ville de Bordeaux, et je me suis fondé en cela sur les circonstances particulières et tout-à-fait extraordinaires au milieu desquelles les troupes Britanniques sont entrées dans cette ville. Il est difficile en effet de reconnaître le droit de la guerre là où la guerre n'existait pas, et il semble qu'elle ne pouvait exister à Bordeaux au moment où cette ville, après avoir abjuré les lois du gouvernement ennemi de l'Angleterre, et s'être réfugiée sous le pavillon de son Souverain légitime, appelait elle-même dans son sein les troupes Britanniques.

Au surplus, en admettant, contre mon opinion, que le droit de la guerre ait pu être exercé à Bordeaux, je ne crois pas que le commissariat Anglais se trouvât autorisé par là à réclamer le montant des droits de douanes perçus ou à percevoir sur les marchandises existant en entrepôt au 12 Mars dernier. Le droit de guerre n'a dû atteindre que la propriété publique, et le séquestre des marchandises n'a eu par conséquent d'autre objet que d'opérer la saisie du montant de la contribution, dont ces propriétés particulières se trouvaient éventuellement passibles. Mais le produit de la contribution n'est acquis à l'administration publique que par l'extraction des marchandises hors de l'entrepôt. Jusques là le propriétaire est libre de les réexporter, et la réexportation ne pourrait être empêché sans donner atteinte à la propriété particulière. Il n'y aurait donc eu de saisissable par le commissariat Anglais que le produit de la contribution perçue depuis le 12 Mars jusqu'à la date du rétablissement de la paix. Autrement il voudrait s'emparer d'une chose qui n'existait pas encore comme propriété publique, et qui n'est devenue telle qu'à une époque où le droit de guerre ne pouvait plus produire d'effet. Ce serait, il me semble, faire survivre le droit de guerre au rétablissement de la paix.

Mais quelle que soit notre opinion sur cette affaire, vous devez être persuadé, my Lord, que le Roi apprécie avec la sensibilité qui lui est propre toute la noblesse de vos procédés, et cette discussion même ne peut que rappeler l'esprit de modération et d'équité qui a constamment dirigé Votre Excellence dans le commandement de ses armées.

Je prie Votre Excellence d'agréer les assurances de ma très haute considération.

LE PRINCE DE BÉNÉVENT.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*

to Sir C. Stuart.

MONSIEUR,

Paris, le 2 Juin, 1814.

Selon une décision de l'Avocat-Général du Banc du Roi, notifiée par Lord Wellington aux autorités Françaises à Bordeaux, vingt navires de commerce qui étaient en rade de cette ville le 12 Mars, jour de l'entrée de l'armée Anglaise, doivent subir les droits de la guerre, et les marchandises en entrepôt

* Blank in manuscript.

doivent être imposées par l'armée Anglaise, suivant le tarif actuel des douanes. Deux commissaires ont été envoyés par Lord Wellington pour procéder à l'exécution de cet acte.

Il me seroit impossible, Monsieur, de discuter les considérations qui ont servi de base à la décision de M. l'Avocat-Général du Banc du Roi ; je les ignore, et je ne puis même les présumer. Les Anglais ne sont point venus à Bordeaux comme ennemis ; ils y ont été appelés par le vœu de ses habitans, et ils y sont entrés lorsque le pavillon du Roi flottait sur ses tours, celui de la Grande Bretagne n'a point été arboré. Si, lorsque les troupes Anglaises se sont approchées de cette ville, elles eussent pu être considérées comme ennemies, le premier soin des magistrats eut sans doute été de protéger les propriétés par une capitulation, et elle eut été facilement conclue, puisque, sans aucune convention, les Amiraux de la Grande Bretagne ont respecté les navires Français portant pavillon blanc, puisqu'à St. Jean de Luz, où les troupes Anglaises étaient entrées les armes à la main, les navires de ce port n'ont point été confisqués, et qu'ils ont été même frétés pour le service de l'armée. Ainsi, loin que M. l'Avocat-Général du Banc du Roi ait pu établir sa décision sur ce qu'il n'y a point eu de stipulation, pour mettre les propriétés à l'abri du droit de la guerre, cette circonstance démontre au contraire qu'il n'y a jamais eu lieu d'exercer ce droit dans la ville de Bordeaux.

Il serait véritablement fâcheux, Monsieur, que la joie publique et l'esprit de bienveillance mutuelle dont sont animés en ce moment les sujets des deux pays fussent troublés par un incident qui blesserait d'une manière aussi pénible les intérêts d'une portion des habitans de la ville de Bordeaux. Votre Excellence partagera sans doute ce sentiment, et c'est avec la plus grande confiance que je la prie de vouloir bien intervenir auprès de son gouvernement pour que la décision du Banc du Roi soit révoquée.

Agréez, etc.

William Wilberforce, Esq., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Near London, 9th Sept., 1814.

An interview with Mr. Stephen last night has rendered it necessary for me to intrude on your Grace once more for the purpose of rectifying an error into which I fell yesterday. I find the paper which Mr. Stephen had drawn up for Lord Castlereagh, and which he transmitted at my suggestion to your Grace, was not, as I conceived, a plan for executing a convention for an absolute and universal abolition of the slave trade, but for enforcing a qualified and limited prohibition of it. I never had seen the paper, and hope your Grace will admit that as my excuse. Your Grace will excuse, I trust, also my anxiety, arising perhaps from a too lively sensibility where this subject is in question, lest so much attention being paid to the drawing up of a provision for excluding the slave trade from a certain part only of the coast should have the effect of conveying an impression that though, for decency's sake, the friends of the cause talk somewhat of total and immediate abolition, they have no idea of the possibility of its being obtained, and that they would be perfectly contented if your Grace could obtain for us this qualified abolition. Grateful for your Grace's exertions they must and ought ever to be ; but I should not speak the truth if I were not to state that, having a strong persuasion that the French government would consent to abolish the trade entirely and

immediately, provided our government, by making them some cession as an equivalent, would enable them to take off the impression (an impression which their people, we hear, are rather disposed to receive) of their having been dictated to by Great Britain—having, I repeat it, this persuasion, they cannot but indulge a confident hope that your Grace, in this as in so many other instances, will be able to achieve a complete victory. The object really seems within the reach of this country if it will pay the price for it; and sure I am a vast majority of the most respectable members of the community would gladly make the purchase.

I have the honour to be with great respect, my Lord,

Your Grace's faithful servant,

W. WILBERFORCE.

[780.]

To the Prince de Bénévent.

SIR,

Paris, 10th Sept., 1814.

I have had the honour of receiving your Highness's letter of this day regarding a soldier named Jean Vidal, stated to have been enlisted into an Italian regiment in the British service.

I am not aware that there was any such regiment, and if there was, it has probably been disbanded since the Peace; but I forward your Highness's note to England, and I don't hesitate to assure your Highness that if there should be a soldier of the name of Jean Vidal in His Majesty's service, he will be discharged forthwith.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Prince de Bénévent to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Paris, 10 Sept., 1814.

Monsieur le Chevalier Charles Stuart m'avait adressé le 19 Août dernier une note dont l'objet était de réclamer la restitution de bijoux et autres objets précieux trouvés sur la personne du Baron de Kolli, arrêté il y a quelques années pour avoir tenté d'enlever du Château de Valençay le Prince des Asturies.

Il résulte des renseignemens qui m'ont été donnés sur cette affaire par M. le Directeur-Général de la Police du royaume, que la confiscation des effets réclamés fut prononcée en 1810; qu'ils furent rendus; que le produit en a été employé par l'ancien gouvernement en partie pour le compte et à l'occasion de M. de Kolli, et porté en dépense pour l'exercice 1810. Le Roi n'a eu à s'occuper de cet objet que comme d'un simple règlement de comptes arriérés sur lesquels il n'y avait plus à revenir; mais Sa Majesté a voulu que les effets à l'usage personnel de M. de Kolli et une somme qu'il avait

sur lui en billets de banque lui fussent restitués, et tel est l'objet des ordres qu'elle a donnés en cette occasion.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, my Lord, avec une très haute considération,

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

LE PRINCE DE BÉNÉVENT.

The Prince de Bénévent to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Paris, 10 Sept., 1814.

Votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser avec sa lettre du 7 de ce mois un numéro du journal dans lequel se trouve la lettre de M. de St. Cricq à l'occasion de laquelle elle m'avait fait verbalement quelques observations.

Je dois vous prévenir, my Lord, que M. de St. Cricq n'a aucun caractère pour influencer d'une manière quelconque sur la traite en elle-même. Les mesures annoncées par sa lettre sont purement réglementaires et conditionnelles. Elles se rapportent au détail des opérations des négociations Français qui feraient le commerce des noirs; mais elles n'impliquent ni encouragement ni même, pour ainsi dire, intervention de la part du gouvernement, qui confie habituellement au département de la Marine l'exécution de ses ordres sur cet objet.

Je pense, my Lord, que cette explication suffira pour convaincre Votre Excellence que la publication dont elle m'a fait l'honneur de m'entretenir n'a effectivement aucune espèce d'importance.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, my Lord, avec une très haute considération,

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

LE PRINCE DE BÉNÉVENT.

The Prince de Bénévent to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Paris, 10 Sept., 1814.

J'ai reçu la lettre que Votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser pour demander au nom de sa Cour que le gouvernement Français, qui a fait retirer du Duché de Bouillon les employés des douanes, en rappelat également les employés préposés à l'administration.

L'art. 3 du traité de paix étant rédigé de manière à laisser de l'incertitude sur la question de savoir à quel territoire appartiendra le Duché de Bouillon, le jugement de cette question doit être remis à la commission qui, de part et d'autre, a été nommée pour régler la démarcation des limites. Cette commission pourra très prochainement commencer ces opérations, et le gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique trouvera sans doute naturel que jusqu'à ce qu'elle ait prononcé sur la question dont il s'agit, le gouvernement du Roi laisse dans le Duché de Bouillon les administrateurs Français qui s'y trouvent.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, my Lord, avec une très haute considération,

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

LE PRINCE DE BÉNÉVENT.

The Earl of Liverpool to Earl Bathurst.

DEAR BATHURST,

Walmer Castle, 11th Sept., 1814.

I quite agree with you in the *absolute necessity* of including the Indians in the treaty of peace. I would insist upon a stipulation that they should be restored to all the rights and privileges which they enjoyed before the war. I would do more, if more has been promised; but I would not make a *sine quâ non* of more, if more has not been promised; and I think the negotiation is now brought to a point when we cannot well avoid explaining ourselves on this question.

I agree with you likewise in the inexpediency of giving in our ultimatum respecting the boundary before we have ascertained that the American Commissioners will agree to our propositions respecting the Indians; but I think it difficult not to instruct our Commissioners confidentially as to what they are to say on the subject of boundary, if the proposition respecting the Indians is agreed to. I do not see that upon the principle we have advanced there would be any objection to demanding Sackett's Harbour in the first instance, as well as Michilimackinac and Niagara, as a qualification and relaxation of the principle of exclusive military possession. If they objected to the demand of Sackett's Harbour, we might then fairly put the question to them whether they would agree to our retaining the two other positions if we did not press for Sackett's Harbour. We might thus be naturally brought by degrees to our ultimatum, and during the time occupied by the discussion we might hear what had been the progress of our arms. I confess I cannot believe that with the prospect of bankruptcy before them, the American government would not wish to make peace, if they can make it upon terms which would not give a triumph to their enemies. I am strongly inclined from all I hear to believe that a bankruptcy would be the result of their continuing the war for another year; but we must recollect that if the ground upon which the negotiation terminated were popular, a bankruptcy would, for a time at least, greatly add to their military means. The war would then be rendered a war of despair, in which all private rights and interests would be sacrificed to the public cause.

I hope you will carry into execution your intention of coming here with the despatch.

I have written to Beckett to say that Friday would suit me best for the Council, if it would suit the Prince Regent.

Ever sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

[781.]

To the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 12th Sept., 1814.

A telegraph message was sent to Strasbourg on the 9th regarding the Princess of Wales, as I informed you it would, and the answer came back on the 10th. The Duke de Valmy,

finding that the Princess intended to go to Italy in a few days, had not communicated to her the King's wish that she should not come to Paris, and did not intend to do so unless he should find that she altered her plan.

The Prince de Bénévent particularly desired that your Lordship should be made acquainted with all these circumstances, and of the King's desire to do whatever should be agreeable to the Prince.

Monsieur de Blacas told me yesterday, that if she had come here, the King had intended to inform her that, unless he was formally acquainted by the Ambassador of her arrival, he could take no cognizance of it. I told him that, according to their own rule, I could not take upon me to introduce anybody to the King who was not received at our own Court.

I think it worth considering, however, whether it is not desirable that every facility should be given to the Princess to amuse herself abroad, in order that she may not be induced to return to England. The same question which has occurred here will occur at Turin, and probably in other Courts in Italy; and I acknowledge that, when I heard on the 9th of her being at Strasbourg, I doubted much of the propriety of what I did in preventing her from coming to Paris. It is desirable, therefore, that you should give some instructions to the Ministers at the different Courts what to do with her.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

[782.]

MY LORD,

Paris, 12th Sept., 1814.

I have the honour to enclose the copy of a note which I have received from the Prince de Bénévent in regard to the reports which I transmitted to him of the refitting and manning of American privateers in the ports of France, and of the consequences to our trade of the use which the enemy made of these ports.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Prince de Bénévent to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Paris, le 12 Sept., 1814.

M. le Chevalier Stuart ayant proposé, par une lettre qu'il me fit l'honneur de m'écrire le 20 Juillet, de convenir que les bâtimens Français et Anglais qui arriveraient aux Iles de la Martinique et de la Guadeloupe, les uns avant, les autres immédiatement après la remise de ces colonies, y seraient admis, je communiquai cette proposition au Ministre de la Marine. La réponse que je reçois de ce ministre me mit dans le cas d'annoncer à Votre Excellence que, bien que l'arrangement proposé ne puisse être fait, parceque des ordres avaient été donnés dans tous nos ports pour qu'aucun bâtiment Français ne fut expédié pour nos colonies de manière à y arriver avant que nous en fussions en possession, cependant il est probable que tant par l'effet des circonstances que par les facilités que les administrations Françaises ont eu l'ordre de donner aux bâtimens Anglais, l'objet pour lequel le gouvernement Britannique désirait cet arrangement se trouvera à peu près rempli. En effet, si le départ du convoi destiné pour les Antilles a été retardé, la remise de nos colonies d'Amérique l'a été aussi, et n'aura pu avoir lieu à l'époque qu'avait fixée le traité du 30 Mai, en sorte que les bâtimens Anglais auront sans doute, au moins pour la plupart, atteint leur destination avant celle où cette remise sera effectuée. D'ailleurs, d'après les instructions données aux administrations Françaises, tout navire Anglais qui aura fait son entrée à la douane Anglaise de la Martinique et de la Guadeloupe avant la remise, ne fût ce que de la veille, sera libre de continuer son déchargement et de faire sa vente.

J'espère, my Lord, que votre Cour trouvera dans cette disposition une preuve du désir qu'a le Roi de faire, autant qu'il lui est possible, tout ce qui peut être agréable au gouvernement Britannique.

Agréez, my Lord, l'assurance de ma plus haute considération.

LE PRINCE DE BÉNÉVENT.

The Prince de Bénévent to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Paris, 12 Sept., 1814.

J'ai l'honneur de prévenir Votre Excellence que le Roi ayant daigné me confier une mission extraordinaire au Congrès de Vienne, a chargé par intérim du portefeuille du département des Affaires Etrangères M. le Comte de Jaucourt, qui, pendant mon absence, aura l'honneur d'entretenir avec Votre Excellence les relations habituelles que mon éloignement de la capitale me donnera le regret de ne pouvoir cultiver en personne; et je vous prie, my Lord, de vous adresser à lui pour les communications que Votre Excellence aura à faire au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, ce qui toutefois n'empêchera pas celles qu'elle pourrait juger convenable de me faire directement. Je suis assuré d'avance, my Lord, que vous accorderez à M. le Comte de Jaucourt l'estime et la confiance qu'il mérite à tant de titres,

et que de vos rapports avec lui résultera constamment une satisfaction réciproque.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, my Lord, avec une très haute considération,

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

LE PRINCE DE BÉNÉVENT.

Thomas Clarkson, Esq., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington,

MY LORD DUKE,

Paris, 12th Sept., 1814.

I write to your Grace to say, before I leave Paris, that as it is probable the members of Congress may amount to seventy, and as Lord Castle-reagh's packet, now in your Grace's hotel, consists but of fifty, that I have thought it right to send him twenty more of the corrected French copies, which will accompany this letter, and beg the favour of you to desire Lieutenant-Colonel Burgh, when he sends off the first packet, to send off the second also.

I have also sent your Lordship thirty corrected French copies, all that remain of the thousand, for your own private use.

When the Essay on the Impolicy comes out, which will be in nine days, I have ordered forty copies to be sent for your use also, and the rest to the two Houses of Assembly, the great officers of state, the literary men of Paris, and all the journals.

I paid this day not only for the first pamphlet, the Address, but also for the Essay on the Impolicy, which is to come out, so that your Grace will have no further trouble about them.

May I venture now to say what I would do, were I a member of the Congress?

I would first try with all my might to get rid of the article in the treaty entirely and immediately, so that the abolition might be immediate and universal; and I would, if the French would accept it, even give up a colony in exchange; that is, I would leave no stone unturned to secure immediate abolition, if possible.

But if after all my exertions I could not get it, then I would aim at two things:

First, to reduce the five years to two, or to three years at most, and I would be strenuous on that point.

Secondly, to have all the coast north of the Line freed from the ravages of the slave trade, not only from French, but Portuguese and Spanish ravages, and indeed the ravages of all nations whatever.

After this I would conclude in the following manner:—I would get a decree from the Congress, that after the two, three, or four years were expired, no nation whatever should be permitted to carry on the slave trade at all. After this period it should be declared to be contrary to the law of nations, and put upon the same footing as piracy. This declaration should be guaranteed by all the contracting parties as eternal, whatever wars they might afterwards be engaged in with one another. The same seals which guaranteed the government of France to the Bourbons, and the restoration of territory and government to the Spaniards and Portuguese,

should guarantee liberty or freedom from the slave trade to Africa. A day then should be fixed, after which any slave vessel, found to be such, should be liable to capture and to be treated as a pirate. This latter clause is essentially necessary. All the contracting Powers, or four or five of the most powerful, should give in their names in combination for the execution of the Act.

These, my Lord, are my own sentiments, and I trust you will excuse me for mentioning them. I dare not mention them to Lord Castlereagh, lest he should think me assuming or dictating; but, if your Grace should approve of them, they would come with great weight from you in a letter to his Lordship. May I ask of you earnestly to recommend them?

I wish your Grace health and every earthly happiness, and I am, with great respect,

Your Grace's obliged servant,

THOMAS CLARKSON.

[783.]

To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley.

MY DEAR HENRY,

Paris, 13th Sept., 1814.

There is no particular news here, but I send you a copy of my despatch reporting my having informed the King's Ministers of the treaty with Spain.* The temper with which this communication has been received shows how important the treaty is. Indeed, I am certain that the best mode of forcing these gentlemen to be quiet against their inclination is for us to be on good terms with Spain. They are now inclined to be quiet; but God knows how long this inclination may last, or rather how long the King will be enabled to remain quiet contrary to the wishes of his army, of some of his own family, and of many in the country. In the mean time it is very desirable to gratify him in his wish that the treaty should not be made public, as it would certainly lower him in the public estimation.

I think it not improbable, between ourselves, that the result of the Congress at Vienna may be a determination to remove Murat from Naples, and to endeavour to give the King of Spain either Parma and Placentia, or compensation for those possessions. It would be absolutely necessary, however, that, if the interests of Spain should be so far attended to, the King should cede Olivença to the Portuguese; and it would be desirable that Labrador should be instructed upon this point. I

* See letter to Viscount Castlereagh, 12th September, 1814, *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xii. p. 109.

don't know whether the Duque de San Carlos can be trusted so far as to be told that serious intentions are entertained of ousting Murat; but I think you will do well to talk to him on the whole subject, and to urge him to facilitate an arrangement so beneficial to the King's family, by being prepared to make this concession in case the King's interests are attended to. I have told Lord Castlereagh that I should write to you upon this subject; and it would be a great point gained if you could get Labrador instructed to make this concession on the conditions above specified.

Let me know when you will come here. I was sorry to learn from Pole that, in intimating your intention of returning to England, you had stated that your office would then be at Lord Castlereagh's disposal. I am quite certain that the Ministers are well disposed towards you; and I think you would do well to explain before you go home that you have no intention of resigning, if that is not your fixed intention.

Ever, my dear Henry, yours most affectionately,

WELLINGTON.

W. Hamilton, Esq., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Foreign Office, 13th Sept., 1814.

The former part of the negotiations at Ghent must have been communicated to you by Lord Castlereagh.

The enclosed is the draft of a note for our Commissioners to present, forwarded from hence the 1st September, and given in by them on the 4th, with only a few verbal alterations.

The reply is this instant received. It rejects all our proposals respecting the boundary and the military flag on the Lakes, and refuses even to refer them to their government, offering at the same time to pursue the negotiation on the other points.

I have the honour to be

Your Grace's obedient faithful servant,

W. HAMILTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Draft of Note to be presented by the Commissioners at Ghent; forwarded by Earl Bathurst to Mr. Goulburn, 1st Sept., 1814.

The undersigned, &c.

It is with unfeigned regret that His Majesty's government observes, both in the tone and substance of the whole note, so little disposition on the part of the American government to enter into an amicable discussion of the several

points which, at the instance, in a great measure, of the American plenipotentiaries, the undersigned, from a sincere desire of bringing the negotiation, as soon as possible, to a favourable termination, did with the utmost frankness bring forward for consideration, although they were perfectly aware that in so doing they departed from the usual course, that of not disclosing all their objects, while the other party withheld what they were instructed to propose. It is perfectly true that the war between His Majesty and the United States of America was begun by the latter power upon the pretence of maritime rights, alleged to be asserted by Great Britain and disputed by the government of the United States. If the war which has been carried on by the Americans for two years had been purely a maritime war, or if any attack which had been made on the frontier of Canada had appeared to have been made for the purpose of diversion and of occupying the British forces in that quarter, any question respecting the boundaries of Canada might have been considered as unnecessary; but it is notorious to the whole world that the avowed object of the American government was the conquest of Canada, in order that it might be permanently one of the United States. Is there any person who doubts that if, in consequence of a different course of events on the continent of Europe, His Majesty's government had been unable to reinforce their armies in Canada, and that the Americans had obtained a decided superiority in that quarter, they would have availed themselves of their situation to obtain important cessions of territory on the side of Canada, if not the entire abandonment of that country by Great Britain? And is the American government to be allowed to pursue a system of acquisition and aggrandisement to any extent, even to that of provinces and kingdoms, as they themselves have avowed, when the fortune of war may appear to have been in their favour, and His Majesty to be precluded, under advantageous circumstances, even from retaining those posts which the valour of British arms may have placed in his power, because they happen to be situated within the territories allotted under former treaties to the government of the United States?

Such a principle of negotiation was never avowed at any period antecedent to that of the revolutionary government of France. If the policy of the United States had been essentially pacific, which the plenipotentiaries assert it ought to be, from their political institutions, from the habits of their citizens, and from their physical situation, it might not have been necessary to propose the precautionary provision now under discussion. That of late years, at least, the American government have been influenced by a very different principle, by a spirit of aggrandisement not necessary to their extended empire, has been too clearly manifested by the acquisition of Louisiana, by an attempt to wrest by force of arms from a nation in amity the two Floridas, and lastly, by the avowed intention of permanently annexing the Canadas to the United States. If, then, the security of the British and American dominions require any sacrifices on the part of the government of the United States, the people of America must ascribe them to the declared policy of their own government in making the war, not a war of self-defence nor one for the redress of grievances, real or pretended, but a war of conquest and aggrandisement. The British government, in its present situation, is bound in duty to endeavour to secure its dominions in North America against a renewal of those attempts which the American government has avowed to be a principle of policy, and which there can be no doubt, therefore, that in any succeeding war between the two countries it would be their main object to accomplish. The British government proposed that the military possession of the Lakes, from Lake Ontario to Lake Superior, should be secured to them, because the command of these Lakes affords to the American government the means of commencing a war in

the heart of Canada, and because the command of them on the part of Great Britain affords no effectual means, as experience has proved, of really annoying the United States.

The military possession of these Lakes is, therefore, not necessary for the protection of the United States. When the relative state of the two powers in North America is considered, it should be recollected that the British dominions in that quarter do not contain a population of 500,000 souls, whereas the territory of the United States contains a population of more than 7,000,000 ; that the naval resources of the United States are at hand for attack, and that the naval resources of Great Britain are on the other side of the Atlantic. The proposal for allowing the territories on the southern banks of the Lakes above mentioned to remain in the possession of the United States, provided no fortifications are erected on the shores and no armament is permitted on the waters, has been made for the purpose of manifesting that security, and not the acquisition of territory, is the object of the British government, and that they have no desire to throw obstacles in the way of any commercial concerns which the people of the United States may be desirous of carrying on upon the Lakes in time of peace.

The undersigned have thus explained the ground upon which they have brought forward the propositions contained in their former paper respecting the boundaries of the British dominion in North America, and which they understood the American plenipotentiaries were desirous should be fully detailed. They do not wish to insist upon them beyond what the circumstances may fairly require. They are ready amicably to discuss the details of them, and to adopt any modifications which the American plenipotentiaries may have to suggest, if they are not incompatible with the object itself. With respect to the proposition for some arrangement respecting the boundary of Maine, by which a direct intercourse may be established between Halifax and Quebec, the American plenipotentiaries must be aware that this boundary has never been correctly ascertained ; that the one maintained at present by the American government, by which the direct communication between Halifax and Quebec becomes interrupted, was not in contemplation of the British plenipotentiaries, at least when the treaty of 1783 was concluded ; and that the greater part of the territory in question is actually unoccupied. The undersigned are persuaded that an arrangement on this point might be easily made, if entered into with a spirit of conciliation, without any prejudice to the interest of the district in question. As the necessity for fixing some boundary for the North-Western frontier has been generally acknowledged, a proposal for a discussion on that subject cannot be considered as a demand for a cession of territory from the United States, unless they are prepared to assert that there is no limit to their empire in that direction, and, availing themselves of the geographical error which crept into the treaty of 1783, acknowledge no boundary whatever. Then, unquestionably, any proposition to fix one, be it what it may, must be considered as a large cession of territory from the United States. Is the American government prepared to assert such an unlimited right, contrary to the evident intention of the treaty itself ? or is His Majesty's government to understand that the American plenipotentiaries are willing to acknowledge the boundary from the Lake of the Woods to the Mississippi (the arrangement made by a convention in 17 * , but not ratified by the American government) as that by which their government is ready to abide ? The British plenipotentiaries are instructed to accept favourably such a proposition, or discuss any other line of boundary which may be submitted for

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consideration. It is with equal astonishment and regret that His Majesty's government finds that the American plenipotentiaries not only decline signing any provisional articles by which the Indian tribes who have taken a part with Great Britain in the present contest may be included in the peace and a boundary assigned to them, but express their surprise at any proposition on the subject being advanced. The American plenipotentiaries state that their government could not have expected such a discussion, and appear resolved at once to reject any consideration of this proposition, representing it as a demand contrary to the acknowledged principles of public law, tantamount to a cession of one-third of the territorial dominions of the United States, and required to be admitted without discussion.

The proposition which is thus represented is, that the Indian nations which have been during the war in alliance with Great Britain should at its termination be included in the pacification, and that the British government is willing to take as a basis of an article on the subject of the boundary for those nations the stipulations which the American government contracted in 1795, subject, however, to modification. After the declaration publicly made to these Indian nations by the Governor-General of Canada that Great Britain would not desert them, could the American government persuade itself that no proposition relating to the tribes would be advanced, and did Lord Castle-reagh's note of the * imply so great a sacrifice of our honour, or exclude from discussion every subject except what immediately related to the maritime questions? When the undersigned assured the American plenipotentiaries that the negotiation might terminate in a peace honourable to both parties, it could not be imagined that the American plenipotentiaries from thence concluded that His Majesty's government was prepared to abandon the Indian nations to their fate, nor could it have been foreseen that the American government would have considered it as derogatory to its honour to admit a proposition by which the tranquillity of those nations might be secured. Where have the American plenipotentiaries learnt that it is contrary to the acknowledged principles of public law to include allies in a negotiation for peace; that it is contrary to the practice of all civilized nations to propose that a provision should be made for future security? The Treaty of Greenville established the boundaries between the United States and the Indian nations. The American plenipotentiaries must be aware that the war which has since broken out has abrogated that treaty. Is it contrary to the established principles of public law for us to propose that this treaty shall, on the pacification, be renewed, subject to such modifications as the case may render necessary? Or is it unreasonable to propose that this stipulation should be amended, and that some arrangement should be made which would provide for the existence of a neutral power between Great Britain and the United States, calculated to promote a continuance of the blessings of peace between them?

So far was the specific proposition respecting the Indian boundaries insisted on as one to be admitted without discussion, that terms could not have been used of greater latitude, and which appeared not only not to preclude, but even to invite discussion. If the basis proposed could convey away one-third of the territorial dominions of the United States, the American plenipotentiaries must be aware that the American government itself conveyed it away by the Greenville Treaty in 1795.

It is impossible to read that treaty without remarking how inconsistent the present pretensions of the American government are with the preamble and provisions of it. The boundary-line between the lands of the United States

* Blank in manuscript.

and the limits of the Indian tribes are therein expressly stipulated. The general character of the treaty with independent nations, and the very stipulation which the American plenipotentiaries refer to that the Indian tribes should sell their lands only to the United States, is a proof, but for that stipulation, that they had a right to dispose of them. The American government has now for the first time declared all the Indian tribes to be its subjects, living upon sufferance within its territories, from whence it claims a right at any time to dispossess them, menacing thereby their final extinction. Against such a system the British government must formally protest. The terms on which the proposition is made for assigning to the Indian nations some boundary, manifest (it is repeated) no unwillingness to discuss any other proposition, or any modification of that which is offered. His Majesty's government is ready to enter into the same engagements with respect to the Indians living within this line of demarcation as that which is proposed to the American government. It can, therefore, only be from a complete misapprehension that it can be represented as being not reciprocal, neither can it with any truth be represented as one contrary to the acknowledged principles of public law, or derogatory to the honour or inconsistent with the right of the American government, or as a demand required to be admitted without discussion. After this full exposition of the sentiments of His Majesty's Ministers on the points above stated, it will be for the American Commissioners to determine whether they are ready now to continue the negotiation, or whether they are disposed to refer to their government for further instructions, or lastly, whether they will take upon themselves the responsibility of breaking off the negotiation altogether.

Note presented by the American Commissioners to those of England at Ghent, 9th Sept., 1814.

The undersigned have had the honour to receive the note of His Britannic Majesty's Plenipotentiaries dated the 4th instant. If, in the tone or the substance of the former note of the undersigned, the British Plenipotentiaries have perceived little proof of any disposition on the part of the American government for a discussion of some of the propositions advanced in the first note which the undersigned had the honour of receiving from them, they will ascribe it to the nature of the propositions themselves, to their apparent incompatibility with the assurances in Lord Castlereagh's letter to the American Secretary of State proposing this negotiation, and with the solemn assurances of the British Plenipotentiaries themselves to the undersigned at their first conference with them.

The undersigned, in reference to an observation of the British Plenipotentiaries, must be allowed to say that the objects which the government of the United States had in view have not been withheld. The subjects considered as suitable for discussion were fairly brought forward in the conference of the 9th ultimo, and the terms on which the United States were willing to conclude the peace were frankly and explicitly declared in the note of the undersigned dated the 24th ultimo. It had been confidently hoped that the nature of those terms, so evidently framed in a sincere spirit of conciliation, would have induced Great Britain to adopt them as the basis of a treaty; and it is with deep regret that the undersigned, if they have rightly understood the meaning of the last note of the British Plenipotentiaries, perceive that they still insist on the exclusive

military possession of the Lakes, and on a permanent boundary and independent territory for the Indians residing within the dominions of the United States.

The first demand is grounded on the supposition that the American government has manifested by its proceedings towards Spain, by the acquisition of Louisiana, by purchases of Indian lands, and by an avowed intention of permanently annexing the Canadas to the United States, a spirit of aggrandizement and conquest which justifies the demand of extraordinary sacrifices from them to provide for the security of the British possessions in America.

In the observations which the undersigned felt it their duty to make on the new demands of the British government, they confined their animadversions to the nature of the demands themselves. They did not seek for illustrations of the policy of Great Britain in her conduct in various quarters of the globe towards other nations, for which she was not accountable to the United States. Yet the undersigned will say that their government has ever been ready to arrange in the most amicable manner with Spain the question respecting the boundaries of Louisiana and Florida, and that of indemnities acknowledged by Spain to be due to American citizens. How the peaceable acquisition of Louisiana, or the purchase of lands within the acknowledged territories of the United States, both made by fair and voluntary treaties for satisfactory equivalents, can be ascribed to a spirit of conquest dangerous to their neighbours, the undersigned are altogether at a loss to understand.

Nor has the conquest of Canada and its permanent annexation to the United States been the declared object of their government. From the commencement of the war to the present time, the American government has been always willing to make peace without obtaining any cession of territory, and on the sole condition that the maritime questions might be satisfactorily arranged. Such was their disposition in the month of July, 1812, when they instructed Mr. Russell to make the proposal of an armistice ; in the month of October of the same year, when Mr. Monroe answered Admiral Warren's proposal to the same effect ; in April, 1813, when instructions were given to three of the undersigned, then appointed to treat of peace under the mediation of Russia ; and in January, 1814, when the instructions under which the undersigned are now acting were prepared.

The proposition of the British Plenipotentiaries is that in order to secure the frontier of Canada against attack, the United States should leave their own without defence ; and it seems to be forgotten that if their superior population and the proximity of their resources give them any advantage in that quarter, it is balanced by the great difference between the military establishments of the two nations. No sudden invasion of Canada by the United States could be made without leaving on the Atlantic shores and on the ocean, exposed to the great superiority of British force, a mass of American property far more valuable than Canada. In her relative superior force to that of the United States in every other quarter, Great Britain may find a pledge much more efficacious for the safety of a single vulnerable part than in stipulations ruinous to the interests and degrading to the honour of America. The best security for the possessions of both countries will, however, be found in an equal and solid peace, in a

mutual respect for the rights of each other, and in the cultivation of a friendly understanding between them. If there be any source of jealousy in relation to Canada itself, it will be found to exist solely in the undue interference of traders and agents, which may be easily removed by proper restraints.

The only American posts on the Lakes known to have been at the commencement of this negotiation held by force are Michilimackinac and Niagara. As the United States were at the same time in possession of Amherstburgh and the adjacent country, it is not perceived that the mere occupation of these two forts can give any claim to His Britannic Majesty to large cessions of territory founded upon the right of conquest; and the undersigned may be permitted to add, that even if the chances of war should yield to the British arms a momentary possession of other parts of the territory of the United States, such events would not alter their views with regard to the terms of the peace to which they would give their consent. Without recurring to examples drawn from the revolutionary governments of France, or to a more recent and illustrious triumph of fortitude in adversity, they have been taught by their own history that the occupation of their principal cities should produce no despondency, nor induce submission to the dismemberment of their empire, or to the abandonment of any one of those rights which constitute a part of their national independence.

The general position that it was consistent with the principles of public law and with the practice of civilized nations to include allies in a treaty of peace, and to provide for their security, never was called in question by the undersigned; but they have denied the right of Great Britain, according to those principles and to her own practice, to interfere in any manner with Indian tribes residing within the territories of the United States, and acknowledged by herself, to consider such tribes as her allies, or to treat for them with the United States: they will not repeat the arguments already brought forward by them in support of this position, which remain unanswered. The observations made by the British Plenipotentiaries on the Treaty of Greenville, and their assertion that the United States now for the first time deny the absolute independence of the Indian tribes, and claim the exclusive right of purchasing their lands, require, however, some notice.

If the United States had now asserted that the Indians within their boundaries who have acknowledged the United States as their only protectors, were their subjects living only at sufferance on their lands, far from being the first in making that assertion, they would only have followed the example of the principles invariably and uniformly asserted in substance, and frequently avowed in express terms, by the British government itself. What was the meaning of all the colonial charters granted by the British Monarchs, from that of Virginia by Elizabeth to that of Georgia by the immediate predecessors of the present King, if the Indians were the sovereigns and proprietors of the lands bestowed by those charters? What was the meaning of that article in the Treaty of Utrecht by which the Five Nations were described in terms as subject to the dominion of Great Britain, or that of the treaty of the Cherokees, by which it was declared that the King of Great Britain granted them the privilege of

living where they pleased, if those subjects were independent sovereigns, and these tenants at the licence of the British King were the rightful lords of the lands where he granted them permission to live? What was the meaning of that Proclamation of His present Britannic Majesty, issued in 1763, declaring all purchases of lands from the Indians null and void unless made by treaties held under the sanction of His Majesty's government, if the Indians had the right to sell their lands to whom they pleased? What is the meaning of the boundary lines of American territories in all the treaties of Great Britain with other European Powers having American possessions, particularly in the Treaty of 1763, by which she acquired from France the sovereignty and possession of the Canadas; in her treaty of peace with the United States of 1783; nay, what is the meaning of the North-Western boundary line now proposed by the British Plenipotentiaries themselves, if it be the rightful possession and sovereignty of independent Indians of which these boundaries dispose? Is it indeed necessary to ask whether Great Britain ever has permitted or would permit any foreign nation, or without her consent any of her subjects, to acquire lands from the Indians in the territories of the Hudson's Bay Company or in Canada? In formally protesting against this system, it is against a novel pretension of the American government, it is against the most solemn acts of their own Sovereigns, against the Royal proclamations, charters, and treaties of Great Britain for more than two centuries, from the first settlement of North America to the present day, that the British Plenipotentiaries protest. From the rigour of this system, however, as practised by Great Britain and all the other European Powers in America, the humane and liberal policy of the United States has voluntarily relaxed. A celebrated writer on the laws of nations, to whose authority British jurists have taken particular satisfaction in appealing, after stating in the most explicit manner the legitimacy of colonial settlements in America to the exclusion of all rights of uncivilized Indian tribes, has taken occasion to praise the moderation of the first settlers of New England, and of the founder of Pennsylvania, in having purchased of the Indians the lands they resolved to cultivate, notwithstanding their being furnished with a charter from their Sovereign. It is this example which the United States, since they became by their independence the Sovereigns of the territory, have adopted and organised into a political system. Under that system the Indians residing within the United States are so far independent that they live under their own customs, and not under the laws of the United States; that their rights upon the lands where they inhabit or hunt are secured to them by boundaries defined in amicable treaties between the United States and themselves; and that whenever those boundaries are varied, it is also by amicable and voluntary treaties, by which they receive from the United States ample compensation for every right they have to the lands ceded by them. They are so far dependent as not to have the right to dispose of their lands to any private persons, nor to any Power other than the United States, and to be under their protection alone, and not under that of any other Power. Whether called subjects, or by whatever name designated, such is the relation between them and the United States. That relation is neither asserted now for the first time, nor did it originate with the Treaty of Greenville: these principles have been

uniformly recognised by the Indians themselves, not only by that treaty, but in all the previous as well as subsequent treaties between them and the United States.

The Treaty of Greenville neither took from the Indians the right, which they had not, of selling lands within the jurisdiction of the United States to foreign governments as subjects, nor ceded to them the right of exercising exclusive jurisdiction within the boundary line assigned. It was merely declaratory of the public law in relation to the parties, founded on principles previously and universally recognised. It left to the United States the rights of exercising sovereignty and of acquiring soil, and bears no analogy to the proposition of Great Britain which requires the abandonment of both.

The British Plenipotentiaries state in their last note that Great Britain is ready to enter into the same engagement with respect to the Indians living within her line of demarcation as that which is proposed to the United States. The undersigned will not dwell on the immense inequality of value between the territories which, under such arrangement, would be assigned by each nation, respectively, to the Indians, and which alone would make the reciprocity merely nominal. The condition which would be thus imposed on Great Britain, not to acquire lands in Canada from the Indians, would be productive of no advantage to the United States, and is therefore no equivalent for the sacrifice required of them. They do not consider that it belongs to the United States, in any respect, to interfere with the concerns of Great Britain in her American possessions, or with her policy towards the Indians residing there; and they cannot consent to any interference on the part of Great Britain with their own concerns, and particularly with the Indians living within their territories. It may be the interest of Great Britain to limit her settlements in Canada to their present extent, and to leave the country to the west a perpetual wilderness, to be for ever inhabited by scattered tribes of hunters; but it would inflict a vital injury on the United States to have a line run through their territory beyond which their settlements should for ever be excluded from extending, thereby arresting the natural growth of their population and strength, placing the Indians, substantially, by virtue of the proposed guarantee, under the protection of Great Britain, dooming them to perpetual barbarism, and leaving an extensive frontier for ever exposed to their savage incursions.

With respect to the mere question of peace with the Indians, the undersigned have already explicitly assured the British Plenipotentiaries that, so far as it depended on the United States, it would immediately and necessarily follow a peace with Great Britain. If this be her sole object, no provision in the treaty to that effect is necessary. Provided the Indians will now consent to it, peace will immediately be made with them, and they will be reinstated in the same situation in which they stood before the commencement of hostilities. Should a continuance of the war compel the United States to alter their policy towards the Indians who may still take the part of Great Britain, she alone must be responsible for the consequences of her own act, in having induced them to withdraw themselves from the protection of the United States. The employment of savages whose known rule of warfare is the indiscriminate torture and butchery of

women, children, and prisoners, is itself a departure from the principles of humanity observed between all civilized and Christian nations even in war. The United States have constantly protested, and still protest, against it as an unjustifiable aggravation of the calamities and horrors of war. Of the peculiar atrocities of Indian warfare, the allies of Great Britain, in whose behalf she now demands sacrifices from the United States, have during the present war shown many deplorable examples : among them the massacre in cold blood of wounded prisoners, and the refusal of the rites of burial to the dead under the eyes of British officers, who could only plead their inability to control these savage auxiliaries, have been repeated, and are notorious to the world. The United States might at all times have employed the same kind of force against Great Britain, and to a greater extent than it was in her power to employ it against them ; but from their reluctance to resort to means so abhorrent to the natural feelings of humanity they abstained from the use of them until compelled to the alternative of employing themselves Indians who would otherwise have been drawn into the ranks of their enemies. The undersigned, in suggesting to the British Plenipotentiaries the propriety of an article by which Great Britain and the United States should reciprocally stipulate never hereafter, if they should again be at war, to employ savages in it, believe that it would be infinitely more favourable to the humanity and Christian temper of both parties, more advantageous to the Indians themselves, and better adapted to secure their permanent peace, tranquillity, and progressive civilization, than the boundary proposed by the British Plenipotentiaries.

With regard to the cession of a part of the district of Maine, as to which the British Plenipotentiaries are unable to reconcile the objections made by the undersigned with their previous declarations, they have the honour to observe that at the conference of the 8th ultimo the British Plenipotentiaries stated as one of the subjects suitable for discussion a revision of the boundary line between the British and American territories, with a view to prevent uncertainty and dispute, and that it was on the point thus stated that the undersigned declared that they were provided with instructions from their government ; a declaration which did not imply that they were instructed to make any cession of territory in any quarter, or to agree to the revision of the line, or to any exchange of territory where no uncertainty or dispute existed.

The undersigned perceive no uncertainty or matter of doubt in the Treaty of 1783 with respect to that part of the boundary of the district of Maine which would be affected by the proposal of Great Britain on that subject. They never have understood that the British Plenipotentiaries who signed the treaty had contemplated a boundary different from that fixed by the treaty, and which requires nothing more in order to be definitively ascertained than to be surveyed in conformity with its provisions. This subject not having been a matter of uncertainty or dispute, the undersigned are not instructed upon it ; and they can have no authority to cede any part of the state of Massachusetts, even for what the British government might consider a fair equivalent.

In regard to the boundary for the north-western frontier, so soon as the proposition of Indian boundary is disposed of, the undersigned have no

objection, with the explanation given by the British Plenipotentiaries in their last note, to discuss the subject.

The undersigned in their former note stated with frankness, and will now repeat, that the two propositions, 1st, of assigning in the proposed treaty of peace a definite boundary to the Indians living within the limits of the United States, beyond which boundary they should stipulate not to acquire by purchase or otherwise any territory; 2ndly, of securing the exclusive military possession of the Lakes to Great Britain, are both inadmissible; and that they cannot subscribe to, and would deem it useless to refer to their government, any arrangement, even provisional, containing either of those propositions. With this understanding, the undersigned are now ready to continue the negotiation, and, as they have already expressed, to discuss all the points of difference, or which might hereafter tend in any degree to interrupt the harmony of the two countries.

The undersigned, &c.

JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.

J. A. BAYARD.

JONATHAN RUSSELL.

ALBERT GALLATIN.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

[784.]

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 14th Sept., 1814.

A person called upon me yesterday, and informed me that he held in his hands the original of a joint bond from the Prince Regent, the Dukes of York and Clarence, for the sum of one hundred thousand pounds, which had been raised here for those Princes in the year 1790, on notes, each of the value of one hundred pounds. The interest had been paid on these notes for two or three years, but had afterwards been discontinued entirely; and the holders of them now claim the sums due to them, as principal and interest, from the person who came to me, who represents himself as the representative of De Beaume, who negotiated the loan for the Princes. I enclose you some papers which this person left with me, which are copies of some of those he has in his possession. He has promised to call again in a day or two, with copies of the whole and a statement of what he knows of this transaction, when I will write to you again. In the mean time I have thought it proper not to lose any time in making you acquainted with a circumstance so interesting to the Prince.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Beresford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Lisbon, 15th Sept., 1814.

I have been returned here about three weeks, and I have had full time to observe and see the feelings and objects of those who now govern this kingdom, and I confess I had not formed to myself the idea of how soon these persons would transform themselves and all things around them into pretty near what we may conceive they were some ten or twelve years since. The governors have become very high and dignified personages, and they appear to wish to show they can walk out of leading strings without dreading or certainly wishing to be observed the stumbles they make. They are now at liberty to follow their favourite object of popularity, and they are extremely jealous that any one should partake with them in that desirable acquisition; and Forjaz told me the other day that the government was now very popular, and said it with great dignity, and almost as a reproach to me. They are the same people you knew when in Portugal, except Forjaz, who is the same person you knew previously to your last coming here. He is again turned the true and good Portuguese, and does not think this nation need be dependent upon any nation. Of the governors of the kingdom as when you were here;—the Patriarch is dead, and Raymundo does not at present attend from ill-health, so that the Regency is composed of the Marquesses Olhião, Borba, and the Principal Souza. The first, you know, sleeps whilst the others discuss, and on awakening nods assent to what he is quite ignorant of; the second, I fear, is a decided enemy to what is English, from the representations relative to the Erario, and the proposal by you and Stuart that he should be displaced from it. The Principal continues the same, ever projecting and scheming and talking, but never concluding any thing; but, admitting for a little Portuguese feeling, he is, I believe, the honourable-intentioned man, who unintentionally mars what he wishes.

On my return, I found the whole of these most anxious for a diminution in the number of British officers; which, after a little conversation, I found meant their entire exclusion, and that is the real desire and object. I have had several conversations with Don Miguel, and though there are a great number of hums and haws, the obvious result comes to be the strongest desire to get rid of the British officers. Many reasons were assigned, which, being extremely futile, were easily observed upon and answered; and indeed the governors seemed so unprepared to express any thing more than the desire, that the reasons have been made to fit that. I have pointed out to them that, in respect to national feeling, or as to what other nations may think of them, there are no nations which do not employ foreign officers, and many of the principal of Europe to a proportion beyond what is proposed to them; that it is the policy of most nations to receive foreign officers, and, as it is, has been particularly that of Portugal, as to encourage them she gave at times double pay, and at all times a gratification beyond what she gave her own officers. It seems strange that she should choose so extraordinary a period as the present, not to refuse the taking of any, but to get rid of those she has, the benefit of whose services neither prejudice nor envy can deny. The period the

choose for this measure is, in another point of view, no less singular, that when the army is going to receive absolutely a new organization, and one to which the country is an absolute stranger, and which, to carry into execution with any good effect, requires the superintendence and vigilance of the best and most active officers, and those accustomed to commands, and of experience. It is at this period they desire absolutely to disorganize that part of their army on which all depends, the officer part; and of that the most essential, the class of superior officers. It is as if they proposed to keep a vessel in its regular course by keeping up the sails and letting fly the sheets and tacks. But the truth is, it is all from a narrowness of mind, and that they think, by showing nationality, they will procure popularity, and they take it for granted it will be popular because some of their toad-eaters and private informers tell them so. To me, as far as their private and personal assurances go, they declare the highest regard, and express the strongest wishes that I may remain; but all their public acts show they have the greatest jealousy of me, and fear extremely that the army should consider any of the little rewards they are getting, as owing to my advice or interference; and I must do so much justice as to say that I really believe they owe them as much to the fear (however most unnecessary) of their Excellencies as to my recommendation, for the troops, on their arrival at Lisbon, which had been most extremely well received in the provinces, were most extremely ill received here: indeed they were not taken the slightest notice of, except that the government ordered a dinner at * cruzados a head to be prepared for them, on the day of their respective arrival, and at an inn to which the officers, it appears, declined going, until they were told the government would be offended. However, the troops were much dissatisfied, and spoke loudly against the treatment they received, and angrily. This was before my arrival. This annoyed the government, and especially Don Miguel, and the consequence has been favourable, as it was wished to recover their good opinion, and yesterday we had a grand parade of all the troops for their Excellencies to see, and the favours conceded were published, care being previously taken that even the publication should not go through the commander-in-chief. However, they did me the honour on all to consult me; and the thing being done, I will not quarrel with the means; and really, under the circumstances, I must say, there has been a fair consideration enough, and that the additions in general to the pay are liberal. The number of British officers which the Regents consider most sufficient to retain is: 1 Major-General, 2 Brigadiers, 2 Colonels, 2 Lieutenant-Colonels, 2 Majors, and 30 Captains; and when I observed that if they restricted the numbers, I at least ought to point out the classes that would be most useful, Don Miguel candidly said, they wished for the higher posts to give to their own officers, and my observing to him that they had not as yet officers fit to be placed there was of no effect; and, in fact, reasoning or argument is of no use where people have made up their minds, from whatever the motive may be. I concluded (and the British minister here, Casamajor, was present) by informing Forjaz that as far as my opinion was worth his knowledge, it was that under the actual circumstances of the Portuguese army, and the proposed arrangements for

* Blank in manuscript.

it, there was not a man in Europe could keep up its discipline if the reduction of British officers, as stated by the governors, took place; that I was, however, sure that I could not, nor would pretend to be able to do it; and that they might therefore reckon upon my withdrawing, if the ministers of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent should, on his arrival, conform to the wishes of the Regents. Forjaz used many other reasons than I have enumerated here for the dismissal of the British officers, such as their continuing to receive any pay or emolument from any other government, as detaching their dependence from Portugal: however, he pointed out, they had already had half-pay British officers. In short, the budget of reasons has been ransacked; but what most encouraged them was Lord Castlereagh having told Funchal the British government desired the British officers to be reduced as much as possible, and which he communicated to this government, and they will not consider Lord Castlereagh's desire as a relative one, but choose to construe it to fit their own object. However, after all this, the Regents say that this is merely private opinion, and which they can only transmit to the Prince, from whom they have no authority on the subject, and therefore all must stand as it is, with such reduction as I may judge convenient, until the Prince's orders arrive; and as there can be no doubt that every description of private influence, both fair and foul, will be used from here, I have communicated to the Prince Regent's ministers in London the state of things here, that if they have any wish or interest in the Portuguese army being kept in a state of discipline, they may influence as they see fit at the court of Rio de Janeiro. For my own part, I am rather sick of what I have seen since I came; and whatever interest I may feel in keeping up the Portuguese army, or that it should remain in a creditable state, I shall be freed from all ties attached to such feelings so soon as I see the object cannot be attained, and I almost feel the wish I may have that excuse for getting away. You know enough of Portuguese officers to make it unnecessary for me to expatiate upon how little I could depend upon them for the strict execution of orders or arrangements, as the greatest numbers at the heads of corps, or near to be there placed, are but the best of those we found as officers in coming here, and who had the old system and its abuses too deeply ingrafted in them to be easily washed out, and they only desire the opportunity to revert and fall back to it, as it was both easy and advantageous, for they did nothing but plunder the government and the soldier. Those we have brought up ourselves, I think, with some further overlooking and encouragement, we might expect better of; but it must be recollected that it cannot be said that any of those officers have had more than five years' instruction (the old ones we had, besides, to break of all their bad habits), a period in which a British officer cannot attain the rank of major; and yet this government expect that we should have made them generals and colonels and field officers for the establishment of their army in that time; a thing absolutely absurd. I have informed them that a considerable reduction would immediately take place; that if they had objections against any particular persons, they should be sent away; and that there could be no objection to a regular and moderate reduction from time to time, to the number the government proposed finally to retain; but the object of the governors would not, by

such a plan, be accommodated : and so we stand as I have stated till the Prince's answer arrives.

I have been led unintentionally to so long a letter, intending, on beginning it, merely to inform you generally of the state of things here, as at least from curiosity you may be interested in knowing them. I am undergoing a regular process for my health, of diet, bathing, &c., and not exposing myself to the sun. I am getting better, and look more so than I really am.

I have seen your plate, which is certainly most magnificent and superb, and really of excellent taste and exquisite workmanship. It can scarcely be excelled ; and perhaps, in respect to taste, its only fault is charging the figures with minor ornaments, as wreaths of flowers, which, though beautifully finished, might perhaps be as well omitted ; but this is so small an object, that it is not worth the criticism. The plateau, take it as it will be, will not certainly be exceeded for beauty in Europe. The service, probably you know, is for sixty persons. I regret they did not make the plates something in the nature of mine : they are handsome plainish plates, but not quite corresponding to the plateau. However, the whole will be magnificent, and I should estimate its value at about 100,000*l*. It certainly would not be made for that in London. It will be finished during this year, so you may under that belief give such orders as you please about it. I shall be glad to be of any use to you in this or any other thing here ; and, requesting my respects to the Duchess of Wellington,

Believe me yours most sincerely,

BERESFORD.

The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Walmer Castle, 15th Sept., 1814.

I have received your letter of the 9th instant on the subject of the arrival of the Princess of Wales at Strasburg. I hope she will be diverted from coming to Paris ; but if she should come, though she could not be received as Princess of Wales, and probably would not expect it, and though I think in consequence you could not receive her in the Ambassador's house, I should nevertheless show her any personal attention and afford her any reasonable assistance she might desire, without however appearing in public with her.

I am satisfied that it is good policy to make foreign countries agreeable to her, in order that she may have no inducement to return to England. "

The King and Royal Family would not of course receive her in public ; but I should leave it to their own discretion whether or not they would see her privately.

Ever most sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

Zachary Macaulay, Esq., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

London, 15th Sept., 1814.

As the solicitude of the French merchants to retain the slave trade seems to be founded mainly on their hope of rendering it available for the restoration of the plantations in St. Domingo, I have been desirous of collecting information respecting the state of that island. A very intelligent person of colour, who has acted as the secretary of the Mulatto chief Petion, is now in this country, having arrived with the last Jamaica convoy, charged with a mission on the part of Petion. His statement is, that the whole population of St. Domingo is resolutely bent on resisting the introduction, not only of a French armed force, but of a single Frenchman into that island, and that they are fully prepared for encountering all the horrors of a war of extermination. The return of Louis XVIII. to his throne had at first been hailed by all parties as affording a hope of the restoration of an intercourse with France without compromising their personal freedom; and they were prepared to receive with confidence the assurances of that monarch that their rights both of person and property would be respected. The circumstance, however, of his having stipulated for the revival of the African slave trade, avowedly with a view to St. Domingo, has completely dissipated this illusion. They say it is impossible to confide in any promises, however satisfactory in their terms, and however solemnly made, while the idea of introducing a single slave into St. Domingo is not renounced: indeed while the slave trade itself is not abandoned by France. It is so obvious that the slaves who might be imported into that island could not long be kept in a state of bondage while the great mass of the black population is free, that the Haytians would regard the single circumstance of the adherence of the French to this trade as completely falsifying every pledge they might offer for their security: they will therefore not even listen to any proposition on the part of France until that trade is entirely abandoned.

The population of St. Domingo exceeds half a million. Now when it is considered how fatally the climate will fight on their side, and when it is also remembered how the former attempt to subdue them was baffled, although the island, taken by surprise, was at one time in complete military possession of the French, it seems very unlikely that any force which France can now spare should be able to effect the subjugation of it.

The plan of warfare resolved on by the Haytians is said to be as follows:— They have demolished all the forts on the sea coast, and are prepared, should the French attempt a descent, to burn every house not only on the coast, but in the extensive plain between the coast and the mountains, which could afford them shelter. They have also powerfully fortified all the defiles by which the French troops could penetrate into the mountains, where they have formed their magazines of warlike stores and provisions. Within these defiles they will retire; and while the culture of provisions will be carried on by the women in the recesses of the mountains, the men will be employed in carrying on a restless and incessant war of alarm

and nocturnal attack, which will wear down the European force, while the blacks will suffer comparatively little.

With the utmost respect, I have the honour to be,

My Lord Duke,

Your Grace's most obedient and most humble servant,

ZACHARY MACAULAY.

To the Commissioners appointed by His Most Christian Majesty to carry into effect the 2nd and 4th Additional Articles of the Treaty of Paris.

Office of Commissioners for British Claims, No. 2, Rue de Beaune,
16th Sept., 1814.

The undersigned Commissioners of His Britannic Majesty, commissioned and instructed by their government to carry into execution the 2nd and 4th additional articles of the late Treaty of Peace, signed at Paris the 30th of May last, have the honour to open their communications with the Commissioners of His Most Christian Majesty, nominated in pursuance of the 2nd and 4th additional articles of the same Treaty, by stating the steps they have already taken, and those which they propose to take, in execution of the high trust committed to them.

The undersigned have observed that their duties are divided into three branches :—

1st. To liquidate the respective expenses of the British and French governments for the maintenance of prisoners of war, in order to arrange the manner of paying the balance that shall appear in favour of the one or the other of the two Powers.

2ndly. To examine and liquidate the claims of British subjects on the French government for the value of goods, moveable or immoveable, unduly confiscated by the French authorities, as well as for the total or partial loss of their credits or other properties unduly detained under sequester since the year 1792.

3rdly. When complete justice shall in their opinion be rendered to the subjects of His Britannic Majesty by the government of His Most Christian Majesty, by the discharge of the sums due for the full of the value of the property so sequestered or confiscated by the French authorities, to renounce the whole of the balance which shall appear in favour of His Britannic Majesty for the support of the French prisoners of war.

For the purpose of executing the first branch of their duty the undersigned have been furnished by their government with an account of the expenses incurred by them for the maintenance of French prisoners during the course of the war, which they will be ready to exchange for a similar account on the part of the French government, whenever their Commissioners shall desire it. The undersigned conceive there can be no great difficulty in settling the balance of this account, both because the number of the prisoners maintained by each party must be accurately known, and because the expense actually incurred must be regularly laid before the House of Commons in one country, and the Chamber of Deputies in the other. But as the undersigned are empowered to renounce the whole of the balance which shall appear in favour of His Britannic Majesty,

provided complete justice shall in their opinion be rendered to British subjects having claims under the Treaty upon the French government, and as it is impossible that the same justice can be done to British subjects in this country as French subjects have received from Great Britain if the satisfaction of their claims is delayed, it has appeared to the undersigned that they should best fulfil their duty by applying themselves in the first instance to the second branch of it, and proceeding conjointly with the French Commissioners to examine the claims of British subjects upon the French government under the Treaty.

In order to be furnished with the means of satisfactorily executing this branch of their duty, the undersigned, immediately after their appointment, opened an office in London for the reception of British claims on the French government, requiring of each claimant as far as was possible to show to the undersigned his title to claim, either in his own person or as the representative of others, by will or assignment. This step has, as they flatter themselves, put them in possession of far the largest proportion of the British claims, and enabled them to class them, and to bring them before the French Commissioners in a tangible shape.

It appeared to the undersigned that a very large proportion of these claims was on the public funded property of France, for sums actually advanced to the French government during the reigns of His Most Christian Majesty's predecessors, and upon the faith of their edicts. Of the sums so advanced the French government must, it is presumed, possess complete evidence upon their public books.

Upon the seizure of this property by the Revolutionary government of 1793, in violation of the contracts entered into with the public creditors, and of the Treaty of Commerce of 1786, steps were taken to deprive the creditor of the evidences of his debt in his own possession by compelling him to send them to Paris, there to be registered, upon pain of forfeiture: the public books, therefore, of the French government are in many instances the best evidences which can be produced of the debt. These claims appearing to the undersigned for the most part of a very simple nature, and easy to be adjusted, according to the principle of the Treaty, with the same justice that French claimants on the English Funds have experienced in England, the undersigned have endeavoured to class them in the most convenient method, to bring them under the cognizance of the French Commissioners, that these may in the first instance be examined and liquidated, before they proceed to claims of a more difficult and complicated nature.

If the French Commissioners coincide in opinion with the undersigned that this course of proceeding is the best calculated for the despatch of the business with which they are respectively charged, the undersigned will have the honour of transmitting from time to time to the French Commissioners for their examination and judgment such claims as shall have appeared to the undersigned to be just, well founded, and supported by the best vouchers which the nature of the respective cases will admit.

The undersigned have the honour to offer to the Commissioners of His Most Christian Majesty the assurances of their high consideration.

C. BAGOT.

C. A. MACKENZIE.

A. E. IMPEY.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Downing Street, 16th Sept., 1814.

As we cannot proceed in the arrangement of the new Orders until we receive from your Grace the list of those whom you may recommend for the remaining medals, I hope you will have the goodness to transmit it as soon as convenient.

We have received an answer from the American plenipotentiaries to our note of the 4th instant,* a copy of which I have directed to be sent to you. We mean in our reply to admit that we do not intend to make the *exclusive military possession of the Lakes a sine quâ non of the negotiation*. You shall have a copy of our rejoinder by the first opportunity.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

Draft of Note to be presented to the American Commissioners, sent from the Foreign Office 16th Sept., 1812.

The undersigned have no intention of making any comment, not absolutely necessary, on the greater part of the note which they have had the honour to receive, as discussions which create irritation act in a very different direction from what the undersigned have proposed to themselves in this negotiation.

On the question of the north-western frontier, they are happy to find that there will not arise any material difficulty.

With respect to the boundary in the district of Maine, the undersigned must observe that the American Plenipotentiaries have acknowledged that they are instructed to enter into discussions on a revision of the boundary line with a view to prevent uncertainty and dispute; but, by assuming an exclusive right at once to decide what is, or is not, a subject of uncertainty and dispute, they render their power nugatory, or inadmissibly partial in its operation.

After the declaration made by the American Plenipotentiaries that they will admit of no limits to the territory of America because the natural growth of its population and strength would be thereby arrested, it becomes unnecessary to discuss whether the purchase of Louisiana from France against the known conditions on which it had been ceded by Spain to that country, or the hostile seizure of a great part of Florida under the pretence of a dispute respecting its boundary, are any proofs of a spirit of aggrandisement in the United States.

Had the American Plenipotentiaries been instructed on the subject of Canada, they would not have been betrayed into the assertion that the permanent annexation of Canada had not been the declared object of the American government. This object has been distinctly declared at different times by two American Generals in their respective invasions of Canada under the order of the American government. If the first had

* See p. 245.

been disapproved, the declaration would not have been repeated. The declarations here referred to are to be found in the Proclamation of General Hull in July, 1812, and of General Smyth on the 17th of November, 1812, copies of which are hereunto annexed.

From the same want of instructions, the American Plenipotentiaries have been led to assert that Great Britain has induced the Indians to withdraw from the protection of the United States, and is therefore answerable for the consequences.

The Indian nations having experienced, as they thought, oppression instead of protection from the American government, declared war against the United States previous to the declaration of war by the government of that country against Great Britain. The American Plenipotentiaries must be aware that, by this war, the treaty by which the Indians placed themselves under the protection of the United States is abrogated, and the American government cannot be entitled to claim as a right the renewal of an article in a treaty which has no longer any existence. The Indian nations are therefore no longer to be considered as being under the protection of the United States; and it can only be on the ground that they are to be regarded in no other light than as subjects of that country that the American Plenipotentiaries can be authorised to deny the right of Great Britain to interfere on behalf of these nations in the negotiations for peace: and it must be repeated that the Treaty of Greenville is in direct contradiction to any such claim.

It is not necessary to recur to the manner in which the territory of the United States was originally settled, to decide whether the Indian tribes, the original inhabitants of America, shall at length by common consent have assigned to them some spot where they may be permitted to live in tranquillity; *and it can only be by preventing an uninterrupted system of encroachment under the pretence of purchase that this tranquillity can adequately be secured.*

If the American Plenipotentiaries are instructed peremptorily to deny that the British government has any right whatever to interfere with the pacification of the Indian tribes, and to refuse all negotiation on the subject, the undersigned are at a loss to understand upon what principle it was that at the conference of the 8th of August the American Plenipotentiaries invited discussion on this subject, and added "that it was not possible for them to decide without discussion, without an article could be framed which could be mutually satisfactory, and to which they should think themselves under their discretionary powers authorised to accede."

The undersigned must observe that if the American government has not furnished their Plenipotentiaries with any instructions since January last, when the general pacification of Europe could not have been in immediate contemplation, their subsequent silence on an event unquestionably calculated to influence the negotiation is, to say the least, no proof of sincere desire on their part of bringing it to a favourable conclusion.

The British government has entered into the negotiation with an anxious wish to effect an amicable arrangement. After a period of convulsions unexampled in their nature, extent, and duration, the civilised world demands repose. To obtain this in Europe, Great Britain has made considerable sacrifices; to complete the work of general pacification, it is her

earnest wish to manifest the same principles of moderation and forbearance in her endeavours to re-establish peace with the United States: but it is utterly inconsistent with her practice and her principles ever to abandon in her negotiations for peace those with whom she has co-operated in war.

The undersigned therefore repeat their assurances that the British government is willing to sign a peace with the United States on terms honourable to both parties. It will not insist on any terms which the United States can justly represent as derogatory to their honour, nor can it be induced to sign any which are injurious to its own. It is on this ground that the undersigned are authorised distinctly to declare that they are instructed not to sign a treaty of peace with the Plenipotentiaries of the United States unless the Indian nations are included in the peace, and restored to all the rights, privileges, and territories which they enjoyed in the year 1811, previous to the commencement of the war, by the Treaty of Greenville, and the treaties subsequently concluded between them and the United States; and that from this point they cannot depart.

They are further instructed to offer for discussion an article, by which the contracting parties shall reciprocally bind themselves not to purchase the lands occupied by the Indians within their respective territory, according to boundaries to be agreed upon; this engagement, however, to be subject to revision at the expiration of a given period. It is hoped that, by making the engagement subject to revision, it may obviate the objection to the establishment of a boundary beyond which the settlements of the United States should be for ever excluded.

The undersigned have never stated that the exclusive military possession of the Lakes, however conducive they are satisfied it would be to a good understanding between the two countries, and in no way endangering the security of the United States, was to be considered as a *sine quâ non* in the negotiation. Whenever the question which relates to the pacification of the Indian nations, which is a *sine quâ non*, shall be adjusted, the undersigned will be authorised to make a final proposition on the subject of Canadian boundaries, founded so much in justice and moderation that they feel confident it cannot be rejected. This proposition will be distinctly stated when the American Plenipotentiaries shall have consented to include the Indian nations in the treaty, provided the undersigned shall have received assurances that the American Plenipotentiaries will consider themselves as authorised to conclude some provisional article on the subject.

H. Goulburn, Esq., to Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD,

Ghent, 16th Sept., 1814.

I have this morning received your letter of the 12th, and cannot sufficiently thank you for so clearly explaining what are the views and objects of the government with respect to the negotiations with America. Before I received it I confess that I was impressed with the idea that the government did not wish the negotiation to be protracted unless there was a prospect of a successful issue, and I therefore considered the last note which

we addressed to the Americans as not so much calculated to delay the conclusion of the negotiation as to throw upon them the responsibility of its rupture. Our reference home of the last American note (the contents of which do not correspond with what you appear to have expected) will enable you to prescribe to us that line of conduct which will best answer the views of the government. Had I had your letter previous to its transmission to you, we would certainly have sent with it a draft of an answer for your approbation.

From what I have seen of the American ministers and what has passed between us, I do not believe that they will, under the present circumstances of the war (they say they will not under any circumstances), consent to the definition of a permanent boundary to the Indian territory within their limits. I believe that our proposition to this effect is even more offensive to them than that for the military occupation of the Lakes. They have sought opportunities of stating it as inadmissible ; and it was only yesterday that Mr. Clay stated his belief that even if America were to accede to our proposition, and if the Eastern States were cordially to unite with Great Britain in endeavouring to enforce it, their united efforts would be inadequate to restrain that part of the American population which is to the westward of the Alleghany from encroaching upon the Indian territory and gradually expelling the aboriginal inhabitants. Their objection to our proposition is not founded upon its requiring a cession of territory already settled by American citizens, but upon its invading the right which they claim to extend their population over the whole of the unsettled country. Under these circumstances, I do not deem it possible to conclude a *good peace* now, as I cannot consider that a good peace which would leave the Indians to a dependence on the *liberal policy* of the United States. I do not think it equally impossible to protract the negotiation so long as to prevent a demand for the papers until after Lord Castlereagh's return. As long as we answer their notes, I believe that they will be ready to give us replies ; and if they cannot leave this before the 1st of October, I think they will have no objection to remaining here during the winter. But it will be to be considered whether, by multiplying notes and thus giving them opportunities of reconsidering and restating some points which they have as yet very weakly stated, and urging others which they have not yet brought forward at all, we shall not give the Opposition a greater advantage when the discussion ultimately takes place than we can do by taking the debate, even in Lord Castlereagh's absence, upon the papers as they stand at present.

In the conversations which I have had with Mr. Clay and Mr. Bayard (which have been as frequent as our opportunities of meeting would admit), I have been fortunate enough to state to them what you think might have been stated with advantage ; but as they proceed upon the principle that Canada never has been in any danger and can never be endangered by the United States unless we force them to become a military nation, they consider the mere conclusion of a peace to be the only security which is necessary. Our national feeling respecting the abandonment of the Indians and the aggrandizing spirit of America draws nothing from them but an expression of regret at the existence of such a feeling, and a statement of the much stronger countervailing feeling on the part of America.

The court martial on the Lake Erie business appears to me to have come to an absurd conclusion. Every one knew that Captain Barclay's fleet was inadequately manned; but the charge against Proctor was that he ordered the squadron to sail at a moment when he knew that an adequate reinforcement of seamen was within a few days' march. Prevost stated this distinctly in his despatch. I think it will also appear from his despatches and from the American account of the battle that our fleet was equal if not superior to that of the enemy. I think it will also appear that Prevost did not mention any deficiency of means of equipment until it was too late to remedy it. A reference, however, to his despatches will clear up this.

I wish Prevost may quickly do something worthy of the force now placed under his command. A success in that quarter would much facilitate our operations at any future congress, if it did not assist us in our present negotiations. If it is intended, as you intimate, to negotiate hereafter upon the basis of the *uti possidetis*, would it not be advisable to urge the Indians to occupy as advanced a position as they can with a view of procuring better terms for them, and through them for ourselves? While on the subject of Indians, I cannot help adding that it appears to me from Mr. Clay's objections to an Indian boundary, that the most obnoxious part of our proposition is that which would exclude them from occupying the remainder of the Illinois and the Indiana territory; but when they object so strongly to the whole proposition, it is useless to specify their objections to particular parts of it.

Believe me, my dear Lord, yours ever most truly,

HENRY GOULBURN.

Since writing the above, I see from the papers that the court martial to which you refer is not that ordered on General Proctor, but that on Captain Barclay. What I have said, therefore, does not apply.

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

[785.]

MY LORD,

Paris, 17th Sept., 1814.

I have the honour to enclose a correspondence which I have had with Monsieur de Talleyrand in regard to the Duchy of Bouillon, which commenced by my requesting to have his answer to a note on the same subject, addressed to him by Sir Charles Stewart, before His Highness should depart from Paris.*

As Monsieur de Talleyrand's last letter of the 14th appeared to me to be but little satisfactory, and, in fact, stated it to be the King's intention to hold the Duchy of Bouillon till commissaries should have ascertained the boundaries, notwith-

* See letter to the Prince de Bénévent, 11th September, 1814, *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xii., p. 102.

standing the facts brought forward in my letter to show that there did not exist the slightest ground for a doubt, I thought proper to speak to Monsieur de Jaucourt on the subject, and to remonstrate against that arbitrary mode of deciding questions, the result of which has been, that the French commissaries have been desired, in concert with the Austrian commissaries, forthwith to ascertain the boundaries of France on the side of the Duchy of Bouillon as the most expeditious mode of getting the French authorities to withdraw from the Duchy.

I think it proper now to trouble your Lordship upon this subject, as in discussing it I think I have discovered an intention in the French government not to keep possession of the Duchy, but to give it to the Prince de Montbazou, who, it appears, has some claim to it, which is viewed more favourably here, particularly by Monsieur de Talleyrand, than that of the Duc de Bouillon.

I believe, likewise, that it is proposed to bring this question under discussion in the Congress at Vienna.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Colonel Niel Campbell to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Porto Ferrajo, Island of Elba, 17th Sept., 1814.

I do myself the honour of enclosing for your Lordship's information the copy of an extract from Admiral Hallowell's letter to Mr. Felton, His Majesty's Acting Consul at Leghorn, which I thought it incumbent upon me to communicate to General Bertrand as per note enclosed.

Yesterday I had an audience of Napoleon for the first time since my last visit to Leghorn, and the baths of Lucca, the use of which was prescribed for my wounds. It was courted by himself, in sending to inform me that one of his carriages was at my disposition, to convey me from this to Longono, where he has been for the last two weeks. This audience lasted three hours, during which time there was no interruption. He constantly walked from one extremity of the room to the other, asked questions without number, and descanted upon a great variety of subjects, generally with temper and good nature, excepting when it bore upon the absence of his wife and child, or the defection of Marshal Marmont.

He began by questions as to Genoa: that he understood Lord William Bentinck was to return there very soon. Was there not a British regiment at Nice? The state of Piedmont, Lombardy, Venice, and Tuscany. That the rude manners and different language of the Austrians rendered it impossible for them to become popular with the Italians, who were flattered

by the formation of the kingdom of Italy. That it would be the policy of Great Britain to retain this kingdom as an ally against France and Austria. That it would be equally so to keep Naples separate from Sicily, as the latter from its situation as an island would be entirely under the influence of England. He inquired where the Queen of Sicily was? whether I knew the intention of the Allies towards Murat? Whether the late King of Spain was to remain at Rome? When I told him that it was reported that Ferdinand VII. had invited his father and mother (provided the Prince of Peace did not accompany them) to return to Spain, he inveighed against the latter, and said that his own countenance and support given the latter had been very prejudicial to his cause in Spain.

He presumed that England would keep Corfu: that he had done a great deal there for us. I observed that the proclamation of the British General on taking possession as Commissioner stated "in behalf of His Majesty and his Allies," and that it was generally supposed Austria and Russia would also have claims. He derided this idea, and that Russia in particular could have no just pretensions.

He then asked if I had lately received any communications from Lord Castlereagh. I told him not since that which conveyed the approbation of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent to my prolonging my residence. He then adverted to the threats of the Algerines, but cursorily, and did not seem apprehensive. That if it was intended to adhere to the treaty entered into with him at Fontainebleau, he would not be molested by them, and one word from England would suffice to prevent them. I reminded him of the application upon this subject some time before, which I had transmitted to Admiral Lord Exmouth, who replied that he could not interfere; and that even according to the treaty quoted by himself, it rested with the Court of France. I also pointed out to him that while the British troops occupied Sicily and Portugal, and were in the most intimate relations with their governments, they made their own treaties and arrangements with the Barbary Powers, without any interference; besides which the fate of the Genoese vessels which had hoisted British colours and received British licences from the Consul at Genoa. He expressed his conviction that the Algerines were well inclined towards him, and related with good humour that they had ridiculed two vessels of Louis XVIII., near Elba, calling to them with reproaches, "*Vous avez déserté votre Empereur.*" He added that all the subjects of the Grand Seigneur were well inclined towards him as the enemy of Russia, and considering him as the destroyer of Moscow.

He asked me if I knew what was intended by the Austrians with respect to his wife and son. He then animadverted with warmth and in strong language upon the interdiction of their joining him which he stated to exist; that it excited universal reprobation even in Vienna; that no such instance of barbarity and injustice unconnected with any state policy could be selected in modern times; that he was persuaded England was too just and liberal to approve of it. The Empress had written to him, and he knew her wishes. She was now absolutely a prisoner, for there was an Austrian officer (whom he named and described) who accompanied the Empress to prevent her from escaping to Elba. Before she left Orleans, it was promised her that she would receive passports to follow him to the Island of Elba. "*L'Empereur d'Autriche est mené par Metternich, mais*

il est mené aussi lui même ; car quoiqu'il a des talens, il est d'un esprit léger."

He then asked me to write to Lord Castlereagh to know whether it was intended to prevent his wife and child, or either of them, from joining him. I told him that I had no correspondence with his Lordship but what was official. He replied, "Mais vous pouvez toucher sur cela légèrement, ou écrivez à quelqu'un près de lui." I bowed, and told him that I should be happy to do everything which was agreeable to him and consistent with my duty. He seemed to receive this as an assent to his wishes. "Oui, vous le ferez, vous pouvez faire cela très bien."

After giving vent to his feelings upon this subject, he mentioned how very inimical and personal the conduct of General Stahremberg, who commands in Tuscany, has been towards him. In the course of these observations an opportunity was afforded me of noticing the apprehensions which were entertained by the General in consequence of persons enrolling and enticing away subjects of Tuscany. He admitted the fact, but treated it with ridicule. That he had only 500 or 600 of his Old Guards, who were not sufficiently numerous to guard all the villages and the fortifications. That the population of the island did not admit of recruiting his battalion of Chasseurs, and therefore the Corsican officers who remained in Elba, in place of going to France with the rest of the garrison, endeavoured to obtain recruits in Italy and Corsica. Could General Stahremberg be so weak as to be alarmed at this? He was very happy that I remained here "pour rompre la chimère. Je ne pense pas de rien dehors de ma petite île. Je pouvois avoir soutenu la guerre pendant vingt années si j'ai voulu cela. Je n'existe plus pour le monde. Je suis un homme mort. Je ne m'occupe que de ma famille et ma retraite, ma maison, mes vâches, et mes poulets."

He expressed regret at some difficulties which a few English travellers had met with several days before from the commandant and the police at Porto Ferrajo. He reprobated the conduct of the latter, and paid many compliments to the British nation, for it was his wish that every traveller should meet with facility and attention. That it arose from advice having been received that a person of another nation was coming to Elba as an assassin. It is probable on account of this information that he has resided for the last two weeks at Longono within the fortress, and orders are given that no stranger is admitted without an order from the commandant. However, he makes frequent excursions in his carriage.

After continuing to expatiate in praise of the British character, and remarking that notwithstanding all the abuse directed against it in his name, his sentiments were well known by those near his person, he requested me to obtain for him an English grammar the first time I went to the continent.

After conversing respecting the affairs of America, he repeated his conjectures made some time ago that the expedition from England was destined for Louisiana, in order to limit definitively the United States to the southward.

He inquired with great eagerness as to the real state of France. I told him that private letters, English travellers, and every source of information concurred in ascribing great wisdom and moderation to the Sovereign and government, but that there were many who had lost good appointments, the prisoners who had returned from abroad, and many of the army, who

were still attached to him. He appeared to admit the stability of the Sovereign and government, supported as the former is by all the Marshals, Berthier, Captain of the Guards, &c.; but that the imitation of Great Britain in the government and constitution was absurd: it was a caricature. It was impossible to imitate the Houses of Parliament; for respectable families, like those composing the aristocracy in England, did not exist in France now. After continuing in that strain for a long time with comparisons highly complimentary to Great Britain, he spoke with some warmth of the cessions made by France since his abdication; that it was not wise on the part of the Allies to exact them; that he spoke as a spectator, without any hope or interest, for he had none; and again repeated his own nonentity; but it showed an ignorance of the French character and temper of the present times. Their chief feeling was pride and glory, and it was impossible for them to look forward with satisfaction and tranquillity (which was stated to be the sincere wish of the Allies) under such sacrifices. They were conquered only by a great superiority of numbers, but not humiliated. The population of France has not suffered to the extent that may be supposed; for he always spared their lives, and expended the Italians, Germans, and other foreigners. These observations gradually led him to his own feats in war and the last campaign, entering into the details of many operations in which he had repulsed and gained great advantages with numbers inferior beyond comparison, and to abuse of Marshal Marmont, to whose defection alone he ascribed his giving up the contest.

In talking of St. Domingo, I remarked that the superfluous portion of discontented military could be employed there. He said it would be bad policy to attempt to re-establish that colony; better to blockade it, and force the negroes to transport the whole of their produce to France only. That this was his own plan in case of a peace.

He asked me whether I had heard that Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla were not to be given to Marie Louise, but to the Queen of Etruria, and an indemnity in Germany to the former. I admitted that among many other reports prevalent in Italy, this was one.

He expressed his desire and expectation of being on a good footing with the Grand Duke of Tuscany: that if I returned to the Baths of Lucca, he presumed I would pay my respects to His Royal Highness; that I would be able to ascertain his sentiments towards Napoleon, and if they were reasonable (as he expected, in consequence of favours received from him formerly, when the Grand Duke was on bad terms with his brother the Emperor of Austria), he would send an officer to compliment him upon his arrival in Tuscany.

Before he received my intimation respecting the Algerines, he was to have gone for a few days to the island of Pia Nosa, where he has established a garrison and a few inhabitants; but his visit is now postponed.

His mother seems now to have taken up her abode permanently in Elba, and his sister the Princess Pauline is expected from Naples in two or three weeks. Napoleon's brig is to be sent to Civita Vecchia to receive her, which looks as if Murat was averse to any public communication with Elba.

The expenses of the troops, marine, and household have been at the rate of one million francs per year since his arrival, and his income only at the rate of three hundred thousand. A great part of the ten months' pro-

visions which were left in store here by the French troops have been sold by Napoleon, which, with the specie carried with him from France (of which the amount is unknown), enables him to continue these expenses.

There are still many discontented officers from the army of Italy here, and it is reported that they are to form a Garde du Corps ; but I do not believe it, and rather think that these adventurers have not met with as much encouragement as has been supposed. Four officers from France have entered into the Guards as privates.

A General Lebelles and his family have lately arrived here from France, but he is not employed.

About three weeks ago a lady with a male child five or six years of age arrived here from Leghorn ; was received by Napoleon with great attention, a degree of concealment, and accompanied him immediately to a very retired small house in the most remote part of the island, where, after remaining two days, she reembarked, and is said to have gone to Naples. It is universally believed in this island that it is Marie Louise and her child, and it is also very generally credited on the opposite coast ; but my information leads me to believe that it is a Polish lady from Warsaw, who bore a child to Napoleon a few years ago. It is probable that the concealment and her speedy departure to the Continent are from delicacy towards Marie Louise, and the fear of this connection being known to her.

The threats of military execution in case of not paying the contributions have not been fulfilled, and as it is only the poorest inhabitants who have not paid, the tax will not be levied from them for the present.

Napoleon seems to have lost all habits of study and sedentary application. He has four places of residence in different parts of the island, the improvements and changes of which form his sole occupation ; but as they lose their interest to his unsettled mind from want of novelty, he occasionally falls into a state of inactivity never known before, and sometimes reposes in his bedroom of late for several hours in the day. He generally takes exercise in a carriage, and not on horseback as before. His health is excellent, and his spirits appear not at all depressed. I begin to think that he is quite resigned to his retreat, and that he is tolerably happy excepting when the recollections of his former power are freshened by sentiments of vanity and revenge.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

NIEL CAMPBELL.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Vienna, 19th Sept., 1814.

I hope in a few days to be enabled to transmit to you a Military Memoir by the Prussians upon the defence of the North of Germany, especially on the side of the Low Countries. In the mean time, as the subject of the limits to be assigned to Holland is pressing, I should be glad, if your Report is completed upon the defences of Holland, to have a copy, in order to profit by your views.

The Emperor is expected on the 25th.

In haste, my dear Lord, ever sincerely yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

To the Commissioners appointed by His Most Christian Majesty to carry into effect the 2nd and 4th Additional Articles of the Treaty of Paris.

Office of Commissioners for British Claims,
No. 2, Rue de Beaune, 19th Sept., 1814.

The Commissioners of His Most Christian Majesty will not be surprised, considering the great length of time that has now elapsed since the British creditors of the French government have been deprived of the enjoyment of their property, at the great anxiety felt by the undersigned to enter into the examination and liquidation of such claims as appear to them to admit of no reasonable doubt with all convenient speed, as thereby alone they can fulfil both the letter and the spirit of the Treaty they are commissioned to execute.

By the Treaty the French government has engaged to treat the subjects of His Britannic Majesty with the same justice in France that the subjects of His Most Christian Majesty have received in England. It is a fact needing no proof, that the subjects of His Most Christian Majesty holding shares in the public Funds of Great Britain have not only enjoyed the full benefit of their original contracts, but have been even exempted from a tax of ten per cent., which all British subjects have been compelled to pay. The undersigned then submit that a delay of justice to the British creditors on the French Funds would be an injury to them, and a violation of the spirit of the Treaty, which they are sure is most distant from the intention and wish of His Most Christian Majesty's government.

It is further to be observed that, by the clause of the Treaty empowering the English Commissioners to renounce the balance due to the British government on account of prisoners of war, when, in their opinion, the private creditors shall be fully satisfied, the British government has in fact made its own property a fund for the payment of the private creditors of France.

Under all these circumstances the British Commissioners are convinced that the Commissioners of His Most Christian Majesty will most cordially unite with them in endeavouring to do speedy justice to such private creditors of the French government whose claims can be so substantiated as to leave no reasonable doubt of their validity.

The undersigned think it their duty to add a few observations on the proofs which the French government are entitled to demand to verify the claims advanced against them.

The undersigned are informed that by a law passed in August, 1793, a Great Book was created for the Public Debt of France; that an account was ordered to be opened with the Nation for the amount of all seizures and confiscations; and that the Great Book was to be from thenceforth the only title of the public creditor. If this information be correct, it is clear that the best, if not the only evidence of the justice of the claims of the English creditors ought to be in the possession of the French government itself.

The undersigned are further informed that secret laws were passed in February, 1808, and December, 1809, which were never printed, for the purpose of destroying the titles of the foreign creditors of France. If this information be correct, and if these laws have really been executed by the burning or destruction of the Great Book above referred to, or any other

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of the titles or vouchers of the British creditors, it is scarcely necessary to remark that in order to repair as far as is in their power an injustice unprecedented in the history of nations, it is incumbent on both the English and French Commissioners to receive and act upon such secondary proofs, however slight, as the nature of their respective cases has enabled the several creditors to preserve or procure.

The undersigned have not the slightest doubt that the French Commissioners are as anxious as themselves to carry into execution, in the most liberal manner, the just intentions of the French government. For the purpose of commencing their labours, they have the honour of enclosing to them a list of five claims, that appear to them of a nature quite indisputable, upon which they request their decision, as early as is consistent with their due examination. The vouchers produced on the part of the claimants lie at the office of the undersigned for the inspection of the French Commissioners: being intrusted to the care of the undersigned, it will be obvious to the French Commissioners that it would be improper that they should be removed from the custody to which they have been committed.

The undersigned have the honour to offer to the Commissioners of His Most Christian Majesty the assurances of their high consideration.

CHARLES BAGOT.

COLIN A. MACKENZIE.

A. E. IMPEY.

Colonel Torrens to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

Horse Guards, 20th Sept., 1814.

Some circumstances having arisen to make the Commander in Chief desirous of revising the lists of officers whom you may intend to recommend for medals for the battles of the Nive, Orthez, and Toulouse, I was about to write to you a few days ago to request that they might be transmitted with your earliest convenience, when I accidentally found, from Colonel Macdonald, that you had not been furnished with the returns from Lord Niddry's column. He has now, however, forwarded the returns to Burgh; and I am authorized to request that you will send the lists as soon as possible.

I at one time thought it fixed that all the aides-de-camp of General officers, being Field officers, should be considered eligible to the medal, and I told Fremantle so; but some doubts having been subsequently expressed upon the expediency of such a measure, I suspended the communication I had promised until I could obtain a final decision. Some apprehensions were entertained that the grant to all aides-de-camp so situated would have too general an effect, and would bear hard upon those Field officers who are second in the command of a corps, and who by the regulations are excluded from it. Under these circumstances, and other considerations with which I need not trouble you, it is now decided by the Duke and the Secretary of State that the aides-de-camp of a Commander of the Forces, who are Lieutenant-Colonels in the army, shall *only* be considered eligible to the medal.

I send you an official authority on the subject.

The gaiety you experienced here has been transferred, it would appear, to Paris, where all the idlers from this country have repaired. I have been very sorry to hear that you have been unwell since your arrival; but I hope you have long before this been perfectly reestablished.

We are going on here pretty much in the old way; but we official people feel the deprivation of interest which was given to business by the constant look out for the occurrence of events of glory under your guidance and command. We have, by the by, a despatch to-day from America, by which it appears that General Drummond has beaten the Yankees. The aide-de-camp tells me that the Americans fought with great desperation, and that they appear to have acquired a degree of good order in their movements hitherto unknown to them. I trust that the reinforcements, which had all arrived, will enable Sir G. Prevost to concentrate a force that will effectually destroy all the enemy's hopes upon Canada, and perhaps lead to the termination of the war. In every affair hitherto our troops have fought against treble their numbers.

Hill's expedition is postponed, if not altogether given up. I am glad of it on many accounts. It was too late in the season for such an object; and I don't think the enterprise was one by which he could have gained much credit.

When I began this letter I did not mean to trouble you beyond the point of business upon which I had occasion to address you; but I have been insensibly led on, which I hope you will excuse.

Ever, my dear Lord Duke, most faithfully and sincerely yours,

H. TORRENS.

Count Jaucourt to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Paris, 20 Sept., 1814.

Il a été réglé par l'art. 15 du traité de paix que les vaisseaux de guerre et bâtimens armés, comme aussi l'artillerie et les munitions navales, etc., qui se trouvaient dans les places maritimes remises par la France en exécution de l'art. 2 de la convention du 23 Avril, seraient partagés entre la France et les pays où les places sont situées, dans la proportion de deux tiers pour la France et d'un tiers pour les puissances auxquelles les dites places appartiendraient.

Le département de la Marine ayant pensé que les puissances auxquelles échoira le tiers des vaisseaux et bâtimens devaient supporter de même le tiers des dettes qui se rapportent à leur construction ou à leur armement, a donné à la commission nommée par le Roi pour concourir aux opérations du partage à Anvers des instructions en conséquence. Mais il paraît que les commissaires des puissances alliées se sont constamment refusés à reconnaître même le principe de cette dette. Ce principe, my Lord, semble cependant ne pouvoir être contesté; les vaisseaux, bâtimens, munitions, etc., qui se trouvaient dans les places désignées sont une propriété dont le partage a été réglé. Les charges dont cette propriété est grévée lui sont inhérentes, et doivent en droit être partagées avec elle. Ne point admettre cette condition serait rompre la proportion d'après laquelle, aux termes du traité, la

répartition a dû se faire ; car la France ne pourrait être regardée comme recevant les deux tiers des objets partagés, si, indépendamment des charges dont sa part est affectée, elle devait aussi acquitter celles de la part qui échoit aux puissances alliées.

J'ajoute que l'esprit du traité est tout-à-fait conforme à cette théorie, puisque par l'art. 30 il a été réglé que les sommes qui seraient dûes pour les travaux d'utilité publique sur le Rhin ou dans les départemens détachés de la France passeraient à la charge du futur possesseur. Or ce cas présente avec la question dont il s'agit une analogie qui n'échappera sûrement pas à Votre Excellence.

Je suis persuadé, my Lord, que les considérations que je viens d'exposer vous paraîtront péremptoires. Je prie Votre Excellence de les porter à la connaissance de son gouvernement ; et je ne doute pas qu'il ne donne à ses commissaires à Anvers les instructions nécessaires pour que la juste demande formée par les commissaires du Roi, quant au partage des dettes contractées pour la construction ou l'armement des vaisseaux et bâtimens dont il est question, soit admise sans difficulté.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec une très haute considération, my Lord,

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

F. JAUCOURT.

Colonel Niel Campbell to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Island of Elba, 21st Sept., 1814.

Napoleon embarked yesterday for the island of Pia Nosa, with several ladies of Elba belonging to his household, and it is said that he means to remain there for a few days. I had formerly the honour of stating to your Lordship that this island is situated a few miles south of Elba, about three miles long and one broad. Being very capable of yielding grain, the acquisition of it is desirable to him ; and it is probable that he has no other view in sending a detachment of soldiers and some inhabitants there ; but it affords him opportunities of receiving persons from the continent, and particularly Naples and Corsica, without any possible means of detecting it. I have therefore thought it my duty to attract your Lordship's notice to the circumstance.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

NIEL CAMPBELL.

[786.]

*

To the Right Hon. J. C. Villiers.

MY DEAR VILLIERS,

Paris, 23rd Sept., 1814.

I have received your letter of the 8th, and I assure you that it gives me the greatest satisfaction to hear from you on any subject, particularly on one in which the nation are so much interested as the slave trade.

I have as yet got nothing in writing on the subject ; but I think the new Minister of Marine, although he has a *kick in his gallop*, and is very old, has now been long enough in office to have made up his mind on the propositions in my note of the 26th August ; and I propose to make another attack in writing to get that, in an official form, which has been promised verbally.

My note proposed a reciprocal search of all vessels north of the Line, within the tropics, as far as long. 25° from London : this must be attended by other regulations, which I intend to propose as soon as the principle is officially adopted.

By the aid of Mr. Clarkson I have already circulated a good deal of information on the trade ; and Madame de Staël has undertaken to translate Mr. Wilberforce's pamphlet, which I likewise propose to circulate. If we can get those who read on our side, who are very few in number, we shall do a great deal of good.

In regard to St. Domingo, the French government have hitherto not only done nothing, but have determined upon nothing. The King, who is the most cautious man I ever saw, and the best Sovereign for this country, some time ago sent two persons to St. Domingo to inquire into the state of things ; and he does not propose to take any step whatever till they shall return.

A report has been made to the Chamber of Deputies by a committee at the head of which is a General Desfourneaux, on a petition from certain proprietors of St. Domingo. The sentiments of this report are moderate. I think it goes to the abolition of slavery, and the establishment of a court of *villénage* in the island. It deprecates the attempt to reduce the negroes by force of arms. I think this report is liked in the societies of Paris, where, if you recollect, everything is canvassed by man, woman, and child.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

H. Goulburn, Esq., to Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD,

Ghent, 23rd Sept., 1814.

Since I last wrote I have received your two private letters of the 16th and the 20th.

You may depend upon our governing ourselves entirely by the instructions which they contain, and upon my continuing to represent to the Americans, as I always have done whenever an opportunity has offered, the very strong opinion which prevails in England against an unsatisfactory peace with America. Of this Mr. Gallatin appears to be the only American in any degree sensible, and this perhaps arises from his being less like an American than any of his colleagues.

I did not trouble you with a letter by the last messenger, because I had only one observation to make, and that was upon the falsehood of which the American plenipotentiaries have, upon their own showing, been guilty in their correspondence with us. You will observe that in their note of the 24th ultimo they stated that "as by the pacification of Europe the causes of the war between Great Britain and the United States had disappeared, they had been instructed by their government not to insist upon the maritime questions." By their subsequent note it appears that their last instructions were dated in January last, when the pacification of Europe had not only not taken place, but was not even probable: consequently it could not have been the pacification of Europe which led America to abandon the pretended causes of the war. It would not be difficult from this to argue (if not to prove) that the maritime questions were only the pretended causes of war, and that the government of the United States were willing and did instruct their ministers to give them up as soon as they found the real object of the war, viz. the conquest of Canada, unattainable. When the subject comes to be debated, I think a good deal may be made of this argument.

The intelligence from Canada is very satisfactory: I hope, too, that it is only the prelude to something better. If Prevost succeeds against Sackett's Harbour, the next year (if the war continues) will pass in a comparative state of repose for Upper Canada.

Believe me, my dear Lord, yours ever most faithfully,

HENRY GOULBURN.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Fife House, 23rd Sept., 1814.

The Prince Regent will hold a Council to-morrow for the meeting of Parliament, which will be fixed for the 8th or 10th of November.

I trust we may be able to get through all the necessary business by the second week in December: we could then adjourn to the very end of January, which would give you time, I hope, to conclude all your business and to return home.

A few days will probably enable us to determine how far, under present circumstances, there is any chance of putting an end to the American war. I confess on many accounts I wish we were well out of it; but I think we

have now gone to the utmost justifiable point in concession, and if they are so unreasonable as to reject our proposals, we have nothing to do but to fight it out. The military accounts from America are upon the whole satisfactory. Our army from Bordeaux had arrived in Canada, and important operations were in contemplation on that side, which our officers appear to have no doubt would now prove successful. On the other hand, the forces under Sir Alexander Cochrane and General Ross were most actively employed upon the coast of the United States, creating the greatest degree of alarm and rendering the government very unpopular. We may hope, therefore, that if the American government should prove themselves so unreasonable as to reject our proposals as they have been now modified, they will not long be permitted to administer the affairs of the country, particularly as their military efforts have in no way corresponded with the high tone in which they attempt to negotiate.

Believe me, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Fife House, 23rd Sept., 1814.

I received the copy of your despatch to Sir Henry Wellesley. We had already instructed him to the same effect from hence. It would be obviously impossible to give the least countenance to the proposition for a Spanish loan without a stipulation for the total and immediate abolition of the slave trade.

I send you a copy of a letter which I have written this day to the Duke of Wellington, in answer to one I received from him a few days ago, a copy of which he has transmitted to you. I hope you will agree with us who are here on the expediency, under all the circumstances, of the proposition referred to in that letter. I am confident that it would allay a storm in this country which we shall otherwise find it very difficult to weather, and that it may operate as a strong inducement to the Continental powers to concur in those measures for the same purpose in which we should want their assistance.

Suppose the French government to refuse our offer, we might then close with them upon that to which they have already agreed, the immediate abolition north of the Line, and the total abolition at the end of five years. This being settled between Great Britain and France, we might call upon the Powers at the Congress to agree to prohibit the importation of colonial produce into their respective dominions from any countries which had not become parties to this stipulation. The offer of compensation or of a West India colony on our part to France as the price of immediate abolition would be the best proof of our sincerity, and might have the effect, therefore, of reconciling other Powers to measures to which they might otherwise be indifferent.

I cannot, therefore, avoid urging this view of the question upon your consideration. You will be the best judge how far the details of it can be managed in the first instance with most advantage at Paris or at Vienna.

LIVERPOOL.

To Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MILORD,

Les sujets de Sa Majesté Britannique que l'ordonnance Royale ci-jointe concerne prient très humblement Votre Excellence de remarquer combien il s'en faut que cette pièce ne leur rende la justice qu'ils attendoient du dernier traité de paix, à l'exécution duquel Votre Excellence ne manquera pas de veiller :

1. On n'y fait pas la moindre attention aux dispositions de ce traité, quoiqu'on les ait fortement réclamées dans les différentes pétitions auxquelles cette ordonnance est supposée répondre ;

2. Bien loin de remettre les sujets Britanniques comme ils étoient en 1792, ainsi que porte ce traité, les misérables reliques des spoliations révolutionnaires sont chargées à tout leur montant des boursiers, dont on n'a d'autre connaissance que de savoir que leur origine est très-équivoque, et qu'ils ne se destinent point à l'Etat ecclésiastique, pour lequel seul ces établissemens ont été fondés ;

3. On ne laisse aux anciens propriétaires, pas même la subsistance, encore moins de quoi satisfaire aux frais qu'on leur fait essuyer par d'inutiles tracasseries et délais.

C'est ainsi qu'on prétend les indemniser de la privation de leurs biens, pendant l'espace de plus de vingt ans d'un temps révolutionnaire, en les y assujettissant pendant huit à dix ans de plus, jusqu'à ce que ces boursiers nommés, on ne sait pas par qui, aient fini leurs études, et que les anciens propriétaires aient, en toute apparence, fini de vivre.

Est-ce donc qu'une nation grande comme la France ne sauroit trouver les moyens de pourvoir à la subsistance d'une trentaine de boursiers (ses propres sujets) qu'elle veut protéger, que par les dépouilles des étrangers qui sont venus placer avec confiance leurs propriétés dans son sein ? Est-ce qu'une nation, fière comme la France, souffrira qu'il soit dit qu'on répond à l'accueil que l'Angleterre a fait pendant la révolution aux Français, par de telles petitesse, sans dire de telles injustices ?

Ordonnance.

LOUIS, par la grâce de Dieu, Roi de France et de Navarre.

Sur le rapport de notre Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat de l'Intérieur avons ordonné ce qui suit :—

ARTICLE I.

L'arrêté du 19 Fructidor, an 9, et le décret du 28 Floréal, an 13, qui avaient ordonné la réunion, en un seul établissement, des diverses institutions d'hommes fondées en France en faveur des Catholiques Irlandais, Anglais, et Ecossais, sont rapportés.

ART. II.

La restitution à chaque section, dite Anglaise et Ecossaise, des fondations, rentes, et biens non aliénés dépendans de ces diverses institutions, est ordonnée, sauf à ceux qui réclament à prouver leurs droits respectifs.

ART. III.

La commission nommée par l'arrêté de notre Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat de l'Intérieur, du 13 Juillet dernier, pour recevoir et arrêter les comptes des Sieurs Walsh, Parker, et Macnulty, depuis le premier Janvier, 1809, est chargée d'examiner les droits des parties réclamantes et d'en faire son rapport à notre Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat de l'Intérieur, afin qu'il en soit statué définitivement.

ART. IV.

L'administrateur-général des trois sections réunies, confirmé par notre ordonnance du 21 Juin dernier, ne prendra plus d'autre titre que celui d'Administrateur-Général des Etablissements et Colléges Irlandais.

ART. V.

Pour éviter toutes discussions nées ou à naître, la commission déjà nommée fixera, à partir de la susdite époque, premier Janvier, 1809, la balance de ce que l'une de ces sections doit à l'autre, à raison des fonds que l'une d'elles a pu avancer, afin que les dépenses pour frais, constructions, et réparations puissent être supportées par chaque section respective.

ART. VI.

Le remboursement de la somme que chaque section peut devoir à l'une des autres doit se faire dans l'espace de deux ans, sans intérêts.

ART. VII.

Les boursiers aujourd'hui placés sur les fonds réunis des trois nations resteront à la charge de la section à laquelle ils appartiennent comme originaires de l'un de ces trois royaumes, jusqu'à la fin de leurs études. Mais, au fur et à mesure des vacances de ces bourses, il n'y sera plus nommés d'autres boursiers sans le concours de qui de droit, approuvé par notre Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat de l'Intérieur.

ART. VIII.

Il sera accordé une année, à dater des présentes, pour évacuer du Séminaire Anglais, les archives, lingerie, bureaux, etc., sauf à fixer à l'amiable entre les trois sections les contributions qu'elles doivent supporter pour le logement de l'Administrateur-général.

ART. IX.

Notre ordonnance du 21 Juin dernier sortira son plein et entier effet en tout ce qui n'est contraire à la présente.

ART. X.

Notre Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat de l'Intérieur est chargé de l'exécution de la présente ordonnance.

Donné au château des Tuileries, le 23 Septembre, 1814, et de notre règne le vingtième.

(Signé) LOUIS.

Par le Roi,

(Signé) L'Abbé de MONTESQUIOU.

Pour ampliation,

Le Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat de l'Intérieur,

(Signé) L'Abbé de MONTESQUIOU.

Pour copie conforme,

Le Secrétaire Général du Ministère, Chevalier de la Légion d'Honneur,

(Signé) GUIZOT.

To the Commissioners appointed by His Most Christian Majesty to carry into effect the 2nd and 4th Additional Articles of the Treaty of Paris.

Office of Commissioners for British Claims,
No. 2, Rue de Beaune, 23rd Sept., 1814.

The Commissioners of His Britannic Majesty have had the honour to receive the note of the Commissioners of His Most Christian Majesty of the 22nd instant, acquainting them that it is their opinion that they ought, in the first instance, to proceed to what they consider the most important object of their duty, the liquidation of the expenses incurred for the maintenance of the prisoners of war.

Without entering into discussion upon a point upon which the undersigned have already had the honour to submit their sentiments to the Commissioners of His Most Christian Majesty, the undersigned hasten to acquaint the Commissioners of His Most Christian Majesty that whenever they are prepared to lay before the undersigned the accounts of the French government for the maintenance of English prisoners of war, the undersigned are prepared to submit on their part to the Commissioners of His Most Christian Majesty the account of the British government for the maintenance of French prisoners, and are ready instantly to apply themselves to the liquidation of the whole account. But whilst the undersigned have the honour to assure the Commissioners of His Most Christian Majesty of their readiness to enter immediately into the examination of this account, they feel it to be their indispensable duty to protest in the most earnest manner against the adoption of any course the operation of which may be to suspend the liquidation and discharge of the private claims of British subjects upon the government of France, until an account so voluminous as that of the prisoners of war shall be completely investigated.

The Commissioners of His Most Christian Majesty are aware that all French subjects are now in the actual possession and enjoyment of the principal, interest, and free disposition of all sums vested by them in any of the public funds of England: they will therefore see that any course which might lead to such a delay would be a direct infraction of the article of the Treaty whereby "France engages to act towards British subjects in

respect to the sums due to them with the same justice which the French subjects have experienced in Great Britain."

The undersigned therefore trust that if, in conformity with the wishes of the Commissioners of His Most Christian Majesty, they proceed immediately to the examination of the account of the prisoners of war, the Commissioners of His Most Christian Majesty will be willing to give at the same time an equal portion of their attention to what the undersigned must consider to be of at least equal importance, the liquidation of the private claims of His Britannic Majesty's subjects.

Persuaded that the Commissioners of His Most Christian Majesty will feel the justice of this proposal, the undersigned have the honour to repeat to them their anxious wish that they would take into their earliest consideration the claims which they had the honour to transmit to them in their note of the 19th instant.

The undersigned have the honour to offer to the Commissioners of His Most Christian Majesty the assurances of their high consideration.

C. BAGOT.

C. A. MACKENZIE.

A. E. IMPEY.

The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Fife House, 23rd Sept., 1814.

I have received your letter of the 13th instant, with the account of your conversation with M. de Talleyrand on the subject of the slave trade. The result of it is very much what I expected, though I cannot avoid saying that it was very unfair in Talleyrand (knowing as he did all our embarrassment on this question) to say even as much as he admits himself to have said to Lord Holland upon it; and though I have no doubt that Lord Holland in his zeal exaggerated what passed on the occasion, yet I think it very probable that Talleyrand said more than he now avows. Upon considering the matter thoroughly, I do think, however, that, especially after what has passed, it would be desirable to have some producible record that we had offered to France a pecuniary compensation or an island for the immediate abolition of the slave trade. Some such proposition is certainly expected by the abolitionists. These expectations have been encouraged by the report of the disposition of the French government to listen to it; and unless the attempt is made in some shape in which it can be shown that it has been made and rejected, I am apprehensive we shall not stand well with many of our friends. I have the less disinclination to the offer of an island for this object, since it has been determined to retain Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice. These settlements are most valuable to us, not only as they are occupied almost exclusively by British proprietors, but likewise as they contain the principal cotton establishments in America for the use of our manufactures. The retention of them will, however, add in some degree to the colonial jealousy of Great Britain which exists on the Continent, and I have reason to believe that the planters and merchants interested in the settlements in question did not expect that we should keep

them. Under these circumstances I think we can afford to offer a West India colony for the accomplishment of an object which the nation has certainly so much at heart. I would offer none but a West India colony, and I have already stated to you my reasons for preferring to offer Trinidad. I think it a question, however, whether in the first instance it would be necessary to state either the amount of money or the particular colony we were prepared to give up. The proposition might be confined to the principle in the first instance; and if that were formally rejected, we could not be called upon to go into details. I should only wish, for the reasons already stated, that if the offer of a colony be made, the colony should be described as a West India colony.

It is likewise worth considering whether under present circumstances such a proposition would better be made at Paris or at Vienna, and I wish upon this point you would communicate with Lord Castlereagh.

I am strongly inclined to the opinion that any attempt on the part of the French government to recover the colony of St. Domingo by force or intimidation will prove abortive. I do not believe that the parties in the island will come even to any compromise with the French government which is not founded upon the independence of the colony and its right to trade with other countries as well as with France.

I should be sorry on many accounts to see the French government embark in the undertaking of acquiring St. Domingo by force, as I am persuaded they would lose character and credit by it. If the government and West India planters could once be brought to the conclusion that it was necessary to give up the recovery of St. Domingo as desperate, they might perhaps be led to think that they could not do better than renounce the slave trade for a new colony, or even for a pecuniary compensation.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, very sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

Lord Holland to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Geneva, 24th Sept., 1814.

I owe you many apologies for the trouble I am giving you, but the pamphlet which I venture to forward with this letter seems to me so well calculated to remove the prejudices of the French on the subject of the abolition of the slave trade, that I am very anxious that you, who, from your public situation, and still more from your personal character and zeal in the cause, must have so many opportunities of combating the opinions of the anti-abolitionists in France with effect, should be in early possession of the facts so clearly stated in this little work. It is written by Mr. Sismondi, the celebrated author of the 'History of the Italian Republics.' Nothing, I fear, but a conviction that it is her commercial interest will induce France to concur cordially in the abolition. I have no doubt, however, that it is her interest in the present dearth of capital, especially as it is yet possible, if France and England agree, to compel Portugal and Spain to acquiesce in the measure. I sincerely believe that if anything could add to your claims on the gratitude of England, it would be becom-

ing the instrument of putting a final end to this horrible trade ; and I am quite sure that nothing could add to the satisfaction which the English public would feel in the accomplishment of that great work more than the circumstance of owing it in some measure to the exertions of the Duke of Wellington.

There is another object of humanity which I am sure you would wish to promote, but of the means of doing so you alone can judge : I mean the release of the *Liberales* leaders whom King Ferdinand has imprisoned in Spain. It has sometimes, I own, occurred to me that any interest expressed about them by Lord Castlereagh and the other ministers at the Congress might have an effect at Madrid, and that your testimony to their zeal against King Joseph and Napoleon, even in their most injudicious methods of opposing them, would carry great weight with the other Powers of Europe, and induce them to urge the Court of Spain to an act of amnesty at least, if it must not be called an act of justice. Perhaps my anxiety from public and private feeling to rescue many honourable public characters and some very intimate friends of mine from imprisonment and persecution may have led me to think such an exertion more easy than it really is, as it certainly has led me to suggest it to you with most unpardonable abruptness. I have no apology for doing so but this, that the very act shows that I have great confidence in your good nature and humanity, and am persuaded that you will readily interest yourself about the unfortunate, and as readily excuse the freedom of one who, though but lately honoured with your personal acquaintance, has long been with sincere respect

Yours obediently,

VASSALL HOLLAND.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Fife House, 25th Sept., 1814.

We received yesterday your letters of the 5th and 11th instant. I can assure you that we are fully sensible of all the difficulties in which you have been involved, and entirely concur with you in the substantial points for which you have been contending. We were certainly apprehensive that the course the negotiations were taking with Russia might unintentionally lead us further than we had any idea of going, and eventually produce a renewal of the war in Europe. It may be quite true that if the Emperor of Russia does not relax in his present demands, the peace of Europe may not be of long continuance ; but for however short a time that peace may last, I should consider it of great advantage. In the course of two or three years it may reasonably be expected that the power of Louis XVIII. in France will be consolidated, and that the revolutionary spirit which still exists to such an alarming degree in that country will in a great measure have evaporated. The people will have returned to peaceful habits, and the landed and moneyed interests will feel their fate connected with that of the restored government. In two or three years likewise the Prince of Orange will, I trust, have been enabled firmly to establish his authority in the Low Countries, will have raised an army for the defence of his dominions,

and have made some progress in erecting a barrier against his neighbours. But if war should be renewed at present, I fear that we should lose all we have gained, that the revolutionary spirit would break forth again in full force, and that the Continent would be plunged in all the evils under which it has groaned for the last twenty years. A war now, therefore, may be a revolutionary war. A war some time hence, though an evil, need not be different in its character and its effects from any of those wars which occurred in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, before the commencement of the French Revolution. In short, this appears to me to be the precise period in which the sentiment of Cicero, so often quoted by Mr. Fox, is really in point: "*Iniquissimam pacem justissimo bello antefero.*" I entertain these sentiments so strongly, that though I should most deeply regret the continuance of Murat on the throne of Naples as a sort of *taint* in our general arrangement, and though I think, therefore, that all means should be used consistent with our engagements to negotiate him out of his present kingdom, yet if such means should fail, as I fear they will, and the question should be whether any of the Powers of Europe should take up arms to drive him out of his dominions, my opinion would certainly be against such a measure. I think the positive benefit resulting from the success of it is not to be compared, under present circumstances, to the evils that might arise out of the attempt.

The reasoning in your last paper in answer to the Emperor of Russia is quite triumphant; but I believe the truth to be that he is committed to the Poles; and the dread of the reintegration of Poland as it existed in 1772 or 1791, and the effect of such a sacrifice of territory upon the Russian nobility and Russian people, are the only considerations that will induce him to give way. He will be quite deaf to every appeal to justice, moderation, or to the engagements which he contracted with Prussia and Austria in the course of the last campaign. We must likewise not conceal from ourselves that we shall have a hard battle to fight against public opinion in defence of any arrangement of which the independence of Poland does not now form a part.

If the arrangements respecting the Duchy of Warsaw could have been quietly settled amongst the three Powers as the result of the Treaty of Kalisch and of that of the 9th September, 1813, we should never have had any serious difficulty on the subject, and it would have been wholly unnecessary, and I think very imprudent, for us ever to have started the idea of Poland or of Polish independence; but it becomes very different to defend the partition of the Duchy of Warsaw as one of the alternatives to Polish independence, when the question of Polish independence has been once brought forward. We must, however, do our best in this respect, fully satisfied that we have acted from no other motive than that which was likely to contribute most upon the whole to the peace and tranquillity of Europe.

It seems difficult to imagine what course this whole business is likely to take in Congress. I trust the means will exist, however, of protesting against what it may not be prudent to resist, or at least that care may be taken that we are not parties to transactions which we have such strong reasons on every account to disapprove.

LIVERPOOL.

H. Goulburn, Esq., to Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD,

Ghent, 26th Sept., 1814.

The American note, which we transmit by the present opportunity, appears to us to contain, in fact, a refusal to accede to the modified proposition respecting Indian pacification, and the restoration of the Indians to the condition of 1811, which we brought forward in our last note as a *sine quâ non*. For if we adopt the mode proposed by them for extending the peace to the Indians, we do in reality abandon them as nations, and consent to treat for them as for subjects of the United States; and although we might perhaps thus protect the individual Indians who have espoused our cause as effectually as (without a restraint on the purchase of their lands) it is possible to protect them, yet an admission of this kind appears to be not only an abandonment of the principle on which our whole argument has been founded, but might be adduced in a later stage of the negotiation as a ground for excluding us from that trade which we carried on previous to the war with those Indians as independent nations, and from which the Americans are (as they have avowed in their preceding notes) desirous of excluding us. In accepting, too, the words proposed by the Americans, even with modifications, there would be great danger to the Indians lest the Americans, having stated the sense in which they have been proposed, should in applying them to the Indians so construe them, in direct opposition to the sense in which we had accepted them. Viewing the note in this light, we have been nevertheless unwilling to take any step which might lead to an early termination of the negotiation without a previous communication with the government, and we therefore send a copy of it home.

That you may not, however, conceive from the length of the note that we are desirous of relieving ourselves of the task of replying to it, I will take the liberty of stating what we conceive to be the mode in which the assertions and arguments contained in it are to be best met. If our view appear to you correct, we need not impose any further task upon you than that of stating your concurrence; if it appear erroneous, the points on which you consider us to err.

The Americans having proposed a specific article on the subject of Indian pacification, we conceive it might be met by proposing on our part the article with which we should be satisfied. Whatever this article may be (and that we must leave to your decision), it would afford us the opportunity of urging in the manner you pointed out in a former letter the sincerity of our desire for peace in reducing our original demands at a moment when the success of our arms might have authorised an opposite line of conduct.

Our ultimatum respecting Canadian frontier is not called for, since they have declined giving us the assurance which we stated to be an absolute preliminary to its production.

The other parts of the note, though not applying immediately, if at all, to the subjects under discussion, nevertheless require some observation. Professing, as the American plenipotentiaries do, to avoid all irritating discussions, it is not quite consistent with this profession to impute to the conduct of Great Britain in restraining the attacks of the Indians the motive which they have assigned to it, however absurd in itself or inconsistent with the conduct of Great Britain both before and afterwards. Great

Britain certainly did not seek a cause of war with the United States, and could consequently not have kept the rage of the Indians suspended in expectation of an event which she did not know would happen at all, and which she did all in her power to prevent. It is sufficient for us, however, that in assigning this motive, the Americans admit the fact that Great Britain did discourage the Indians from invading the United States, and that the Indians declared war against them previous to the commencement of the war between Great Britain and the United States, and therefore admit the accusation contained in their former note to have been unfounded.

The falsehood of their assertion respecting the instructions received from their government is apparent from their former note; but we beg in confirmation to state collectively and individually in our answer to them that we have no recollection of their having ever alluded, at conference or otherwise, to any instructions received by them dated in June last. Indeed we are perfectly certain that no such communication was ever made.

They have equally, as far as we have any means of judging, misstated the grounds upon which Mr. Pitt rejected the French proposition in 1762 for considering the Indians between Canada and Louisiana as independent nations. The enclosed extract from the history of that negotiation shows that it broke off upon a ground altogether unconnected with Indian independence. There must certainly be in the Foreign or the State Paper Office Mr. Pitt's original answer to M. de Bussy, from which this might effectually be proved. Be this as it may, the Americans have been inconsistent in referring to this transaction, after having declared that they knew of no instance in which a definition of Indian boundary with a view to a neutral barrier had ever been proposed or discussed by European nations. How far their statement as to their having received the solemn sanction of Spain herself to the occupation of Louisiana is correct, you will be able to inform us: we doubt it much.

The last point to be remarked relates to the district of Maine. The proposal for appointing Commissioners appears to us inadmissible, it being a receipt for defrauding Great Britain; but it might be well to state that so far from ever having required, as they state, *all* the portion of the district between New Brunswick and Quebec, we at no time required more than that very small portion of unsettled country which interrupts our communication, and which there is much doubt whether it does not already belong to Great Britain under the former treaties. I know not whether you will think us right, but we avoid as much as possible referring to the treaty of 1783 as to territorial boundaries, considering it as founded throughout in this respect on very erroneous principles.

Believe me, my dear Lord, ever yours most faithfully,

HENRY GOULBURN.

We have not enclosed in the American note a copy of Sir A. Cochrane's proclamation, because it has been long since published in all the newspapers, and our powers of copying have been fully exercised in making two copies of the American note.

The Prince of Orange to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Brussels, 26th Sept., 1814.

This being written in the midst of a ball given after this morning's races, I hope you will excuse the confusion of my thoughts; but Lieut.-Gen. Fagel having been appointed Dutch Minister at the Court of France, and leaving this in an hour for Paris, I make him the bearer of these lines, by which I take the liberty of introducing him to you. He is a very excellent man, brother to the Dutch Ambassador in London, and has himself lived a great deal in England: he is a personal friend of my father's, and has never left him in all his adversities, which is the chief reason for his having been chosen to fill the diplomatic situation he now is in, since he is the only person my father can entirely trust, and of whom he can be certain that he will not intrigue with the French government. If you will be so good as to take him under your protection, since by his instructions he is to do nothing without your participation, I am sure my father will be most particularly obliged to you, and I think you will find Fagel worthy of it.

I remain, my dear Duke, with perfect regard,

Yours most truly,

WILLIAM, HERED. PRINCE OF ORANGE.

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

[787.]

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 27th Sept., 1814.

I enclose you a memorandum and copy of a letter which I have written to Lord Bathurst on the defence of the Netherlands.* You will observe that the left, that is to say, from the Scheldt, or rather from Mons to Namur, will be the most vulnerable point.

I have not considered the subject in this memorandum beyond the boundary of the Meuse, but I entertain no doubt that the evil would be considerably diminished if Luxembourg were to be ceded to the Prince of Orange. The territory which would be ceded with the place would more than provide the garrison and defray the expense.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xii., p. 123.

*The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, and to
Viscount Castlereagh.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Fife House, 27th Sept., 1814.

I have sent you the "Extraordinary Gazette" of this day, with the very satisfactory account of the operations of our army and navy upon the coast of America, by the destruction of the American flotilla, and the capture and occupation for a time of the city of Washington.

The conduct of all the officers and troops employed on this service does them the highest credit. I rejoice to say, likewise, that Sir A. Cochrane, General Ross, and Admiral Cockburn are very sanguine about their future operations. They intend, on account of the season, to proceed in the first instance to the northward, and to occupy Rhode Island, where they propose remaining and living upon the country until about the 1st of November. They will then proceed again southward, destroy Baltimore, if they should find it practicable without too much risk, occupy several important points on the coast of Georgia and of the Carolinas, take possession of Mobile in the Floridas, and close the campaign with an attack upon New Orleans. In the mean time we hope Sir James Yeo will be able to establish his superiority on Lake Ontario, and that Sir George Prevost, having collected his forces, will succeed in his attack upon Sackett's Harbour and upon Plattsburgh, on Lake Champlain, for both of which he is preparing, and that the Canadian frontier will thus be rendered secure.

Having said all this, I can assure you that these considerations will make no difference in our anxious desire to put an end to the war if it can be done consistently with our honour, and upon such terms as we are fairly entitled to expect. The notes of our commissioners at Ghent will, I think, sufficiently prove the moderation of our views. I am satisfied that if peace is made on the conditions we have proposed, we shall be very much abused for it in this country; but I feel too strongly the inconvenience of a continuance of the war not to make me desirous of concluding it at the expense of some popularity; and it is a satisfaction to reflect that our military success will at least divest the peace of anything which could affect our national character.

We are in daily and hourly expectation of the answer of the American Commissioners to our last note; by which I think we shall be enabled to judge how far it is practicable, under present circumstances, to bring the negotiation to a successful termination.

The Americans have certainly assumed hitherto a tone in the negotiation very different from what their situation appears to warrant.

In any conversation which you may have with the King of France or with his Ministers, you will not fail to advert to this circumstance, and to do justice to the moderation with which we are disposed to act towards them.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke,

Ever yours sincerely,

LIVERPOOL.

[A copy of the above letter to the Duke of Wellington, leaving out the

last paragraph and substituting the following, was addressed by Lord Liverpool the same day to Lord Castlereagh.]

“In the exercise of your discretion as to how much you may think proper to disclose of what has been passing to the Sovereigns and ministers whom you will meet at Vienna, I have no doubt you will see the importance of adverting to this circumstance, and of doing justice to the moderation with which we are disposed to act towards America. I fear the Emperor of Russia is half an American; and it would be very desirable to do away any prejudice which may exist in his mind, or in that of Count Nesselrode, on this subject.”

Count Jaucourt to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Paris, 27 Sept., 1814.

J'ai reçu la lettre que Votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser en date d'hier pour rappeler la note relative à la traite des Nègres, qu'elle avait passée le 26 Août à M. le Prince de Talleyrand.

Avant de répondre officiellement à Votre Excellence, M. le Prince de Talleyrand avait cru devoir demander au Ministre de la Marine quelques renseignements sur les moyens d'exécuter les mesures qu'elle proposait dans cette note, et que le Roi s'est montré disposé à adopter.

Ces renseignements n'ont point encore été donnés par le département de la Marine. Je viens de les demander de nouveau, et dès qu'ils me seront parvenus j'aurai soin d'adresser à Votre Excellence la réponse qu'elle m'a fait l'honneur de me demander.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec une très haute considération, my Lord,

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

F. JAUCOURT.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Downing Street, 27th Sept., 1814.

I enclose a copy of a letter which I received from the Hereditary Prince and of my answer. The intimation that it will be necessary for him to give up his command if he proceeds to Vienna will be sufficient to put an end to the project, which I imagine has taken its rise from some jealousy of the Sovereign Prince. If you should, however, hear anything of it, I hope you will equally discourage it.

I have seen a letter from his head-quarters, by which I learn that the Russian Ambassador at the Hague, General Pfhull, had gone over to Brussels to impress the Hereditary Prince and his staff with the necessity of immediately combining movements with the Prussians for the purpose of resisting an invasion of Belgium, which the Ambassador appeared to apprehend. That this has not been done without orders appears probable from the Russian Ambassador here having last week held the same language nearly to Liverpool. As the object appears to be to make us jealous of France, I do not quite understand it, unless it is to impress us with a notion that

there is a secret understanding between Austria and France; of which your Grace, I think, is not very suspicious. Lord Liverpool assured the Russian Ambassador here that we had an entire dependence on the good faith of France.

I send you a sketch of the advance and battle at Bladensburg, which you will have the goodness to return to the office. The conduct of Major-General Ross does credit to your Grace's school.

I remain yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

You will, I hope, approve of my letter to our Commissioners at Ghent, which is sent under a flying seal to you for Lord Castlereagh.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

The Prince of Orange to Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD,

Brussels, 21st Sept., 1814.

My father is very pressing upon the subject of my going to Vienna; for although I told him that I thought it very indelicate in me to ask the British government to allow me to quit the army for some time so immediately after having assumed the command, he urged in favour of his desire that it was impossible for him to quit Holland and the Low Countries at present, and therefore could not go in person to the Congress; that it would, however, be of importance to him to have some one of our family at Vienna, and that he thought me the most eligible person for that mission, being very well seen by the four principal Powers, England, Prussia, Austria, and Russia, knowing all these Monarchs personally, and having received the greatest marks of kindness from them; he therefore thinks it might be of great use to his affairs, and to the interests of this country, if I could go. My answer was, that if I was at liberty, I certainly would immediately follow his desire; but that not being the case, I would refer it to you, and ask your leave to that effect. Sir Henry Clinton being here, the army will be in the best possible hands during my absence, and suffer in no respect whatsoever by my being away. I beg you will communicate to the Prince Regent this demand, and assure him that nothing but the importance my father attaches to this mission would have made me apply for a permission to quit the army for any time at present. I beg, my dear Lord, you will be so kind as to let me have an answer without delay, my father wishing me to go as soon as possible.

For ever yours most truly and sincerely,

WILLIAM, HERED. PRINCE OF ORANGE.

II.

Earl Bathurst to the Prince of Orange.

SIR,

Downing Street, 27th Sept., 1814.

I received on Saturday the letter which your Royal Highness did me the honour of writing to me on the 21st, in which your Royal Highness expressed the wish of the Sovereign Prince, and also your own, to proceed to Vienna for the purpose of attending the Congress.

I hope your Royal Highness is assured that it will always give me the sincerest satisfaction to forward any proposition which the Sovereign Prince or yourself can think advantageous to the interests of the House of Orange, and that you will not think it inconsistent with this profession if I beg you to reconsider this undertaking before you engage in it.

The adjustment of the various subjects which will be matter of discussion at the Congress is not the business of a day. Your attendance there will therefore render it, I am afraid, expedient for you to resign the command, which is the more to be regretted, as arrangements would be probably made which would make it difficult for your Royal Highness afterwards to resume it.

Even if this objection did not exist, I should doubt very much whether it is expedient for your Royal Highness now to proceed to Vienna. The great questions in which the House of Orange is peculiarly interested are, in fact, already arranged : of their final conclusion no doubt can exist. Whatever remains are questions of minor consequence, with which the Sovereign Prince can safely trust his Minister, more particularly as he will be aided by Lord Castlereagh and also by Lord Clancarty, who has had the honour of being attached to the person of His Royal Highness from the moment he returned to Holland. Should any questions arise of greater magnitude than I am aware of, your Royal Highness will, I hope, excuse the freedom which I have always presumed to use towards you if I fairly tell you that you are too young to be entrusted with the prosecution of them ; for, whatever may be the consideration in which your Royal Highness is deservedly held by the Sovereigns who will be assembled at Vienna, it is with their ministers, men of great experience and sagacity, with whom your Royal Highness would have to contend on any question of great political importance.

The question which is likely to occupy the first attention of the Congress is one deeply affecting the interests of our three Continental Allies. The discussion is calculated to create great jealousy, I wish I could be sure it would not excite much animosity, among them. In this it cannot be the interest of your Royal Highness to take a part ; and yet it might be difficult for your Royal Highness, if present, to keep aloof. So far, therefore, from thinking that it is advisable for your Royal Highness to give up the command for the purpose of attending the Congress, I should think it fortunate you had such an excuse for being absent, if I imagined that it would otherwise have been necessary for you to have gone to Vienna.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your Royal Highness's most faithful humble servant,

BATHURST.

William Wilberforce, Esq., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Sandgate (Folkestone), 28th Sept., 1814.

Though I felt the strongest desire to address a few lines to your Grace for the purpose of returning my best thanks for your most obliging letter, I resisted the impulse, from a conviction that I should best prove my sense of your kindness by sparing your time. But as I have occasion to trouble your Grace with a letter, let me begin it by begging your Grace to accept my best acknowledgments.

Forgive me, however, if I next proceed to state that I am almost afraid your Grace's account of the disposition towards the slave trade both of the

King of France and of his Prime Minister, and still more your Grace's confirmation of their consenting immediately to abolish the trade on the Windward Coast (using the term in its most extended sense, as including all the coast from the Senegal to the Gold Coast), may have caused me too soon to dismiss my fears for the safety of that part of Africa.

I was a good deal shocked to see a few days ago in one of our newspapers the translation of an ordonnance, stated to have been issued on the 29th of August last, and rendered more suspicious and alarming by its being copied from a Dutch newspaper, authorizing the sailing of slave ships from all the ports of France which had a public bonded warehouse, *under the old arrangements and regulations*; no limitation expressed of the parts of the coast on which the trade is to be carried on. The apprehensions produced by this article, a copy of which I will take the liberty to enclose, have been greatly aggravated by my hearing this morning that a French armament sailed three weeks ago to take possession of Goree, Senegal, &c., and that an order for delivering up those settlements has been given by Lord Bathurst to M. de la Chartre. I need not detain your Grace with any comments on these particulars, on which I will, by this day's post, address a few lines also to Lord Bathurst. Lord Liverpool is out of town, and I wish Lord Bathurst himself also may not be absent.

I trust your Grace reads Peltier's 'Ambigu.' The last number contains much curious and excellent matter relative to the slave trade and St. Domingo. It is curious that about the very time when M. des Fourneaux was making his — report (I dare not trust myself to give it an epithet), information was received in England, both from Christophe and Petion, contradicting all M. des Fourneaux's assertions, and more particularly intimating that the single circumstance of the French clinging so obstinately to the slave trade proved decisively the falsehood of all the pretences of the French to have any real intentions of settling the St. Domingo affairs otherwise than by restoring the old system of slavery. If your Grace should not have read the last number of the 'Ambigu,' No. 413, Sept. 20th, allow me to recommend the latter part of it strongly to your perusal.

There is still another topic on which I trust your Grace will allow me to trouble you. The information I received from various quarters, above all from your Grace's letter, convinced me that the best course for us to pursue was to endeavour, by proper publications, to open the minds of the French nation to the real nature and effects of the slave trade. I therefore instantly set to work and drew up a pamphlet in the form of a letter to the Prince Talleyrand, stating, in a summary way, the manner of carrying on the slave trade, and its consequences on the happiness and civilization of Africa, adding an Appendix of extracts from authors of high credit confirming the truth of my statements; more especially bearing testimony to the amiable character and excellent qualities of the natives of Africa. My piece, written of course in English (for unhappily I have almost forgotten my French), is translating, and indeed I hope nearly finished, and is printed as fast as it is translated, so that it will be soon ready for publication. Now, may I take the liberty of asking your Grace how the publication and circulation of it can be secured, or rather the former, for I would not trouble your Grace concerning the latter? I conceived that possibly

government (I mean both the French government and our own) might feel that taking any active part in bringing it forward might be implicating them too much in its contents; though I scarcely need say that I have endeavoured to render it as conciliatory as I could consistently with the object in view.

I wrote lately to M. Humboldt at Paris on another subject, and mentioned the matter to him, and also to General Macaulay, who is now in Paris.

I trust your Grace will have the goodness to assist me to any degree in which you can do it with propriety.

I was just now told that our post, which sets out very early, is on the point of departing; and I wish much to write, though ever so shortly, to Lord Bathurst.

Your Grace will therefore excuse my hastening to subscribe myself, with the greatest respect,

My Lord, your Grace's obliged and faithful servant,

W. WILBERFORCE.

[ENCLOSURE.]

French Slave Trade.

(From a Dutch Paper.)

By a Circular from the Royal Customs, dated the 29th of August, French shipowners are informed that the slave trade is restored, with and under the old arrangements and regulations. The fitting out of ships for this trade can only take in those ports where there is a public bonded warehouse. The owners in making up their cargoes may not only take all the articles of domestic manufacture enumerated in the 6th article of the letters patent of 1716, such as all sorts of linens, toys, merceries, glassware, coral, rod iron, muskets, sabres, and flints, but also such foreign merchandise from the bonded warehouses as may suit them, without payment of any duties except the balance duty. Freedom from the duties of export shall also extend to the necessary provisions and stores, both for victualling the crew and feeding the negroes.

The owners must deliver a declaration to the Customs, under sufficient bond, that they will apply the whole of their cargo in this trade, and show that they introduced the negroes into our colonies, by a certificate from the chief of the government or his deputies, containing the name and the tonnage of the ship, the number and value of the negroes, together with the date of their importation. The trade in slaves, as well as the trade to our colonies, can only be carried on in French vessels. Negroes may not only be introduced into the islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe, but also into the other French colonies as soon as the government shall have taken possession of them.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

[788.]

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 29th Sept., 1814.

I have received your letter of the 23rd,* regarding the cession to the French government in order to obtain an immediate

* See p. 283.

abolition of the slave trade; and after considering what is your object, it appears to me that I shall best fulfil it by leaving the matter to be settled between Lord Castlereagh and Monsieur de Talleyrand.

I am inclined to doubt, from what passed between Monsieur de Jaucourt and me this day, whether Monsieur de Talleyrand ever mentioned to the King what I had before said to him on this subject. I think it most probable he did not. He certainly did not to Monsieur de Jaucourt. At all events, the King would not like to authorize that an official answer should be given to such an offer from us without referring to Monsieur de Talleyrand; and if there should be more than one reference to Vienna, your object would not be accomplished before the Parliament would meet.

As the notion of this cession originated with Monsieur de Talleyrand in his conversation with Lord Holland, and I spoke to him alone on the subject, it appears to me that it is best that the official proposal should be made to him, and that he should give the answer.

Monsieur de Jaucourt told me that he would inform the King this day of the proposal, and would take His Majesty's orders either to accept or decline the offer, and would transmit them by the courier of to-morrow to Monsieur de Talleyrand. I will endeavour to see him after he will have seen the King, and will let Lord Castlereagh know what the King may determine.

Monsieur de Jaucourt, to whom I explained that the intention of your Lordship had been to make a cession which should compensate to the party interested in the trade for its immediate abolition, and that it should be either a sum of money or one of the colonies in the West Indies, observed that the purchase or sale of any political object for a sum of money was unpopular in France as affecting the dignity of the government; and that those interested in the slave trade and the proprietors in the old colonies would feel that the cession of an island to obtain the immediate abolition of the trade would be no compensation to them, and that they would contend it would be none to the country, as the continuance of the trade would bring as much new land in the old colonies into cultivation and produce as the State would acquire in the newly-ceded colony.

The conversation then turned upon St. Domingo, and it is

quite clear to me that no plan regarding that island has yet been determined upon. The letter received by Peltier had occasioned a good deal of astonishment and disappointment, and Monsieur de Jaucourt told me that the government were inclined to believe it was not genuine. I had luckily seen a person in the morning who had had the letter in his hands and had assured me it was genuine, which I told Monsieur de Jaucourt; and he then went into a discussion to show that a plan which had been proposed of sending 20,000 men to St. Domingo, to aid one of the parties against the other, would have no effect excepting to induce the two to join to keep out the French. He told me that the government were overwhelmed with demands and schemes for the recovery of this colony; but he said, that as the individuals who proposed these schemes had everything to gain and nothing to lose in their execution, it was not astonishing that they were extravagant, and that the King received them with suspicion.

Let me know whether you don't think it would answer your purpose, in some degree, if I were to put the whole that has passed on this subject in a separate despatch.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

[789.]

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 30th Sept., 1814.

The copy of my letter to Lord Liverpool of this date will show you how matters stand respecting the official offer of a cession for the immediate abolition of the slave trade. Monsieur de Jaucourt did not see the King yesterday, and I have not seen him since the hour at which he was to see him this day. I won't detain the courier, however, as I conceive it but little important what may have been his communication with His Majesty.

The conversation with Watersdorf, reported in my despatch, is more important; particularly connected with the alarm which the Emperor's ministers at the Hague and in London have endeavoured to create regarding the designs of the French in the Low Countries. I don't know whether Pozzo di Borgo was acquainted with, and mentioned to the Emperor, the jealousy felt

here upon the Emperor's designs in the north of Germany, but I'll endeavour to discover.

There is nothing new here. I think we are getting a little unpopular in the town, but I don't think that circumstance is of much importance.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Liverpool to Earl Bathurst.

DEAR BATHURST,

Walmer Castle, 1st Oct., 1814.

I was sorry that Morris had not taken a copy of the note from Ghent before he sent it. You will have received it, however, this morning, and will have seen that my opinion upon the article respecting the Indians concurs entirely in substance with yours. The article in their favour must be distinct and specific. We cannot object to making it reciprocal if they desire it, nor to a proviso that it depends upon the Indians putting an end to hostilities and living peaceably. I am quite ready to agree to the projet of the article as you have sent it. I have marked one or two softenings, and I should not object to leave a discretion to our Commissioners to alter a word or a phrase, provided they adhered to the substance of what we sent them.

I quite agree with you that the passage in Mr. Pitt's negotiation is not intelligible either in French or English, but I do not think it can warrant the inference of the American Commissioners. This is, however, the worst part of our case, and we must get over it as well as we can. I am anxious on this account for as many instances as can be found of special protection stipulated in treaties of peace to sects, bodies, &c., &c., such as Protestants in France and Germany, Greeks in parts of the Turkish Empire, and such instances. They will be material in explaining the matter in Europe when we come to draw up a declaration.

I have put down on a separate sheet some memoranda for an answer on certain points, to which I will make additions, if any occur, upon my receiving the copy of the note by the post of to-morrow.

Ever sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

2nd Oct.

I have just received your letter of the 1st. I perceive that we quite agree as to the answer to the last proposition of the American Commissioners respecting the Indians. It is only necessary therefore now to prepare a paper in reply to theirs, and I concur with you in thinking that we had better bring this part of the negotiation to a point. If we cannot agree about this article, we might as well suspend or break off the negotiations at Ghent, and settle our instructions to Sir G. Prevost in the course of the week after next.

MEMORANDUM.

Louisiana and Florida.

With respect to Louisiana, the Commissioners have only stated it as one instance amongst many of the spirit of acquisition and aggrandizement which has for a long time animated the councils of the United States ; but with regard to the measures which have been adopted by the same government as to the Floridas, they are confident that there exists but one sentiment throughout Europe—that considering the transaction itself, and the occasion and circumstances under which it took place, it is to be regarded as one of the most immoral acts recorded in the history of any country.*

Conquest of Canada.

Although it cannot be denied in principle that the acts or declarations of an officer not disavowed when known by his government must be considered as the act of the government which employs him, it might not be just or reasonable to extend this principle to every act or declaration which in the course of an extensive and complicated service may be done or made by the officers employed in it ; but can it be contended that the proclamations of two commanders in chief, issued at the interval of some months, upon their invasion of a neighbouring province, declaring the intention with which the invasion was undertaken, and calling upon the inhabitants to aid and assist them—can it be contended that such proclamations, never disavowed for the space of two years, do not contain the sentiments of the government by whom the officers who issued them were employed ?

The Prince Regent's government have abundant other means of knowing that the conquest of Upper and Lower Canada, and the annexation of them to the United States, were the object and policy of the American government. They never have asserted that the American government would have made the acquisition of either of these provinces a *sine quâ non* of peace in any negotiation which might take place before the conquest of them had been accomplished.

With respect to the proclamation of Sir Alexander Cochrane, of ,† the former have no scruple in declaring that after the proclamation issued by the American commanders, it is most fully approved by their government.

F. Magee, Esq., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Paris, 1st Oct., 1814.

I am persuaded your Grace will pardon me if the anxiety which I feel, in common with all your countrymen, upon all occasions in the most remote degree interesting to your Grace, leads me to trespass for a moment upon you unnecessarily. I have had the honour of experiencing your Grace's kindness when you held a distinguished situation in Ireland, and therefore entertain the less doubt that your Grace will excuse me for my motive.

* This may be softened.—*Note in manuscript.*

† Blank in manuscript.

Since I have been in France, having mixed very much with the people upon several occasions, I have had an opportunity of hearing their sentiments and opinions; and I think it a duty I owe to my country and to your Grace to communicate to you that the discharged officers of this country say their feelings are wounded particularly by seeing your Grace ambassador here, having within 60 leagues of Paris a part of the army at the head of which you never failed to conquer. A stranger to fear, your Grace will permit your country to feel some apprehension at seeing your Grace in Paris with a disappointed, disbanded French army entertaining such sentiments towards your Grace. I scarcely imagine the circumstance can have escaped the notice of some other person, and that your Grace has not been already apprised of it; but I should never forgive myself were it otherwise, if I had not taken the liberty of troubling your Grace with this letter.

I am not aware that your Grace can have a wish to see me upon this subject, but lest you should, I shall inquire on Monday, when I shall call concerning my passport, if your Grace has expressed an intention of honouring me with an interview.

I have the honour to be, with every sentiment of respect and esteem,

My Lord,

Your Grace's most devoted obedient humble servant,

FRANCIS MAGEE.

[790.]

To Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 2nd Oct., 1814.

I avail myself of the opportunity of the passage of Lord Castlereagh's courier from Vienna to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th September,* and to tell you that if the Prince of Orange should ask my opinion on his proposed journey to Vienna, I will advise him against it; and that, in the mean time, I will speak to Fagel, who is arrived here, on the subject. From all that I hear, however, I don't believe that the military affairs of Flanders would suffer if they were in other hands; as the Prince is certainly too young, and not sufficiently steady or sufficiently attentive to business, for such a charge at present, and he cannot hold it long without public detriment. I spoke to him on the subject by his father's desire.

From your mentioning that Pfhull must have occasioned the alarm in the Low Countries by authority from his Court, it occurred to me that this authority must have originated in the jealousy expressed here of the continuance of Beningsen's army

* See p. 291.

in the north of Germany. But having spoken to Pozzo di Borgo on the subject, I find that he purposely omitted to make any report of the complaint, of which he had a knowledge ; and he is convinced that Pfhull has taken alarm from the report he has received of the language held by the French officers on the frontier, and that he communicated the alarm to Lieven.

You may depend upon it there is no intention in this government to disturb the general tranquillity in any manner.

There has been some awkwardness in the town within these few days. There has been no disturbance, but libels against the King and the government have been sold publicly and distributed very generally. The Jacobin party are supposed to be at work, and I have received intelligence from a variety of persons, of different notions, of the public mind being a good deal disturbed. There have been some instances of ill-treatment and rudeness to strangers, particularly the English ; principally, I believe, from disbanded officers returned from England and Russia as prisoners of war.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Vienna, 2nd Oct., 1814.

I send enclosed Hardenberg's memoir, which, I believe, has been drawn up by General Knessebeck, with a map for your consideration. Also a paper of Lord Clancarty's with an explanatory map.

I add also an extract from a general scheme of European arrangement suggested by Prince Hardenberg, at Paris, in May last, in which he brings forward another version of the Prince of Orange's interests.

These several documents will give you the adverse views of the question, that is, what the Prince of Orange desires, and what the Allies offer. I have declined giving any opinion on the principle of this proposition till I hear from you, and also from home ; and a final assent cannot reasonably be expected till I can see the bearings of this arrangement in relation to the other proposed allocation of territory on the continent.

My letters home, which you have seen, will have explained the points most in dispute, and the mode in which the respective Powers attempt to solve these difficulties. Austria and Prussia, in proportion as they are excluded from Poland, become pressing in other directions. The complication in which the present proposition originates is principally to be traced to the difficulty of arranging the line of the Maine, and especially of the possession of Mayence between the northern and southern States of Germany.

In Hardenberg's Paris projet, Bavaria was indemnified for the Tyrol, Salzburg, &c., partly on the right of the Maine, Prussia being placed behind the Rhine, with a *lisière* only on the left bank; her flanks supported by Wesel and Mayence. To this arrangement Bavaria and Austria positively refuse their concurrence, as giving to Prussia the entire command of their only great river, in addition to the Rhine, the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula. They also object to cede to the Northern interests the only great fortress towards the south of Germany, which bears, they say, as much, if not more, on their security. This resistance has induced Prussia to endeavour to find an expedient by tempting Bavaria to place herself in the more exposed positions on the left bank of the Rhine. To make this plan succeed, some extension of territory must be found for her, and some place d'armes to cover and protect her frontier. To effect this, it is suggested that the King of Bavaria should reassume his ancient subjects in the Palatinate, strengthened by the territory and fortress of Luxembourg, by which concession Prussia expects to keep Bavaria to the southward of the Maine, and to arrange that Mayence shall be an Imperial fortress, instead of being given to Bavaria, with regulations which shall secure the free navigation of the river to the southern States.

The general reasoning brought forward in support of this plan, you will find in the Memoir No. 1, viz., the inability of the provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, by any combination of their own means, permanently to secure themselves against France; the necessity of interesting other States in their defence; and the impossibility of doing so effectually, except by giving them a substantive footing beyond the Rhine.

It is further alleged that, to give a decided German character to the politics of Bavaria, now closely united with Austria, she ought to be liberally treated, and have her territorial interests rendered incompatible with the French scheme of extending themselves to the Rhine.

If this reasoning is solid, there can be no doubt that the support of so highly military a power as Bavaria on the left flank, with Prussia in second line to Holland and Bavaria, as proposed in the present plan, presents a much more imposing front to France than Holland spread out to the Moselle, as suggested in the former plan, with Prussia behind the Rhine, and the territories between the Moselle and Rhine *morcellés* as mere indemnities between the Grand Duke de Bade and other petty Princes.

The arrangement, as suggested, is less liberal in a territorial point of view to the House of Orange than could be wished; perhaps in this respect some modifications may be effected; but the great question for them, as well as for us, is to weigh what is the best security for peace, and for keeping the Low Countries out of the hands of France. In this view of the subject, beyond all others the most essential for Great Britain to look to, I doubt the policy of our building our system of defence exclusively upon the Prince of Orange's power, enfeebled as it must be for great military exertions by the genius of his people, and by the principles of his government. You will weigh this in deciding on the alternatives into which the question resolves itself. We should both wish to press what was most acceptable to the Prince of Orange; but the point ought to be ruled upon larger principles, and, in examining them, I am always led to revert with considerable favour to a policy which Mr. Pitt, in the year 1806, had

strongly at heart, which was to tempt Prussia to put herself forward on the left bank of the Rhine, more in military contact with France. I know there may be objections to this, as placing a power peculiarly military, and consequently somewhat encroaching, so extensively in contact with Holland and the Low Countries ; but as this is only the secondary danger, we should not sacrifice to it our first object, which is to provide effectually against the systematic views of France to possess herself of the Low Countries and the territories on the left bank of the Rhine, a plan which, however discountenanced by the present French government, will infallibly revive whenever circumstances favour its execution.

Ever, my dear Lord, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Extraits du Plan proposé par le Chancelier Hardenberg pour l'arrangement futur de l'Europe.

La Hollande et la Suisse seraient invitées à une alliance perpétuelle avec la fédération.

Les anciennes provinces Prussiennes sur la rive gauche du Rhin, évaluées à 122,000 âmes, en réservant toutefois une cession le long de la Meuse pour la Hollande, afin de donner à ce pays tout le cours de cette rivière.

La Hollande, dont l'importance pour le soutien du système qu'on se propose d'établir en Europe, et particulièrement pour l'indépendance du nord de l'Allemagne et de la Prusse, est universellement reconnue, doit être rendue forte, et obtenir une puissance territoriale qui la mette à même de se défendre avec succès contre toute agression.

Pour atteindre ce but on propose d'y joindre la Belgique, à l'exception de quelques parcelles qui resteraient à la France, une partie des anciennes possessions Allemandes sur la rive gauche du Rhin.

Voici la frontière qu'on donnerait à ce nouvel état, sous la dénomination des Provinces Unies des Pays-Bas.

Depuis la mer du Nord en partant du Dollart, les anciennes limites entre la Hollande et l'Allemagne resteraient intactes jusqu'à la Meuse. Cependant, la Prusse céderait aux Provinces Unies les enclaves de Huyssen et de Sevenaar, et on réglerait conjointement la frontière entre Emmerich et Genex. La Meuse formerait les limites depuis Genex jusqu'à Liège. Cette rivière appartiendrait aux Provinces Unies, en réservant toutefois la libre navigation et l'exemption de tous droits qui ne seraient pas imposés aux sujets de ces provinces mêmes aux pays adjacens.

Toutes les places fortes sur la Meuse, nommément Venloo, Roermonde, et Maestricht, appartiendraient à la Hollande, avec des rayons sur la rive droite. La partie de la Gueldre Prussienne située sur la rive gauche de la Meuse serait cédée aux Provinces Unies. Liège, avec la plus grande partie des pays de ce nom, le serait également, et aurait un rayon sur la rive droite de la Meuse pour être fortifié.

On a déjà observé plus haut que la maison de Nassau doit être rapprochée ou amalgamée avec la Hollande. La branche d'Orange se trouvera très richement dédommée de tout ce qu'elle possède et possédait en Allemagne par les cessions considérables qu'on fera à la Hollande ; et supposé qu'elle voulait établir une seconde géniture, ce serait à elle à la prendre sur ces cessions et à

faire des arrangemens en conséquence. Il s'agit donc de trouver un équivalent suffisant et convenable pour les branches de Weilbourg et d'Usingen, qui vont être fondues en une seule. Celui-ci se présente dans les belles contrées le long de la Meuse, dans les cantons d'Ekelens, Juliers, Duren, Eschweiler, Bonette, Aix-la-Chapelle, Linruh, Geilenkirchens, Heinsberg, Auchten, Littard, Oirsbeck, Herl, Rolduc, Gulpen, Dalheim, Fleran, Herve, Aubel, Eussen Limbourg, Verviers, Spa, dans leurs frontières actuelles, et dans une partie de ceux de Louveigne, Ost Maestricht, Merschen, Maseyck, et Roermonde. La forteresse de Juliers, avec un rayon militaire, appartiendrait à la Hollande. Elle aurait de plus des routes militaires pour ce nouveau pays de Nassau, et la navigation sur la Roer entre Juliers et Roermonde.

Un traité fixerait les rapports entre les deux pays. La maison de Nassau gagne à tous égards par cet arrangement.

Ses anciennes possessions qui lui appartiennent dans ce moment, avec les droits de souveraineté et de propriété, ne renferment que 191,000. Elle exerce le premier sur plusieurs états médiatisés par Buonaparte contenant 81,000 ; total, 272,000. Le pays qu'on lui destine est de 276,800. Par conséquent elle obtient un surplus de 4,800, et le très grand avantage d'acquérir un pays de 85,800 âmes en toute propriété au delà de ce qu'elle possédait.

La ville et forteresse de Luxembourg appartiendrait à la Hollande. Les frontières depuis Liège seraient réglées de manière qu'elles suivraient la route de Liège et Valambert, Neufville, Terwagen, Bois Baillonville, Marche en Famene, Tournal Bastogne, Martelange, Arlon, Steinfort à Luxembourg, avec une lisière suffisante à l'Est de cette route qui serait à la Hollande.

De Luxembourg elles iraient jusque vers la Moselle jusqu'à Neuenkirchen. Ici commence la frontière avec l'ancienne France, et suit les départemens des Forêts ou Sambre et Meuse, Jemappe, et de la Lys. On pourrait admettre les modifications suivantes. Les cantons de Gediene, Beauraing, Florenne et Valcourt, Flaster le Vaux et Waulson, dans le canton de Dinant, du département de Sambre et Meuse ; ceux de Chimay, Beaumont, Merbes le Château, et Dour, du département de Jemappe, pourraient rester à la France pour lui donner de meilleures limites et des rayons et communications convenables aux places de Givet, Philippeville, Maubeuge, et Valenciennes.

Les limites entre la France et les Provinces Unies se termineraient comme autrefois entre Furnes et Dunkerque à la Mer du Nord. Les places de Nieuport, Ostende, Furnes, Dixmuyden, Ypres, Menin, Courtray, Oudenarde, Tournay, Ath, Mons, Charleroi, Namur, Dinant, Huy, resteraient aux Provinces Unies, et formeraient, de ce côté, une barrière suffisante.

Les possessions Hollandaises se montaient, avant la réunion de la Hollande à la France, à 521 milles, âmes 1,889,000 ; par l'arrangement proposé elle acquerrait la presque totalité de la Belgique et une partie des possessions Allemandes de la rive gauche du Rhin, 523½ milles, âmes 2,728,500 ; Juliers, avec un rayon, 1¼ mille, âmes 6,500 ; total, 1,045¾ milles, âmes 4,624,000. Y compris le dédommagement de la maison d'Orange pour ses possessions en Allemagne. Celle-ci y avait avant le Traité de Luneville 127,000.

Elle ne peut pas prétendre à une indemnité pour Fulva, Corbège, Dortmund, et Weingarten, parceque ces possessions lui avaient été assignées pour la perte de la Hollande.

Nous reviendrons plus bas, et lorsqu'il sera question de l'Allemagne, aux pays Allemands sur la rive gauche du Rhin, et à la destination qu'on pourra leur donner à l'exception de ce qui a déjà été assigné à la Prusse, à la Hollande, et à la maison de Nassau.

II.

*Note on the Projet transmitted in Prince de Hardenberg's Letter to Lord Castlereagh of the * September, as far as relates to the Interests of the Prince of Orange.*

By certainly not an over estimate in a former paper, the cessions to the House of Orange Outre Meuse, under the stipulation of the Allies at Troyes, should not be less than a population of 605,513, comprising the former patches of Dutch territory on that side of the river. In the accompanying map are marked, as exactly as could be traced from the description in the projet, the limits of the cessions Outre Meuse proposed to be made for the aggrandisement of Holland, and to strengthen her, as professedly the advanced post of the north of Europe in respect to France.

Without observing upon so extremely extended a line of frontier unsupported by any means of competent internal resource for the purposes of its defence, it will be sufficient to compare the estimated population of the projet with the amount of that stipulated by the Allies at Troyes :

Estimated population stipulated by the Allies	..	605,513
Estimated population of the lisière marked in the Département de la Roer		25,500
Estimated population of that part of the Département de l'Ourte marked red		14,200
Ditto, Department of Sambre and Meuse		78,000
Ditto of Les Forêts		84,400
Population of the town and rayon of Juliers by the projet		6,500
		208,600
Deduct population of Dutch territory of Outre Meuse not comprised in this projet		37,492
		171,108
Defalcation by the projet		434,405

And it must be remarked that even the territories assigned by this projet to the Dutch are not proposed to be ceded without some compensation, although the stipulation at Troyes was totally silent on the subject of any other return than what was looked to at the hands of Holland for the future defence of the frontier against France. The compensation is stated to be the relinquishment of the possessions of the House of Orange on the right of the Rhine. These amount to a population of 115,000 souls, which, if added to the above defalcation, makes the total deficiency of the projet amount to 549,405, or in other words, instead of ceding a population of 605,513, it makes the whole of the cession amount to only 56,408.

III.

Memorandum explanatory of the Second Map.

The parts coloured red in the annexed map denote the ancient possessions of Holland Outre Meuse and those patches enclavés in the Pays de Liège. The boundary line designated by red crosses marks the southern limits of the country Outre Meuse, which the Allies, by their official and sealed notes, dated respectively from Troyes February 15, 1814, stipulated to cede to the Dutch.

* Blank in manuscript.

It comprises the far greater part of the Département de la Roer, together with parts of that of Meuse Inférieure. Prussia, however, at the time of this cession urged the necessity of a modification of this plan, principally on the ground of connecting her territories on the right bank of the Rhine with those of which she might eventually become possessed on the left bank of that river. In order to accommodate Prussia in this object, several projets have been formed, and, as will appear from the Mémoire, these also embrace a proposition made on the highest military authority, viz. that the possession of the fortress of Luxembourg should be annexed to the dominions of the House of Orange as being essential to their defence. The two first of these are of M. Falck, Secretary General of State to the Prince of Orange.

These no otherwise differ from each other than in exchanging the Arrondissement de Bonn, in the Département de Rhin et Moselle (marked in this map by a slight red line), for that part of the Arrondissement of Coblenz, in the same department, which lies south of the Moselle (the southern boundary of which is also marked by a slight red line). The boundary of M. Falck's plan will be found by tracing a black and yellow line, marked in the annexed map, from Moolck upon the old Dutch frontier, a little to the northward of the junction of the river Triers with the Meuse, to the southward of Aix-la-Chapelle, and then nearly pursuing the north boundary lines of the Départements of Ourte, la Sarre, and Rhin et Moselle to a little below Bonn, on the Rhine, and commencing again at the junction of the Moselle with that river, following up the course of that river until it meets the French frontier.

The second plan of M. Falck will be found by excluding the Arrondissement of Bonn and continuing the boundary line of the Département de la Sarre till it reaches the slight red line south of Ulmea, and then pursuing that line until it reaches the Rhine, and commencing again at the slight red line to the south of Rheinfels, following it until it joins the Moselle a little above Zell, and thence mounting the river until it meets the French frontier.

Two other projets were framed by M. de Gagern, one of the Prince of Orange's ministers at Vienna: these were formed upon the supposition of the lisière marked along the Meuse from Moolck to Aix-la-Chapelle in M. de Falck's plans being unattainable. They therefore differ no otherwise from M. de Falck's plans than in leaving out the whole of that lisière. It was, however, intended by M. de Gagern to retain the old Dutch territories Outre Meuse. The boundaries of both of M. de Gagern's will therefore be ascertained by reserving those territories as marked in the annexed map, and from the southward of the largest of them following the boundary of the Département de l'Ourte till it meets the limits of M. de Falck's projets south of Aix-la-Chapelle, and then continuing the same limits respectively as those proposed by M. de Falck.

With the objects of Prussia, which it is to be hoped will not be realised, it may unhappily become impossible to obtain a communication with Germany through the Duchy of Nassau: a projet has therefore been formed to meet this emergency, and at the same time to afford sufficient resources for the support of Luxembourg, and some means of defence in case of hostility from other quarters. The limits of this projet are sufficiently stated in the Mémoire. These will be traced, comprising the towns of Ruremond and Juliers, by following up the course of the Roer till it meets the boundary of the Département de l'Ourte, and then following the boundaries of that and the eastern limit of the Département de la Sarre till it reaches the Moselle, tracing up that river to the French frontier.

If to this projet could be added the lisière on the right of the Meuse from Moolck till it touches the Roer, as described in M. de Falck's projet, it would be a considerable acquisition.

IV.

Sur la Défense des Pays-Bas, de la Hollande, et du Nord de l'Allemagne contre la France.

A Vienne, le 28 Septembre, 1814.

1. La défense d'un état, et par conséquent son indépendance, repose (A) sur les moyens qu'il peut employer et opposer lui-même à l'agresseur; (B) sur la situation géographique et d'autres localités; (C) sur les secours étrangers qu'il peut obtenir par ses liaisons politiques et par la situation géographique dans laquelle il se trouve relativement à d'autres états.

2. La proportion dans laquelle les propres moyens de défense d'un état se trouvent envers les forces de l'agresseur et les localités relatives déterminent s'il peut se défendre seul et indépendamment du secours de ses voisins ou s'il doit recourir à ceux-ci.

3. Il n'y a que de bonnes liaisons qui puissent tirer d'affaire un état qui se trouve dans le dernier cas; et lorsqu'on travaille à fonder un état pareil, il faut nécessairement mettre tout en œuvre pour établir un intérêt réciproque entre lui et des états dont il doit espérer des secours. Sa sûreté et sa conservation se trouvera par là beaucoup plus solidement assurée qu'en lui accordant quelques centaines de milles quarrées de plus, qui, loin d'affermir son indépendance, la compromettrait, surtout si on les ôtait à un état voisin appeler à le secourir, et s'ils en diminuoient les forces.

4. C'est d'après ces principes généraux que nous considérerons, ce qu'exige à l'égard de la distribution de territoire, la défense des Provinces Unies des Pays-Bas, si étroitement liée à celle du nord de l'Allemagne.

5. La Hollande, avec les provinces de la Belgique sur la rive gauche de la Meuse, renfermera les anciens départemens Français suivans :—

Départemens.	Population.
West Ems	110,000
Frise	95,000
Zuyder-See	650,000
Bouches de l'Yssel	170,000
Over-Yssel	275,000
Bouches de la Meuse	258,000
Bouches du Rhin	185,000
Bouches de l'Escaut	80,000
Total de la Hollande	1,823,000
 De la Lys	 470,000
De l'Escaut	594,000
Des deux Néthes	300,000
De Basse-Meuse	232,000
De la Dyle	363,000
De Jemappes	412,000
D'une partie de Sambre et Meuse	60,000

Ces pays ainsi réunis formeront une population de 4,254,000

D'après le discours que le Prince de Bénévent vient de tenir dans la Chambre des Pairs en lui présentant le plan de finance, la France compte encore 28,000,000 habitans. Il saute aux yeux que ces quatre millions et un quart ne peuvent pas soutenir seuls leur indépendance contre 28,000,000, quelque soit les avantages qu'offrent les localités. Sans doute la Hollande a-t-elle des

marais, des canaux, des forteresses, des défilés ; le Brabant des haies, des fossés, des canaux, un terrain facile à défendre ; mais avant tout il faut dans une lutte entre deux nations voisines surtout un certain équilibre de nombre. Sans celui-ci, les défenseurs de la patrie pourront combattre en vrais Spartiates, mais ne pas vaincre, et le salut de la patrie n'aura rien gagné quand même ils périraient comme ceux-là aux Thermopylæ.

On a ordinairement une idée trop favorable des avantages du terrain, et ceci est surtout applicable à la défense de la Hollande et des Pays-Bas. Ni la lutte des Bataves contre Alva, ni la guerre de la succession d'Espagne au commencement du siècle passé, ne peuvent être alléguées par ceux qui attachent trop de prix à ces avantages, car il faut considérer que les circonstances favorables dans lesquelles ces guerres eurent lieu contribuèrent plus à leur succès que le terrain.

Observons d'abord que les Bataves de ce tems-là étaient beaucoup plus guerriers que ceux de nos jours. Puis il y a une différence entre l'attaque d'un voisin et celle d'un état éloigné, et si cette attaque s'exécute par des troupes mercenaires contre les défenseurs de la patrie, ou par des armées combattans également pour la leur.

Alva se trouvait dans le premier cas. La guerre des Pays-Bas était pour l'Espagne une espèce de guerre de colonie ; c'étoit une guerre nationale pour les habitans des Pays-Bas.

Dans la guerre de la succession d'Espagne, presque toute l'Europe avoit pris parti pour les Bataves ; c'étoit le secours étranger qui décida principalement ; et si dans ce tems la Hollande avoit seule 130 mille hommes sur pied, ce n'étoit pas par ses propres forces, mais au moyen de celles qui étoient à la solde, qu'elle ne pourroit pas se procurer maintenant ; car quel pays, excepté peut-être la Suisse, seroit à même de lui en fournir ?

Les Hollandois, habitués à ces secours, en sont devenus moins guerriers, et se sont tournés vers le commerce et la navigation.

Leur aversion pour la vie militaire est telle que dans ces derniers tems, où il s'agissoit de leur existence, on n'a pu mettre sur pied en Hollande que quelques milliers d'hommes enrôlés à force d'argent.

Mais, dira-t-on, l'esprit public est meilleur dans la Belgique, et celui des Hollandois est susceptible de le devenir. Même dans cette supposition ces pays pour se défendre devront-ils avoir recours à l'étranger, puisque toujours ils seront trop foibles pour y pourvoir par leurs propres forces, surtout d'après la manière actuelle de faire la guerre.

Ceci mérite une attention bien particulière. Autrefois une armée destinée à envahir un pays étoit composée de 50, 60, 70 mille hommes.

On en destinoit 20 ou 30 mille pour cerner une ou deux places fortes, et en faire le siège ou le blocus ; le reste servait à les couvrir. Avec cette manière de faire la guerre, 40 ou 50 mille hommes pouvaient défendre avec succès un pays comme les Pays-Bas contre 70 à 80 mille. On jetoit 18 à 20 mille hommes dans les six ou sept places avancées, telles que Namur, Mons, Charleroi, Courtrai, Ypres, Menin, Ostende ; souvent même on ne garnissait point celles qui se trouvoient sur les derrières de l'armée, parcequ'on étoit assuré que l'ennemi ne pourroit pas y parvenir. On avoit donc encore 25 à 30 mille hommes disponibles à opposer à l'ennemi ; et comme on tiroit ses subsistances des magasins, on avoit la facilité des mouvemens, avantage qui compensait le nombre des agresseurs, qui étoient obligés d'avoir recours aux moyens de transport à chaque pas qu'ils fesoient en avant.

Maintenant c'est autre chose. La France n'attaquera pas les Pays-Bas avec moins de 250 mille hommes. Une force pareille ne s'attache point aux places fortes, n'a que faire de voitures, et base surtout la facilité des subsistances sur la vitesse de ses marches et la courte durée des séjours.

Elle tâche seulement d'éviter de séjourner dans des pays incultes, qu'on ne rencontre pas dans les Pays-Bas.

Faisant observer les forteresses qu'elle rencontre par un corps égal en nombre aux garnisons qu'elles renferment, ce qui demande au plus 12 à 15 mille hommes, elle se porte en avant. Supposons donc que cette armée Française ait pris ses cantonnemens entre la Meuse et l'Escaut, et qu'elle se rassemble dans les environs de Maubeuge.

Supposons de plus que du côté des Pays-Bas on fait tous les efforts imaginables, qu'on ait même réussi, ce qui paroît très difficile, à mettre une armée de 130 mille hommes sur pied, sous un chef habile et doué de talens : sa première idée seroit sans doute de se battre, sans s'embarrasser du nombre supérieur de l'ennemi, et de se conserver pour cet effet le plus de force possible en campagne. Mais les forteresses ont besoin de garnisons ; celles en arrière en ont également un besoin pressant, la bataille pouvant être perdue, et l'ennemi pouvant alors diriger sa marche sur celles-ci. Or, il y a à garnir Nieuport, Ostende, Ypres, Courtrai, Mons, Charleroi, Namur, Dinant, Anvers, Maestricht, Vliessingue, Bergen op Zoom, Breda, Gertruydenberg, Bois le Duc, Venloo.

Outre cela il faut placer quelque garnison au moins dans les grandes villes pour y maintenir l'esprit public, telles que Bruxelles, Gand, Louvain, et Malines.

En plaçant seulement—

	Hommes.
A Maestricht	3,000
Namur	5,000
Dinant	500
Mons	5,000
Courtrai	3,000
Ostende	3,500
Anvers	4,000
Bois le Duc	1,000
Breda	800
Vliessingue	700
Nieuport	500
Et n'assignant aux quatre villes de Bruxelles, Gand, Louvain, et Malines, vû leurs propres moyens de défense, que de foibles garnisons, en tout	3,000
	30,000

il ne resteroit que 100 mille hommes à l'armée pour aller au devant de l'ennemi, qui avanceroit avec 250 mille hommes de Namur sur Louvain. Ce seroit là que la bataille auroit lieu, et avec une force aussi disproportionnée y auroit-il quelque apparence de succès pour les Bataves, pour peu que l'armée Française fit son devoir.

Pousser plus loin les efforts, afin de mettre en campagne une armée plus considérable encore, paroît peu possible. Le nombre supposé plus haut est déjà très considérable pour une population de $4\frac{1}{4}$ de millions et au delà. Si la Prusse dans ces derniers tems a fait plus, c'étoit dans des circonstances tout-à-fait extraordinaires, et cela ne peut guères être imité ailleurs.

Ajoutons qu'il faut doter les forteresses, les pourvoir d'artillerie, de munitions de guerre et de bouche, entretenir leurs ouvrages, tenir la flotte en bon état, et avoir soin des invalides des troupes de terre et de mer. Considérons enfin le grand nombre de forteresses qui existent dans ces pays, on verra que

les moyens que nous venons de supposer dans notre calcul surpassent déjà ses forces.

Il faut bien se garder d'étendre trop les mesures permanentes de défense. Loin d'augmenter le patriotisme, rien ne tend plus à l'affaiblir, et à le perdre. Le chameau surchargé ne se lève pas lorsqu'il s'agit de marcher; il reste immobile.

D'après les considérations ci-dessus, il est clairement prouvé que les Pays-Bas ne peuvent pas se défendre par eux-mêmes.

Mais il faut, dira-t-on, les agrandir encore de quelques départemens sur la rive droite de la Meuse, tels que ceux de l'Ourthe et des Forêts, par exemple, qui ajouteroient 650 mille âmes à sa population; il faut même étendre leur territoire vers le Rhin et la Roer; cela ira au delà d'un million; il faut leur assigner Luxembourg et Juliers pour les rendre inattaquables de ce côté. Loin d'améliorer par là leur situation, on la rendroit encore plus pénible. Leur ligne de défense contre la France se trouveroit presque doublée (car Namur fait à peu près le centre entre Luxembourg et Ostende); et quand même on pousseroit l'accroissement aussi loin qu'il est possible dans ces contrées, cela ne changeroit rien à la thèse, car il seroit toujours impossible d'atteindre la population et le degré de force nécessaires pour suffire à la défense qu'exigeroient l'étendue de la frontière et tant de places fortes, qui absorberoient une très grande partie de l'armée.

Luxembourg surtout paroît plutôt une charge qu'un avantage pour la Hollande, parcequ'il y faut une garnison très considérable de 12,000 hommes.

L'Angleterre, les puissances du nord de l'Allemagne, nommément la Prusse, le Hanovre, sont éminemment intéressées à donner aux Pays-Bas toute la force nécessaire pour se défendre, et servir de boulevard au système politique que nous avons établi; mais il paroît bien clair que ce n'est pas en leur donnant trop d'étendu, et en leur imposant une charge qui surpasse leurs véritables forces, qu'on peut se flatter d'atteindre ce but salutaire: que bien au contraire, ce seroit à coup sûr le moyen de le manquer.

Luxembourg et Juliers défendront beaucoup mieux les Pays-Bas entre les mains des Puissances Alliées qu'entre les siennes propres. Ces places sont nécessaires à l'Allemagne, et s'il est possible d'assigner une portion de territoire considérable à la Bavière sur la rive gauche du Rhin, Luxembourg à celle-ci, et Juliers à la Prusse.

Pour bien lier leur système à celui des Pays-Bas il ne faut pas vouloir renforcer ceux-ci à leur dépens; il ne faut pas les obliger à établir leur première ligne de défense sur le Rhin; il faut rendre le système de défense commun; il faut mettre les intérêts réciproquement en rapport.

La Prusse, si elle n'envisageoit avec un égoïsme répréhensible que son intérêt particulier, abandonneroit toute possession sur la rive gauche du Rhin. Elle insisteroit sur un arrondissement plus convenable de ses forces, sur le recouvrement de toutes ses anciennes provinces.

Ce seroit une grande fausse politique de la part de la Hollande, et de ceux qui s'intéressent à juste titre à son sort, d'engager la Prusse à suivre un système d'isolement. Il me paroît, au contraire, que tous leurs soins devroient tendre à intéresser cette puissance, par des possessions entre le Rhin et la Meuse, à regarder la défense des Pays-Bas comme la sienne propre, et à aller au devant des intentions de la Prusse à former des liens indissolubles avec ce pays, fondés sur un intérêt réciproque.

Le même raisonnement est applicable au reste de l'Allemagne et à la Bavière si elle obtient le pays mentionné plus haut.

Namur, la Meuse, et Maestricht forment déjà tout ce qu'il faut pour la dé-

fense des Pays-Bas, et même dans un plus haut degré que la Roer, Luxembourg, et Juliers.

La Hollande et les Pays-Bas, déjà couverts de forteresses, exigeant des frais et des garnisons presque au dessus de leurs forces, ne devraient pas briguer la possession de ces deux dernières, qui ne pourroient que lui être infiniment à charge.

Résumons :

Les Pays-Bas ne peuvent pas fournir par eux-mêmes à leur défense ; que faut-il qu'ils fassent pour y pourvoir ? Donner à leur ligne d'attaque du côté de la France le moins d'étendue possible, afin que la défense en soit d'autant plus facile, moins contenu à entretenir, et plus forte. Arranger le système de défense intérieure de manière à ce qu'on soit assuré que l'ennemi ne puisse pas s'établir dans le pays avant que les secours étrangers ne soient à portée ; le situer de manière qu'il puisse être assuré de ces secours par un intérêt bien décidé et réciproque.

Ici nos regards se portent premièrement sur l'Angleterre, parcequ'en effet l'Angleterre est éminemment intéressée à ce que la France ne se remette pas en possession des Pays-Bas. Mais en considérant la chose de plus près, on se demande :—

Les secours de l'Angleterre pourront-ils toujours arriver assez à tems pour le salut des Pays-Bas ? et les Français, agiles guerriers et rusés politiques, n'attaqueront-ils pas ce pays de manière qu'il soit presque totalement conquis avant que les Anglais soient rassemblés, embarqués, et descendus sur les côtés ? De plus, les secours de l'Angleterre pourront-ils être assez nombreux pour résister avec les forces seules des Pays-Bas au choc des Français ?

La constitution de l'Angleterre met des lenteurs irrésistibles dans de pareilles opérations. L'embarquement, la descente, ne sont pas sans difficultés. Les possessions de l'Angleterre sont d'une telle étendue que le nombre de troupes nécessaire pour les garnir dans le cas d'une guerre avec la France empêcheroit d'en destiner un qui fut assez considérable pour atteindre le but dans les Pays-Bas.

Supposons l'armée auxiliaire Anglaise de quarante à cinquante mille hommes : ce seroit un secours infiniment respectable ; mais ne nous le cachons pas, il ne suffiroit pas pour garantir les Pays-Bas d'une attaque bien combinée de la part de la France.

Quelles ressources reste-t-il donc à cet état ?

Un seul regard sur la carte nous montre d'où doivent venir les secours les plus prompts et les plus importants, et le passé nous apprend de quelle manière il faut faire ces arrangemens pour s'en assurer.

C'est de l'Allemagne, et surtout de la Prusse.

Celle-ci n'est pas à craindre pour les Pays-Bas, pourvu qu'un intérêt les lie. Les Pays-Bas n'ont pas besoin de Juliers pour assurer leur côté faible, parce qu'il sera mieux garanti par toutes les forces de la Prusse que par une place forte. Ils n'auront pas à appréhender l'isolement de la Prusse, qui auroit lieu si on l'y forçoit par de fausses mesures ; et supposons le malheureux cas qui paraît inadmissible, en s'établissant le système que nous proposons, que la Prusse se déclarât contre la Hollande, Juliers n'offriroit aucune sûreté contre cette première, vû qu'elle attaqueroit la Hollande plus bas. Le véritable point que la Hollande doit rendre inattaquable avant toute chose, c'est celui de Dinant et de Namur ; car une armée ennemie qui pénétreroit par là sur Louvain tourneroit toutes les autres forteresses principales, et opéreroit au cœur du pays.

Il faut donc lier bien intimément les Pays-Bas avec la Prusse et la ligue

Germanique, soit qu'ils en fassent une partie intégrante, soit qu'ils entrent avec elle dans une alliance indissoluble, ce qui paroît plus simple.

On ne peut trop le répéter, ces liens doivent recevoir leurs forces et leur durée par un intérêt réciproque. L'Allemagne doit par conséquent trouver dans l'arrangement à faire ce qui peut assurer sa propre défense. Celui que nous proposons fait trouver ce bienfait aussi à la Bavière, et engage aussi le Sud de l'Allemagne par un intérêt commun plus que par des traités à la défense commune.

C'est ainsi que les Pays-Bas deviendront le nœud d'union entre le continent et la Grande Bretagne, et seront par là l'anneau le plus précieux de la chaîne des états de l'Europe attaché par leur flotte à l'Angleterre, par leur armée à l'Allemagne.

Voilà la seule manière d'assurer l'indépendance de ce pays et de la sauver du joug de la France, auquel, sans cela, il n'échappera pas.

Il est à désirer encore que le Prince Souverain des Pays-Bas, qui prendra probablement le titre de Roi, n'ait aucune possession détachée ou d'intérêt éloigné de ses états. Qu'il échange donc ces possessions héréditaires sur la rive droite du Rhin, en les cédant à la Prusse contre le pays de Liège, appartenant à l'Allemagne, voisin des Pays-Bas en tant qu'il se trouve sur la rive gauche de la Meuse, et avec un rayon pour Liège qui est à cheval sur cette rivière. Il y gagnera considérablement, car ces états actuels de la maison de Nassau-Orange contiennent 127,000 âmes

La partie en question, ou pays de Liège 255,000

Profit 128,000

dans un pays industriel et bien cultivé.

Rien n'empêchera des arrangemens convenables pour la seconde géniture, si on les trouve à propos. La Prusse cédera aux Pays-Bas partie de la Gueldre Prussienne sur la rive gauche de la Meuse, et afin de donner à ceux-ci cette rivière toute entière et des rayons aux places, une marge de long de sa rive droite.

La carte ci-jointe montre la frontière qu'on propose entre la Prusse et les Pays-Bas moyennant une ligne bleue, avec la France moyennant une ligne rouge, et telle que nous la projettons avec la Bavière moyennant une ligne verte. Les places fortes ou à fortifier s'y trouvent également marquées, de même que la partie du pays de Liège à assigner au Prince d'Orange, par une ligne brune. Le territoire qu'on destine aux Pays-Bas est enluminé de jaune. Il s'agira de s'arranger avec la Bavière dès qu'on sera d'accord entre la Prusse et les Pays-Bas.

[791.]

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 4th Oct., 1814.

Pozzo di Borgo is going to Vienna, and I write you just one line by him to inform you that I have drawn up some despatches for you upon the slave trade and other matters, which will not be ready to go by him, but will be sent to you to-morrow night.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

[792.]

MY LORD,

Paris, 4th Oct., 1814.

In consequence of the directions given to my predecessor, Sir Charles Stewart, and what passed between your Lordship and the deputies from Hamburgh in London, I have thought it proper to urge the King of France's ministers to come to a settlement with the persons residing here deputed by the Bank of Hamburgh to represent their claims.

My recommendations to M. de Jaucourt and M. de Blacas have induced the King's ministers to take the subject into consideration ; but instead of satisfaction having been given to the Bank of Hamburgh, their deputies have been referred for the adjustment of their claims to the Congress at Vienna. Having this day waited upon M. de Jaucourt, I spoke to him on this subject, and pointed out to him that the claim of the Bank of Hamburgh was made under the convention of the 23rd of April and the treaty of peace ; and that the Congress of Vienna was to settle all other questions in Europe excepting those which had been settled with France by these instruments.

M. de Jaucourt then said that the Minister of Finance was of opinion that the Bank had no claim, and that at all events the claims which the King had upon the town of Hamburgh were more than sufficient to cover those which the Bank of Hamburgh might be supposed to have upon France. I pointed out to M. de Jaucourt that this claim was recognized in an article of the treaty of peace, and that His Majesty could not omit to acknowledge it unless he should say that he intended the money should be restored only in case it had been taken from the Bank on any other account but for his own service ; that the claims which it was alleged His Majesty had upon the town of Hamburgh were for requisitions which had not been complied with ; that to urge them now, after the treaty of peace, and to offer the relinquishment of them in discharge of the claims of the Bank, under an article of the treaty of peace, was tantamount to the adoption and enforcing of a severe measure of war during a period of peace ; and that we could admit neither that the Bank had no claim upon His Majesty, nor that His Majesty had any claim upon the town of Hamburgh for the requisitions remaining uncomplied with ; that if the Minister of Finance, or any other person, had any reasons to allege

against what I had said, I hoped they would bring them forward and have the matter settled at Paris by amicable discussion; and that above all I hoped that I should not be under the necessity of giving in a note upon the subject, thus giving fresh ground to those who clamoured against His Majesty for his want of faith and sincerity in his promises.

M. de Jaucourt deprecated this measure; but he said that as M. de Talleyrand had settled this article of the treaty with your Lordship, he wished to have his directions upon the claims of the Bank of Hamburgh, and he promised that he would again speak to the King about it.

In case the subject should come under discussion at Vienna, I enclose your Lordship the copy of a petition from the agents of the Bank to the King, in which their case is clearly stated.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[793.]

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Paris, 4th Oct., 1814.

Having found that the late operations and successes of His Majesty's arms in America created a good deal of sensation at Paris, were canvassed in a very unfair manner in the public newspapers, and had increased the ill temper and rudeness with which in too many instances His Majesty's subjects are treated in this town, I thought it proper, in obedience to the directions which I had received from Lord Liverpool, to avail myself of the opportunity which offered in my interview with Monsieur de Jaucourt this day, to inform him of the state of the negotiations at Ghent, and to beg him to assure the King that the late successes would not make any alteration in the reasonable terms on which the Prince Regent had always felt disposed to make peace with America; and that the British Commissioners at Ghent had been authorised to make a declaration accordingly. Monsieur de Jaucourt expressed great disgust at the state of the daily press at Paris at present; and assured me that what had been published on the subject of our operations in America had made no impression on the King's mind, and that he was certain that His Majesty would hear with satisfaction the communication I had made to him.

He then told me that he had had many representations lately from the Americans regarding the partiality towards the British government of their system of neutrality.

There existed a good deal of uneasiness in the town in the course of the last week, which, however, was not manifested in any act of riot or disorder. The Jacobin party, and that attached exclusively to Buonaparte, were observed to be more than usually active; two libels against the King and the government were published and distributed, and reports of English influence, of the dangers to be apprehended from our position in the Low Countries, &c., were circulated in all the coffee houses and public places. At the same period of time General Vandamme, whom the King had forbidden to appear in his presence, went to the Tuileries; and the King, instead of ordering that he should be turned out, directed that he might be informed that His Majesty would not go to mass if the General did not quit the Palace. The General remained, and the officers of the household were obliged to turn him out by violence.

This circumstance, as it was considered by the Emigrant party a symptom of weakness on the part of His Majesty, augmented the uneasiness of the moment, which, however, appears now to have subsided.

There exists no doubt of the continued discontent of the military, and of those employed by the late government, for whom there is no employment under the present. The number of discontented is augmented by the immense number of persons ruined by the Revolution, who have all been accustomed to look to the restoration of the House of Bourbon as the end of their sufferings, and that the possession of their fortunes and of the honours and emoluments of the State would immediately follow. All this class of persons have been disappointed, and their wants are increased by the expenses which they have incurred to come to Paris to solicit employment; and they are as loud in their complaints of the want of firmness of the government as the Jacobin party and those attached to Buonaparte are in their censures of its want of other qualities.

The number of persons obliged to look for support from public employment and the resources of the public is immense, and far greater even in proportion to the size and population of France than in any other country; and all these are discontented,

and ready to seize any opportunity to effect a change of any kind.

This situation of affairs must occasion constant uneasiness ; but I entertain no doubt that if the King can carry on his government without any material difference of opinion with the legislature, he will gain time sufficient to establish it effectually.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[794.]
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To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Paris, 4th Oct., 1814.

In pursuance of the Prince Regent's commands to offer to the French government the cession either of a sum of money or an island in the West Indies in order to obtain from them the immediate abolition of the slave trade, I took the earliest opportunity of speaking to M. de Talleyrand on the subject on the night of the 12th ultimo. I told him that the idea of making this offer had originated in a notion which prevailed generally that the French government were disposed to abolish the trade entirely if some concession were made to obtain that object. M. de Talleyrand replied that no such disposition existed ; that both the King and he had explained themselves fully to your Lordship and to me on the subject ; that the King was determined to perform his engagements, and in the mean time to restrict the trade of his subjects, as far as was possible, on those parts of the coast of Africa which we had pointed out, and to co-operate with the British government by every means in his power, at Congress and elsewhere, to put an end to the trade altogether.

Finding in the course of the conversation that no disposition existed to abolish the trade immediately on any ground, I did not think it necessary or proper to describe what concession the British government were disposed to make, any further than as one to compensate the persons interested in carrying on the slave trade for the losses they might be supposed to incur by the immediate abolition.

I reported this conversation to Lord Liverpool, who has expressed to me a desire that the offer of a cession to the French

government should be recorded in a more formal manner, either at Paris or at Vienna, as might appear most expedient to your Lordship.

It appears to me most expedient that it should be done at Vienna, M. de Talleyrand being there, in whose conversations in society at Paris the idea is supposed to have originated. I had spoken to him alone on the subject, and I was quite certain that he had reported to the King the offer which I had made of a cession to obtain the immediate abolition. I was certain that the King would neither accept nor refuse the offer without referring to his minister at Vienna; and I conceived that time would be saved, and other advantages would be gained, by leaving the matter to be settled by your Lordship with M. de Talleyrand.

I therefore mentioned, on the 29th, to M. de Jaucourt what had passed between M. de Talleyrand and me on the night of the 12th Sept., and explained the reasons for wishing that the offer and the answer to it should be recorded; and, in order to save time, begged him to prevail upon the King to send orders to M. de Talleyrand either to decline or accept the offer, as His Majesty might think proper.

In the course of this conversation M. de Jaucourt, who was decidedly of opinion that the business ought to be settled at Vienna, stated that he thought the offer of a sum of money to obtain this or any other political object ought not to be taken into consideration; that the cession of a West India island would not be considered by those carrying on the slave trade as a compensation for the loss they would sustain by its immediate abolition; and that they would contend that the State would gain nothing by the cession, as the continuance of the trade would bring as much new land into cultivation and produce in the old colonies as would be acquired in the newly ceded colony. M. de Jaucourt promised me to report to His Majesty what I had stated, and to make me acquainted with the result, but I have not been able to call upon him till this day.

Having called upon him this day, he told me that he had mentioned to the King what I had desired him, and that His Majesty had directed him to report it to M. de Talleyrand, and to leave it to M. de Talleyrand to come to an agreement with your Lordship, informing M. de Talleyrand at the same time that His Majesty's sentiments and intentions as last communi-

cated to him were not altered. I asked M. de Jaucourt whether I was to understand that His Majesty accepted or declined the offer which had been made ; and he said that he knew no more than he had told me, and I must form my own opinion from what I knew of His Majesty's sentiments ; that he, M. de Jaucourt, was not acquainted with the instructions which the King had given M. de Talleyrand, and that he was only directed to refer to those instructions, and to report the conversation with me.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Zachary Macaulay, Esq., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

London, 4th Oct., 1814.

I have been honoured by your Grace's letters of the 12th and 20th September, and feel infinitely indebted to your Grace for the condescension with which you have been pleased to receive my communications. I have been encouraged by it to submit to your Grace's notice two publications which have lately reached me from St. Domingo, and which will be found to contain important information respecting the state of that island, and such evidence of the rapid advance of its inhabitants in the arts of civilized life as seems altogether inconsistent with the remotest hope of their return to their ancient state of depression.

The books I now send will be found to refer to that part of Hayti which is governed by Christophe. There is now in London an envoy from the other chief, Petion, who is a man of colour, and who comes charged with a mission to the English government. He has this day applied to Earl Bathurst for an audience, and although I have seen him several times, he has very properly been silent respecting his precise objects, until he shall have explained them to His Majesty's government. He is a man of very considerable intelligence, and even address. He treats the idea of subjugating Hayti as perfectly chimerical, and represents the whole population as absolutely decided against any accommodation with France which shall even assume as its basis the enjoyment by that country of the monopoly of the commerce of Hayti.

Will your Grace pardon my taking the liberty of putting under the protection of your Grace's cover a packet for my brother.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,

Your Lordship's much obliged and most obedient servant,

ZACHARY MACAULAY.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Downing Street, 4th Oct., 1814.

General Maxwell (the Governor of Sierra Leone) has just returned on leave of absence. On waiting on me, he expressed his apprehensions in the strongest manner of the fatal consequences which would follow from the resumption of the slave-trade to the northward of the Line, and how much every moment was valuable, if there existed a disposition in France to prohibit it, to make that intention known. He has since sent me in a paper containing these representations, and was at one time inclined to set off to Paris to enforce them to your Grace, which I assured him was unnecessary. I, however, enclose his paper, and I hope you will take an early opportunity of pressing on His Majesty the necessity of making the declaration which he has promised us he will make. The humane and generous disposition of the French King will, I am sure, induce him to hasten the prohibition when he sees what misery is produced by the delay.

After the hopes we had been led to entertain that the trade would not have been renewed north of the Line, and the language which we considered ourselves authorized to hold on this subject, it must be a mortification to receive complaints on this head.

A few days ago I received a letter from Mr. Wilberforce, enclosing to me the ordonnance of the French government authorizing the recommencement of the slave-trade under the old regulations. It appeared in the Dutch Gazette; and though I am aware it is by no means inconsistent with what has been promised to publish such an ordonnance, and to limit the coast within which that trade should be in future carried on, yet if the ordonnance appears alone, and is not soon followed by the limitation, we have reason to complain.

I am, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Governor Maxwell's Report.

The inhabitants of Senegal and Goree, it cannot be doubted, will engage with eagerness in the renewal of the slave-trade on the receipt of the first intelligence from Europe that it will be again permitted: they have never been accustomed to view it in any other light than that of a traffic by far the most profitable which they could possibly carry on; nor can any restraint be expected to operate upon them but that imposed by the fear of laws now so soon to be extinguished.

The expectation of the restoration of those settlements to the crown of France has been generally entertained by them, and with it that of the former freedom of carrying on the slave-trade; and though information of the treaty of peace between Great Britain and France had not reached the coast in the beginning of July, yet the knowledge of the successes of the Allies and of the armistice had been communicated, and had infused sanguine hopes that the period was fast approaching when the traffic in human beings might again be prosecuted by them with impunity.

The connexions of these persons both in France and elsewhere would not fail to convert these hopes into assurance by sending off with the utmost despatch a copy of the treaty of peace; and it is extremely probable that the article therein relating to the slave-trade was known in Senegal and Goree by the latter end of last July.

On the receipt of this intelligence (or perhaps sooner), not only those who were formerly accustomed to carry on this dreadful commerce, but also numerous new speculators, would immediately put in execution the usual methods for obtaining large supplies of what would again become the most valuable of the exportable commodities of Africa: considerable advances would consequently be directly made by them to the native chiefs in the neighbourhood of both settlements, who, discontented with the sort of privation which the cessation of the trade has placed them under, are universally eager for its revival. The Moors, too, the most inexorable and unprincipled beings on earth, would receive a similar impulse from the advances of the traders; and, ravaging with indefatigable activity and perseverance the negro country on the borders of the Senegal, would, in a very short space of time, collect for sale multitudes of its unfortunate inhabitants; their operations, so far from being checked, would rather be aided by the negro chiefs, whom the Moors hold in a state approaching to subjection; and in the view of liquidating considerable claims which the latter pretend to have upon them, they would readily point out to this formidable banditti the towns and villages best adapted to furnish the prey of which they were in quest.

It will occur, too, most unhappily for Africa, that at the period when the provisions of the treaty will be known there, the merchant-vessels of Senegal will be proceeding up the river in their annual voyage to Galam, the distance of which from Fort Louis is several hundred miles. From this voyage they will not return till Christmas: they will therefore be in the exact situation in which they may furnish the greatest facilities to the views of the dealers, and to the operations of their instruments, the chiefs and the Moors. Dépôts will be formed at every convenient place in the course of the river, which will speedily be crowded with unfortunate victims intended for conveyance to the island of St. Louis; and the activity employed to collect them will no doubt be materially stimulated by the opportunity thus presented for their immediate removal.

Proceedings of the same atrocious nature will be pursued along the whole coast, from the Senegal to as far as the slave-trade has usually been carried on. It will be aided and urged to the utmost by the agents of this execrable occupation; and, it is too surely to be apprehended, will rapidly sweep away the influence which the English have acquired over an extensive tract of country, destroy all the incipient improvement which they have accomplished, and consign to chains and misery thousands of both sexes, of all ages and conditions.

Nor will the trade, on its revival by the permission of the French government, be confined to the subjects of France settled at the colonies already referred to. It is notorious that there are many subjects of the British realm lurking in different parts of the coast, who will seize with avidity any opportunity to engage in it, under which they may hope to elude the penalties attached to it by the laws of their country. These men, in the event of its renewal to the northward of the Line, will be enabled so to mix and identify themselves with the French settlers in its prosecution, that, detection being deemed nearly impossible, the denunciations of our laws will become to them a dead letter; the only circumstance which has hitherto circumscribed their transactions in this afflicting commerce will thus be rendered unavailing, and

the return to it on the part of France will be the certain signal of its recommencement by too many subjects of Great Britain.

These evils are, it is believed, at this moment in actual operation. The belief that the trade will be again legalized by France must be considered as their immediate cause; and the mischief, it is presumed, will be further aggravated, should the opinion be confirmed by the acts of the French government at the epoch of the restoration of their African settlements. On the other hand, should the negotiations with France lead to the abolition, on the part of that Power, of the slave-trade in all places to the north of the Line, it will be a measure of obvious expediency to despatch with the least possible delay a communication to Africa with such intelligence, in order that the progress of the slave-dealers in their renewed efforts to carry on their infamous traffic may be arrested, and the extension of the variety of human misery consequent on their operations thereby prevented.

CHARLES W. MAXWELL.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Vienna, 4th Oct., 1814.

I send you all my despatches open, and beg you to forward them when read, including a copy of mine to you.

I shall be most happy to have your military plan for an Italian operation, if such should be decided on; but I am anxious to keep back, if possible, all *bruit* upon this point at present. I think Talleyrand judges ill in wishing to press this object early. According to my notion, he can be sure of no Power in the present stage of our discussions. Several will hold off till they see how it will bear upon their own immediate interests; and whilst this is the case, stirring points merely to alarm is running an unnecessary risk of stirring up mischief.

I am, my dear Lord,

Ever yours sincerely (in haste),

CASTLEREAGH.

The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Walmer Castle, 5th Oct., 1814.

Wilberforce and Co. are becoming very impatient as to the conclusion of that part of our arrangement with France on the subject of the slave trade which regards the northern limits. This impatience has been increased by the publication in one of the Dutch papers of the rules and regulations under which the French slave trade is to be carried on, by which it would appear that it is to be put on the same footing on which it stood before the war, and likewise by the measures which are in progress for taking possession of the French factories on the coast of Africa.

As a considerable interval has now elapsed since the death of Malouet, I should hope that you would be able to bring this part of the business to the termination promised by the King. Parliament meets on the 8th of

November. We can certainly keep off there any discussion on this and on other subjects of foreign policy till after Christmas; but even the partial arrangement would serve to put our friends in good humour, and materially, therefore, assist us.

I have a letter from Castlereagh of the 24th ult. He seems to think that Austria and Prussia will make no serious resistance to the views of the Emperor of Russia as to Poland.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, very sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Vienna, 9th Oct., 1814.

I have the honour to acquaint your Grace that the plenipotentiaries of the eight Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris, and by that instrument convoked the present Congress, have agreed to a declaration, by which they propose to adjourn its formal opening to the 1st of November. The eight Powers will be in the mean time employed in digesting the engagements to which they are mutually bound, and in forming such arrangements as may tend to shorten and facilitate the proceedings of Congress.

I have the honour to be, with great truth, my Lord,

Your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY LORD,

Vienna, 9th Oct., 1814.

In pursuance of the authority received from your Lordship, I addressed to Prince Talleyrand the official note of which the enclosed is a copy.

I thought it material to employ our utmost means to bring France to adopt the measure of immediate abolition before the discussions in Congress were entered upon.

I have lost no occasion of favourably preparing the minds of the several plenipotentiaries for the approaching discussions, and have taken measures for supplying them with the necessary information to enable them fully to understand the question. I am sorry, however, to find that, as yet, neither the Ministers of Spain nor Portugal have received any authority from their respective Courts to enter upon the discussion with the plenipotentiaries assembled here.

I have the honour to be, with great truth, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Viscount Castlereagh to Prince de Talleyrand.

Vienna, 8th Oct., 1814.

It having been represented to the British government that some expressions had lately dropped from His Highness the Prince de Talleyrand, His Most Christian Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to the effect "that the French government would not object to an immediate abolition of the Slave Trade, provided they were enabled to justify such a sacrifice as that measure might be supposed to involve by some acquisition procured for the nation, or some compensation secured for their planters:" though nothing which passed in the course of the discussions in May last, at Paris, on the subject of the Slave Trade was in the smallest degree calculated to give countenance to such an idea, His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, always eager to seize upon every suggestion which can afford him a prospect of terminating or even of narrowing this great social evil, has commanded the undersigned, Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to invite the French government to negotiate for the absolute and immediate abolition of the Slave Trade upon the following basis, viz., "The cession by Great Britain in full sovereignty to France of an island in the West Indies; or, if more acceptable, the advance by Great Britain of a sum of money to be applied by His Most Christian Majesty's government to the benefit of the French colonists, in compensation for any loss they might be supposed to experience in consequence of the trade in slaves being forthwith abolished, instead of at the end of five years, as stipulated by the first additional article of the Peace of Paris."

It will afford to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent the truest satisfaction to make this further sacrifice on the part of the British nation to the interests of humanity, and to the progress of a cause which he deems it not less his pride than his duty to sustain; and His Royal Highness will experience an increased gratification if he can thus enable His Most Christian Majesty to carry into immediate execution his own benevolent intentions without making what His Majesty might otherwise consider an undue sacrifice of interest on the part of his subjects.

The undersigned requests His Highness, &c.

CASTLEREAGH.

Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD,

Vienna, 9th Oct., 1814.

My public letter will have put you au fait of the state of parties here. I wish I could send you a more satisfactory statement. However unpromising, we must not despair of getting it into some better form.

I had a long interview with Prince Hardenberg this morning. He has made a communication of his views this day to Prince Metternich, which, though in certain points exigent, may lead to an understanding and concert. The Austrian Minister will have much to retrench.

I afterwards paid Prince Talleyrand a visit. I had a long interview with him, in which I took the liberty of representing to him without reserve the errors into which he appeared to me to have fallen, since his arrival here, in

conducting the views of his Court, if they had been correctly understood by me at Paris, when I was permitted to confer upon them with His Highness and the King of France.

That I could not disguise from him that the general impression resulting from his demeanour had been to excite distrust and alarm with respect to the views of France ; and that the effect of this had been to deprive him of his just and natural influence for the purposes of moderating excessive pretensions, whilst it united all to preserve the general system ; that instead of presenting himself here as disposed to cavil, to traverse, and to create a discontented party in Germany, he ought to have come to carry his own avowed object (which I understood he had limited to Naples), and to moderate excessive pretensions from whatever quarter, but with a disposition to support the councils of the confederacy against anarchy and petty intrigue.

That it was not for the Bourbons, who had been restored by the Allies, to assume the tone of reprobating or throwing odium upon the arrangements which had kept the confederacy together. That it was impossible to suppose that in conducting so great and complicated a cause to a successful issue, concessions to interested views were not at moments wise and requisite. That France having been delivered by this combination, and the legitimate family restored, both ought to regard the means which had been applied to this end in the spirit of favour and indulgence, and not endeavour to thwart it upon general reasoning, without any due consideration of the circumstances of the moment.

That in estimating his means of usefully moderating the arrangements in progress, it was a gratuitous sacrifice of influence to be opposing at once the favourite objects of all the respective Powers, instead of suffering the general sentiment to effect its first object, of modifying as far as possible the extravagant pretensions of Russia on the side of Poland ; in the event of succeeding in which it would have been then open for him, without complication and counteraction, to try either to moderate the demands of Prussia upon Saxony, or to urge the union of all the powers in support of the Sicilian family. But that as His Highness had conducted it, he had sacrificed all useful influence, and united all against himself.

I pressed upon his attention that, more especially with respect to success on the Neapolitan point, conciliation was his duty. That so far from wishing to bring it into early decision, and upon a collateral point, his object should be (so long, at least, as the nature of the proceeding did not involve any concession of principle in favour of Murat) to keep it out of the way till the Great Powers, assured of their own objects, felt themselves at liberty to take up such a question as this.

Prince Talleyrand received with perfect good humour my remonstrances except so far as to justify his past intentions ; but he did not combat my statement with respect to the future. On the contrary, he indicated a disposition to take the questions in the order I had stated, and seemed to admit that for any useful purpose the resistance ought not to be pushed beyond what certain of the Allied Powers could support.

I cannot answer for this explanation with the Prince de Talleyrand being a protection against the revival of inconvenient and fruitless controversy ; but I think it has given him more precise notions of the mode in which he

may render service, if he be so disposed. The course His Highness adopted at the instant, and the impression produced, left me no alternative but to uphold decisively the authority of the Alliance, which had advanced us to our present position. Whilst this conduct was tempered with every endeavour to conciliate France, it may, I trust, induce Prince Talleyrand to direct his exertions rather to modify our course than to speculate either upon disuniting or overpowering us, if such can have been his object, which I hardly believe to have been the case.

I left him in a temper apparently to be of use; but I have lived now long enough with my foreign colleagues not to rely very implicitly upon any appearances.

Believe me, my dear Lord, most sincerely yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

[795.]

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 10th Oct., 1814.

I enclose copies of two letters which I have written to Lord Castlereagh and despatched this day. My despatches of this date contain the answers to yours of the 5th.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 8th Oct., 1814.

I went to M. Blacas yesterday morning respecting the Hamburg claims which he promised me to bring before the King, and the conversation then turned upon the Congress at Vienna, from whence he told me he had received letters. He said that he found the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia were closely united, and determined to carry all their objects both in Poland and Saxony, and he manifested more warmth upon the latter point than I had yet seen him betray on any subject. After discussing it with him for some time, and pointing out how the disposal of Saxony was necessarily influenced by the Emperor's arrangements in Poland, and that as Saxony had for the last thirty years been in the Prussian system, the arrangement for that kingdom was not so very contrary to good policy as he supposed, he exclaimed that he was certain the King would never sign the treaty giving

Saxony to the King of Prussia, and he went into a long reasoning to show that that was the only point by which either Great Britain or France could exercise any influence in the North of Europe.

He seemed to imagine that we had engagements with Austria which ought to induce us to oppose both the arrangements in Poland and the disposal of Saxony; and, upon the whole of his conversation, I was induced to be of opinion that this Court would not be indisposed to go to war for Saxony, if it were certain either that we would take part with them, or would not take part against them.

I suggested to him the dangers of war to the Bourbon family; but he replied, that if we were not against them, there was no danger, and that, in some cases, to remain at peace was more dangerous even than the most unsuccessful war.

I have thought it proper to give you this intelligence. It is quite certain that the internal state of France must give the King most uneasiness; but this very state may drive him to war, if he has a prospect of carrying it on successfully, and that the war will not be protracted to any great length of time.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

II.

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 10th Oct., 1814.

I have not been able to see Blacas since I wrote to you on the 8th, and I have heard no more of the warlike notions which he appeared to entertain. I must also mention that I have not been able to discover the adoption of any measures to put the army on a better footing. The desertion is immense, and the recruiting very slow indeed. There is nothing new.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[796.]
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To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Paris, 10th Oct., 1814.

In consequence of directions from the Earl Bathurst of the 4th inst. and from the Earl of Liverpool of the 5th to make

a fresh effort to induce the King to adopt measures immediately to prevent the trade in slaves on the north coast of the continent of Africa, suggested in the note which I gave to M. de Talleyrand on the 26th of August, the former enclosing the copy of a Report made by Governor Maxwell on his arrival in England, stating the evils which had already occurred on the coast in consequence of the expectation of the revival of that traffic, I immediately waited upon M. de Blacas, and requested him to lay that Report before the King, and to point out to His Majesty the evil consequences which must result from any further delay in the adoption of the measures to prevent the traffic in slaves on that coast, the principle of which had been already agreed to, and their early execution promised.

M. de Blacas promised me to lay the paper before the King, and to inform His Majesty what I had said.

I could not see M. de Jaucourt till this day, and I urged him, in the most earnest manner, to let me have a decided answer upon this subject. I am sorry to have to report, however, that the matter rests exactly where it did in the Department of the Marine; and although M. de Jaucourt promised me that he would make every exertion in his power to obtain a Report from that Department, it is impossible for me, after the discussion that I have had with M. de Jaucourt, to feel sanguine that I shall have the decision of the government as soon as I wish.

It appears that government have been a good deal pressed in both the Houses of the Legislature lately, in the House of Peers only yesterday, to adopt some decisive measures regarding St. Domingo, on the principles recommended in the Report made in the Chamber of Deputies by General Desfermeaux, which they successfully resisted; and although M. de Jaucourt declared that the measures which I had recommended had not been adopted because the Reports upon them had not yet been received from the Marine Department, he admitted that government were desirous to avoid, if possible, making any public declaration on the principle of those measures till the warmth which prevailed on all subjects connected with the colonies, and particularly on this one of the slave trade, should in some degree have subsided. He said, in reply to my observations, that the principle of what we asked was promised in M. de Talleyrand's notes and letters, and various conversations with that minister,

and even with His Majesty ; that these promises were of the nature of secret engagements ; and that it was natural enough that the King should wish to proceed in a different manner in carrying such engagements into execution, particularly as the subject was considered with so much interest in France, from that in which he should proceed in carrying into execution the articles of a public treaty.

In the course of this conversation M. de Jaucourt again dropped some expressions which induced me to think that the question of the total and immediate abolition is still open, and liable to be decided by the result of discussions at Vienna on other subjects.

Your Lordship may rely upon it that I will not lose any opportunity which may offer of urging the King's Ministers to bring this business to a conclusion.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,

Madrid, 11th Oct., 1814.

M. de Tatischeff is intriguing here, and, I suspect, without any instructions from his Court. Perhaps you may be able to find out what his object is in sending his secretary to Paris. You will find in my despatches and in my private letter to Lord Castlereagh all that I know upon the subject.

I know not whether you will be of my opinion as to the expediency of affording pecuniary aid to this government. I cannot get the return from Bordeaux of the amount of provisions furnished to the Spanish armies, and I know not what is due to the Spanish government on account of the subsidy. I have advanced them nearly a million of dollars, but dare not advance more until I am furnished with this account. Can you give me any idea of the expense of the provisions?

You will see by Alava's letter what has happened to him. There never was a more infamous proceeding. I have spoken to the King about him, and I think if you were to write to the King, merely requesting that justice might be done to him, it would have a good effect. I am so disgusted at this and at the general conduct of the government that I am most anxious to leave this place. I enclose a statement of Alava's case.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

My courier will, I should think, be at Paris long before Tatischeff's secretary.

Viscount Castlereagh to the Emperor of all the Russias.

SIRE,

Vienna, 12th Oct., 1814.

In obedience to your Imperial Majesty's commands, I have deeply and attentively reflected on the arrangements with respect to Poland which your Imperial Majesty so graciously condescended to open to me.

That the result of such reflections may be weighed by your Imperial Majesty with more precision than if submitted in a personal interview, I have presumed to throw the reasoning on which they rest into the form of an unofficial memorandum.

I have preferred this course as enabling me to state the question to your Imperial Majesty with the less reserve, and as the world will feel and reason upon it, convinced that the candour with which your Imperial Majesty always desires to hear the truth and to examine it, will render it not less acceptable to your Imperial Majesty in this form than if it were reduced within those bounds which my individual respect and confidence in your Imperial Majesty's intentions might have assigned to it. I should wish to offer my sentiments to your Imperial Majesty upon the present occasion as little as possible in an official character; I should desire to be allowed to speak to your Imperial Majesty as an individual whom circumstances had associated in an humble sphere to the great work which your Imperial Majesty has now prominently conducted to the eve of its completion. Having attended your Imperial Majesty's head-quarters, and followed your footsteps throughout many of the difficulties and uncertainties of the contest, I must be permitted to feel more than an ordinary share of personal solicitude that the close may correspond with the character of the undertaking, and that your Imperial Majesty may by your influence and by your example inspire the councils of Europe at the present conjuncture with that spirit of forbearance, moderation, and generosity which can alone secure to Europe the repose for which your Imperial Majesty has contended, and to your Majesty's name the glory that should surround it.

I cannot, however, so far abstract myself from the public situation in which I am placed that it should not occur to your Imperial Majesty that it is the Prince Regent's Minister that addresses you.

In this view permit me, Sire, to recall to your attention that, except so far as British interests may be affected through interests of Europe, Great Britain is the last Power whose separate interests could be endangered by any determination of your Imperial Majesty on the side of Poland; and that if I feel and argue strongly upon this question, I may be mistaken in the judgment I form, but upon no European question can I venture to claim, as the organ of the British government, to be considered as a more impartial authority by your Imperial Majesty than upon the present.

I must also entreat, Sire, if you find me opposed in a certain extent to your Imperial Majesty's pretensions on the Duchy of Warsaw, that you will not therefore consider me indisposed to witness, even with satisfaction, your Imperial Majesty receive a liberal and important aggrandizement on your Polish frontier. It is to the degree and the mode to which I alone object. Your Imperial Majesty may receive an ample pledge of European

gratitude without imposing upon your Allies and neighbours an arrangement inconsistent with the relations of independent States to each other.

I might also appeal to past experience, were it necessary, to relieve myself and my government from any suspicion of a policy adverse to the views and interests of Russia. Your Imperial Majesty will recollect that we are only now emerging from a long course of painful policy with respect to Norway, undertaken at your Imperial Majesty's instance in order to secure to you the support of Sweden throughout the war, and to consolidate your possession of Finland, by obtaining for that Power an adequate indemnity in another direction. To this object our resources throughout the contest, and our conquests from Denmark, were steadily directed and successfully applied, under circumstances not a little arduous in such a government as ours.

Your Imperial Majesty will trace the same friendly spirit in the aid lately afforded by His Majesty's Ministers at the Porte to the conclusion of a peace with the Turks, which involved in it a large accession of territory to your empire.

I may refer to a still more recent instance on the side of Persia, which your Imperial Majesty has condescended more than once to acknowledge, where a peace has been signed securing to your Imperial Majesty important and extensive acquisitions in consequence of the active intervention of the King's Ambassador acting under express instructions from home.

If I have referred to these transactions, it is only from an anxiety that your Imperial Majesty may not misinterpret my motives. If I now find myself compelled in this, the fourth instance of Russian aggrandizement within a few years, by a sense of public duty to Europe, and especially to your Imperial Majesty, to press for a modification, not for an abandonment, of your Imperial Majesty's pretensions to extend your empire farther to the westward, I persuade myself that I may do so without being considered by your Imperial Majesty as influenced by any other sentiments than those which it becomes me to entertain as the Minister of an Allied Power. I might perhaps venture to claim some credit with your Imperial Majesty, if not influence, on the part of my master the Prince Regent, from the spirit in which His Royal Highness has acted on other occasions.

Your Imperial Majesty cannot doubt how deeply the future fate and interests of Europe are likely to be influenced by the issue of the present Congress; how entirely the character of the great transactions in which the States of Europe have been engaged, and the fame of the principal actors in them, will depend upon the mode and temper in which it shall at last be wound up; how secondary in your Imperial Majesty's enlightened mind, and in the scale of such an empire as that over which Providence has called your Imperial Majesty to reign, can a million of population, more or less, be, compared to the glory and to the service rendered to your own people, as well as to mankind, by setting to Europe an example of generosity and moderation in the regulation of what immediately concerns your own dominions.

I do not hesitate to declare, Sire, my solemn conviction that it depends exclusively upon the temper in which your Imperial Majesty shall meet the questions which more immediately concern your own empire, whether the present Congress shall prove a blessing to mankind, or only exhibit a scene of discordant intrigue, and a lawless scramble for power.

The station your Imperial Majesty occupies in Europe at this day enables you to do anything and everything for the general happiness, if you found your intervention upon just principles that Europe will bow to.

If your Imperial Majesty should leave public opinion behind you, what may be your power I know not at the present moment, and on this I trust your Imperial Majesty will not rely; but in such a calamitous calculation I should despair of witnessing any just and stable order of things in Europe, and I should have the mortification of seeing your Imperial Majesty for the first time regarded, even by those whom you have delivered, as an object of alarm instead of confidence.

This, Sire, must not, and I feel convinced cannot be; and your Imperial Majesty, with your accustomed indulgence, must permit me to conjure you, in the freedom to which you have condescended to admit me, to rise superior to all minor considerations, and to give to Europe that peace which they expect at your hands.

I should press these considerations with the more reluctance, if I did not feel persuaded that there is a course open to your Imperial Majesty to pursue, which will combine your beneficent intentions towards your Polish subjects with what your Allies and Europe, Sire, claim at your hands. They desire not to see the Poles humiliated, or deprived of a mild, conciliatory, and congenial system of administration. They desire, not that your Imperial Majesty should enter into any engagements restrictive of your sovereign authority over your own provinces; they only wish you, Sire, for the sake of peace, to ameliorate gradually the frame of your Polish administration, and to avoid, if you are not prepared for the complete reunion and independence of Poland, that species of measure which, under a title of higher import, may create alarm both in Russia and the neighbouring States, and which, however it may gratify the ambition of a few individuals of great family in Poland, may, in fact, bring less of real liberty and happiness to the people than a more measured and unostentatious change in the system of their administration. I shall beg permission to reserve the development of my ideas on this subject till your Imperial Majesty has looked at the general principle.

I am confident it may be so arranged as to meet your Imperial Majesty's views, to satisfy the Poles, and to conciliate to the attempt both the favour of foreign Powers and your Majesty's Russian subjects.

If the political branch of the question can be thus settled, it will only remain for your Imperial Majesty to arrange your frontier with your Allies in such a manner as may satisfy the spirit as well as the words of your Treaty of the 27th of June, 1813, with Austria and Prussia.

This may be done, leaving your Imperial Majesty still in possession of the greater part of the Duchy of Warsaw, whilst your Allies will obtain that species of frontier which no independent Power can forego either with dignity or with safety.

I entreat your Imperial Majesty's gracious forgiveness for the liberty I have thus presumed to take in occupying so much of your Imperial Majesty's attention, and that I may be permitted to subscribe myself,

With the utmost deference and the most profound respect, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM ON THE POLISH QUESTION.

Endorsed "First Memorandum."

When, by the defeats of the French army, and their expulsion from Russia, an opening had been made for Prussia to join the general cause of Europe, the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia united themselves for that cause by the Treaty of Kalisch, on the 28th February, 1813.

As this treaty was of the greatest importance, the character of it was peculiarly marked, by its laying down with uncommon force and detail, in its preamble, the principles on which it was founded, and which were to be the rule for the future conduct of the two Powers.

It runs as follows :

"La destruction totale des forces ennemies qui avaient pénétré dans le cœur de la Russie a préparé la grande époque de l'indépendance de tous les Etats qui voudraient la saisir pour s'affranchir du joug que la France a fait peser sur eux depuis tant d'années.

"En conduisant les troupes victorieuses hors de ses frontières, le premier sentiment de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies fut celui de rallier à la belle cause que la Providence a si visiblement protégé ses anciens et plus chers Alliés afin d'accomplir avec eux les destinées auxquelles tiennent et le repos et le bonheur des peuples épuisés par tant de commotions et tant de sacrifices.

"Le tems arrivera où les traités ne seront *plus des trêves* ; où ils pourront de nouveau être observés *avec cette foi religieuse*, cette inviolabilité sacrée, auxquelles tiennent la considération, la force, et la conservation des Empires.

"C'est dans ces circonstances solennelles et décisives qu'un mouvement spontané a rapproché Sa Majesté de toutes les Russies et Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse. Tous deux également guidés par le généreux motif de la délivrance de l'Europe ont commencé pour procéder à cette œuvre salutaire par resserrer les liens de leur ancienne alliance, par rétablir dans le sens le plus étendu leur première intimité, et voulant fixer la base de leurs engagements réciproques par un traité de paix et d'amitié, d'alliance offensive et défensive, ils ont nommé," &c.

Such is the preamble to the treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, against France entered into by these Powers, to which are annexed two separate and secret articles.

The first engages that Prussia "sera reconstruite dans les proportions statistiques, géographiques, et financières conforme à ce qu'elle était avant la guerre de 1806. Pour cet effet S.M. l'Empereur de toutes les Russies promet de la manière la plus solennelle d'appliquer aux équivalents que les circonstances pourraient exiger pour l'intérêt même des deux états, et à l'agrandissement de la Prusse, toutes les acquisitions qui pourraient être faites par les armées et les négociations dans la partie septentrionale de l'Allemagne, à l'exception des anciennes possessions de la maison d'Hanovre. Dans tous les arrangemens il sera conservé entre les différentes provinces qui doivent rentrer sous la domination Prussienne *l'ensemble et l'arrondissement nécessaires pour constituer un corps d'Etat indépendant.*"

ART. 2.—“ Pour donner à l'article précédent une précision conforme à la parfaite intelligence qui existe entre les deux hautes parties contractantes, S.M. l'Empereur de toutes les Russies garantit à S.M. le Roi de Prusse, avec ses possessions actuelles, plus particulièrement la vieille Prusse, à laquelle il sera joint un territoire qui sous tous les rapports *tant militaires* que géographiques lie cette province à la Silésie.”

On the 27th of June following, in order to confirm the dispositions of Austria to join the common cause, and to assure to her adequate indemnities for her co-operation in case of her mediation with France failing, the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia entered into a solemn treaty with the Emperor of Austria.

The conditions of this treaty were as follows :

The 1st. “ La dissolution du Duché de Varsovie, et *de partager* les provinces qui le forment *entre l'Autriche*, la Prusse, et la Russie d'après des arrangemens à prendre par ces trois Puissances, sans aucune intervention du gouvernement Français.”

The 2nd is, “ L'agrandissement de la Prusse ensuite de ce partage, et par la cession de la ville et du territoire de Danzig. L'évacuation de toutes les forteresses dans les Etats Prussiens et dans le Duché de Varsovie qui aujourd'hui se trouvent encore occupées par les troupes Françaises.”

The 3rd is, “ La restitution des Provinces Illyriennes à l'Autriche.”

In furtherance of this treaty, the Courts of Austria and Prussia entered into a separate treaty of alliance for the protection of their mutual interests on the 9th September, 1813, by the third stipulation of the first secret article whereof they bind themselves to procure “ *un arrangement à l'amiable entre les trois Cours d'Autriche, et de Prusse, et de Russie sur le sort futur du Duché de Varsovie.*”

Such being the engagements with respect to the Duchy of Warsaw under solemn treaties, it is nevertheless understood that His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia considers himself entitled to dispose of the whole Duchy of Warsaw, with all its fortresses, on the ground that his troops first occupied the Duchy. That however, as matter of grace and favour, he means to assign to Prussia the city and territory of Dantzic, and a district necessary for connecting ancient Prussia with the other Prussian territories ; and it is further understood that it is in the intention of His Imperial Majesty to connect the residue of the Duchy of Warsaw with the Russian provinces which were allotted to Russia by the former divisions of Poland, and to erect them into a separate monarchy, to be governed by His Imperial Majesty, as King of Poland, under such arrangements as may be judged suitable for reviving the kingdom of Poland under the Russian dynasty ; and this measure is alleged to be necessary on the principles of moral duty, in order to produce a due improvement in the government of His Imperial Majesty's Polish subjects, and of the people of the Duchy of Warsaw, who are at present subject to him, by His Imperial Majesty's occupation of the Duchy.

The contemplation of this measure has necessarily created great alarm and consternation in the Courts of Austria and Prussia, and diffused a general apprehension throughout the European states.

The forced annexation of nearly the entire of so important and populous a territory as the Duchy of Warsaw, containing above 4,000,000 of people,

upon a principle of conquest, to the empire of Russia, so largely increased of late by her conquest of Finland, by her acquisitions in Moldavia, and by her recent extension on the side of Persia; her advance from the Niemen into the very heart of Germany; her possession of all the fortresses of the Duchy, and thereby totally exposing to her attack the capitals of Austria and Prussia, without any line of defence or frontier; the invitation to the Poles to rally round the Emperor of Russia's standard for the renovation of their kingdom; the giving new hopes and animation, and the opening new scenes for the activity and cabals of that light and restless people; the prospect of renewing those tumultuary contests in which the Poles so long embroiled both themselves and their neighbours; the dread that this measure inspires of laying fresh materials for a new and early war; the extinction it produces of any reasonable hope of present tranquillity, confidence, and peace: all these and many more considerations present themselves to the general view, and justify the alarms that pervade Europe.

While there is an universal feeling to acknowledge and to do justice to the eminent virtues of the Emperor of Russia, and to the immense benefits which his perseverance and exertions have achieved for the general cause, the public mind is at a loss to conceive upon what ground this formidable measure is adopted or justified.

It is strongly alleged that it is in direct opposition to the engagements made by His Imperial Majesty with his allies the Emperor of Austria and King of Prussia when they were engaged by Russia as confederates in the war.

It is argued irresistibly, from the treaties above stated, that the measure is not only against the tenor, but even more against the spirit, of these treaties. Can it be supposed, it is alleged, that the Emperor of Austria and King of Prussia, when they stipulated "*la dissolution du Duché de Varsovie, et de partager les provinces qui le forment entre l'Autriche, la Prusse, et la Russie, d'après des arrangemens à prendre par ces trois Puissances sans aucune intervention du gouvernement Français,*" intended to stipulate to cede nearly the whole Duchy, which they had thus engaged to divide, for the mere aggrandisement of Russia alone, to the entire destruction of their own frontier, exposing thereby the capitals of their respective dominions naked and defenceless? As little can it be maintained that the treaty contemplated the distribution of the Duchy between Russia and Prussia alone, to the exclusion of Austria. The reverse is expressed on the face of the treaty; and Prussia, in the subsequent treaty, signed in September, with Austria, pledges herself to see "*l'arrangement à l'amiable entre les trois Cours*" carried into effect. Can it be supposed that when Austria and Prussia stipulated *for the dissolution of the Duchy of Warsaw*, they would have agreed to the more dangerous revival of it in a Polish kingdom under the Crown of Russia, an arrangement tenfold more menacing and alarming to their respective states? If the words of the treaty were as ambiguous as they are plain and conclusive, no person could possibly give such a construction to them as that these two Powers, who were then making engagements for the delivery of Europe, were induced to embrace that cause by covenanting their own disgrace, and military exposure to a powerful neighbour.

When, therefore, it is felt that the measure is contrary to the treaties made, the subject assumes an aspect still more serious. His Imperial Majesty must, upon a review of these facts, be sensible that the policy which it has occurred to him to pursue is against the faith of his most solemn engagements, more especially as the system held out by His Imperial Majesty to induce Prussia, and afterwards Austria, to join the cause of Europe was, that the time was arrived when "*les traités ne seront plus des trêves, où ils pourront de nouveau être observés avec cette foi religieuse, cette inviolabilité sacrée, auxquelles tiennent la considération, la force, et la conservation des Empires.*" It is, however, trusted that when His Imperial Majesty more maturely and seriously examines his engagements, both in form and in spirit, he will be himself the most forward to recognise and adhere to them, and to desist from every project inconsistent with either.

It is a matter of no less difficulty to conceive how the annexation to the Russian empire of almost the whole Duchy of Warsaw, the erecting it into a kingdom, together with the Polish provinces now under the Russian dominion, can be regarded as a moral duty. Surely it can never be a moral duty to act in violation of the most sacred treaties; and if His Imperial Majesty is seriously impressed with the necessity of ameliorating the condition of the Poles distinct from views of territorial extension, it is submitted that the power is sufficiently in his hands at present with regard to the numerous inhabitants of the Russian provinces taken from Poland, together with his fair proportion of the Duchy of Warsaw; and that for an experiment of such a nature, however beneficent, it cannot be necessary to attempt an aggrandisement of his empire so enormous and so menacing as that proposed, an empire at present amply sufficient for every purpose of ambition, and more than sufficient for the purposes of good government, at the expense of the present character and future security of his allies, and in contravention of his own engagements, and of those principles of justice and moderation which he has so repeatedly declared to be the sole motives of his conduct, and by which his conduct, as to France, upon the late peace was so eminently regulated.

His Imperial Majesty should also weigh how far it can be reconcileable with moral duty precipitately to embark in an experiment which is likely to excite alarm and discontent amongst the neighbouring states, and political fermentation within his own dominions. If moral duty requires that the situation of the Poles should be ameliorated by so decisive a change as the revival of their monarchy, let it be undertaken upon the broad and liberal principle of rendering them again really independent as a nation, instead of making two-thirds of them a mere formidable military instrument in the hands of a single Power. Such a measure of liberality would be applauded by all Europe, and would not be opposed, but, on the contrary, would be cheerfully acquiesced in, both by Austria and Prussia. It would be a measure, it is true, of sacrifice, on the ordinary calculation of states, on the part of Russia; but if His Imperial Majesty is not prepared for such sacrifices to moral duty on the part of his own empire, he has no moral right to make such experiment at the expense of his allies and neighbours.

It is further alleged, that so long as His Imperial Majesty tenaciously adheres to this objectionable project, it is impossible that any plan of

arrangement for the reconstruction of Europe can be brought forward by the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Powers, or that the present Congress can be assembled in form to discuss and sanction any such arrangement.

It can hardly be expected by His Imperial Majesty that the Plenipotentiaries of Austria and Prussia should come forward of their own accord and propose in the face of Europe, as a measure they think safe and honourable, to leave the dominions of their Sovereigns without a military frontier. It is unreasonable to demand a measure personally so degrading at their hands. Can they, as statesmen, after having framed and signed the Peace of Paris in the face of Europe and of their own fellow subjects, recommend such an arrangement as calculated "de mettre fin aux longues agitations de l'Europe et aux malheurs des peuples par une paix solide, fondée sur une juste répartition de forces entre les Puissances, et portant dans les stipulations sa garantie et sa durée?"

The Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, of France, of Spain, and, it is believed, those of all the European states great and small, are impressed with similar sentiments as to this project. How unfortunate then will be the predicament of Europe if His Imperial Majesty shall tenaciously adhere to his present purpose, and determine to hold in military possession the Duchy of Warsaw against the general sense; and that the Plenipotentiaries of the other Powers, selected for arranging a system for Europe, and for the settlement of a solid and permanent peace, shall be obliged to inform the representatives of all the states assembled at Vienna that they are deprived, by such a line of conduct on the part of Russia, of any hope of proposing such a settlement as they have pledged themselves, by the Treaty of Paris, to give to Europe after its long agitations and sufferings!

It seems that no other course can be properly adopted unless His Imperial Majesty shall graciously condescend to consider seriously the consequences which must necessarily result from the measure to which he is at present attached; and it is for His Imperial Majesty to consider of that course which the various declarations which have been issued to Europe in his name, the spirit of his treaties, the honour and safety of his allies, the general voice of Europe, his own eminent virtues, and the great character he has established, imperiously call for in the face of Europe upon so solemn an occasion as the reunion of its plenipotentiaries in a general Congress.

[ENCLOSURE from LORD CASTLEREAGH to LORD LIVERPOOL.]

Claim of Prussia upon Saxony.

Lorsqu'au commencement de l'année 1813 la Prusse s'allia avec la Russie pour combattre l'ennemi de l'Europe, il fut expressément stipulé, comme condition fondamentale de toute co-opération de la Prusse, "que pour assurer à jamais l'indépendance entière de cette puissance, on lui rendroit la force réelle qu'elle avoit eue avant la guerre de 1806; et que, pour cet effet, il seroit conservé dans tous les arrangemens entre les différentes provinces qui devoient rentrer sous la domination Prussienne l'ensemble et l'arrondissement nécessaire pour constituer un corps d'état indépendant." Toutes les puissances qui accédèrent ensuite à cette alliance ont reconnu "l'intérêt

qu'avoit l'Europe entière de voir la Prusse reconstruite sur l'échelle la plus rapprochée de celle où elle s'étoit trouvée avant l'époque précitée ;" et elles ont sanctionné ce principe par des traités solennels.

L'Angleterre s'est nommément engagée par l'article secret du 14 Juin, 1813, à contribuer à l'agrandissement de la Prusse dans des proportions statistiques et géographiques pour le moins telles qu'elles étoient avant la guerre de 1806 ; et c'est à cette condition que la Prusse s'est également engagée à procurer à la maison de Hanovre un arrondissement convenable, dans lequel l'évêché de Hildesheim provisoirement cédé au Hanovre entre-roit nommément, et qui ne seroit pas moindre que d'une population de 250 mille à 300 mille âmes, bien entendu que sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse soit dédommagé ailleurs pour cette cession.

Personne n'ignore de quelle manière la Prusse, en consacrant la totalité absolue de ses forces au soutien de la grande cause, s'est acquittée de ses engagements.

Elle réclame maintenant ce qui doit faire le récompense de ses efforts, ce qui lui a été promis dans les traités, et ce qu'exigent impérieusement sa sûreté future et l'intérêt même de l'Europe, dont l'équilibre politique ne sera jamais solidement établi si la Prusse n'est assez forte pour maintenir elle-même son indépendance.

D'autres puissances ont trouvé dans leurs rapports géographiques le moyen de recouvrer déjà, par des acquisitions convenables, ce que leur assignoient les traités et l'assentiment des autres Cours. La Prusse seule n'a point encore obtenu ce qu'elle a droit de prétendre.

Loin d'être rentrée dans la possession de tous les pays qui lui appartenaient avant la guerre de 1806, elle doit, au contraire, ne plus compter sur la majeure partie des anciennes provinces de la Pologne, et renoncer à la principauté de Hildesheim, et à celles d'Ansbach et de Bayreuth, tandis que toutes les acquisitions éloignées de son centre, et conséquemment de moindre valeur, qui pourront lui tomber en partage sur les bords et au delà du Rhin, semblent plutôt faites pour l'exposer à de nouveaux orages que pour augmenter sa force réelle ; quoiqu'il en soit, elles ne compléteront jamais son état de possession de 1806. Mais où trouver tout ce qui manque encore à ce complément ?

Pour reconstruire la monarchie sur une échelle rapprochée de celle où elle étoit avant la guerre de 1806 ; pour établir entre ses provinces l'ensemble et l'arrondissement nécessaires à son indépendance ; pour remplir enfin les promesses solennelles des traités, il ne reste à la Prusse, faute d'autres dédommagemens convenables, que de faire valoir ses droits de conquête sur un pays limitrophe.

Ce pays c'est la Saxe, conquise par les armes Prussiennes et Alliées.

Cette conquête n'est qu'une suite toute naturelle de la persévérance opiniâtre du Roi de Saxe dans le système destructeur de Buonaparte.

Il y avoit au commencement de l'année 1813 une époque où les délibérations du Cabinet de Dresde étoient plus libres que celles de la Cour de Berlin. C'est alors que le Roi de Saxe, maître des forteresses de Torgau et de Wittenberg, disposant d'une brave armée, et n'ayant presque aucun ennemi dans ses états, auroit dû se déclarer pour la bonne cause. Il pouvoit alors suivre l'exemple de la Prusse, sans en partager les dangers. Il y

avoit encore un moment avant la bataille de Lutzen, et même immédiatement après, où l'accession de la Saxe à l'union de la Russie, de la Prusse, et du Nord de l'Allemagne, auroit fait pencher dès lors la balance du côté des Alliés. Néanmoins, et malgré les plus instantes sollicitations de la Russie et de la Prusse, malgré le bel exemple que lui donna l'Autriche, le Roi de Saxe a constamment refusé son accession à une cause qui devoit être celle de son cœur, et qui seule pouvoit assurer le bonheur de ses peuples.

Après avoir mis à la disposition de Napoléon la forteresse de Torgau, toutes ses troupes, et toutes les ressources de son pays, et dans un moment où les grands coups alloient se frapper, ce Prince quitta subitement Prague, pour se jeter à Dresde entre les bras de l'oppresseur de sa patrie. Dès ce moment devenant l'ennemi implacable et déclaré de la cause des Alliés, il devoit être traité par eux comme tel ; son sort ne pouvoit plus être séparé du sort de celui dont il avoit épousé avec aveuglement les intérêts iniques ; et toutes les suites de sa conduite politique dans un moment aussi décisif devoient retomber sur lui.

Les troupes alliées pénétrèrent en Saxe de tous côtés. La conquête de ce pays leur fut disputée pas à pas, mais enfin la victoire de Leipsic la décida, et soumit la Saxe.

Cette ville fut prise d'assaut, et on fit prisonnier le Roi avec ce qui s'y trouvoit de troupes Saxonnnes, et n'avoit pas passé le dernier jour de la bataille, et lorsqu'elle étoit décidée du côté des Alliés, après que les généraux eurent tâché en vain d'obtenir la sanction de leur Souverain pour cette mesure.

Dès lors lui et toute la Saxe restèrent au pouvoir des Alliés.

Ayant été le maître absolu de ses actions, le Roi de Saxe ne peut imputer qu'à lui-même les suites funestes qui résulteront pour lui d'une résistance aussi opiniâtre. Retiré à Berlin, il y jouit des égards qu'on se plaît à prodiguer au malheur ; mais de quel droit pourroit-il réclamer davantage, et où trouver dans le droit de gens une disposition qui exige le rétablissement d'un Souverain après que tous ses états ont été conquis, et après qu'il a même été fait prisonnier de guerre pour sa personne ? Il pourra provoquer la générosité des vainqueurs, il pourra solliciter un établissement convenable pour lui et pour sa famille ; mais pour obtenir ces avantages il devra les réclamer plutôt de leur magnanimité que de leur justice.

Cependant cette générosité en faveur d'un Prince qui a si puissamment secondé l'ennemi commun ne sauroit passer ses justes bornes, ni empiéter sur ce qui revient de droit à un autre Prince, qui a tout sacrifié pour combattre cet ennemi, et pour faire triompher la cause de l'Europe entière.

Et ce droit de conquête, dont la Prusse demande l'exécution, en offrant ailleurs un bel établissement au Roi de Saxe et à ses successeurs, qui lui offre bien plus d'agréments que celui qu'il pourroit conserver en Saxe même, où il seroit toujours froissé entre l'Autriche et la Prusse, un malheureux objet de jalousie pour ces puissances, qui doivent rester unies pour le salut de l'Europe, un foyer de mécontentement et de cabales, un objet hétérogène et dangereux enfin, qui ne peut que forcer malgré elle la Prusse à porter sans cesse ses vues sur son acquisition—ce droit de conquête, dis-je, n'est-il pas consacré par l'exemple de tous les siècles et de tous les pays ? Sans remonter à l'origine de la plus grande partie des états qui lui doivent leur arrondissement actuel, et sans faire le récit de toutes les conquêtes ordinaires

et partielles dont fourmillent les annales de la guerre et les traités de paix, on n'a qu'à consulter l'histoire moderne de quelques monarchies pour faire voir combien de fois l'ordre des dynasties et la forme des gouvernemens se sont réglés uniquement d'après le sort des armes.

C'est d'abord la Saxe même qui en fournit un exemple frappant ; car c'était là que le droit de conquête a placé sur le trône en 1547 les ancêtres du Roi actuel, et en faisant descendre l'Electeur Jean Frédéric, victime infortunée de son dévouement pour la cause la plus légitime.

C'est le même droit de conquête qui par exemple en Italie a changé tant de fois la face des états ; qui décida, 1713, du sort des plus beaux pays de l'Europe, faisant partie de la succession d'Espagne ; qui encore, 1735, disposa du Grand Duché de Toscane, du vivant de son ancien Souverain, en faveur du Duc de Lorraine, qui attribua le patrimoine de ce dernier à la France, et qui transféra deux Princes de la maison de Bourbon, l'un en 1735 sur le trône des deux Siciles, l'autre (à la suite de la conquête de la Belgique) en 1748 sur celui de Parme.

C'est le même droit de conquête qui de nos jours a fait passer aux Indes Orientales plus d'un trône sous la domination Britannique. C'est encore le droit de conquête qui en Allemagne, même dans les époques antérieures à la Révolution Française, a amené plusieurs changemens de territoire très considérables, et sanctionnés ensuite par les traités ; et qui notamment a ôté à la couronne de Suède en 1720 la plupart de ces possessions qu'une loi fondamentale de l'empire lui avait assurées, et qu'on était habitué à regarder comme essentiellement nécessaires pour l'intérêt général de l'Allemagne.

Viscount Castlereagh to Prince Hardenberg.

MON PRINCE,

Vienna, 12th Oct., 1814.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of yesterday, with its enclosures, and lose no time in explaining myself upon it, with the frankness which I always wish to observe towards you.

There is no principle in European politics to which I attach more importance than the effectual reconstruction of Prussia. Her glorious services in the late war give her the highest claims upon our gratitude ; but there is a more commanding claim even than our gratitude, which is, that upon Prussia, as the only solid foundation, every arrangement for the security of the north of Germany against the greater dangers that may menace it must be built.

It is to Prussia in such a crisis we must all cling ; it is upon her power we must look to assemble ours ; and to fulfil this task the Prussian monarchy ought to be both substantive and solid, and endowed with all those characteristics of an independent State which may enable her to command respect and to inspire confidence.

With respect to the question of Saxony. If the incorporation even of the whole of that country in the Prussian monarchy is necessary to effect so great a good for Europe, I may feel some individual pain that so ancient a family should be thus deeply affected, but I can feel no moral or political

repugnance to the measure. If ever a Sovereign justly subjected himself to become a sacrifice to the future security of Europe, I conceive the King of Saxony has, by his repeated tergiversations, and by his having been not only the most devoted but the most favoured of Buonaparte's vassals, largely and cheerfully contributing, at the head of both his German and Polish States, to carry subjugation into the very heart of Russia.

I know there are numerous instances of similar political immorality in Germany. I know of none, however, so flagrant; and in the vicious circle in which the German States have latterly almost considered themselves entitled to move, where all cannot be punished, and where the greater number have redeemed their offences by subsequent services in the general cause, I shall not lament, whilst the mass are forgiven, that one example should be made to check this intolerable evil.

Your Highness will see from this statement that I have no hesitation in entertaining the principle of the proposed arrangement, if it shall be necessary to place Prussia in the station she should occupy for the interest of Europe; but if this incorporation should be attempted as a means of compensating Prussia for unjust and dangerous encroachments on the part of Russia, and as an arrangement to reconcile her, uncovered in point of frontier, to submit to an obvious relation of military dependence on that great Power, in this latter alternative, which I should for the honour and interest of all, and of none more than Russia herself, most deeply deplore, I do not feel myself justified in giving your Highness the smallest expectation that Great Britain could, in the face of Europe, be a party to such an arrangement.

Trusting that a result so inconsistent with the principles of the Alliance cannot be either pressed or listened to, I can feel no objection to the provisional administration of Saxony being, as your Highness proposes, entrusted to His Prussian Majesty. I am willing immediately to yield this arrangement, which appears to me just and reasonable in itself, as a pledge of the sincerity of the assurances I have above given to your Highness, and in the full confidence that the King of Prussia will not lend himself to any arrangement which can be either inconsistent with the dignity of his crown, or with the permanent security of his dominions.

I have thought your Highness would wish to hear from me without delay on the latter subject. As soon as Prince Metternich is prepared to explain himself upon the points referred to in your Highness's letter, I shall be ready to enter with you both into the general subject, and shall be most anxious to accelerate an understanding which appears to me essential to the best interests of Europe.

I am, &c.,
CASTLEREAGH.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Foreign Office, 13th Oct., 1814.

Your Excellency's despatch, No. 26, relative to the pretensions of the French government, as stated in the note from M. de Jaucourt to your

Excellency, that the Dutch government be made to bear their share of the debts due for the construction and armament of the ships which were divided between that Power and France, under the 15th article of the Treaty of Paris, has been laid before the Prince Regent.

It is probably known to your Excellency that in the negotiation with Buonaparte, which took place in the course of last spring, the Allies had made it a *sine quâ non* that the whole of the fleet and stores at Antwerp, and at all other ports, which were to be given up by the French government, should belong to the government of the country to whom the places were assigned by the Treaty of Peace. Upon the restoration of the House of Bourbon, the Prince Regent and his Allies were induced to relax from this demand; and in order to avoid questions of the very nature of that now for the first time brought forward, and to prevent all disputes as to details, it was agreed that two-thirds of the fleet and stores at Antwerp should be assigned to the French government, and one-third to that of the Sovereign of the United Provinces. The settlement under this article was to be referred to commissioners, whose decision upon all cases must be considered as final.

It can hardly be doubted that if the division had been made according to the proportion of capital, materials, and labour employed in the construction of the fleet, the advantage to Holland and Flanders would have been much more than the proportion of one-third to two-thirds; but this could not have been done without endless disputes; and a general principle of division was therefore adopted, after much deliberation, in which considerable advantage was conceded to the French government.

I have the honour to enclose, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a letter from Admiral Martin, one of the British Commissioners at Antwerp to whom this subject was referred.

I am, with great truth and respect, my Lord,

Your Excellency's most obedient humble servant,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Rear-Admiral T. B. Martin to W. Hamilton, Esq.

SIR,

H.M.S. *Prince Frederick*, Hamoaze, 29th Sept., 1814.

I have this day had the honour to receive your letter of the 27th inst., in which you signify to me Lord Liverpool's desire that I would furnish you with such information as I possess respecting the circumstances stated in a note from M. Jaucourt, French minister *ad interim*, to the Duke of Wellington.

I beg to state to you for his Lordship's information that, soon after the English Commission arrived at Antwerp, allusion was made to debts incurred in various ways prior to the convention of the 23rd of April; and I did distinctly refuse to entertain any subject so totally irrelative to the 15th article of the Treaty of Peace. And the impression on my mind, from the way in which the thing passed, was that the French Commissioners acquiesced in this opinion. If they had not, I should imagine the interference of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs would have been procured at an earlier period.

The claim suggested by the French government, and which appears as foreign to the spirit as it is to the letter of the treaty, is of a most unlimited nature, unless we are to look for its commencement in the very origin of the French establishment at Antwerp; for the whole of the ships built and equipped at that place were divided under the 15th article of the Treaty of Peace; and if the question of debt could in possibility be entertained, it would not be difficult to show how largely the resources of Holland contributed to the creation and equipment of that force.

The 15th article of the Treaty of Peace, whereby the division of the fleet and naval property at Antwerp was to be settled, is so conclusive that we should have thought it presuming in the highest degree to have deviated from the points so distinctly marked out to us; and in the statement of the settlement of the division the French Commissioners acknowledge the division was made to their satisfaction.

I have, &c.,

T. B. MARTIN.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Fife House, 14th Oct., 1814.

The Prince Regent received some days ago a communication from Count Munster, in which he informs him that the Emperor of Russia did not desist from his views upon Poland, and that the King of Prussia was to be indemnified upon the north of Germany, and possibly with a part of Hanover. I have told the Prince that I am sure he might set his mind at ease as to the latter part of the communication, for that all the Powers at the Congress would be disposed to protect him against any such pretensions. The intelligence respecting the views of the Emperor of Russia as to Poland is confirmed by your private letter and by accounts we have received from Lord Walpole at Petersburg.

However this question of Poland may now end, it cannot be settled either creditably or satisfactorily. The Emperor of Russia need never have stirred it, and in that case the Powers of Europe would have left the three States most interested to settle the question *à l'aimable* amongst themselves; but as it has been once mooted, it becomes a question of serious embarrassment, and it is very material that we should lose no character by the part we take in it.

I am inclined to think that the less we have to do with it, except as far as regards giving our opinion, the better. I have sent you a short Memorandum on the subject, containing the ideas which have occurred to me upon it. They very much correspond with what passed at a meeting at your house before you left England; but the train of reasoning is drawn out with more precision than occurred to me at that time, and the idea of the Duchy of Warsaw being preserved as an independent State, under an independent sovereign, I think it may be of importance to put forward, for the reasons given in the Memorandum.

It is impossible to know how far you may have advanced on this and other subjects before you receive this letter; but at all events the Memorandum can do no harm, and you will make such use of the contents of it as you may judge upon the whole most advisable.

The French government are not using us well on the subject of the slave trade. No step whatever has been taken for carrying into effect their promise to abolish the trade north of the Line. The expedition has sailed to take possession of the French factories on the coast of Africa ; and if some measures are not adopted to prevent the renewal of the trade within the agreed limits, speculations will be entered into for that purpose, and we shall have an amazing clamour to encounter from all the abolitionists. Nothing can be more unsatisfactory than Jaucourt's last communication to the Duke of Wellington on this subject. I hope you will be able to bring Talleyrand to some point upon it. By accounts we have received from St. Domingo, it appears that Petion is as determined upon resistance as Christophe, and there is no person acquainted with the island who thinks the French have the least chance of establishing their authority in it.

LIVERPOOL.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Memorandum respecting Poland.

14th Oct., 1814.

There can be no doubt that the restoration of the kingdom of Poland, such as it was in the year 1792, under an hereditary, independent, and limited monarchy, would be the measure most just in itself, and most satisfactory to the people of this country.

Have we any right, however, to call upon Russia, Austria, and Prussia to give up those provinces of Poland which they annexed to their own dominions, and which continue to form a part of them? Certainly not. We may recommend it, but we can do no more ; for however unjust the partitions of Poland may have been, if from considerations of prudence we found it either impracticable or did not deem it expedient to oppose them at the time they were made, we can have no right, at the distance of five, ten, or twenty years, to require of the above-named Powers to dismember the provinces which they had then annexed, and which formed part of their dominions during a period in which we were at peace with all of them, and in alliance with some of them.

The only portion, therefore, of ancient Poland about whose fate we have now a right to take a decisive part is the Duchy of Warsaw. The fate of that Duchy is *sub judice*.

It is obvious that an arrangement may be made with respect to the Duchy of Warsaw upon either of the three following principles :

1st. It may be divided between the three great Powers, and so made to constitute a part of each of their dominions. Or

2ndly. It may be preserved as an independent State under an independent prince, Or

3rdly. It may be assigned to one of the three great Powers as an independent State, which under the present circumstances would be Russia.

Of these three alternatives, I should certainly consider the third the worst for the general interests of Europe.

The second would preserve the principle of Polish independence, and might lead the inhabitants of the dismembered provinces to look to their reunion at some period more or less remote with the Duchy of Warsaw ; but the weakness of the Power itself would in this case afford a reasonable security to the neighbouring Powers against the accomplishment of any such object, and at all

events the three Powers would be upon an equal footing, and have a common interest in opposing any measure which was likely to produce such an effect. But if the Duchy of Warsaw is to be an independent State under the Emperor of Russia, the independent principle will not only be preserved, but it will be preserved under a monarch whose power will be sufficient to give encouragement to the disaffected in the Austrian and Prussian Polish provinces to seize the first opportunity of resisting their acknowledged Sovereigns, and of reuniting themselves under a head whom they will consider as strong enough to protect them, and who will be the Sovereign of a country which they will regard as the parent stock of Polish independence.

I cannot, however, conceal from you that this last project would be less unpopular in this country than the measure of complete partition, and consequently of Polish annihilation. If we are to come to either of these alternatives, I think it would be very desirable that there should, if possible, be some record of our having expressed our opinion how desirable it would be to restore Poland on the principle of 1792, and of our having made some effort for that which we are more entitled to ask, the independence of the Duchy of Warsaw under a neutral Sovereign.

I feel so much importance as to this and every other question being settled at the Congress by the three Allies and ourselves upon a principle of cordiality and good humour, that I would sacrifice a great deal here for the attainment of so important an object; but if the extravagance and unreasonable views of Russia render this impracticable, and that the question, however settled, must become a matter of contest, I think we ought to secure to ourselves in that case the advantage of having some record of the principle on which we would have been desirous of making the Polish arrangements, and at the same time that we should decline, if possible, being direct parties to an arrangement which is at variance with the principles we have set forth, though the interest may not be of that nature to induce us to wish the renewal of all the evils of war to Europe in support of our opinion or our wishes.

H. Goulburn, Esq., to Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD,

Ghent, 14th Oct., 1814.

We send you by this opportunity a note which we have just received from the American Commissioners. They accept the substance of our Article, with two qualifications, to one only of which (*viz.* that which stipulates for not considering their acceptance as an argument or precedent in any future negotiation) we think it may be as well to object, and to limit our understanding of the Article to its not being obligatory upon either party in a future negotiation. It may be doubted whether their acceptance of "the substance of the Article" satisfies the instruction under which we proposed it, and whether it may not be so limited by them with a view of opening a door for future discussion as to what is substantial in the Article and what is not; and I at first thought that it would be right to place this beyond a doubt by a further communication with them before we troubled you. But upon considering the note further, it appeared to us that their admission of the Article, notwithstanding this limitation, was sufficient to preclude future discussion as to its substance, and that its limitation was

to be ascribed solely to that invincible dislike which an American always has to give a distinct answer to a distinct proposition. We also considered that it might look ill if, after a note so much more conciliatory than any which they have yet addressed to us, we required an explanation which necessarily implied so much distrust.

On the other parts of the note it appears but little necessary to make any observation in reply. As our arguments remain unanswered on those points, we think that the case of Great Britain cannot stand better than it does at present.

With respect to the demand which they have made for a projet of a treaty from us, it may be matter of deliberation whether we should give them the advantage of receiving a projet from us, instead of furnishing us in the first instance with their projet. Whether this is worth insisting on we leave to your better judgment.

Believe me, my dear Lord, yours ever most truly,

HENRY GOULBURN.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Vienna, 14th Oct., 1814.

I send you under a flying seal the result of our discussions, not progress ; for progress we have not made, unless the enclosed can deserve that name.

I expect to see Talleyrand to-morrow morning ; and I rather expect he has some communication to make to me on the subject of the slave-trade. You shall have a messenger in two or three days.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

[ENCLOSURE.]

D É C L A R A T I O N.

Vienne, le 8 Oct., 1814.

Les Plénipotentiaires des Cours qui ont signé le traité de paix de Paris du 30 Mai, 1814, ont pris en considération l'article 32 de ce traité, par lequel il est dit que toutes les Puissances engagées de part et d'autre dans la dernière guerre enverront des Plénipotentiaires à Vienne pour régler dans un Congrès général les arrangemens qui doivent compléter les dispositions du dit traité ; et, après avoir mûrement réfléchi sur la situation dans laquelle ils se trouvent placés, et sur les devoirs qui leur sont imposés, ils ont reconnu qu'ils ne sauroient mieux les remplir qu'en établissant d'abord des communications libres et confidentielles entre les Plénipotentiaires de toutes les Puissances. Mais ils se sont convaincus en même tems qu'il est de l'intérêt de toutes les parties intervenantes de suspendre la réunion générale de leurs Plénipotentiaires jusqu'à l'époque où les questions sur lesquelles on devra prononcer seront parvenues à un degré de maturité suffisant pour que le résultat réponde aux principes du droit public, aux stipulations du traité de Paris, et à la juste attente des contemporains. L'ouverture formelle du Congrès sera donc

ajournée au 1^{er} du mois de Novembre, et les susdits Plénipotentiaires se flattent que le travail auquel ce délai sera consacré, en fixant les idées et en conciliant les opinions, avancera essentiellement le grand ouvrage qui est l'objet de leur mission commune.

[797.]

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 17th Oct., 1814.

I have nothing particular to communicate to you from hence. There is certainly a good deal of uneasiness in the public mind at Paris, but I cannot discover any ground for it excepting the numbers of ruined and discontented persons there are in the town, who are certainly not discouraged from the execution of any scheme of mischief they may have in contemplation by the advice and example of their superiors. Even the Marshals and those in favour with the King do not scruple to express their dislike of the present system, and the shame they feel at finding themselves in the situation in which they are.

Blacas is inclined to make light of the danger, which I conceive consists for the present only in the chances of a sudden movement by a part of this body of discontented officers and employés, and its consequences. Hereafter the King will have some difficulties with his Legislature; but by that time he will have formed his army, it may be hoped. I have heard no more from Blacas about Saxony. Jaucourt does not appear to entertain at all the same sentiments.

Lord Harrowby is here, and has got your papers upon the Netherlands, and I cannot reply to them by this messenger. I agree so far in principle with you that I think it would be desirable that, if possible, all the territories on the left of the Rhine should belong to one power only besides the Sovereign of the Netherlands, and that that power should be Prussia. If all this territory cannot be given to Prussia, it is better that a part should be given to Bavaria than that it should be parcelled out among several Powers. It must be observed, however, of Bavaria that that Power has generally been in the opposite system to ours, and that any distant territory in the hands of so weak a Power as Bavaria must still continue to be, is seldom well defended. Here will arise the question of Luxembourg. It is essential to the defence of the Netherlands to keep that fortress out of the hands of the French; at the same time I see

the military inconvenience of extending so far the system of the Sovereign of the Netherlands. I should rely upon Prussia keeping that fortress, but not upon Bavaria.

There is another view in which the disposal of Luxembourg is important, and that is the long standing connexion between that duchy and the provinces on the left of the Meuse. The inconvenience of the separation of a few cantons ceded to France has been felt and complained of by the Netherlands, and I fear they will feel more severely the separation of the provinces on the right of the Meuse, with which they have been so long connected, and in which so many of them must have property. This point deserves consideration. Upon the whole, what I should prefer for the Netherlands would be that Prussia should have all the territory on the left of the Rhine to a line drawn from Huy to that river, and that the Prince of Orange should from that line have both banks of the Meuse to the left bank of the Rhine. If that arrangement can't be made, Luxembourg would be more secure in the hands of the Sovereign of the Netherlands than in those of the King of Bavaria, and should be given to the former.

This is what occurs here upon reading your papers over once ; but I'll write to you again, more in detail, when I shall get them from Lord Harrowby.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Major-Gen. Sir Hudson Lowe to Major-Gen. Bunbury.

MY DEAR SIR,

Aix la Chapelle, 17th Oct., 1814.

Since my arrival here on the night before last, I have had two conversations with General Müffling, Chief of the Staff of the Prussian army, and I will endeavour to give you in as summary a manner as possible the substance of his communications to me.

Having the map of the "Treize Départemens Réunies" before us, he assumed the fortresses upon the Rhine as the basis upon which all the operations for the defence of this country must principally depend ; but referring to their number, found that Mayence and Wesel were the only ones that presented the necessary points d'appui, all the other ones being in so ruined and dilapidated a state as to be of no immediate utility. The distance between Mayence and Wesel he explained to be much too great for an army to be able to operate with any advantage between them ; and taking it up as a general rule that three days' march was the most suitable distance at which large fortresses could be placed from each other, he found Coblenz

(with Ehrenbreitstein) at the confluence of the Moselle and Rhine, and Cologne (so important from its extent and the supplies of every kind it could afford), as meeting perfectly every view that could be desired on this point. These he had already particularly recommended should be fortified.

In second line the only fortresses that presented themselves between the Moselle and the Meuse were Juliers and Maestricht. Between Luxembourg and Coblenz nothing presented itself; and viewing the situation of Luxembourg, placed beyond the forests, more destined naturally to be a frontier town for France than this country, within two short days' march from Longwy and Thionville, liable to have its communications cut off in the first moment of hostility, from the lateral direction of the principal chaussées which lead to it, from Trèves on one side and Namur on the other, without having any direct road in its rear by which supplies might be sent to it, he judged it advisable a new chaussée should be immediately commenced through the forests and mountains to Cologne, that this chaussée should be intersected by another leading from Mayence to Namur, and a new fortress built at the point of intersection.

Of this intended fortress he had already a plan formed. Its situation he had fixed at the village of Schonfels.

To command a passage at all times across the Moselle and by the same road which was to lead through Schonfels, he proposed besides to have erected a small fort at Trarbach, and another to command a pass through the mountains between Mayence and Trarbach, at Kirchberg.

This would comprehend the whole of the fortresses and forts which General Müffling conceived necessary to have established in the country lying between the Moselle and the Meuse. For these he assigned garrisons in nearly the following proportion:—

						Men.
Mayence	..	..	..	..	..	18,000
Coblenz	..	..	..	..	..	8,000
Cologne..	..	..	..	..	..	10,000
Wesel	..	..	..	..	..	6,000
Juliers	..	..	..	..	..	4,000
Schonfels	..	..	..	..	..	4,000
Trarbach, &c.	..	..	..	..	..	2,000
Luxembourg	..	..	..	..	..	12,000
Total	..	..	..	..	..	<u>64,000</u>

Supposing a General to have the command of an army of 80,000 men, he might readily form a moveable corps of 30,000 by placing in the first instance only half garrisons in the fortresses of the second line, and one-third even in those of the third line, only completing them in proportion as the attacks of the enemy might compel him to recede. With this corps he might make a stand in some position connected with the fortresses until the German contingents should arrive, and until the Prussian reserves in particular should come up.

General Müffling seemed to disapprove of the construction of any new fortresses between Luxembourg and Namur, considering the nature of the country in general to be such as to present difficulties enough of itself to the advance of an enemy; but if no fortresses are to be erected in that

direction, it appears to me it will be of peculiar importance to strengthen the line of the Meuse by fortifying in the strongest manner Huy and Liège, and it is therefore of great importance to decide with whom these two places, which are claimed by the Dutch, but now retained by the Prussians, are finally to rest. The reason assigned to me for the occupation of Liège is that the Meuse was assigned as the boundary for the Prussian and Dutch armies, and that the Dutch immediately took possession of Venloo beyond it. Venloo, it is acknowledged, was an ancient Dutch possession; but in the negotiations at Paris, Holland was not regarded as one of the Allied Powers. Her claims even to restitution of what she formerly possessed must depend on the decisions of Congress.

Lord Clancarty had addressed a letter to General Kleist on the subject of Liège, and therefore the question will be before it.

It is almost unnecessary to observe that Liège is a town of the greatest importance, having a large cannon foundry and manufactory of arms.

General Müffling having terminated his remarks to me on the country between the Moselle and Meuse, I requested his attention to the Belgic provinces. The first point that fell under consideration was Namur. He was of opinion that the whole of the height on which the citadel once stood should be enclosed or crowned with redoubts, and he attached peculiar importance to the immediate execution of the works necessary for it, the cost of which he estimated at about a million and a half of Prussian dollars (250,000*l.*) This opinion respecting the nature of the works to be constructed you will find to accord with that expressed in my observations on the place. I obtained from him a copy of the sketch he had himself taken of the ground, and his view of the mode of fortifying it. He considered five years as necessary for the construction and complete equipment of all the fortresses to be repaired or built in the countries which Prussia might occupy, viz., three years to build and arm them, so that their defence might be with confidence undertaken, and two years for the building of magazines, storehouses, barracks, &c.

General Müffling had not visited the frontier of Belgium beyond Namur, and could, therefore, offer no opinion except from observation of the map and hearing my remarks on the different positions. Mons, Tournay, and Ypres, however, he seemed to consider it as advisable should be occupied in force, and every means taken to secure them against being carried by a coup de main.

Courtray, from its situation on the Lys and at the confluence of different chaussées leading to Bruges, Ghent, Brussels, Lisle, and Tournay, he considered as a post that ought to be secured, if the nature of the ground could possibly admit it; and he manifested a preference for the position of Courtray over that of Menin, as an enemy in the attack of the former would have his flanks much more exposed both from Tournay and Ypres than in that of the latter, and be therefore much more cautious of commencing his operations in that quarter.

Ath he seemed to think also might merit attention, but particularly Ghent, if its great extent prevented not its being readily fortified. On my explaining to him, however, the situation of Ghent, at the confluence of two navigable rivers and two canals, tending so much to diminish its attackable front, and that the localities in other points presented means of

defence, he coincided in the great advantage of profiting by them; and as he is to proceed in a few days to Brussels with General Kleist, I shall endeavour to get him to visit Ghent and obtain his final opinion upon it.

Adverting to the aid to be derived from Great Britain in any future war in this country, he regarded both Ostend and Antwerp as points of the last importance, an absolute freedom of communication between Belgium and England being the best means of security the former could obtain. To put the security of this communication beyond all doubt, and to enable Great Britain at the same time to grant with the best effect possible the means she was disposed to furnish, he thought in the event of a contest she ought to demand the immediate cession to her "pro tempore" of the island of Walcheren, which with Flushing, Middleburg, &c., ought to be regarded as her principal depôt and the point where she could best combine the means for assisting the Dutch in the defence of their former or newly-acquired territory.

I have thus related the principal part of the conversation held with General Müffling. He entered into much fuller details, but I am not aware of having omitted anything essential.

The force of the Allied army in this country he gave me as follows :

Left Bank of the Rhine.

1st Prussian Corps d'Armée	22,000 men; of whom 2900 cavalry and 98 pieces of artillery.
2nd do. do.	25,000 men; of whom 3400 cavalry and 104 pieces of artillery.
3rd do. do.	34,000 men; of whom 4300 cavalry and 108 pieces of artillery.
3rd German Corps d'Armée, consisting of Saxons and the Royal German Legion	20,000 men; of whom 2600 cavalry and 80 pieces of artillery.

Right Bank of the Rhine.

4th German Corps d'Armée	15,000 men; of whom 1200 cavalry and 24 pieces of artillery.
5th do. do.	9000 men; of whom 500 cavalry and 20 pieces of artillery.
4th Prussian do. do.	18,000 men; of whom 1500 cavalry and 8 pieces of artillery.
Prussian Reserve Corps	16,000 men; of whom 400 cavalry and 8 pieces of artillery.
Total	101,000 men on the left bank of the Rhine.
	58,000 men on the right bank of the Rhine.

The number of pieces of artillery on the left bank, it results from the above, is 390.

The corps of General Tauenzien, General Müffling told me, was on the Elbe, occupying Magdeburg, Wittenberg, Torgau, &c., and consisted of 50,000 or 60,000 men.

It is proper, however, to observe that the numbers of the different corps

d'armée are taken from the provision lists, and that some deduction must in consequence be allowed for.

It was considered that a very considerable deduction would take place from the above numbers as soon as the tranquillity of a general peace admitted it, and that Prussia might not in such case have more than 30,000 men in the places on the Lower Rhine. General Gneisenau is the officer, as General Müffling acquaints me, destined to have the command of the army on this important line, as soon as Congress has determined all the limits, and that the permanent arrangements are to be made.

Praying you to excuse any inaccuracies in the present relation, which is given to you during the haste of travelling, and the writing of which has suggested to me several questions that I may afterwards put to General Müffling, and on which I may again communicate,

I remain always, my dear Sir,

Your most obliged and most faithful servant,

H. LOWE.

W. Wilberforce, Esq., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

Sandgate, Kent, 18th Oct., 1814.

Owing to an accidental hindrance I did not till this morning receive your Grace's most obliging communication of the 8th instant.* All my unwillingness (and it is always great) to trespass on your Grace's valuable time would scarcely have prevented my requesting your Grace's acceptance of my best thanks for your very obliging and gratifying packet, but I have a fair plea for taking up my pen in having to request your Grace's acceptance of a copy of my letter to the Prince de Talleyrand on the subject of the Slave-trade. Most thankfully shall I avail myself of the offer which your Grace has made, with so much kind cordiality, to distribute my printed letter, and I shall immediately order a number of copies to be transmitted to your Grace. You really encourage me to express a hope, which I should not otherwise have ventured to indulge, that your Grace will be so obliging as to suggest to me any alterations, either in the way of addition, or correction, or excision, which you conceive would render the piece more likely to be useful in France. If I had thought it best to suit it exactly to the *actual* state of public opinion in Paris, I should have made it somewhat different; but I judged it most prudent to calculate as well as I could on what it might, I hope in no long time, become in certain classes of society. I return your Grace many thanks (with, I assure you, a deep feeling of your kindness) for the hint you have given me concerning the tone of our English papers: I will endeavour to turn it to account. It can scarcely be needful for me to assure your Grace that I shall always feel it my duty to be discreet in my use of your Grace's name, and to observe most strictly any injunctions of secrecy which your Grace may lay upon me. May I beg your Grace to do me the honour to present for me a copy of the letter to the Archbishop of Rheims, with whom I had the honour to

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xii., p. 141.

be acquainted when I was Mr. Pitt's fellow-traveller in France in 1783, and your Grace will best know whether I may lay a copy at His Majesty's feet. It might be rendered less improper by my having done it in the case of my former work some time previously to his happy restoration.

I have the honour to be, with every sentiment of respect and regard,

My Lord, your Grace's most obliged and faithful servant,

W. WILBERFORCE.

P.S.—I ought to have had a copy for your Grace, as well as the King, properly bound, but really a week's loss of time would be ill incurred for such a purpose. Your Grace will excuse the unavoidably rude exterior.

RELATIVE SITUATIONS OF AUSTRIA AND BAVARIA.

20 Oct., 1814.

La Bavière, dans ses Rapports avec la Cour de Vienne et les Cours Alliées.

Pour juger la situation de la Bavière et ses titres, il faut remonter à l'époque du traité de Ried.

Ce traité lui assure—

1. Une indemnité complète, et calculée sur les proportions géographiques, statistiques, et financières des provinces à céder.

2. Il lui garantit que l'équivalent devait former une contiguïté complète, et non interrompue ; et que

3. L'arrangement ne pourroit se faire que de gré à gré entre les deux puissances.

On se réfère à cet effet à l'annexe ci-jointe, cotée (A.) La conduite militaire de la Bavière en suite de ce traité, conclu dix jours avant la bataille de Leipzig, jusqu'à l'entrée des Alliés à Paris en 1814, est trop connue pour qu'il soit nécessaire d'y revenir. C'est elle qui enleva par une marche rapide tout le midi de l'Allemagne pour livrer la bataille de Hanau, et qui empêcha qu'une neutralité ne se formât sur les bords du Rhin.

La Cour de Vienne voulut reconnoître ces services. Sentant qu'elle ne pouvait demander la totalité des rétrocessions Bavaïoises, nommément Salzbourg, qu'en offrant les plus grands avantages, les deux Cours arrêterent par une convention signée à Paris le 3 Juin, 1814, et dont l'extrait se trouve coté (B), l'application des principes renfermés dans le traité de Ried. Il fut convenu que le Roi de Bavière céderoit—

Le Tyrol,

Le Voralberg,

La principauté de Salzbourg,

Les cercles de l'Inn et du Hausruck,

contre les équivalents les plus complets, et même au delà, autant que les circonstances le permettoient. A cet effet S.M.I. promettoit d'employer ses meilleurs offices pour faire entrer dans le lot de la Bavière, outre les principautés de Würzburg et d'Aschaffenburg, qui furent échangés sur le champ contre le Tyrol et le Voralberg,

1. La ville et place de Mayence, avec le plus d'étendue possible sur la rive gauche.

2. Le comté de Hanau, avec la place.
3. Les villes de Francfort et de Wetzlar.
4. L'ancien palatinat du Rhin, sur les deux rives, avec les communications les plus directes que possible.

Il fut convenu que les pays de la rive gauche du Rhin seraient occupés par un corps de troupes mixte, et qu'ils seroient administrés par les deux gouvernemens jusqu'aux arrangemens définitifs, et que jusqu'à cette époque la forteresse de Kuffstein, en Tyrol, resteroit occupée par les troupes Bavaraises.

Telles étoient les stipulations qui devoient faire la base de la reconstruction Bavaroise.

Le Roi voulant donner à S.M. l'Empereur d'Autriche des preuves non équivoques de son attachement et de sa confiance, devança l'époque fixée de la cession de Kuffstein. Sans attendre l'issue des négociations, il lui en fit la remise par une lettre autographe, à laquelle ce Souverain répondit par des témoignages de la plus grande sensibilité. L'histoire de la diplomatie offre peu de procédés portant un tel caractère de loyauté.

Muni de ces titres, son plénipotentiaire se rendit au Congrès de Vienne ; et pendant que chaque jour la convention arrêtée à Paris souffroit des atteintes, le Roi, sans s'en occuper, ne songea qu'à appuyer de tous ses moyens et avec le plus grand désintéressement une cause défendue alors avec chaleur par les Cours de Londres et de Vienne.

Le Congrès de Vienne touchoit à son terme lorsqu'on régla enfin les intérêts de la Bavière, la convention de Paris étoit anéantie par le fait, les objets dont on avoit disposés n'existoient plus en grande partie. La Cour de Vienne, pénétrée de cet état des choses, se contenta à demander la cession des cercles de l'Inn et du Hausruck, et une partie de Salzbourg, pour avoir ses communications avec le Tyrol.

On assigna à la Bavière des arrondissemens pris sur les pays de Wurtemberg, Bâde, de Darmstadt, et de Hesse-Cassel.

Ces Cours devoient recevoir les compensations en partie par des reviremens et en partie sur la rive gauche du Rhin. Mais leur opposition suspendit l'exécution de ce troisième arrangement. En attendant l'invasion de Buonaparte ayant appelée l'Europe aux armes, 60,000 Bavares volèrent à la défense de l'Allemagne, et prirent position au Rhin jusqu'à l'arrivée des grandes armées.

Il est prouvé aujourd'hui, par des recherches financières, que le dernier arrangement n'offroit à la Bavière aucun avantage réel, et que les arrondissemens, renfermans en plus grande partie des pays de souveraineté possédés par des princes, ne compensaient pas les riches domaines qui se trouvoient dans les cercles de l'Inn et du Hausruck. Mais Salzbourg étoit conservé : c'étoit une considération qui consolait de la perte du cercle de l'Inn, qui avoit fait pendant six siècles partie intégrante de la Bavière.

On étoit bien loin d'admettre qu'au moment où ce troisième arrangement devenoit inexécutable par l'opposition des Cours qui y étoient intéressées, le Cabinet de Vienne, demandant les rives de la Salza et de la Saale pour frontières, étenderoit ses vues, non seulement sur la presque totalité du pays de Salzbourg, mais même sur la principauté de Berchtolsgaden, dont la Bavière n'avoit jamais accordé la cession dans aucun arrangement antérieur. Jamais celle-ci ne sauroit porter les sacrifices à ce point. Elle invoque le traité de Ried, qui a fait la base de ses transactions.

A. Ce traité lui garantit une indemnité complète, calculée sur les proportions géographiques, statistiques, et financières.

B. Il lui garantit la contiguïté de ses états, et

C. Des arrangemens de gré à gré.

Salzbourg, Berchtolsgaden, les cercles de l'Inn et du Hausruck, offrent à peu près une population de 430,000 à 440,000 habitans. La position géographique de ces pays, riches en domaines, en fondations, est des plus avantageuses. Les salines de Salzbourg et de Berchtolsgaden ont fait depuis des siècles une des sources les plus abondantes de la prospérité Bavaroise. Ils n'étoient exploitées sous le règne des Archévêques et des Princes de Berchtolsgaden que pour le compte de la Bavière, en vertu de traités qui se datent depuis plusieurs siècles.

La Cour Impériale d'Autriche ne posséda ces pays que pendant quatre années. Cette puissance, si forte d'ailleurs, ayant le Tyrol et le Voralberg, qui bordent toute la partie méridionale de la Bavière, tandis que par la Bohême elle peut déboucher dans les provinces de Franconie, n'a sûrement pas besoin de la limite de Salzbourg, englobée entre le Tyrol et les provinces Autrichiennes. Ce n'est point Salzbourg, c'est toute la ligne de l'Inn qui offre les grands moyens de défense.

Ce n'est point la Bavière qui peut être dangereuse à l'Autriche. Elle ne demande pas mieux que de s'unir intimement avec ce voisin. Elle ne lui fera pas la guerre. Salzbourg n'a jamais fait un obstacle au développement des moyens militaires de l'Autriche ; car aussi souvent que cette Cour se voyoit menacée de ce côté, ses armées avoient occupées le cœur de la Bavière, avant que Buonaparte, dont la célérité des mouvemens étoit cependant connue, peut arriver. Aussi la Cour de Vienne n'a-t-elle demandé ce pays, qu'à Paris, lorsqu'elle a cru pouvoir procurer des équivalents proportionnés à son importance.

Elle a senti devoir y renoncer à Vienne. Voudroit-on balancer aujourd'hui la mince acquisition de Landau, et de son arrondissement, avec la précieuse possession de Salzbourg ? Pourroit-on prétendre que la Bavière céda une masse de provinces riches qui forment le plus bel arrondissement à portée de sa capitale, pour se contenter d'un équivalent détaché du corps de l'état, d'un lambeau de pays informe, privé de domaines, qui exige une administration particulière, qui est exposé à tous les orages politiques, et où le trésor de l'Etat doit payer le culte et l'instruction publique ?

Parmi nombre de maisons religieuses qui se trouvent à Salzbourg il est une abbaye qui offre seule un revenu de 100,000 écus. Certes ! ce ne sont pas là les proportions géographiques, statistiques, et financières, ni la contiguïté, garanties par le traité de Ried.

Si, pour simplifier des questions devenues odieuses à l'Allemagne par les éternels reviremens des peuples, la Bavière se montre disposée à passer le Rhin, elle est en droit d'espérer que lui sachant gré d'un tel dévouement, et qu'en égard des pertes inséparables d'une telle détermination, on limitera plus tôt ses cessions que de vouloir les étendre.

D'après cet exposé la Cour de Bavière, forte de ses traités qui n'admettent que des arrangemens de gré à gré, ne peut croire qu'on voulut lui imposer des conditions incompatibles avec les engagemens contractés.

Elle se prêtera à tout ce qui est juste et équitable, mais jamais elle ne peut sacrifier des intérêts dont dépend essentiellement sa conservation.

Le Roi ne sauroit se persuader qu'à l'issue de deux guerres, entreprises pour la restauration de l'édifice social de l'Europe, il soit le seul de tous les Alliés qui n'y trouve sa garantie. Il ne peut se persuader que pour prix de la conduite la plus noble et la plus loyale, il soit le seul appelé à porter des sacrifices, et que pendant qu'on respecte l'état de possession de ses voisins, on veuille porter atteinte au sien, qui est garanti par les traités les plus solennels. Il espère que les vues conciliatrices des Cours Alliées préviendront un état de choses aussi fâcheux. Il en appelle à la foi des traités renouvelés par son acte d'accession à Vienne.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

(A.)—*Extrait des Articles Additionnels et Secrets du Traité de Ried.*

ARTICLE 2.

Sa Majesté le Roi de Bavière se prêtera à toutes les cessions qui seront jugées nécessaires pour assurer aux deux états une ligne militaire convenable.

ART. 3.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche s'engage en retour pour elle-même, et de concert avec ses Alliés, à employer son intervention la plus efficace, et s'il en est besoin toutes ses forces, à l'effet de procurer à Sa Majesté le Roi de Bavière l'indemnité la plus complète, et calculée sur les proportions géographiques, statistiques, et financières des provinces cédées : la dite indemnité devra être à la bienséance du royaume de Bavière, et de manière à former avec lui un contigu complet et non-interrompu.

ART. 4.

La situation géographique des deux états exigeant une nouvelle démarcation entre eux, S.M. Impériale et Apostolique promet, de concert et sous la garantie des puissances alliées, à S.M. Bavaroise une indemnité pleine et entière pour les cessions qu'en suite de ce principe la Bavière serait dans le cas de faire à l'Autriche. Tout arrangement dans l'état de possession actuel de la Bavière est toutefois expressément réservé à l'époque de la pacification future, et ne pourra avoir lieu que par un arrangement de gré à gré entre les deux puissances.

II.

(B.)—*Extrait de la Convention de Paris, signée le 3 de Juin, 1814.*

ARTICLE 1.

Sa Majesté le Roi de Bavière et S.M. Impériale et Apostolique, désirant prévenir toute mésintelligence qui pourrait naître d'une fausse interprétation des articles secrets du traité de Ried, et de confirmer les rapports d'amitié et de bonne harmonie qui existent entre elles, sont convenus de donner aux articles 2, 3, et 4 du dit traité l'application suivante, savoir :—

S.M. le Roi de Bavière s'engage à céder à S.M. Impériale, Royale, et Apostolique le Tyrol, le Voralberg, la Principauté de Salzbourg, telle qu'elle a été possédée par le dernier Prince Archevêque, à l'exception du baillage de Lauffen et des villages situés sur la rive gauche de la Saale, l'Innviertel, et le cercle de Hausruck, sauf les exceptions et les modifications dont il est fait men-

tion dans les articles 2 et 4 de la présente convention ; et d'autre part S.M. Impériale, Royale, et Apostolique garantit à S.M. le Roi de Bavière de lui faire avoir les équivalents les plus complets pour les dits pays, et même au delà autant qu'elle en aura les moyens et que les circonstances permettront.

ART. 2.

Les hautes puissances contractantes voulant accélérer autant qu'il dépend d'elles le moment où l'exécution de l'article 1 pourra avoir son effet, sont convenues que S.M. Impériale, Royale, et Apostolique entrera en possession du Tyrol, tel qu'il a été réuni à la couronne de Bavière (à l'exception du baillage de Vils sauf à faire de ce dernier un objet d'arrangement), ainsi que du Voralberg, à l'exception du baillage de Wesler, dans le délai de 15 jours après l'échange des ratifications de la présente convention ; et que S.M. le Roi de Bavière sera mis à la même époque en possession du Grand Duché de Würzburg et de la Principauté d'Aschaffenburg, tels qu'ils ont été possédés par leurs derniers Souverains.

ART. 3.

Les pays situés sur la rive gauche du Rhin, entre les nouvelles frontières de la France et la rive droite de la Moselle, seront occupés jusqu'aux arrangements définitifs en Allemagne par des troupes Bavaoises et Autrichiennes, sous les commandemens séparés de leurs généraux respectifs. Il sera nommé une commission mixte pour régler tout ce qui a rapport à l'administration civile des dits pays, dont les revenus seront perçus pour le compte des deux gouvernemens et partagés en parties égales. On conviendra d'un nombre de troupes qui de part et d'autre devront occuper les dits pays.

ART. 6.

S.M. Impériale, Royale, et Apostolique, voulant donner à S.M. le Roi de Bavière des preuves de l'intérêt qu'elle mit à voir sa puissance assise sur des bases solides, promet d'employer ses meilleurs offices :

1. Pour faire entrer dans le lot de la Bavière la ville et place de Mayence, et pour faire donner aux états de S.M. le Roi de Bavière le plus d'étendue possible sur la rive gauche du Rhin.

2. Pour procurer à S.M. le Roi de Bavière le comté de Hanau, ainsi que les villes et territoires de Francfort et Wetzlar, en réservant toutefois à la première les privilèges nécessaires à la liberté de son commerce.

3. Pour faire entrer dans le lot de la Bavière l'ancien palatinat du Rhin, S.M. le Roi de Bavière s'engageant de son côté à se prêter à des arrangements de frontière qui se trouveroient être d'une mutuelle convenance entre elle et ses voisins.

4. Pour faciliter les arrangements de cession, d'échange, et autres que S.M. Bavaoise pourrait désirer faire avec les états voisins, savoir, avec le Roi de Wurtemberg, les Grands Ducs de Bâde et de Darmstadt, et les Princes de Nassau, pour établir des communications plus directes entre ses états.

Les stipulations du présent article s'appliquent aux petites principautés qui se trouveraient placées sur les lignes de communication entre les états Bavaoises, dans la supposition qu'en vertu des arrangements définitifs de l'Allemagne elles fussent médiatisées.

III.

Articles Additionnels.

ARTICLE 1.

La forteresse de Kuffstein, sans y comprendre la ville du même nom, restera occupée par les troupes Bavaoises jusqu'aux arrangemens définitifs entre les deux puissances.

ART. 3.

S.M. Impériale, Royale, et Apostolique fera dédommager le gouvernement Bavaois des arrérages qui lui seraient dûs sur les impôts directs des départemens Français qui avoient été placés sous son administration durant la guerre, dans les proportions qu'elle en sera dédommagée elle-même par le gouvernement Français.

Les présents articles additionnels auront la même force et valeur que s'ils étoient insérés mot à mot à la convention de ce jour. Ils seront ratifiés, et les ratifications en seront échangées, en même temps.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires respectifs les ont signés et y ont apposé le cachet de leurs armes.

Fait à Paris, le 3 Juin, 1814.

Le Feld-Maréchal Prince de WREDE.
[L.S.]

Le Prince de METTERNICH.
[L.S.]

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Vienna, 20th Oct., 1814.

You see we are still at anchor. The Emperor is beset by the Poles, and has, I fear, embarrassed himself by promises. If I could bring Austria and Prussia fairly to bear upon him, I think we should yet get a tolerably good frontier from him.

I am sorry the King of France makes such a point of Saxony. It prevents a real union in Germany, and there is nothing in it prejudicial to the general interests of Europe, however it may bear hard upon the family. I send a memorandum upon this point, which may enable you to soften some of Blacas's scruples. Prussia certainly had every reason to look to it during the war as her own. Our misfortune is, that the Powers all look to points instead of the general system of Europe, which makes an endless complication. You know that Prussia may be brought forward. I have gone so far with Talleyrand as to tell him that I do not despair of her being useful, if properly managed; but we must not commit Hardenberg.

Ever, my dear Lord, most sincerely yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

[ENCLOSURE.]

17th Oct., 1814.

It is supposed that an intention exists to incorporate Saxony with Prussia in order to enable the latter Power to form a barrier for the security of the north of Germany.

The policy as affecting the result of such a measure is admitted; the means only are objected to.

It is contended that a measure of such severity to the House of Saxony, the criminality of whose conduct can only be imputed to necessity, and not to principle, is not consistent with the more lenient conduct observed to other Powers who have acted against the cause of Europe from similar constraint, and is irreconcilable with the principles of justice.

Let us examine the case. The King of Saxony, from the zeal with which he engaged in the cause of Buonaparte, became his principal favourite, and was distinguished by him in the annexation of the Duchy of Warsaw to his crown, by which the frontier of Austria was uncovered and Prussia subjected to French control, and a way opened into the heart of Russia.

Upon the expulsion of the French from Russia, the Duchy of Warsaw fell into the military occupation of Russia.

When the Allied arms succeeded in driving the French army in the field beyond the Oder and the Elbe, and advanced into the heart of Saxony, the King of Saxony retired into the Austrian territories (Austria being at that period engaged in a mediation for peace), without allowing his troops to assist the Allies, and evinced a disposition to join the policy of Austria; but no sooner did the armies of Buonaparte again advance than he joined the French with all his powers and zeal, and co-operated in the measures which led to the defeat of the Allies and their repulse to the Oder. By the junction of Austria to the Allies, after a fruitless negotiation, the French armies were at length driven beyond the Rhine, Saxony was totally conquered, and the King himself made prisoner.

Is it unjust that, after all the efforts of the Allies for the cause of Europe, they should, within certain limits, be compensated for their risks and for their losses?

No one is so unreasonable as to maintain such a principle.

How then ought they to be compensated, but at the expense of those Powers who were aggrandized in consequence of their zeal for the common enemy, and who refused to join the common cause for liberating Europe when a fair opportunity presented itself? And this is the peculiar case of the King of Saxony as distinguished from other Sovereigns.

It is said the King willingly relinquishes the Duchy of Warsaw, as he can have no right or claim to retain after reconquest what he gained by conquest only. This suggestion is not to be heard.

But if it is admitted that the Allies are to be compensated, and if this claim is specially asserted and admitted in favour of Russia, where can Russia be compensated but in the Duchy of Warsaw, and how can she be compensated in that Duchy without the spoliation of Prussia?

And how can Prussia be indemnified, first, for that compensation; and secondly, for her exertions and losses in the common cause?

It is evident that if indemnified at all, if compensated at all, it must be from the dominions of some other Power.

On whom then, in point of justice, can that indemnity and compensation fall so properly as on that Power who was the first and chief instrument in the dismemberment of her States, and by subsequent tergiversation, or pusillanimity, or ambition, one of the chief causes of the loss she has experienced in recovering parts of them?

How many Powers, how many Princes, have been divested of their dominions and rights, who have deserved better of Europe than Saxony!

Why is their cause to be passed over and forgotten, and that of Saxony, certainly the most criminal and the least pardonable, to be upheld?

Russia, it is admitted on all hands, is to be compensated, and can only be compensated, at the expense of Prussia, whose exertions and sufferings in proportion to her means have been greater in the cause of Europe than those of any other Power; but Prussia is not to be compensated at the expense of Saxony, the greatest enemy in Germany of the common cause, although such a compensation would be the only one which could in any degree indemnify her for the cessions she is to make of her former possessions in the Duchy of Warsaw, and enable her to form a barrier for the security of the North, or place her in the same relative state which she before enjoyed.

If Russia is thus to be compensated from an ally, why not Prussia from an enemy? If Russia is to be aggrandized at the expense of the Power who has served the cause of Europe most, why is not Prussia to be aggrandized at the expense of a Power who has most injured her?

It is impossible to overturn this reasoning but by arguments which, by destroying the right and claim of the deliverers of Europe for any compensation, holds out the greatest temptation to every Power to desert it upon every suggestion of danger or speculation of aggrandizement.

By every principle of the law of nations the King of Saxony has lost all his rights; and where no right intervenes, the law of public convenience and public utility takes place, which can only be controlled by motives of clemency. I say can only be controlled, for they are not to be sacrificed to it.

The King of Saxony has *no right* to indemnity or to restoration: he may have a claim on the lenity of his conquerors; and if they offer him a compensation in any other part of Europe for what, by his conduct, he has forfeited, should he complain of the inadequacy of the offer, and reject it, he can only complain upon the ground of the insufficiency of the offer made to him, not of its injustice.

It is to be added that the defence of the King of Saxony for his conduct is that which would subject every officer commanding a fortress to be shot. His defence for rejoining the cause of Buonaparte after retiring from it is, that he acted in consequence of his threat to lay waste his country and burn his capital; yet this was at a period when the Allied armies were yet in possession of his capital and great part of his dominions. At such a period he rests his apology upon his terrors. He prefers regaining his kingdom by the arms of Buonaparte rather than defending it by uniting his arms with those of the Allies; by the assistance of the Power that was marching to destroy, instead of the aid of the Allies who were resolved to deliver Europe. He pleads necessity where choice was in his power. When the chance of success was even in his favour if he joined the Allies, he alleges the certainty of destruction if he did not act against them, and states the recovery of his dominions as his sole motive for action, wishing indeed for the cause of Europe, but determined to hazard nothing for its deliverance; and as ready to destroy as to save her, so long as he could hope to secure his own personal interests.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Vienna, 20th Oct., 1814.

There are two points in your Grace's letter upon which I wish to remark, though I doubt not you will receive satisfactory instructions before this from London.

The first regards the claim put forward by the French government, that debts incurred and outstanding for the share of the vessels and stores

which fall to Holland are to be defrayed by Holland. Such a construction of the Treaty of Paris would suppose that it had been stipulated, not that Holland should have a third of the ships and stores, but that she should be allowed to purchase a third. If such an idea had been in contemplation at the time the treaty with France was made, the treaty would have been worded accordingly, and arrangements made with respect to the debts supposed to be incurred or outstanding at the time. No such words were introduced, and it necessarily follows that no supplementary demand can be admitted which the treaty does not warrant, and the admission of which would entirely change its substance and value.

The second point is the demand made by France for the arrears of contributions levied upon Hamburg during war, and not paid.

Such a demand is contrary to the principle upon which contributions are levied and justified. The right of levying contributions arises from a state of war, and is determined by it. Directly upon peace being made, all the rights of belligerents cease except as they are reserved by treaties, and the natural rights of territorial independence revive. No engagements made by a conqueror in war for the purposes of war are binding on the return of peace, unless formally revived and renewed by specific articles in a treaty of peace.

This reasoning, however apparently conclusive in general, is subject to so many difficulties and exceptions that some writers admit that contributions imposed and not paid are due even after a peace; and it is for this reason that special provision is usually made in treaties on the subject. Accordingly, the 18th Article of the French treaty is express on the point. By the former part of it, the Allies renounce all claims on account of contracts, supplies, &c., on France from 1792; and by the latter, France renounces every claim which might be brought forward on the same principle against the Allies.

It is to be observed that Hamburg had rescued herself from the dominion of France, had joined the Allies, and become a party with them; that she fought with the Allies, and in defence of herself, aided by the Allies, was taken by the arms of France.

Your Grace will further observe that the stipulations in favour of the Bank of Hamburg are special exceptions to the agreement made by the 18th Article, and confirm the reasoning that debts incurred and unpaid under war contributions or confiscations cannot be regularly and unquestionably demanded after a peace, unless provisions are made for that purpose respecting them in a treaty of peace.

Believe me to be ever, my dear Lord, sincerely yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

Viscount Castlereagh to the Emperor of Russia.

SIRE,

Vienna, 20th Oct., 1814.

I have the honour to submit to your Imperial Majesty the communication received in January last from Lord Cathcart; also an extract from the

Convention of 1797, which ought to have accompanied the papers which I had the honour of delivering to your Imperial Majesty.

I am, Sire, with the utmost deference,

Your Imperial Majesty's most respectful servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Lord Cathcart to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR LORD,

Basle, 16th Jan., 1814.

The messenger Williams brought me your Lordship's letter of the 8th this morning early.

The Emperor has already made every arrangement to proceed this day to overtake the army, and His Imperial Majesty's head-quarters will be this night at Delle, tomorrow at Montbeillard, and the 19th, at furthest, at Vesoul, at which place you may, if you think proper, overtake him.

Pozzo is not yet arrived. The Emperor has charged me to express to you his regret that he cannot await your Lordship's arrival here, and that there are important considerations which oblige him to go away from the conversation he was so anxious to have with you on your arrival. His Imperial Majesty, however, trusts that you will bear in mind the principles which dictated the request I have, by various messengers, stated on his part concerning your first audience.

He is aware that you cannot now avoid going into business with the Ministers you will find here, but he requests that you will leave a place in the opinions you may be led to form, and particularly in any communications of them you might be disposed to make, for the results of the conversation His Imperial Majesty hopes to have with you at an early day on several most important topics.

The first of these is that of negotiation.

The general sentiments of His Imperial Majesty are to avoid incurring the charge of neglecting to make peace when a favourable opportunity presents itself, but to avoid precipitation, and to weigh well the question whether more should not previously be done by arms.

2ndly. To treat for peace pure and simple, proposing boundaries, and reducing the question to a categorical answer—Yes or No; and avoiding mixing in this negotiation those questions which belong to the Allies themselves, towards ensuring the proper balance of power and securities for the duration of peace.

On this latter subject His Imperial Majesty is desirous that you should reserve yourself for a conversation with him, and you will find the Emperor equally impressed with a notion of the importance of postponing for the present all complicated questions on this subject.

I know the principal topics have been named to you: Saxony forms the principal feature. The greatest nicety may be required to adjust that question between Austria and Prussia.

Russia renounces all idea of extension to the Vistula in favour of Prussia, but will look to the demolition of the Duchy and to the acquisition of so much thereof as may be necessary for her purpose.

CATHCART.

II.

Copie de l'Article séparé et secret de la Convention signée à Pétersbourg le 26 (15) Janvier, 1797, entre les trois Puissances copartageantes.

La nécessité d'abolir tout ce qui peut rappeler le souvenir de l'existence du Royaume de Pologne, lorsque l'anéantissement de ce corps politique est effectué, ayant été reconnu par les deux Cours Impériales aussi bien que par Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, les hautes parties contractantes sont convenues et s'engagent de ne jamais faire insérer dans leur intitulé et respectivement pour les trois Cours la dénomination ou désignation cumulative de Royaume de Pologne, qui demeurera dès à présent et pour toujours supprimée ; toutefois il leur sera libre d'employer les titres partiels qui leur appartiennent respectivement du chef des différentes provinces de ce Royaume qui sont passées sous leur domination.

Le présent Article aura la même force et valeur que s'il était inséré de mot à mot dans la convention, et les ratifications en seront échangées de la même manière et dans les mêmes délais que celles de la présente convention.

En foi de quoi nous plénipotentiaires avons signé le présent Article séparé et secret, et y avons fait apposer le cachet de nos armes.

Fait à St. Pétersbourg le 26 (15) Janvier, 1797.

Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LIVERPOOL,

Vienna, 20th Oct., 1814.

I don't know that I can add anything worth mentioning to my official report, nor can I give you any insight either as to the turn things will take, or the time we shall employ here. Hitherto the great armies have been manœuvring without firing a shot, and I am a little out of patience at this waste of time. Whilst we were actually at war, events hurried even the most temporizing to a decision ; at present the irresolute and speculating have full scope to indulge their favourite game. I see now no chance of anything decisive being effected before the 24th, when the Sovereigns go to Bude. They will return on the 29th, which will not leave much time for business before we shall have again to explain ourselves to the Plenipotentiaries at large. As yet we have no progress to report.

I observe Vansittart has made some communication to the Bank with respect to not wanting money before Christmas. I hope, however, you will secure such a power from Parliament as may enable you, if necessary, to postpone the meeting after the holidays to a later period than your private letter calculates upon. You may rest assured that if matters traînent en longueur here, it will not be my fault ; but if so, my withdrawing might be disadvantageous, and a premature discussion in England prejudicial on either the Continental or American negotiations. I hope, therefore, you will be enabled to keep the discretion in your own hands of not meeting till late in February, if general politics render such a measure advisable.

Ever, my dear Liverpool, yours very sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

I have no answer yet from Talleyrand to my Slave Trade note.

The Prince of Orange to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUC,

La Haye, le 21 Octobre, 1814.

Je vous suis infiniment obligé de la complaisance que vous avez eu d'entretenir mon fils aîné avant de vous séparer à Courtray sur les objets que j'avois pris la liberté de soumettre à votre attention. Si je suis charmé de pouvoir lui rendre témoignage qu'il a eu égard à vos conseils, vous excuserez, je me flatte, à la sollicitude paternelle de regretter que ce ne soit pas au point que je l'aurois désiré. Je prends en conséquence la liberté de recourir à vous dans l'espoir que de temps à autre vous voudrez continuer à venir à son assistance. La facilité de caractère de Guillaume, et sa légèreté, me font toujours craindre qu'il ne s'occupe pas suffisamment de sa position actuelle, et oublie celle à laquelle il s'est appelé; et je crains que l'idée d'être à même de la remplir lui fasse négliger de se procurer les moyens de la faire dignement.

Agréez l'assurance de la très haute considération avec laquelle je suis,
my Lord Duc,

Votre très affectionné,

GUILLAUME.

The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Fife House, 21st Oct., 1814.

I think it material to inform you that whilst I was at Walmer a Mons. de Facbaze arrived in this country from St. Domingo, upon a special mission from the President Petion. Lord Bathurst saw him before I returned to town, and I had an interview with him yesterday. He brought full powers and instructions with him from Petion to negotiate any treaty with us, political or commercial, which we might be desirous of concluding. We both of us explicitly informed him that we could not receive his full powers, or acknowledge him as an accredited agent; that our relations with the French government were of that nature that we could in no way interpose between any measures that might be taking for renewing the connexion between the present French government and the island of St. Domingo; but that we were ready to receive any information from him which, as an individual, he might be disposed to give us.

He communicated to me very fully yesterday all the circumstances which are connected with the present state of the island of St. Domingo. He represents the differences between Christophe and Petion to be irreconcilable; but that, although no treaty of peace has been, or is likely to be, concluded between them, there are no existing hostilities. He says that if a French army were to arrive for the purpose of attacking either power, the other would feel a common interest in repelling the attack, even if no concert should be established between them. He represents Christophe as a sanguinary tyrant, and Petion, by whom he is accredited, as a mild and humane man, and very much beloved in the part of the colony over which the authority of his government is established. I observed from a part of his instructions, which he read to me, that the indispensable condition of any negotiation was the independence of St. Domingo; and I am satis-

fied from his conversation that the King of France would have no chance of establishing even a nominal authority except upon the basis of acknowledging the present state of property and the abolition of slavery and the slave-trade in St. Domingo. I do not think it quite clear, from the answers which he made to some questions which I put to him, that a negotiation might not be opened by the King of France on such a basis as that last mentioned. I am inclined, however, to believe that it would not lead to any satisfactory result, and that nothing short of absolute independence would satisfy either of the parties who have the government of the island at present in their hands. He seems to have no apprehension that any force the King of France could send could succeed in conquering the island.

He left St. Domingo before the return of the King of France was known, but at a time when that event was generally expected.

I recommended to him strongly to go to the Comte de la Chartre, and to state to him explicitly all that he had communicated to me. He said his full powers and instructions did not authorise him to have any communication with the French government. I replied that those instructions were given under other circumstances, but that I did not see any reason why he should not now make such a communication as could not compromise his government, and might contribute to avert the adoption of measures which might be equally detrimental to all parties. He told me he would reflect on the advice I had given him, and that he might probably soon receive further communications from his government which might relieve him from the difficulties which he at present felt on this subject.

I have thought it right to apprise you without delay of all that has passed on this occasion, not for the purpose of your originating any communication with the French government upon it at this time, but in order that you may be able to obviate any misrepresentations if the arrival of Mons. de Facbaze in England, and the cause of his coming, should in any way be known to the French government. I should add that Mons. de Facbaze appears to me a very sensible and intelligent man.

Believe me, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

The Prince of Orange to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUC,

La Haye, le 21 Octobre, 1814.

Au moment de mon départ de Bruxelles j'ai reçu la lettre que vous avez eu la bonté de m'écrire, ainsi que la mémoire concernant la défense des Pays-Bas. Je n'ai eu que le tems de charger mon fils aîné de vous en accuser la réception, et de donner au Général Krayenhof les ordres nécessaires pour qu'il mette les Ingénieurs sous ses ordres à l'ouvrage, afin de former les projets et devis pour préparer son exécution, me réservant de vous adresser plus tard mes remerciemens pour la communication de ces pièces, ainsi que de la lettre à Lord Bathurst, dont le contenu est une nouvelle preuve de l'intérêt que vous portez aux Pays-Bas. Arrivé depuis trois jours à la Haye, je m'empresse de profiter du premier instant dis-

ponible pour vous témoigner ma reconnaissance, et prends en même tems la liberté de fixer encore votre attention sur la frontière à la rive droite de la Meuse, la sûreté des Pays-Bas paroissant dépendre principalement des mesures qui seront prises au Congrès de Vienne pour assurer leur flanc gauche. J'ai lieu de présumer, my Lord Duc, que vous avez connoissance des mémoires que le Prince de Hardenberg a communiqué à Lord Castlereagh. Ils portent la date du 28 Avril et 28 Septembre. Si, d'après le contenu du premier, les forteresses de Juliers et de Luxembourg étoient destinés à tomber en partage à la Hollande, le second leur en soustrait la possession pour les remettre à la Prusse et à la Bavière, sous prétexte que la défense des Pays-Bas est plus assuré en la faisant dépendre de la bonne volonté de la Bavière et de la Prusse qu'en mettant cet état dans la position d'établir son propre système de défense, et d'opposer une résistance suffisante à la France pour donner le tems à l'Angleterre, la Prusse, et les états Allemands de venir à son secours. La possession de Luxembourg, qui est le clef de la Belgique, dont de tous tems elle a fait partie, semble de nécessité absolue. J'ai lieu de me flatter que vous partagez cette opinion, et c'est ce que me fait espérer, my Lord Duc, que vous voudrez appuyer auprès de Lord Castlereagh les représentations que je lui fais par Lord Clancarty, pour que les idées que j'ai mises en avant par rapport à la frontière future des Pays-Bas obtiennent le préférence sur celles du mémoire Prussien, assuré de l'importance que ce Ministre attachera à vos considérations. Je ne peux d'ailleurs répondre de remplir les intentions des puissances, en formant un état intermédiaire entre la France, l'Angleterre, et l'Allemagne, et qui doit être le boulevard du nord de l'Europe, si celui-ci n'obtient pas Luxembourg, une partie du cours de la Moselle, et un établissement sur ce fleuve qui assure la communication avec l'Allemagne et la possibilité d'avoir des secours de ce pays ainsi que de la Suisse. J'ai cru devoir fixer votre attention sur ces objets. Ils ne sauroient être considéré vous être étrangers, et j'ose me flatter que votre opinion en cette matière servira à établir la conviction générale de la nécessité de régler conformément à mes vues un point dont dépend peut être le sort futur des Pays-Bas.

C'est plein de confiance en votre amitié que je vous recommande ces objets, vous priant d'agréer les assurances de la haute considération avec laquelle je suis, my Lord Duc,

Votre très affectionné,

GUILLAUME.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Fife House, 21st Oct., 1814.

The Duke of Wellington will have communicated to you the conversation he had with M. Jaucourt on the subject of the slave trade. The more I have considered our difficulties upon this question, the more I am satisfied of the importance of having some record that we had offered a West India colony to France for the immediate abolition of the trade. I think such an offer will induce our Allies more cordially to assist us in the question; that it will in some degree do away any unfavourable impression which might arise from our retaining Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice; and that if

Talleyrand declines it, it will be impossible for the abolitionists in this country to deny that we have made every effort in our power for the attainment of the object.

I enclose a copy of a letter which I have written this day to the Duke of Wellington. I am satisfied that the recovery of St. Domingo by France is absolutely hopeless, unless they can make up their minds to abolish the slave trade, and to acknowledge the existing state of property and the abolition of slavery within that colony. I doubt if they would succeed now even on these conditions.

LIVERPOOL.

H. Goulburn, Esq., to Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD,

Ghent, 21st Oct., 1814.

We received late last night your despatch and the letters and papers which accompanied it. The news which they brought from America is very far from satisfactory. Even our brilliant success at Baltimore, as it did not terminate in the capture of the town, will be considered by the Americans as a victory, and not as an escape. We owed the acceptance of our Article respecting the Indians to the capture of Washington; and if we had either burnt Baltimore or held Plattsburgh, I believe we should have had peace on the terms which you have sent to us in a month at latest. As things appear to be going on in America, the result of our negotiation may be very different. Indeed if it were not for the want of fuel at Boston, I should be quite in despair.

You may rely upon our using every exertion to secure the boundary which you have pointed out. In carrying into effect the instructions which you have given us, we have not brought the subject of fisheries as forward as the instruction might seem to warrant. Having stated distinctly in the first conference the views of the government on this subject, we have contented ourselves with referring to that statement. Had we done more, it would have appeared as if we had proposals to make, when in reality the proposition ought to come from them, or as if we expected discussion on a point on which we have already stated the fixed determination of our government.

I hope that the next time you are good enough to write, you will be able to send me better news.

Believe me, my dear Lord, ever yours most faithfully,

HENRY GOULBURN.

I find it will not be possible to get our note copied in time for to-night's post: we must, therefore, defer sending it officially till Friday. I enclose you a melancholy account of the voyage of the *Antelope* and her convoy. I hope she had not, in addition to the 100,000*l.*, any stores or troops under her protection.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Fife House, 21st Oct., 1814.

We have received your letters of the 4th instant, and I had at the same time a very long and interesting private letter from Cooke. I was prepared for the turn affairs have taken respecting Poland. My letter of the 14th instant will have fully explained to you my opinion on this subject: it very much corresponds with your own. We must take care so to manage this question as not to get the discredit of resisting the Emperor of Russia's proposition upon a principle of partition. I am desirous, if it is not too late, of drawing your attention to the distinction in my letter respecting the Duchy of Warsaw.

Our news from America in the course of the last week has been chequered. Though we did not obtain possession of Baltimore, the advance upon that town, and the destruction of property and of the harbour which has been consequent upon it, have done them as much mischief as the capture of Washington. This success has been dearly bought, however, by the death of Major-General Ross. We intend sending Sir Edward Pakenham to replace him. Sir Alexander Cochrane writes in high spirits, and has no doubt, with the reinforcements announced to him, of accomplishing all the objects which he had in view. On the other hand, the American papers contain unfavourable accounts of our operations on the frontier of Canada. We have not received any despatches from that quarter of as late a date; but there can be no doubt of the defeat of our flotilla on the lake Champlain and of the retreat of Sir George Prevost from Plattsburgh, though I am satisfied there is no foundation for the assertion of his having been defeated with any serious loss. He has, however, managed the campaign in that quarter as ill as possible, and if he cannot redeem himself by some brilliant success, he must be recalled at the end of the campaign. He has not the confidence of the army. We must now lament that we sent such large reinforcements in that quarter: the two Canadas would have been safe with half the amount, and I verily believe that with the remainder added to the force placed under the command of General Ross, we might have taken possession of every considerable town in America south of Philadelphia. We thought, however, we were acting for the best, and so we were if we had had a competent officer in the command in Canada.

The American plenipotentiaries have agreed to our Article relative to the Indians. The negotiation is therefore proceeding, and with more prospect of success than has hitherto existed. We shall probably be able to form some decisive judgment on the subject in the course of the next ten days. The capture and destruction of Washington has not united the Americans: quite the contrary. We have gained more credit with them by saving private property than we have lost by the destruction of their public works and buildings. Madison clings to office, and I am strongly inclined to think that the best thing for us is that he should remain there. His government must be a weak one, and feeling that it has not the confidence of a great part of the nation, will perhaps be ready to make peace for the purpose of getting out of its difficulties.

LIVERPOOL.

Lord Sidmouth to Earl Bathurst.

DEAR LORD BATHURST,

Richmond Park, 22nd Oct., 1814.

I was on the point of calling at your office yesterday, when I was informed that you had left it. My chief purpose was to tell you (what you have perhaps learnt from Torrens) that, after a communication with the Irish government, I have recommended it to His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief to keep in Ireland during the winter the British militia regiments now there, amounting to between 9000 and 10,000 men. In the spring the term of service of the greater part, if not of the whole of them, will expire. I have further directed that the disembodying of the few remaining regiments of British militia now in this country should be suspended. They do not consist of more than 6000 rank and file; but such of them as have not served in Ireland may go there in the spring, if the war lasts, and the rest will diminish the demand for regular troops in Great Britain. An early ballot for the militia would afford a fresh supply of troops fit for service in Ireland in a very few months.

I have stated these particulars, because they may assist you in deciding upon the amount of the regular force which may be spared from home service in case the war with America should continue.

Believe me yours very sincerely,

SIDMOUTH.

[798.]

To the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 23rd Oct., 1814.

General Macaulay, who will deliver this letter to your Lordship, is perfectly acquainted with the public opinion in France, and particularly at Paris, regarding the slave trade, and will communicate to you details upon that subject which will be useful to you. I am much mistaken likewise if he will not be of use in opening the eyes of the friends of the abolition to the state of the question here, and I recommend to you to communicate with him confidentially on that point. His brother is the secretary of the African Society.

General Macaulay will likewise make you acquainted with what he has learnt of the state of Paris in regard to the Bourbons. My former letters and despatches will have shown you what I think on that subject. Without knowing more facts, it appears to me that he considers the danger more certain and more likely to occur than I do; that is to say, he believes it certainly will occur within a very short period of time. I think it may occur on any night; but I know of no fact to induce me to believe it is near, excepting the general one of

great discontent and almost desperation among a very daring class of men. However, what General Macaulay will tell you is worth attending to. Lord Buckinghamshire knows him well, and will tell you the kind of man he is.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Grenville to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Dropmore, 23rd Oct., 1814.

Some of the friends to the abolition of the slave trade were of opinion that the publication of a speech which I made in the House of Lords on the subject of the unqualified restoration of the French colonies might be of service to that cause, and such a motive was decisive with me. I was necessarily led in that discussion to refer both to the personal character and conduct of the King of France, and also to his present situation in reference to that question; and I hope that I touched on both with that respect which is due to his station, and which I have particular reasons for feeling personally towards him.

It would, I think, be now more respectful that I should myself solicit his acceptance of this little publication than that I should take the chance of its reaching him through any other hands; and I should feel it particularly honourable to myself, if you saw no objection to be the channel of that communication—not, certainly, in any public character, or as making yourself at all responsible for my opinions or statements, but simply as an act of that personal regard and kindness with which you permit me to flatter myself.

I am at the same time perfectly well aware that from the freedom with which I express myself both as to the past and also as to many questions still depending, and those of no small delicacy, there may very possibly be objections of which I am quite ignorant, and which may render your compliance with this request improper. No one can be more reluctant than I should be to ask you to do anything which in your own better judgment you deem to be in the slightest degree objectionable; and, in that case, I will only beg you, without any farther explanation, to tell me that you have so felt it, and to be assured that I shall feel perfectly satisfied that your opinion was the right one.

I have taken the liberty to enclose two copies, in the hope that you will have the goodness to accept of one of them for yourself.

I have the honour to be, with the most unfeigned respect and regard, my dear Lord,

Your Grace's most faithful and most obedient humble servant,

GRENVILLE.

[799.]

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 24th Oct., 1814.

The Danish Minister here has frequently spoken to me regarding the difficulties in which the King found himself with the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia, and has at last entreated me to write to your Lordship on the subject. I have recommended to him to urge the King to open himself candidly to your Lordship, which he tells me he has done, and I write to apprise you of the circumstance.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[800.]

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Paris, 25th Oct., 1814.

Monsieur de Blacas called upon me this morning for the purpose of talking to me on a remonstrance which I had made to him regarding the nature of the powers given to the French Commissioners under the 2nd and 4th additional Articles of the Treaty of Peace; and after having informed me of what the King had determined on that subject (of which I had before been informed by Monsieur de Jaucourt), he adverted to the state of the negotiations at Vienna. He said that the Emperor of Russia appeared to entertain an erroneous notion that the King was incapable of making any exertion, in consequence of His Imperial Majesty's recollection of the quantity of cannon which had been carried away from France by the Allies; and he added that he entertained no doubt that the King could with the greatest facility add 100,000 men to his army, and that in his opinion the measure would be a remedy, not only for all the difficulties at Vienna, but for the discontents and dangers in this city, which I had frequently represented to him.

I observed that the King could not mean to go to war for Poland, and that the menace in the existing state of the negotiations at Vienna would alarm those who ought to be united with His Majesty in opposing the Emperor's views in Poland, and might thus do more harm than good. To this Monsieur de Blacas replied that, though the King would not go to war for Poland, the country was not disinclined to make an exertion

to save Saxony ; and he again expressed great apprehensions of the consequences which would follow from that kingdom falling into the hands of Prussia. I told him that the only chance of saving Saxony was for all the Great Powers in Europe to join to prevent the execution of the Emperor's plans in Poland ; and that while France was looking after little objects in Saxony and elsewhere, and by means of this false direction of her views, a power would be established in the east of Europe which would place not only Saxony but every other object out of her reach ; and I strongly recommended to him to have a full explanation with your Lordship and the Powers at Vienna before he adopted such a measure as augmenting his army. Monsieur de Blacas after a very long discussion appeared to be convinced of the necessity of acting fairly with the Allies in respect to Poland, and said that he entertained no doubt from the instructions sent to Monsieur de Talleyrand that he would act with your Lordship in everything, and, as far as I understood him, that Monsieur de Talleyrand would consult with you on this measure. But I am quite certain that it is intended to increase the army, whatever may be the political plan to be followed, and that the object of the conversation with me was to apprise me of that intention.

Monsieur de Blacas must have known that I was informed yesterday of the King's determination regarding the powers of the Commissioners, and yet he called upon me twice yesterday when I was from home, and once this day ; and throughout the conversation which I have reported to you, he insisted, in every view he took of the subject, that the army ought to be increased. He mentioned frequently the benefit which would be derived from the measure in internal tranquillity and security, by providing for such numbers of unemployed officers, now the object of so much alarm.

I therefore consider this measure to be decided ; and although I sent the despatches to you this morning, I think it proper to despatch another messenger this night with this intelligence.

In talking about Italy, Monsieur de Blacas informed me that he had received intelligence, to which he gave credit, that the Austrian government at Milan had sold 20,000 stand of arms to Murat.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Vienna, 25th Oct., 1814.

The events of the few last days, coupled with your letter of the 8th, have made me apprehensive that any decisive effort to abate the Russian demands may be defeated by the counteracting exertions of France on the Saxon point. It has occurred to me that you might keep down any rising temper at the Tuileries by throwing before Monsieur de Blacas the possible consequences to which any hostile interference, such as he appears to countenance on the part of France, might lead.

You will perceive from my several despatches that the difference in principle between Monsieur Talleyrand and me chiefly is, that I wish to direct my main efforts to secure an equilibrium in Europe, to which object, as far as principle will permit, I wish to make all local points subordinate. M. de Talleyrand appears to me, on the contrary, more intent upon particular points of influence than upon the general balance to be established; and his efforts upon the Neapolitan and Saxon questions are frequently made at the expense of the more important question of Poland, without essentially serving either of those interests upon which he is most intent.

I was from the outset aware of the extreme difficulty of making Prussia an useful ally in the present discussions, connected closely as she has been with Russia; but it appeared to me that, notwithstanding the King's *liaison* with the Emperor, it ought not to be despaired of, under the known sentiments of the Prussian cabinet, more especially as it was difficult to found a satisfactory system of balance in Europe unless Prussia could be induced to take a part.

Two alternatives alone presented themselves for consideration: an union of the two great German Powers supported by Great Britain, and thus combining the minor States of Germany, together with Holland, in an intermediary system between Russia and France; or an union of Austria, France, and the Southern States against the Northern Powers, with Russia and Prussia in close alliance.

It would have been to be wished that the arrangements upon a peace could have been effected in Europe without giving rise to any combination whatever of this nature, and that, at the end of so long a struggle, the several Powers might have enjoyed some repose without forming calculations that always augment the risks of war; but the tone and conduct of Russia have disappointed this hope, and forced upon us such considerations.

In weighing the conveniences and inconveniences of the latter of these alternatives, the objections appeared to me strongly to preponderate, and especially as affecting *our* immediate interests. Necessity might dictate such a system, but not choice. It appeared, in the first instance, difficult to cement, on account of the fundamental jealousy existing between Austria and France, especially upon the point of Italian preponderance.

If adopted in order to curb Russian power, and with this view supported by Great Britain, it rendered Holland and the Low Countries dependent on France for their support, instead of having Prussia and the Northern States of Germany as their natural protectors. It presented the further inconvenience, in case of war, of exposing all the recent cessions by France to re-occupation by French armies as the seat of war might happen to present itself.

These considerations were sufficiently weighty to induce me to be of opinion that however pure the intentions of the King of France were, and however friendly, we ought not to risk so much upon French connection, and that it was wiser to preserve as far as possible the good will of France, whilst we laboured to unite Germany for its own preservation against Russia.

I was induced to prefer this course, first, as affording the best chance, if Prussia could be brought forward, of averting the Polish danger without a war; and secondly, if we failed in this object, as opposing the best barrier to further encroachments on the part of Russia, whilst it afforded a natural cover to our interests on the side of Flanders, without leaving them at the mercy of a combination formed somewhat out of the natural course of political interest.

I have troubled you with this outline of the policy upon which I have been acting here, that you may use your own discretion, as occasions arise of preparing and reconciling the mind of the French government to a concert between the two *limitrophe* Powers against Russian encroachment and dictation. You will find their minds (at least Prince Talleyrand's is) very adverse to Prussia, and impatient of the notion of any union between Austria and Prussia; yet whilst they most inconsistently object to such an union, they admit that it is the only mode in which Russia can be kept within due bounds.

If France were a feeble and menaced Power, she might well feel jealous of such a German alliance; but as her direct interests are out of all danger, it is unreasonable that she should impede the sole means that remain to Germany of preserving its independence, in order either to indulge a sentiment towards the King of Saxony, or to create a French party amongst the minor States. France need never dread a German League: it is in its nature inoffensive; and there is no reason to fear that the union between Austria and Prussia will be such as to endanger the liberties of other States.

Until the determination of Austria and Prussia is more fully established I have to beg your Grace will make your reasoning general, and not admit that any negotiation is in progress.

Believe me to be, with great truth and regard, my dear Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient and faithful servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

E. Cooke, Esq., to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD,

Vienna, 25th Oct., 1814.

You will see by Lord Castlereagh's letters that we are still in the dark, and do not advance. Affairs stick with Metternich, who, I believe, will never play a great, straightforward game but by mere necessity, and when he finds that all little and side games fail.

In the mean time the Emperor of Russia fancies that he can manage by address his Imperial and Royal colleagues. He flirts and plays the amiable from morning to night, and flatters himself with complete success by his captures.

There have been fine displays of sentiment. The Emperor of Russia has been appointed to the command of the regiment of Hiller, which he placed himself at the head of the other day in the Prater, and there was an affecting scena between him and the Emperor of Austria. The King of Prussia has another Austrian regiment, and we have a print in the shops of the three Emperors, and under it, *The Sacred League*. All this nonsense tells. To-morrow, or the day after, all the Courts set off for Basle, and will be absent five or six days; so there will be little time after their return to arrange for the 1st of November, if there is to be an arrangement. But hitherto the Emperor *ne bouge pas*.

In the mean time the fêtes go on at an immense expense. The review in the Prater of near 20,000 men, and the dinner of the Courts and whole army, were really imposing and grand. Metternich's ball in the evening was equally superb. I understand Stadion, who is at the head of the finance, begins to complain loudly of the expense, and that it is too much for him, in addition to 300,000 men in arms. The Emperor of Austria also is almost worn out.

Talleyrand wants to make an explosion; and if Lord Castlereagh does not, I think he will. I have tried to force Metternich to act by goading his employés, who all profess to be of our sentiments, and eager to forward them; but they do not speak in confidence as to their principal. They see the game: that on one side Poland and Saxony must both be surrendered, on the other Saxony only; on the one hand Saxony and their frontier lost, on the other Saxony lost, but their frontier saved; on the one hand Prussia made a vassal of Russia, and Austria thrown for self-defence into the arms of France, on the other Prussia and Austria combined for the protection of Germany and the independence of Europe against Russia and France, if she should join Russia, which at present seems impossible.

In the mean time Bavaria wishes to act with Austria in order to form her arrondissement, and from jealousy of Wurtemberg. The latter is said to be Russian, and the Crown Prince's views on the Archduchess of Oldenburgh are said to be still favoured; but I do not learn that anything on that point is settled.

In this state, you may naturally believe that Lord Castlereagh is rather fidgety. I begin to think it may be best for Europe that nothing should be done before the 1st of November, and that a forced statement should be made, that nothing could be brought forward because Russia would not declare that she was bound by her treaties. Of course this will be avoided if possible. All this is to yourself alone, so you will burn my letter.

Ever most truly your Lordship's servant,

E. COOKE.

E. Cooke, Esq., to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD,

Vienna, 25th Oct., 1814.

I yet am almost quite benighted. They say Czartorisky, with assistance, is preparing an answer to Lord Castlereagh's paper, at which I rejoice; for if once the Emperor of Russia can be brought to a *guerre de plume*, I think

matters may be brought to bear. In the mean time Talleyrand wants to enter a caveat on Saxony, and he has drawn a *drôlerie* on the law of nations in order to save Saxony and destroy Murat at one stroke. I was desired by Lord Castlereagh to request he would not give in his note till he had seen his Lordship ; and when I left him, he assented. He seems miserable that any system should be formed for defending the north of Germany against Russia without the march of French armies beyond the Rhine ; and he said France was more ready for war than any country in Europe. He is *acharné* against Prussia, cannot bear her alliance with Austria, or tolerate the idea that Austria and Prussia should be able to defend the north of Germany.

I think if the Emperor can be brought to bend on the point of Poland, Prussia will not object to preserve Saxony in part ; and so things may go on : but this is all in the clouds. In the mean time, Prussia and Austria are getting closer.

Talleyrand's principle is this : there is no judge of Sovereigns ; Sovereigns always retain their rights till they cede them : all dispossession without a cession is illegal.

I asked where he found this new theory, for I never had found it in any author. He said, in the history of the last three centuries. I agreed with the fact, that all dispossessed Sovereigns had made acts of cession, because they secured compensation ; but I never could understand that the act of cession made the *droit*, however it might be an *actus expletonius juris* ; and it was an odd principle to make the consent of a criminal the foundation of the right to punish him.

I am not sure whether delay and a new adjournment will not be the happiest measure, though one must wish for Europe to speak out. I am sure you must feel for Lord Castlereagh. As for the Emperor of Russia, he dances while Rome is burning. He plays the lion after hunting, dividing the prey. I take one part to give me the keys of Berlin, I take the second to give me the keys of Vienna, and I claim the third for the *beau moral*. If I tried to write seriously, I could only confuse your Lordship. We must wait the calends of November.

Ever most truly your Lordship's servant,

E. COOKE.

There is an assembly here. I have fled from the heat. Pozzo di Borgo talked to me in mournful tones. He says the Emperor is quite wicked. He abused Metternich yesterday, and was very violent. He has affronted many of his Generals by giving the regiments to Colonels, and giving them nothing in their place. He has abused Nesselrode. The King of Prussia has promised to do nothing in the journey which can derange the plans adopted. When he finds Prussia fall off, he will be furious.

Count Munster to the Prince Regent.

Vienne, le 25 Oct., 1814.

Le titre royal de l'Hanovre a été formellement reconnu par l'Autriche, la Prusse, la Bavière, le Wurtemberg, le Dannemark, le Duc de Bronsvic,

Saxe Weimar, Saxe Gotha, l'Electeur de Hesse. Le Nonce du Pape, l'Ambassadeur d'Espagne, celui de Portugal, les Ministres de Hesse Darmstadt, de Hollande, de la Ligue Helvétique, du Roi des Deux Siciles, de la Porte Ottomane, de Sardaigne, de Suède, ont fait des réponses polies, portant qu'ils avoient acheminé ma note à leurs Cours respectives, et qu'ils ne doutent nullement du plaisir avec lequel leurs Souverains recevront l'annonce en question.

La Cour de Bade boude et garde le silence parcequ'elle reste exclue du Comité.

L'Empereur de Russie, quoique présent, n'a pas fait de réponse encore. J'ai prié le Comte de Nesselrode de m'expliquer ce silence, vu qu'il connoissoit mieux que personne les motifs qui avoient fait adopter à l'Hanovre le titre royal, comme il avoit été présent aux discussions qui avoient eu lieu l'hiver passé sur le titre électoral. Le Comte de Nesselrode m'a assuré là dessus qu'il me feroit avoir la réponse de l'Empereur telle que je la désirois à son retour de Hongrie, pour où Sa Majesté est partie hier dans l'intention de revenir à la fin de la semaine. Il ajouta que l'adoption du titre royal avoit causé quelque embarras aux Ministres de Russie, puisque les Polonois s'en réclamoient pour engager l'Empereur de se déclarer Roi de Pologne.

Il sembla que ce plan tient à des raisons entièrement indépendantes de la mesure qui a dû être adoptée pour le Hanovre.

MUNSTER.

[801.]

To the Comte de Jaucourt.

M. LE COMTE,

Paris, 26th Oct. (?) 1814.

Under the 2nd additional Article of the Treaty of Paris, the Prince Regent and His Most Catholic Majesty engaged to name, without delay, Commissioners to liquidate the accounts of their respective expenses for the maintenance of prisoners of war; and by the 4th additional Article of the same Treaty, that immediately after the ratification of the same Treaty the sequesters which, since 1792, had been laid upon the funds, revenues, debts, or any other effects of the high contracting parties, or their subjects, should be taken off.

That the Commissioners mentioned in the 2nd Article *s'occuperont de l'examen et liquidation* of the claims of His Britannic Majesty's subjects upon the French government for the value of the property, movable or immovable, illegally confiscated by the French authorities, as also for the total or partial loss of their debts or other property illegally detained under sequester since the year 1792.

His Majesty's Commissioners farther engaged to act towards

British subjects in this respect in the same spirit of justice which the French subjects have experienced in Great Britain.

In consequence of these engagements the Prince Regent signed the appointment, of which I enclose the copy, of Mr. Bagot, Mr. Impey, and Mr. Mackenzie, to be the Commissioners on the part of His Britannic Majesty to execute the 2nd and 4th Articles of the Treaty of Paris, for which, by the same instrument, His Royal Highness gave them full powers and the enclosed instructions.

The British Commissioners arrived in Paris in the end of the month of August, and having previously had the honour of a communication with His Highness the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and having been put in communication with the French Commissioners, the Commissioners on the part of the two governments had a meeting on the 15th September, at which the British Commissioners having communicated their commission and full powers and instructions to the Commissioners on the part of His Most Catholic Majesty, the latter assured them "on their honour that the powers given to them by His Catholic Majesty were equal to those with which the former were invested by the Prince Regent on behalf of His Britannic Majesty, and the French Commissioners promised to transmit a copy thereof without delay."

After a delay of one month from that period of time, the French Commissioners, after much discussion, at length, on the 18th of October, transmitted to the British Commissioners the letter, the appointment, and instructions; the two latter purporting to be under His Most Catholic Majesty's sign manual, of which the enclosed are copies; the instructions, it must be observed, which the French Commissioners promised "on their honour" they would send immediately after the meeting of the 15th September, not having been signed by His Majesty till the 17th October.

The undersigned Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Britannic Majesty begs to observe upon these transactions, first, that they cannot be considered to be in conformity with the spirit or the letter of His Most Catholic Majesty's engagement "to act towards the British subjects" in respect to their claims on the French government "in the same spirit of justice which the French subjects have experienced in Great Britain."

It is well known that the latter have long ago received all that they can legally claim from the government; and if any individual French subject thinks himself aggrieved by government, he, equally with any British subject, can go into a British Court of Justice to claim those rights in which the law will protect him.

Secondly, the 2nd and 4th additional Articles were framed to give to His Britannic Majesty's subjects in France the same justice which French subjects enjoyed in Great Britain; that is, an early and fair decision upon their claims by means of Commissioners, acting independently and impartially, by virtue of full powers from their respective governments. By adverting to the instructions, under His Majesty's sign manual, to the French Commissioners, it will be seen that those Commissioners have no powers to "*liquidate*" the claims of His Britannic Majesty's subjects. They are authorized only to treat in His Majesty's name with the British Commissioners respecting the claims of British subjects, and, as far as the last clause of the instructions can be understood, to report to the Minister of Finance, who will convey His Majesty's instructions.

With every confidence in His Majesty's good intentions and justice, the undersigned, on the part of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, protests against the enclosed appointment and instructions.

First, they do not contain any reference to the 2nd additional Article of the Treaty of Peace, although that is the Article under which it is agreed that the Commissioners shall be named.

Secondly, they do not give those Commissioners the same powers as the British Commissioners have under the 2nd and 3rd Articles of their instructions, such as the French Commissioners ought to have under the 4th additional Article *pour s'occuper* "*de l'examen et liquidation*" of the claims of His Britannic Majesty's subjects.

So much time has now elapsed since the ratification of the Treaty and since the British Commissioners have been in Paris, that it becomes essentially necessary that some steps should be taken for the execution of these Articles of the Treaty; and the undersigned therefore entreats le Comte de Jaucourt to bring this note and the annexed papers under the consideration of His Most Catholic Majesty, and to urge His Majesty to direct the Minister of Finance to prepare for his signature an appoint-

ment and instructions for the Commissioners under the 2nd and 4th additional Articles of the Treaty of Peace, which shall be in conformity with the letter and spirit of those Articles.

The undersigned takes this opportunity of assuring the Comte de Jaucourt of his high consideration.

WELLINGTON.

Viscount Castlereagh to Earl Bathurst.

DEAR BATHURST,

Mount Stewart, 26th Oct., 1814.

I feel with you the question between Spain and Portugal to be a very embarrassing one, especially to us. I also incline to think that as a line of absolute neutrality or indifference would in the long run be hardly practicable, the most prudent mode of interfering will be by considering the whole as a species of infraction of the Treaty of Vienna, and on this ground that we should invite the five other Powers who signed that settlement to concur with us in offering a joint mediation to arrange all differences in such manner as may be consistent with the preservation of the general pacification there concluded. This will mix France and Sweden in the question. The latter will be no embarrassment; the former Power it is essential to carry along with us.

If this is our ultimate measure, the only question is how to prevent additional complications that may in the mean time occur. I rather think, whatever may be threatened, that nothing can happen during the winter. The Spaniards have no army in a state of equipment to enter Portugal. At this season, and even, as I believe, till the green forage exists, which is not till late in May, operations are utterly impracticable in that country without a scale of preparation of which the Spanish government is wholly incapable. On the other hand, we hear of no preparations in Portugal for sending more force across the Atlantic, nor can this be attempted without our having full notice.

My notion then is, that, if you cannot gain time upon the plea of the present separation of the Cabinet, you should take up the ground of declining a separate interference, declaring at the same time that the Prince Regent cannot see with indifference so serious an interruption to the general tranquillity, and that it was his intention immediately to call the attention of his Allies, who signed the Peace of Vienna, to the question for the purpose of interposing their good offices conjointly to settle matters.

Pending this reference, I think it desirable, if possible, to keep matters quiet, without actually engaging to stop the Portuguese government from moving troops. This is a strong measure in principle, and it is desirable to tranquillize the Spanish government by showing them the improbability of such an attempt, rather than by pledging ourselves by force to prevent it. As far as management goes, there can be no difficulty in saying that our endeavours will be so directed.

Perhaps it is an additional motive for making this a Congress question, in order that we may be enabled, with the concurrence of Europe, to force upon Spain some more liberal and practicable system for South America. The

conduct of Portugal is not to be defended; and yet she might well say that Spain, by driving her colonies into revolt, was in fact republicanizing the whole continent, and ultimately subverting the Portuguese monarchy in the Brazils.

I think Spain may await with the less impatience the interference of Europe, as she hardly yet can judge of the state of affairs in the Plate, and she must depend upon recovering her ground there by negotiation rather than by arms; whilst in Europe, if the attack upon Portugal is only looked to upon a principle of holding that country as a counter security, she had better not involve herself in a war of serious expense, and possible failure, till she sees clearly that she has no other expedient left by which she can do herself justice.

Ever yours (in haste),

CASTLEREAGH.

[802.]

To the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 27th Oct., 1814.

I enclose copies of two letters, one of the 17th* and one of this date,† which I have written to Lord Castlereagh in regard to Prince Hardenberg's plans for the partition of the countries on the left of the Rhine; likewise a letter written to Lord Castlereagh this afternoon upon the same subject as my despatch of the 25th.

There is nothing new. The discussion on the Emigrants Estate Bill is going on well.

Lord Harrowby sets out to-morrow.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[803.]

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 27th Oct., 1814.

Since I closed my letter to you of this morning I have seen a person who has seen a letter from La Bernadière to one of his friends here, in which La Bernadière states his opinion that all that can be done at Vienna is to keep the Ministers now at Congress assembled in discussion a sufficient length of time to enable France to prepare for the war which must be the result of the Congress.

I mention this circumstance as it may throw some light on

* See p. 346.

† See p. 381.

the conversation with Blacas reported in my despatch of the 25th.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

[804.]

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 27th Oct., 1814.

Although I wrote the despatch which accompanies this the night before last, I have delayed to transmit it till now, that I might have an opportunity of talking to Lord Harrowby, who is still here, regarding its contents, and might make farther inquiry whether the impression I received from my conversation with Blacas was correct or not. I have not since been able to see Blacas, and have not heard of the subject of our conversation from any other quarter; but I think it better to send you the despatch, with the information that I have heard no more upon the subject.

I have not written to you since the 17th respecting the countries on the left of the Rhine, as, in fact, the substance of what I had to say to you is in that letter. The Prince of Orange will have a bad frontier if Luxembourg is in the hands of Bavaria, for the reasons therein stated; he will not have a very good one if he has Luxembourg himself, because it will be too extended; and he will, in fact, have only a *lisière* along the French frontier, and between that and the Prussian dominions. He will have a very good one if Prussia is brought forward to Luxembourg, and his frontier goes along the Meuse to Huy, and even Liège, and runs thence to the Rhine by any convenient line. This is, I believe, what he would himself prefer.

These are the only military points in the case; the others are for political consideration. First, the cession of the territories of the House of Orange in Germany in exchange for Liège, which I always understood the Prince of Orange was to have at all events. I don't think the Prince will agree to that exchange. In fact, if he does not get the course of the Meuse from the Powers of Europe, on the principle of the necessity of forming a great Power on the northern frontier of France, without sacrifice on his part, or if Liège is to be kept back as belonging to Ger-

many, he had better not take the other provinces of the Netherlands, as he will be placed in the advanced post to cover others, without the means of defending either them or himself; whereas, by remaining within his old frontier, he must be protected by others. I think the same reasoning might almost be applied with fairness to throwing him back from the Meuse to the left bank of the Rhine; and here, secondly, would arise the question whether, considering the interest which all the Powers of Europe have in keeping the French out of Germany, and therefore away from the Rhine, it would not suit the interests of the Powers in the south of Germany to put Prussia in possession of Mayence, with a view to induce that Power first to come forward to the French frontier, and next to make such cessions to the Prince of Orange between the Meuse and the Rhine as would make him a real bulwark. These are not the points on which you wished to have my opinion, but I throw them out for your better consideration, and merely to show you what I think would be the best military arrangement of the countries on the left of the Rhine.

I'll send a copy of this letter, and of mine of the 17th, to England.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Fife House, 28th Oct., 1814.

I send you enclosed a memorandum of Vansittart's on reading your despatches of the 14th inst.

I think his paper contains very much the impression of several of our other colleagues, viz., that we have done enough on this question of Poland, and that if our efforts should not have been successful, the time is now come when, according to one of your former despatches, it would be far better that we should withdraw ourselves from the question altogether, and reserve ourselves for points on which we have a more immediate and direct interest.

I am the more strongly inclined to this opinion because I am fully persuaded, as I have already said, that no arrangement respecting Poland can now be either creditable or satisfactory.

I think it very material that we should likewise consider that our war with America will probably now be of some duration. We owe it therefore to ourselves not to make enemies in other quarters if we can avoid it, for I cannot but feel apprehensive that some of our European Allies will

not be indisposed to favour the Americans; and if the Emperor of Russia should be desirous of taking up their cause, we are well aware, from some of Lord Walpole's late communications, that there is a most powerful party in Russia to support him. We shall be happy to hear that you have been able to keep clear of any engagement with Russia as to the Dutch debt.

Looking to a continuance of the American war, our financial state is far from satisfactory. Without taking into the account any compensation to foreign Powers on the subject of the slave trade, we shall want a loan for the service of the year of 27,000,000*l.* or 28,000,000*l.*

The American war will not cost us less than 10,000,000*l.*, in addition to our peace establishment and other expenses. We must expect, therefore, to hear it said that the property-tax is continued for the purpose of securing a better frontier for Canada.

Your note to Talleyrand on the subject of the slave trade is perfectly satisfactory, and will place us on excellent ground as to that question.

LIVERPOOL.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Memorandum by Mr. Vansittart.

I begin to apprehend that we are making ourselves too much principals in the disputes respecting Poland. The pretensions of Russia evidently endanger the security and independence of Austria and Prussia; but those Powers are at least wavering in their resistance, if not disposed to acquiesce, for the sake of securing objects still more interesting to them. We run the risk, therefore, of being disavowed, and represented abroad as actuated by a jealousy of the greatness of Russia, and at home as the advocates and instigators of a system of partition.

I cannot look without apprehension at the means by which (if at all) the views of Russia can be counteracted. I can see no other than by bringing forward France as a leading Power either in war or negotiation, and re-establishing her influence in the centre of Europe, which it has cost us so much to overturn.

After all, we can have no security against some treacherous compromise between France and Russia; and there is even a great probability that in resentment of our interference, the Emperor of Russia may be disposed to listen to some suggestion for bringing forward questions of maritime law at the Congress.

With respect to the Polish question itself, I cannot help thinking there is some weight in the Emperor's observation to Lord Castlereagh, "that Russia would gain more power by acquiring half the Duchy of Warsaw as a province than the whole as a kingdom." The Emperor, in accepting the crown of Poland, becomes bound to give the kingdom a constitution; and whether he restores the constitution of 1790, or the old one, or frames a new one, he will infallibly cripple the powers of his government, and render the Poles much less manageable than when directly subjects of Russia. There is, besides, the greatest probability that in the course of one or two generations, at the utmost, the nominal independence of Poland would become real. A minority, or a weak reign, in Russia would bring about a separation which all the other Powers of Europe would be inclined to countenance.

In the mean time, as far as British interests are concerned, I think the decision of the question of no great political importance to us either way; and

that in a commercial point of view we should reap considerable advantage even from a nominal independence of Poland. Russia, from whatever cause, shows the strongest spirit of hostility against our trade; and nothing could so effectually defeat her restrictive regulations as the opening the ports of an adjoining kingdom, in which, even if similar prohibitions were nominally imposed, they would be constantly evaded. It is, indeed, well known that previously to the final partition of Poland large quantities of British goods, prohibited in Russia, always found their way there through the Polish ports; and the same thing, I am told, in a degree takes place at present in the uncertainty of the final settlement.

These ideas occurred to me upon reading the conversations of the Emperor of Russia with Lord Castlereagh and Lord Stuart, and they lead me to this practical conclusion, that though we were bound to support to a certain extent the endeavours of Austria and Prussia to prevent the extension of a dominion dangerous to their independence, yet that we have now fully performed all that could be expected from us, and that we ought to avoid irritating Russia by a pertinacious opposition which is so unlikely to be successful.

The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Fife House, 28th Oct., 1814.

The last note of the American Plenipotentiaries puts an end, I think, to any hopes we might have entertained of our being able to bring the war with America at this time to a conclusion.

We proposed the *uti possidetis* to be the basis of the treaty as to territory, subject, however, to such modifications as might be found on discussion reciprocally advantageous. They are disposed to advance the extravagant doctrine of some of the revolutionary governments of France, viz., that they never will cede any part of their dominions, even though they shall have been conquered by their enemies. This principle they bring forward during a war in which one of their chief efforts has been to conquer and annex Canada to the United States.

The doctrine of the American government is a very convenient one: that they will always be ready to keep what they acquire, but never to give up what they lose. I cannot, however, believe that such a doctrine would receive any countenance (especially after all that has passed) in Europe.

We still think it desirable to gain a little more time before the negotiation is brought to a close; and we shall therefore call upon them to deliver in a full projet of all the conditions on which they are ready to make peace, before we enter into discussion on any of the points contained in our last note.

There can be, however, very little doubt as to the result, unless some extraordinary good news should come in the interval, which I do not expect.

I am, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

[805.]

MY LORD,

Paris, 30th Oct., 1814.

I enclose a memorandum which has been put into my hands regarding a memoir on a plan for invading India through the continent of Asia, for which the possessor asks 600 guineas. I beg to have your Lordship's directions whether to purchase it or not.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

A Son Excellence Monseigneur le Duc de Wellington, Pair d'Angleterre.

MÉMOIRE sur le Manuscrit de M. de REUILLY sur l'Expédition de l'Inde.

M. de Reuilly, Auditeur au Conseil d'Etat, et Correspondant de l'Institut, ci-devant Préfet à Florence (Italie), auteur du Mémoire sur l'Expédition de l'Inde, a été aussi Secrétaire d'Ambassade sous le Général Hédouville en Russie. Il fit pendant son séjour en Russie un voyage en Crimée. De retour à Paris il publia deux ouvrages, l'un intitulé "Voyage en Crimée," et l'autre "Description du Thibet."

Arrivé en Crimée, il s'est lié avec le Métropolite Grec et autres personnages marquants du pays. Son titre de Français, et la bienveillance de M. Pallas, l'ont mis à même de faire ce mémoire sur l'Inde, d'après les instructions secrètes qu'il avait reçues.

Ce Mémoire traite :—

1. De l'alliance que l'on pourrait faire avec les ennemis de la puissance Anglaise.
2. De l'expédition maritime.
3. De l'expédition par terre.
4. Du matériel de l'armée et du choix des hommes et de leur conservation pour la réussite de l'expédition.
5. De l'habillement et de l'armement de l'armée en général.
6. D'une copie de note, dont l'original a été remise à Buonaparte par M. Pallas.
7. Enfin, d'une carte faite exprès pour ce Mémoire, qui se trouve à la fin de ce volume, avec l'itinéraire tracé pour l'expédition.

Il ne reste que le manuscrit de l'auteur, dont il n'a été fait qu'une seule copie, qui a été remise à Napoléon en 1806, et qui l'a emporté avec lui à Moscou. Ce Mémoire est donc unique, et peut être regardé comme une preuve du projet que Napoléon avait conçu.

M. de Reuilly, auteur de ce Mémoire, est mort depuis quatre ans. Il a légué sa bibliothèque à un ami qui s'en trouve possesseur aujourd'hui. Il désire, d'après les avis que je lui ai donnés, que Son Excellence en fasse l'acquisition. Ses prétentions à ce sujet sont de 600 guinées.

C'est moi qui lui ai conseillé de le faire parvenir à Son Excellence, car

lors de l'arrivée des troupes alliées à Paris il voulait en faire hommage à Sa Majesté l'Empereur Alexandre.

J'ai l'honneur de laisser à l'examen de Votre Excellence le dit manuscrit et la carte y jointe, et d'attendre sa réponse.

Je joins à l'appui de ce Mémoire le Voyage en Crimée et la Description du Thibet, l'un et l'autre publiés par feu M. de Reuilly.

M. ALEXANDRE.

Comte de Blacas d'Aulps to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Paris, ce 30 Octobre, 1814.

Je me suis empressé de remettre au Roi l'écrit que Lord Grenville désiroit faire parvenir à Sa Majesté, et je prie Votre Excellence d'être persuadée que la confiance avec laquelle vous vous êtes acquitté de cette commission est un sentiment auquel le Roi attache le plus grand prix. Quelle que soit l'opinion manifestée dans cet ouvrage, Sa Majesté ne doute pas qu'elle n'y trouve les principes généraux auxquels elle ne pourra qu'applaudir, et le talent qui leur prête encore plus d'autorité.

Je prie Votre Excellence d'agréer avec ses sentimens ordinaires l'assurance de la haute considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être, my Lord,

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

BLACAS D'AULPS.

The Emperor of Russia to Viscount Castlereagh.

Vienne, le 18 (30) Octobre, 1814.*

J'ai tardé jusqu'à présent à vous répondre, my Lord, parceque j'ai voulu auparavant peser mûrement la force de chacun des argumens que vous cherchiez à opposer à la détermination que j'ai prise et que je vous ai confiée relativement au Duché de Varsovie. J'ai eu aussi de la peine, je l'avoue, à comprendre vos motifs et leur explication, et à concilier vos démarches avec les sentimens que vous exprimez, et votre débût au Congrès avec la conduite passée de la Grande Bretagne.

La forme que vous avez suivie est aussi celle que j'adopte. La réponse au Memorandum contiendra là en forme d'une pièce que je ne puis envisager d'après les déterminations dont elle menace, que comme un acte à peu près officiel, mais il m'a paru nécessaire que dans cette lettre particulière je vous parle de ce qui a fait l'objet de la vôtre.

Après une introduction dont je ne me connaîtrai pas l'intention, vous dites, my Lord, que vous verriez *même avec satisfaction* que je reçusse un agrandissement libéral et important du côté de mes frontières Polonaises, un gage considérable de la reconnaissance de l'Europe, pourvu que ce ne soit pas imposant à mes voisins, un arrangement inconsistent avec ce que des états indépendans se doivent les uns aux autres.

* See letter from Lord Castlereagh to the Emperor of Russia, p. 329.

Comme je partage à cet égard entièrement votre opinion, et que la réponse au Memorandum prouve au long que je ne m'en suis nullement départi, je n'aurai rien à ajouter ici sur cette matière, sinon à vous témoigner ma surprise de vous voir renchérir sur les appréhensions de mes voisins.

Je passe donc à l'article où vous me rappelez des événemens dont je ne perdrai jamais le souvenir, c'est-à-dire l'assistance franche et cordiale que j'ai reçu de la part de l'Angleterre lorsque je luttais seul contre tout le Continent conduit par Napoléon.

L'on se met toujours dans son tort quand on veut porter en compte à quelqu'un des services rendus. Si j'avais cru trouver dans vos remarques cette intention, ou bien le soupçon injuste de ne pas suffisamment apprécier le caractère élevé de la nation, et la politique éclairée et amicale du Cabinet Britannique pendant le cours de la guerre, je n'y eusse pas répondu. Mais nous avons à discuter l'avenir, et pour cela il est naturel de bien s'expliquer sur le passé. La réponse au Memorandum vous démontrera que toutes les acquisitions que j'ai faites jusqu'à présent n'ont eu de valeur que strictement sous le rapport défensif. Je suffira donc de vous adresser la question suivante : Si dans la lutte à mort que j'ai soutenue au cœur de mes états je n'avais pas été tranquille du côté des Turcs, aurai-je pu mettre dans la continuation de la guerre les grands moyens que j'y ai consacrés, et l'Europe eut-elle été affranchie ? Vous me faites entendre que l'Angleterre n'a consenti à l'acquisition de la Norvège en faveur de la Suède que pour me garantir l'acquisition antérieure de la Finlande. Pour moi j'étais parti d'un parti plus généreux, et en sollicitant l'Angleterre à concourir à la garantie de la Norvège, je voulais procurer un allié de plus à notre cause. Je ne pouvais perdre de vue les grands avantages maritimes que la Norvège donnait à la Suède contre moi.

Cependant tout compensé, ma capitale était devenue inattaquable, tandis que la Suède mieux concentrée n'avait plus rien à redouter. De cette façon on gagnait de part et d'autre en sûreté, et toutes les raisons de discussions et d'alarmes étaient écartées. Si les règles de l'équilibre ne se trouvent point là, j'ignore où il faudra les chercher.

Vous voyez, my Lord, que je n'ai pas méconnu le véritable sens dans lequel vous m'avez rappelé quelques actes de la politique de votre Cabinet, et que je suis loin d'en vouloir diminuer le mérite.

Sans doute que de l'issue du présent Congrès dépend le sort futur des états Européens, et tous mes efforts, tous mes sacrifices ont eu pour objet de voir les membres de notre union récupérer ou acquérir des dimensions capables de maintenir l'équilibre général. J'ignore donc comment avec de pareils principes le Congrès actuel pourrait devenir un foyer d'intrigues et de haine, une scène d'efforts iniques pour acquérir le pouvoir. Je me défends de tourner cette phrase contre aucun de mes Alliés, quelque extraordinaire qu'il ait dû me paraître de le trouver dans votre lettre.

C'est au monde qui a vu mes principes depuis le passage de la Vistule jusqu'à celui de la Seine, à juger si le désir d'acquérir un million d'âmes de plus de population, ou celui de m'assurer une prépondérance quelconque, était capable de m'animer, et de guider aucune de mes démarches.

La pureté de mes intentions me rend fort. Si je tiens à l'ordre des choses que je voudrais établir en Pologne, c'est parceque j'ai dans ma conscience

l'intime conviction que ce serait agir en faveur de l'avantage général, plus encore que pour mon intérêt personnel. Cette politique morale, quelque nuance que vous cherchiez à lui donner, trouverait peut être des appréciateurs chez les nations, où tout ce qui est désintéressé et bienveillant est accueilli.

Au surplus les détails et les raisonnemens contenus dans la réponse au Memorandum serviront, je me flatte, à vous calmer sur le sinistre avenir que vous voulez présager pour les puissances, auxquelles me lie tout ce que l'amitié et la confiance ont de plus indissoluble. Je compte de leur part sur un retour parfait. Quand de pareils élémens existent on ne doit pas craindre, quelques soient les brandons de discorde qu'on cherchera à jeter parmi nous, qu'il ne résulte du Congrès un état de choses honorable pour chacun, et tranquillisant pour tous.

Quant à ce qui concerne les soins que je dois à mes propres sujets et mes devoirs envers eux, c'est à moi à les connaître ; et il n'y a que la droiture de vos motifs qui ait pu me faire revenir sur les premiers impressions qu'a produit en moi la lecture de ce passage de votre lettre.

Au reste, ma réponse et ma confiance dans cette occasion vous prouveront, my Lord, que mes sentimens sincères pour vous n'ont pas changés.

ALEXANDRE.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Réponse au Memorandum.

L'auteur du Memorandum ne pouvoit assurément point faire un choix plus analogue aux circonstances qu'en introduisant sa pièce par le préambule de ce traité de Kalisch, où les maximes d'état et les principes de l'Empereur de toutes les Russies se trouvent dans leur vrai jour. C'est le premier lien auquel s'est rattaché l'indépendance de tous les états. C'est la Russie qui a été au devant d'eux, après avoir exterminé les forces Françaises qui avaient dévasté ses provinces, et qui a voulu que ses anciens Alliés reprissent toute leur puissance. L'Empereur y a consacré des moyens extraordinaires, et ni Moscou en cendres ni ses villes et ses campagnes désolées n'ont pu l'arrêter dans cette grande et généreuse entreprise, à laquelle sa modération attirait tant de moyens. Mais ce ne sont point là les conclusions que l'auteur du Memorandum veut produire : il veut prouver que l'Empereur s'écarte de ses premiers principes, qu'il méconnaît la foi des traités, qu'il menace la sûreté de ses voisins.

Sa Majesté a lu avec calme d'aussi étranges inculpations, quoiqu'il ne s'y attendisse point de la personne qui est entré en lice. Mais sa conduite les a réfuté d'avance ; et cette réponse servira, elle l'espère, à calmer toutes les alarmes et à rendre superflues de nouvelles remontrances de ce genre.

Pour appuyer son raisonnement l'auteur du Memorandum cite textuellement l'article 2 du traité de Kalisch : de là il passe à la convention du 27 Juin, et en rappelle les stipulations, c'est-à-dire celles qui concernent le Duché de Varsovie, et les acquisitions en faveur de l'Autriche et de la Prusse. Finalement il rapporte les conditions du premier article secret du traité d'alliance du 9 Septembre, 1813. Il en infère que "d'après le sens de ces différens engagements, il n'est nulle part supposé que l'Empereur s'envisageoit comme autorisé à disposer de tout le Duché de Varsovie, avec ses forteresses, par la raison qu'il en avait fait la conquête avec ses seules armes ; et que ce n'est que par forme de grâce et de faveur qu'il est intentionné d'assigner à la Prusse la ville et le territoire de Danzig ainsi que les districts nécessaires pour lier l'ancienne

Prusse avec les autres territoires Prussiens." L'auteur du Memorandum ajoute, "qu'outre cela il est entendu que du reste du Duché de Varsovie l'Empereur créera une monarchie séparée, pour, de concert avec ses autres provinces Polonaises, être administrée par Sa Majesté Impériale en qualité de Roi de Pologne.

"Que cette détermination est annoncée comme fondée sur le devoir moral d'améliorer le sort des anciens sujets Polonais de l'Empereur, comme celui des habitants du Duché.

"Citons-nous même les actes allégués. L'article 2 du traité du 27 dit :—

"§ 2. La dissolution du Duché de Varsovie, et le partage des provinces qui le forment entre la Russie, l'Autriche, et la Prusse.

"§ 3. L'agrandissement de la Prusse en suite de ce partage, et par la cession de la ville et du territoire de Danzig.

"§ 4. La restitution des provinces Illyriennes à l'Autriche," etc., etc.

Voilà la substance de ce principal article. Mais de quel acte fait-il partie ? D'un traité purement éventuel, que ni l'Autriche ni la Prusse n'eussent atteint cet étonnant accroissement de puissance, de territoire, d'influence, ou de considération, si la poursuite de la guerre n'avait amené d'autres conquêtes bien plus considérables.

Dès lors les premières stipulations n'étaient plus applicables aux résultats, et devaient suivre d'autres proportions, à mesure que l'Autriche ainsi que la Prusse acquerroient la perspective d'immenses acquisitions, la Russie acquerroit aussi le droit de prétendre à des dédommagements moins restreints.

Les puissances alliées ont si bien senti la vérité de ce fait, que dans le traité du 9 Septembre il n'est plus question d'autre chose, sinon "d'un arrangement à l'amiable entre les trois Cours de Russie, d'Autriche, et de Prusse sur le sort futur du Duché de Varsovie."

Où la rédaction de cet article est insidieuse, où l'on y reconnaît évidemment les droits proportionnellement acquis par la Russie ; mais dans tous les cas il est subversif de l'article du traité éventuel de Reichenbach.

Donnons donc à celui du 9 Septembre toute sa force d'intention et d'application, et voyons si ses conditions sont remplies. Au moment où Danzig fut tombé, l'Empereur, d'un mouvement spontané, remit cette place avec son territoire à Sa Majesté Prussienne.

L'Autriche a récupéré la possession entière et les revenus des mines de Wieliczka, le faubourg et le rayon de Cracovie.

Le pays à céder à la Prusse pour lier ses anciennes provinces est un des plus peuplés et des plus riches du Duché, le plus avancé dans la civilisation, l'agriculture, et l'industrie, et rempli de manufactures qui manquent au reste du pays. C'est-à-dire, en résumé, que l'Autriche reprend au delà de trois millions de florins d'Allemagne de revenu net, un territoire riche en mines de charbon de terre et de soufre, un rayon sans lequel Cracovie n'est rien. Ou, pour être plus précis encore, c'est-à-dire, que la Russie renonce dans le Duché à un quart de sa population et un tiers de ses richesses et de ses revenus, et qu'elle n'acquiert en dernière analyse que 2,200,000 âmes d'une population dont le maximum n'a jamais passé 3,300,000, et environ 8,000,000 de florins d'Allemagne de revenus.

Or l'arrangement le plus défavorable pourrait-il restreindre d'avantage le lot de la Russie ? Et cette acquisition, on le demande à tout homme impartial, peut-elle s'appeler immense, comme la qualifie le Memorandum Anglois ? Peut-elle seulement s'appeler considérable, ou même équitable, en comparaison des proportions réservées à l'Autriche et à la Prusse dans les contrées les plus favorisées de la nature, et où abondent toutes les sources de production et de

richesse ? Si à cette considération l'auteur du Memorandum veut joindre le tableau de la situation intérieure du Duché, ruiné par la guerre, la famine, les maladies contagieuses, les émigrations, à quoi se réduiront ses chaleureuses déclamations contre l'immensité de cette acquisition ?

Considérons maintenant la question sous ses rapports militaires, et détruisons également les exagérations du Memorandum, qui montrent comme une conséquence inévitable de la réunion d'une partie du Duché de Varsovie tous les maux politiques qui doivent assaillir l'Europe.

Pour donner quelque poids à ses remarques à cet égard, l'auteur du Memorandum est obligé de recourir à une ressource à laquelle on ne s'attendait assurément point. Il montre la Russie devenue colossale par l'acquisition de la Finlande Suédoise, d'une partie de la Bessarabie, et par la frontière qu'elle a obtenue en Perse. Puis donnant au Duché de Varsovie une latitude toute nouvelle, il montre la puissance Russe établie par là dans le cœur de l'Allemagne.

Quand un raisonnement donne dans l'extrême il cesse de persuader. Il suffit d'ailleurs de peu de remarques pour l'anéantir. Après que la Russie eut acquis la Finlande Suédoise, elle fut la première à travailler à obtenir un dédommagement en faveur de la Suède, mais l'Empereur y mit la condition expresse de l'accession de cette puissance à la cause commune. Sa Majesté Impériale lui acquerroit ainsi un allié utile, et rétablissait en même tems un équilibre parfait de ce côté-là. Quant à la ligne acquise en Perse, elle est d'une défense plus facile ; mais malgré cet avantage, la sûreté et la tranquillité de cette partie des frontières exigent des garnisons assez nombreuses, qui doivent être renouvelées chaque année, à cause d'un climat mal sain et destructeur.

L'acquisition d'une partie de Bessarabie a fourni de même une défense plus facile au moyen de quelques forteresses. Sous tout autre rapport, c'est un avantage insignifiant après une guerre longue et meurtrière. Or quand tout annonce à l'œil de l'observateur que l'Empereur ne s'applique qu'à établir un système de défense, et non d'agression ; quand on se rappelle qu'il n'a pu trouver que dans Moscou sacrifié un moyen de repousser la dernière invasion de la grande ligue, comment concevoir encore des alarmes contre ses intentions et ses vues ?

Ramenons la question au Duché de Varsovie et de ses forteresses.

C'est en vain que l'auteur du Memorandum s'écrie que par cette réunion les capitales de l'Autriche et de la Prusse sont menacées sans aucun moyen de défense ; c'est en vain qu'il offre la peinture animée des entreprises de ces Polonais inquiets et rémuants appelés à se rallier autour de l'étendard royal, renouvelant les scènes du passé, conspirant contre leurs voisins, enlevant ainsi à tous les cœurs chaque espoir de tranquillité et de bonheur pour l'avenir. Il suffit de jeter un coup-d'œil sur la carte pour se convaincre que ces dangers sont imaginaires ; que la défense naturelle se trouve du côté de l'Autriche, la défense artificielle par les places de guerre du côté de la Prusse ; que le Duché, au contraire, formant une point avancée, serait pris entre les armées d'Autriche et de la Prusse, et les opérations continuant sur les provinces intérieures, tout ce qui se trouveroit au delà du Boug, du Niemen, serait coupé de fait, et n'accroît de ressources que dans deux ou trois forteresses. Ainsi en portant les choses à l'extrême, le danger serait toujours plus grand pour la Russie que pour l'Autriche ou la Prusse, qui ne manqueraient point de faire cause commune.

Mais admettons l'hypothèse d'une entreprise sur Vienne, de cette capitale que le Memorandum croit principalement menacée. De quelque point que l'attaque partit, elle prêterait le flanc et le dos aux débouchés des Carpathes.

Cette chaîne de montagnes est à l'égard du Duché ce que sont à l'égard de la Saxe les montagnes de la Bohême.

Or deux rassemblemens de troupes faits en Transylvanie et en Hongrie couperaient de ses communications toute armée qui se serait portée sur Lemberg, ou qui du Palatinat de Cracovie voudrait agir sur la Moravie. Revenons aux forteresses. Cracovie, muni d'un mauvais château, ne peut plus être mis en ligne de compte, depuis que, perdant son principal faubourg, son rayon et la rive droite de la Vistule, l'établissement d'une tête-de-pont est impossible. Restent Thorn, Modlin, Zamosc, car Sierock est à peine une place d'armes. La Prusse conservant Graudenz et Danzig, il est de justice que Thorn reste au Duché. Si Modlin est entre les mains d'une autre puissance, la navigation a cessé pour la Russie sur le Bug, le Nareu, etc., etc. Si Zamosc est entre les mains de l'Autriche, le palatinat de Lublin n'est pas tenable.

Cependant, disons-le, ce n'est point la raison militaire qui a motivé de si vives clameurs ; c'est la question de la restauration du nom du Royaume de Pologne.

L'auteur a eu soin de produire à cet égard l'article secret du traité de 1797 qui stipule que les trois Cours copartageantes n'inséreraient plus dans leur intitulé la dénomination ou désignation cumulative de Royaume de Pologne. Pour que cet article demeurât obligatoire, il aurait fallu que les choses fussent restées dans la même situation.

Mais lorsque l'Autriche et la Prusse ont contribué comme alliés de la France à dépouiller la Russie de la plus grande partie des provinces Polonaises, quand la Russie a été obligé de les reconquérir, lorsque la conquête du Duché de Varsovie devient aujourd'hui une compensation pour d'énormes sacrifices, il s'agit effectivement d'un nouveau partage, et dans ce cas les stipulations qui ont accompagné celui de 1797 n'existent plus.

Vouloir méconnoître en ceci le droit public, c'est chercher gratuitement à compliquer les affaires et à multiplier les difficultés. Supposons ce nom de royaume de Pologne rétabli, et une partie du Duché de Varsovie réunie à la Russie. Admettons à cet égard les conjectures les plus étendues de l'auteur du Memorandum, quels sont les dangers qui en résulteront pour l'Autriche et la Prusse ? Aucun, puisque l'Empereur offre à l'une et à l'autre de ces puissances la garantie la plus formelle des parties de la Pologne qui demeurent sous leurs sceptres. Aucun, puisque cette restitution devant être contraire, selon l'auteur du Memorandum, au système de l'Autriche, de la Prusse, de la France, et du Ministère Britannique, la moindre tentative réunirait toutes ces puissances, auxquelles la Turquie se joindrait d'abondance, contre la Russie, isolée et abandonnée à ses seules forces. Cet aveu est sans doute un des premiers de ce genre fait en diplomatie. Mais il est digne de la pureté des intentions de l'Empereur. Ce n'est point d'un peu plus ou d'un peu moins de surface, ce n'est pas de quelques places fortes que se compose d'ailleurs l'équilibre général. C'est de la parité d'intérêts qui ont une tendance commune au moment du danger. Rien ne prouve autant que cette remarque que s'il se présente une solution d'équilibre, ce n'est assurément point en faveur de la Russie.

Concluons de plus que la nationalité qui doit revenir aux Polonais n'est point dangereuse, mais au contraire que ce serait le moyen le plus sûr de calmer l'inquiétude qu'on leur reproche, et de concilier tous les intérêts. L'Empereur a cette conviction, et les tems et les événemens prouveront qu'elle était fondée.

L'on ignore quel jugement l'auteur, après avoir lu ces passages, portera lui-même de l'inconcevable reproche qu'il fait à l'Empereur d'avoir abusé du langage de ses traités et de ses engagements, pour porter l'Autriche et la Prusse à se joindre à la cause de l'Europe, tandis que ces deux puissances affranchies

du joug de Napoléon ont repris par là leur ancienne force, une dignité nouvelle, un accroissement considérable, et comment il maintiendra la thèse qu'il a avancé que parceque l'Empereur a pensé à restituer le titre de royaume de Pologne, l'Europe sauvée, et tous les avantages acquis par les Alliés se réduisent à rien.

Il termine en déclarant qu'aussi longtems que Sa Majesté Impériale adhérera à son projet, aucun plan, aucun arrangement ne pourra être fait par les plénipotentiaires respectifs, que le Congrès ne saurait être assemblé, ni pour discuter ni pour sanctionner un travail quelconque. Il ajoute qu'il est impossible de supposer que les plénipotentiaires d'Autriche et de Prusse laisseront les domaines de leurs maîtres sans une frontière militaire, que les ministres de toutes les puissances que l'auteur représente dans cette circonstance (l'on ignore de quel droit) sont du même avis, et qu'il ne leur restera qu'à rendre compte des motifs qui les ont obligés de se séparer sans avoir pu mettre la main à l'œuvre bienfaisante qui devait assurer le bonheur futur de l'Europe.

Si, après avoir médité le contenu de cette réponse, l'auteur se croit obligé de tenir aux mêmes principes, s'il n'est point convaincu, si enfin il pouvait parvenir à faire dissoudre le Congrès pour un seul point, tandis que tant d'autres plus importants restent à régler, l'Empereur n'aura point à se reprocher ce malheur. Il exposera à l'Angleterre, à l'Europe, la nature et l'étendue de ses demandes. Les peuples qui l'ont vu combattre pour leur liberté, qui ont été témoins de sa modération, apprendront quelle est la cause qui s'est opposée au rétablissement général de l'ordre, du bonheur, et de la tranquillité pour lesquels tant de sang a coulé.

Quant aux Souverains, ses amis, ses alliés, ses frères d'armes, rien ne pourra jamais attiédir son amitié envers eux. Elle est fondée sur l'estime et la confiance la plus absolue, et toutes les conceptions de sa politique seront constamment réglées sur ces principes.

[806.]

To the Prince Sovereign of the Netherlands.

SIR,

Paris, 31st Oct., 1814.

I received the two letters which your Royal Highness did me the honour of writing to me on the 20th instant, and I am highly flattered by the confidence which your Royal Highness has been pleased to repose in me.

I will take an opportunity of again writing to the Hereditary Prince on the subject on which I spoke to him; and your Royal Highness may depend upon my omitting no opportunity which may offer of doing what you wish in that respect.

On the subject of your Royal Highness's other letter, regarding the frontier of your Royal Highness's dominions, I have written letters to Lord Castlereagh. In the first, in which I enclosed him the copy of the memorandum which I had drawn up on the defence of your Royal Highness's frontier, I acquainted him with my opinion that Luxembourg ought to belong to your Royal Highness. In the second and third, which con-

tained my observations on plans which had been submitted to Lord Castlereagh by Prince Hardenberg, I acquainted Lord Castlereagh with my opinion, first, that it would be very prejudicial to your Royal Highness's interests, and to those great interests which induced the Powers of Europe to form a great state of the Netherlands, if Luxembourg were placed in the hands of the King of Bavaria, for reasons referable to the usual policy of that kingdom, and to the state of comparative weakness in which it would be left even after its aggrandizement, which would render it very incapable of defending a distant possession against the attack of such a power as France.

Secondly, I admitted the inconvenience of extending your Royal Highness's frontier to Luxembourg, more especially if the Prussians were to be immediately behind you, between the Meuse and the Rhine, thus making your Royal Highness their advanced guard.

Thirdly, adverting to the necessity of forming a strong state on the northern frontier of France, and to the interest which all the Powers of Europe must feel in preventing the French from passing, or even reaching, the Rhine, I recommended that arrangements should be made which should bring the King of Prussia forward to Luxembourg, and on the Moselle, with the exception of such parts of the former as should suit the local convenience of your Royal Highness's territories; and that your Royal Highness should have the countries between the Meuse and the Rhine, from a line to be drawn from the former to the latter river.

Lastly, I recommended that if this could not be done, Luxembourg should positively be left with your Royal Highness.

Upon conversing with General Fagel, I was happy to find that what had occurred to me concurred with your Royal Highness's views. In fact, your Royal Highness would then have a short and compact frontier, with a rich country behind it, and a probable ally on your left, interested in your safety, and able to assist you. I see no other mode in which you can have the degree of strength which you ought to have in order to be able to accomplish the objects which are expected from you.

General Fagel will give your Royal Highness all the intelligence from hence, and I will therefore trouble your Royal

Highness no further than to assure you of the respect with which I have the honour to be,

Sir,
Your Royal Highness's, &c.,
WELLINGTON.

The Prince of Orange to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Brussels, 31st Oct., 1814.

A considerable number of men of the German Legion having deserted into France, I think it my duty to submit to your Grace whether it would be possible to make some arrangement with the French government by which these men would be again given up to us; and to request, if you think that they would agree to it, that you would undertake to establish with the French government some measure regarding deserters in future.

General Count d'Erlon, who commands at Lille, made no difficulty about sending back the men's horses and necessaries, but did not send the men themselves, which is a great encouragement to desertion amongst our army; and I conceive that friendly Powers ought rather to discourage desertion between their armies than harbour their respective deserters. Your Grace is, however, the only person to judge how far it will be possible to make the French government agree upon a measure of this kind, and to propose it if you think it would be accepted.

For ever yours, most truly devoted,

WILLIAM, HERED. PRINCE OF ORANGE.

M. de Jaucourt to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Paris, le 31 d'Octobre, 1814.

Des renseignemens parvenus au Ministre de l'Intérieur annoncent qu'un détachement de troupes Anglaises de la garnison de Tournay s'est porté dans les premiers jours de ce mois sur le territoire Français près de la commune de Baisieux, département du Nord, et qu'il a poursuivi jusques dans cette commune un déserteur qui s'y était retiré. Je ne doute point, my Lord, que cet acte irrégulier ne soit l'effet de quelqu'inadvertence ou de quelque hasard, et qu'il ne se trouve en contradiction avec les ordres probablement donnés aux commandans des troupes de Sa Majesté Britannique. Je crois toutefois devoir en entretenir Votre Excellence, et la prier de vouloir bien provoquer auprès de sa Cour les mesures qu'elle croira propres à empêcher qu'à l'avenir il ne s'en commette de semblables.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec une très haute considération, my Lord,

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

F. JAUCOURT.

Memorandum of the Subsidiary Engagements and Expenditure of Great Britain for the Year 1814.

Foreign Office, Nov., 1814.

On the 1st of March, 1814, three treaties were concluded at Chaumont by the Plenipotentiary of His Majesty with those of their Imperial Majesties the Emperors of Austria and Russia, and of His Majesty the King of Prussia; by the Third Article of which Great Britain engaged to pay the sum of 5,000,000*l.* in twelve equal monthly instalments, and in equal portions among the three Allied Sovereigns, during the current year, provided the war should last so long, or in case of peace these monthly instalments were not to be considered as due beyond the calendar month in which the definitive treaty of peace should be concluded. But it was farther stipulated that two additional monthly instalments should be paid to Austria and Prussia for the return home of their troops, and four monthly instalments on the same ground to Russia.

Great Britain has consequently engaged to pay to Austria during the current year the sum of 972,216*l.*, being 7-12ths of the sum of 1,666,666*l.* = the third of the five millions; to Prussia also 972,216*l.*; and to Russia 1,249,992*l.*, being 9-12ths of 1,666,666*l.*

On the 3rd of March, 1813, a treaty was concluded at Stockholm by the British and Swedish Plenipotentiaries, in virtue of which Great Britain engaged to pay to Sweden, for the year 1813, a subsidy of 1,000,000*l.*

By an additional Article to this Treaty, signed at Leipsic on the 22nd October, 1813, Great Britain agreed to pay to Sweden for the continued service of her 30,000 troops, for the twelve succeeding months, if the war should last so long, 1,200,000*l.*, in equal monthly payments.

Subsequent to the conclusion of peace, and in conformity to the provisions in the above additional Article, it has been agreed to place Sweden on a footing with the three Allied Powers respecting payments for the return of her troops, and three monthly instalments have been allowed on this account. Consequently Great Britain will have paid to Sweden a subsidy of 800,000*l.* for the service of the current year.

By the Treaty of Peace with Denmark, concluded at Kiel by the respective Plenipotentiaries on the 14th day of January, 1814, Great Britain obtained the right to subsidise 10,000 Danish troops to aid in the common cause, on the same terms which had formed the stipulations with Sweden; and the engagements with Sweden having been 1,200,000*l.* for 30,000 men, the yearly subsidy payable to Denmark, had the service of the Danish troops been required for a whole year, would have been 400,000*l.*; but Denmark has of this sum received only 146,665*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.*; being five monthly instalments, between the 15th January and the 15th June, 1814, for the service of the campaign, and inclusive of the return of her troops.

By the Treaty concluded at Palermo on the 13th May, 1809, between the respective Plenipotentiaries of His Majesty and His Sicilian Majesty, Great Britain agreed to pay to His Sicilian Majesty 400,000*l.* annually.

The monthly instalments on this account have been made good to the Sicilian government till the last day of July, viz. during the war, and two months after; and in consequence of the distressed state of the finances of

Sicily, and the circumstances which oblige His Sicilian Majesty to keep on foot a part of his army, His Majesty's Minister at Palermo has been instructed to announce to the Sicilian government that, although the subsidiary engagements between the two countries are considered to be at an end, assistance will be still afforded to His Sicilian Majesty in the proportion of one-half of what has been engaged for, until the Sicilian arrangements shall be settled at the Congress held at Vienna.

Portugal.

With the Crown of Portugal no Treaty of Subsidy has been concluded for the prosecution of the war, but the sum of two millions sterling has been annually voted by Parliament towards the maintenance of the Portuguese army, in pursuance of a Royal Message to that effect.

This sum has been annually paid to Portugal, partly in money for the payment of troops, and partly in provisions and military stores.

In consequence of the great probability of the return of peace in the spring of 1814, the usual Royal Message to Parliament was not brought down, and the money was consequently not voted; but the same payments in money and in kind were made under the sanction of the government, and controlled by His Majesty's Minister at Lisbon according to the principles recommended by the Duke of Wellington during the war; and in consideration of the distance at which the troops of Portugal were acting from their own frontier at the conclusion of peace, His Majesty's Minister at Lisbon has been instructed to authorise the continuation of the monthly issues till the end of September, *i.e.* four months after the definitive Treaty of Peace. Consequently the sum of 1,500,000*l.*, being 9-12ths of 2,000,000*l.*, will be payable to Portugal, either in kind or in money, during the current year; and by the arrangements made between the Duke of Wellington, Sir Charles Stuart, and the Portuguese government, the proportion of what was paid in money to that which was paid in kind was nearly as one to three each month. But by a despatch, dated 1st November, 1814, to Mr. Casamajor, it was agreed to pay the last three months entirely in money, if so much should appear to be due.

N.B. 200,000 dollars was the monthly amount of the *money* payments to Portugal under the above arrangement.

Spain.

The pecuniary assistance afforded to Spain during the year 1813 amounted to 1,000,000*l.*, and was met by the vote of credit.

Sir H. Wellesley was authorised early in that year to give to Spain the same pecuniary aid as she had received in the preceding year, which had been 1,000,000*l.*

No positive instructions were sent to Sir H. Wellesley at the commencement of 1814 for the continuation or suspension of these payments, in the understanding that they would be continued on the footing of the preceding year. Accordingly Sir H. Wellesley has authorised pecuniary issues to Spain for 1814 on the principle of the instructions forwarded to him in 1813; and since the conclusion of the definitive Treaty of Peace, he has been instructed to notify that these payments would be discontinued from

the 30th day of July, 1814, that is, from the expiration of the second month subsequent to such treaty.

Various other supplies of arms, ammunition, clothing for troops, military and naval stores, have been supplied both to Spain and Portugal during the war in the Peninsula, an account of which it is intended to prepare, in order to be laid before Parliament as soon as the last returns can be obtained.

For those furnished to Spain, it is understood between the two governments that an account is kept of the assistance in kind reciprocally afforded, for the balance to be ultimately struck between the two countries.*

On the 5th December, 1813, an agreement was concluded at London with the Hanoverian Minister, by which Great Britain agreed to pay to Hanover the sum of 600,000*l.* during the twelve months commencing from the 25th day of January, 1814, for the pay and maintenance of 15,000 Hanoverian troops, of which the Russian-German Legion (on whose behalf the Treaty of Peterswalden had been concluded on the 6th of July, between the Courts of St. Petersburg and London) were to form a part. The greatest part of this Russian-German Legion has been since transferred to Prussia by a convention signed at Paris on the 2nd of June, 1814. The Hanoverian force, however, has been kept up from other sources.

It has been since agreed between the British and Dutch governments that one half of the expense of this Hanoverian force shall be immediately, and the whole ultimately, borne by Holland.

Two payments of 100,000*l.* each were made to the Prince of Orange on his leaving England in the winter of 1813-14 to take possession of his recovered dominions; and two payments of 100,000*l.* each have been made in 1814 to His Most Christian Majesty.

On the 3rd of February, 1814, a military agreement was signed by Lord Bathurst and the Sardinian Minister, by which Great Britain engaged to raise a Piedmontese Legion from the prisoners of war in England, to consist of 3000 men, to maintain, clothe, and pay the same, until their arrival in the territories of the King of Sardinia, and on their being made over to His Sardinian Majesty to give them three months' pay in advance.

This event took place on the*

<i>Recapitulation.</i>							<i>£.</i>
7 months, Austria	..	..	..	..	..	..	972,216
7 months, Prussia	..	..	..	..	..	..	972,216
9 months, Russia	..	..	..	..	..	..	1,249,992
							3,194,424
8 months, Sweden	..	..	..	..	..	..	800,000
5 months, Denmark	..	..	..	..	..	..	146,665
7 months and 5 half months, Sicily	..	..	..	..	..	..	316,666
9 months, Portugal	..	..	..	..	..	..	1,500,000
7 months, Spain	..	..	..	..	..	..	583,333
7 months and 5 half months, Hanover	..	..	..	..	..	..	475,000
Holland	..	..	..	..	..	..	200,000
France	..	..	..	..	..	..	200,000
Total	..	..	..	..	..	..	7,416,089

* Blank in manuscript.

EXTRAIT d'une Lettre de M. MATUSIEWIEZ, écrite après avoir été présent à la Conférence que tint Napoléon à son Passage par Varsovie, au retour de Moscou.

Novembre, 1814.

Au passage de Napoléon par Varsovie il n'a vu personne outre le Comte Sta. Potocki, M. Matusiewiez, l'Archévêque de Malines, et le Général Dutailly. Tous les quatre appelés en même tems, l'ambassadeur (l'Archévêque de Malines) fit un tableau exact de la triste situation du Duché et de son épuisement. L'Empereur répondit à peu-près en ces termes :— "Nous y remédierons ; je me servirai des millions d'argent comptant que j'ai dans ma caisse." Dans le cours de cette conversation, où il paroisoit quelquefois gai et tranquille, même quelquefois plaisant, il dit entr'autres, "J'ai quitté Paris dans l'intention de ne pousser la guerre que jusqu'aux anciennes frontières de la Pologne ; les circonstances m'ont entraîné ; j'ai peut-être eu tort de pousser jusqu'à Moscou, peut-être mal fait de m'y arrêter trop longtems, mais du sublime au ridicule il n'y a qu'un pas, et c'est à la postérité à en juger." Plus tard il dit, "Jusqu'au 6 Novembre j'étois conquérant ; depuis la chance a tourné ; tout a bien été jusqu'à Wiasma ; une gelée de 18 degrés m'a jeté 30 mille chevaux sur le carreau. Tels sont les événemens de la guerre ; tout le monde sait d'ailleurs qu'une armée est composée d'êtres vivans. La dyssentérie s'étant mise dans mon armée, j'ai été obligé de rétrograder, et j'ai mieux aimé perdre 30 mille chevaux que cent mille hommes." Dans un autre moment il dit, "J'ai été si fort contrarié dans ma retraite, que j'ai été pendant 17 jours sans rapports de nulle part, ni des différens corps, qui pareillement ignoroient ce que j'étois devenu. Il faut que j'aie me montrer à mes 40 millions de sujets ; c'est bien plus important que de rester à la tête de 150 mille hommes à demi gelés et sans chevaux. . . Dans ma marche je n'avois pas de cavalerie pour me couvrir, et je conviens de m'être trouvé embarrassé, lorsque les Cosaques venoient donner dans les colonnes. Je ne pouvois réunir mon armée, elle aurait gêné ma marche ; je ne pouvois non plus la disséminer, parceque les Cosaques m'auroient coupé de tous côtés. Il a fallu avancer, reculer, boucher des trous, les tromper continuellement. J'ai eu besoin de toute mon expérience pour me tirer de là."

L'Empereur s'étant tu, M. Potocki dit, "Vous êtes le seul, Sire, qui ayiez pu sauver votre armée d'un aussi mauvais pas." L'Empereur répondit vivement, "Peut-être ; un autre même peut-être y auroit perdu courage. Ces événemens sont au-dessous du mien ; voilà pourquoi je suis le chef de cette armée. J'ai été obligé d'enclouer mes canons, de brûler mes effets, de faire sauter mes caissons ; les Russes, qui me suivoient, voyant la route jonchée de ces débris et des chevaux morts, ont profité de la circonstance pour me poursuivre vivement. J'avois résolu de ne pas me battre. Arrivé sur la Bérézina, je trouve Tschitschagoff dans une position très forte ; je fus embarrassé, je ne me souciois pas d'accepter le combat ; mais Tschitschagoff m'ayant attaqué, je lui ai passé sur le ventre, et me voilà ! Mes Français ne valent rien l'hiver, le froid les engourdit. Les Polonois sont de braves gens ; c'est eux qui m'ont soutenu et qui se sont soutenus le plus longtems. Il n'en étoit pas de même en Allemagne. Je n'avois ni les élémens ni le climat à combattre. A Essling j'étois si sûr de ma supériorité que je n'ai même pas fait de dispositions, et lorsqu'on m'annonça que le

Danube grossissoit, je demandai ce qu'il y avoit de l'autre côté ; et apprenant par la réponse qu'il y avoit les deux tiers de ma Garde et les trois quarts de mon armée, j'ai vu qu'il falloit payer de ma personne. Je donnai l'ordre de la bataille. Je me mis à la tête-de-pont avec un régiment ; je soutins tout l'effort de l'ennemi. Après cela vint la bataille de Wagram, et puis j'épousai une Archiduchesse."

Lorsqu'il fut question du Général Zaiaviek, l'Empereur dit, que deux jours après qu'on lui eut amputé la jambe, il étoit assez bien, et que comme il manquoit d'argent il lui avoit envoyé 6000 francs.

L'Empereur dit encore que le froid et la neige étoient si violens que l'escorte et le charriage abandonnèrent la caisse, les chevaux n'en pouvant plus, et tombant de fatigue. Par bonheur l'Empereur y survint le lendemain, et sauva cette caisse, qui contenoit neuf millions.

Demand of Murat to be recognised by the Congress as King of Naples.

Novembre, 1814.

Une dépêche du Roi de Naples, arrivée ici à son agent Mercredi dernier, renferme les détails suivans :—

Le Roi annonce que voulant mettre un terme aux incertitudes du sort qui lui est réservé, il avoit chargé son Ministre au Congrès, M. le Prince de Campochiaro, de demander à l'Autriche de le faire reconnoître par le Congrès dans la qualité de Roi de Naples. Le Prince étoit chargé de déclarer que son maître, parfaitement instruit des projets sinistres de quelques puissances à son égard, étoit déterminé à en prévenir les effets, et à s'en mettre à l'abri, qu'il avoit une armée de 80 mille hommes, qu'il étoit maître de faire soulever toute l'Italie, et de s'en faire déclarer chef de la Confédération, et que très certainement, quelque pussent être le résultat de ces événemens, il mouriroit Roi. L'Empereur d'Autriche a autorisé foiblement son Ministre à faire cette ouverture aux Ministres influens des grandes puissances, mais M. le Prince de Metternich a été plus chaud que son maître, et a mis le plus vif intérêt, ajoute la dépêche, à soutenir la demande du Roi de Naples.

Les Ministres de France et d'Angleterre se sont réunis pour s'opposer à cette reconnoissance. Le Roi ajoute qu'il est à peu près sûr que le Congrès prendra à son égard un mezzo termine, celui de ne pas agiter du tout la question qui l'intéresse, et de la laisser indécise ; mais que cela ne peut lui convenir ; que dans un an d'ici on renouvelleroit les conspirations, les intrigues contre lui ; que la France et l'Espagne armeroient pour le Roi de Sicile, et qu'il étoit bien aise de prévenir toutes ces tentatives par un parti extrême, dont le succès lui paroissoit certain dans ce moment, et qui pouvoit ne plus l'être à une autre époque.

Le Roi ajoute encore que le Prince de Campochiaro a eu une audience particulière très longue de l'Empereur Alexandre, dans laquelle il a répété à ce monarque tout ce qui vient d'être dit de la demande du Roi, et du parti qu'il a pris de mourir ou de rester Roi. L'Empereur a répondu au Prince, qu'il n'étoit pour rien dans les tracasseries dont le Roi de Naples se plaignait avec raison ; que lui, Empereur, l'avoit reconnu pour Roi de

Naples ; que loin d'avoir contre lui des intentions hostiles, il l'estimoit, et ne pouvoit qu'applaudir à la noble détermination qu'il avoit prise, et qu'il pouvoit être certain qu'il ne participeroit en rien aux mesures qui pourroient lui être désagréables.

Il paroît qu'il y a une correspondance très active entre la Reine de Naples et le Prince de Metternich, son ancien amant.

Un personnage très attaché au Roi de Naples, et qui a son entière confiance, partira de Paris pour aller le rejoindre d'ici à Vendredi prochain.

L'agent du Roi de Naples à Paris, qui a reçu cette dépêche, ajoute que par ordre de la Cour, M. le Duc d'Orléans a dû sonder M. le Lieutenant-Général Excelmans, qui a été grand écuyer du Roi de Naples, pour engager cet officier à se charger d'une négociation d'abdication auprès de ce Prince, mais que le Général Excelmans s'est refusé sèchement à cette proposition.

On garantit la certitude de l'existence de la dépêche du Roi à son agent sans en garantir l'exactitude ni de ce qui concerne le Général Excelmans.

The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Fife House, 1st Nov., 1814.

I have read and considered your letters attentively on the subject of the frontier to the Netherlands, and as far as I am capable of forming any opinion upon such a subject, it entirely concurs with yours.

I certainly think that it is essential to the security of the Low Countries, and I may say of the rest of Europe, against France, that some considerable military power should be brought into contact with her. I always preferred the idea of restoring the Low Countries to Austria on this very account to their annexation to Holland. But this was rendered impracticable from circumstances ; and we have no way now, therefore, of affording adequate security to Holland, the Low Countries, and the north of Europe, than by bringing Prussia in some way or other into contact with France on that side.

I think the best arrangement would be, therefore, that Prussia should have Luxembourg, and the Prince of the Netherlands have Liège and Juliers.

If the question should arise as to Luxembourg between the Sovereign of the Netherlands and the King of Bavaria, I should have no hesitation in preferring the former. They might neither of them have adequate military means (considering the other calls upon them) for the defence of the place, but the Sovereign of the Netherlands would certainly have every disposition to defend it, and would use every effort in his power for this purpose ; whereas the King of Bavaria might be so circumstanced as to feel it for his interest to sacrifice Luxembourg for the purpose of securing advantages elsewhere. The worst arrangement of all, I think, would be anything like a Confederation garrison.

These sort of projects may do very well for a little while, but in a certain time it is found out that what is everybody's is nobody's. No Power has a sufficient interest for preserving the place. The fortifications are neglected, perhaps ultimately dismantled ; and even if this should not

be the case, the nature both of the garrison and of the command must give great facilities to the enemy who attacks it.

I concur with you that it would be very desirable to give Mayence to Prussia, but I am apprehensive that neither Austria nor France will agree to it. In that case it would be better that Bavaria should have Mayence than Luxembourg. It is more contiguous to the King of Bavaria's other dominions, and the German Powers would feel a much deeper interest in supporting the King of Bavaria with a view of keeping Mayence out of the hands of France than they would for keeping Luxembourg out of the same hands.

Would you have the goodness to forward this letter, or a copy of it, to Lord Castlereagh by the messenger on Friday.

LIVERPOOL.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Fife House, 2nd Nov., 1814.

I have received your private letter of the 20th. I am sorry to find your progress so very slow, for I fear it will be quite impossible to adjourn Parliament beyond the end of January, or the very beginning of February.

We could not have made a loan before Christmas without the greatest possible inconvenience. We have given to the contractors the usual assurance that we most probably should not make another loan in the course of the year 1814. This sort of assurance does not expose government to much difficulty. If the loan is at a premium, and has been a profitable concern for them, we can always make reasonable conditions with the present contractors; but if the loan is at a discount, as is the case at present, it puts you entirely in their hands.

We shall therefore feel it necessary at present to confine ourselves to voting the annual duties, and a part of the war taxes.

Besides the difficulties as to money, the Bank Restriction Bill expires on the 28th of March, and the Property Tax on the 5th of April. Both these measures will occasion serious contests in Parliament, and we should fight them to great disadvantage if we put off the period of the meeting of Parliament so late as not to give the two Houses time for a fair and full discussion of them.

I should hope, however, that you will soon be able to make some way in the negotiations. The first point on these occasions, if not the greatest difficulty, always takes more time in settling than any other. In this case it is the principal and most complicated difficulty, not only from its own importance, but in consequence of the variety of interests which must be decided with reference to it. The subject in point of argument has, however, been nearly, if not entirely, exhausted, and we must come to some decision upon it. We shall, above all things, I hope, avoid a renewal of the war.

You will have heard from many quarters of the combustible state of the interior of France, and the expectation which exists of some explosion.

If the war under such circumstances were to be renewed, there is no

saying where it would end. It would very probably plunge Europe again in all the horrors from which we have had the credit of extricating it. Between such an evil and any arrangement more or less good for Poland, Saxony, or Italy, I should not hesitate. I do not say that I would not give my opinion fairly as to what was best, but having given it, I would certainly recommend compromise to avoid rupture.

I see little prospect of our negotiations at Ghent ending in peace, and I am apprehensive that they may be brought to a conclusion under circumstances which will render it necessary to lay the papers before Parliament, and to call for a vote upon them previous to the Christmas recess. Of this, however, I shall probably be enabled to speak more positively some days hence. The continuance of the American war will entail upon us a prodigious expense, much more than we had any idea of; and I cannot, therefore, avoid pressing upon you the importance of not entailing upon us any part of the Russian debt to Holland if you can avoid it. Consider only what this charge will be in addition to our war expenditure and to our pecuniary obligations to Holland and Sweden. It would be in principle one of the most difficult questions to defend that ever was brought forward in Parliament. If we had been at peace with all the world, and the arrangements to be made at Vienna were likely to contain anything very gratifying to the feelings of this country, we might have met the question with some degree of confidence; but as matters now stand, everything that is really valuable will be considered as having been gained before, and we shall be asked whether we can really meet such a charge in addition to all the burthens which the American war will bring upon us.

I recommend these considerations to your most serious attention.

All our colleagues are coming to town, and we are to have a Cabinet on the Speech to-morrow.

Many of them have not yet seen the American correspondence; but we have got the question into that state that the government is not absolutely committed, and there will be an opportunity therefore of reviewing in a full Cabinet the whole course of our policy as to America.

I regret particularly that we cannot have the advantage on this subject of your assistance.

LIVERPOOL.

[807.]

To Lord Viscount Castleragh.

MY LORD,

Paris, 3rd Nov., 1814.

I was informed some days ago of the arrest of a General Dufourgues, with between thirty and forty other persons, General officers of the army on half-pay, and some of them Gardes du Corps du Roi. The cause of their arrest has been kept secret, and has been stated by the persons attached to the Court to have been that they were discovered raising men to go to support the revolt in St. Domingo.

The truth is, however, that they were discovered in a con-

spiracy to destroy the Royal Family ; and it is an extraordinary circumstance, and a symptom of the prevailing disposition, that these persons were quite unconnected with those known to be hostile to the King and his government, and whose conduct, conversations, and writings have given most encouragement to his enemies.

I know that these last consider these arrests a fortunate circumstance, and likely to blind the King to the real dangers of his situation ; as Dufourgues and his companions could give no information whatever respecting any leading character, excepting from general report.

The protest signed by Monsieur Ferrand, the Prince de Condé, and the Duc de Bourbon, against the 'Charte Constitutionnelle,' which has been published in the 'Morning Chronicle,' has produced a great sensation here, and, connected with the recent appointment of Monsieur de Ferrand to the Ministry of Marine, is made use of by the discontented of all classes to prove the insincerity of the King. It would certainly have been more prudent not to have confirmed Monsieur de Ferrand in his office just at the moment that the Committee of the Chamber of Deputies made a report on a speech of his, in which he is accused of having intimated that the King entertained intentions inconsistent with what His Majesty had promised in his Royal Charter.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Major-General Torrens to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

Horse Guards, 3rd Nov., 1814.

In reference to your recommendation of Colonel Douglas, I enclose the copy of a letter which I addressed to that officer, in reply to the memorial you forwarded from him ; and which I thought might be the most convenient and satisfactory mode to you of letting him know the earnest terms in which you recommended his case and pretensions to the Commander-in-Chief.

I am very glad you have given such an opinion of him, as the experience of many years convinces me of his real worth and ability, and I sincerely wish the means could be procured of providing for him to his satisfaction. This is not so easily done, however, because he is very sensitive in regard to the least notion being entertained that he is not fit for all kinds of service, though, poor fellow, he has suffered amputation high up in his

thigh. He is offended at not having got one of the companies in the Guards.

You will perceive that we have had sad doings in Canada; and making every allowance for the prejudice of indirect communication, I fear there is too much reason to apprehend that a wretched scene has been exhibited upon the frontier of that country. It is not fair, however, to prejudge Sir George Prevost's case before his own account is received; and I think he injures himself by delaying his report, and thereby allowing the representations of many individuals to take root in the public mind. If his success at Plattsburgh was to depend upon the naval ascendancy on Lake Champlain, it is difficult to understand why he committed his troops in that operation before our fleet had sustained the conflict with the Americans; and it remains to be explained whether after all his retreat was so immediately necessary in consequence of the defeat of our fleet. I am certain you would have been sorry for poor Ross. He has been a great loss to the service. Pakenham sailed yesterday morning; and I feel confident that he will fulfil the expectations which are so universally entertained, as arising in his well known zeal and ability.

Forgive my intruding a long letter upon your time; I cannot give up the idea of preserving a communication with you, though your present high employment is not in the way of my official duties.

Ever, my dear Lord Duke, yours most sincerely,

H. TORRENS.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Major-General Torrens to Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas.

SIR,

Horse Guards, 26th Oct., 1814.

The Duke of Wellington having transmitted and strongly recommended your memorial of the 6th instant, I have not failed to lay the same before the Commander-in-Chief; and I am directed to acquaint you that His Royal Highness is very sensible of your zeal and merits, to which such honourable testimony is borne by his Grace, and he will have great pleasure in bringing your name before the Prince Regent in the most favourable manner possible for such provision and employment as the nature of the public service may admit.

I have, &c.,

H. TORRENS.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Fife House, 4th Nov., 1814.

I send you a copy of a letter I have this day written to the Duke of Wellington, in consequence of communications which I have had with Major-General Macaulay, Hamilton, and Lord Harrowby. Whether the information we have received is or is not exaggerated, the whole Cabinet are of opinion that we should not be justified in allowing the Duke of Wellington to incur the risk to which he might be exposed by his con-

tinuance in Paris at the present moment. Although the Duke of Wellington leaves the question entirely to our decision, he is evidently not insensible to his own danger, particularly to the danger of his being detained as a hostage or prisoner in the event of any internal convulsion in Paris.

The point of the Duke of Wellington's quitting Paris being decided, I confess I feel most anxious, under all the circumstances, that he should accept the command in America. There is no other person we can send there really equal to the situation, except Lord Niddry. Bathurst had a communication with him. He would be willing to go if his wounds and health would permit, but his surgeons give no hopes of his being able to undertake the service for some months, and they doubt if they would suffer him to go even then.

The Duke of Wellington would restore confidence to the army, place the military operations upon a proper footing, and give us the best chance of peace. I know he is very anxious for the restoration of peace with America if it can be made upon terms at all honourable. It is a material consideration, likewise, that if we shall be disposed for the sake of peace to give up something of our just pretensions, we can do this more creditably through him than through any other person.

I wish very much we could have had a communication with you before we came to this decision, but from the nature of the case delay was impossible. It was quite essential to remove him from Paris, and it was not less so to decide on the ground on which that removal was to take place. Besides, if we are to have the advantage of his services in America, the sooner it is known and the sooner he can go the better.

His appointment will in itself be sufficient to obviate many difficulties and much embarrassment at home.

Believe me, &c.,
LIVERPOOL.

The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Fife House, 4th Nov., 1814.

I received on Sunday last your letter by General Macaulay, and I had an opportunity of seeing that gentleman on Tuesday morning. The information he gave me strongly impressed my mind with the importance of your leaving Paris. As, however, both General Macaulay and Mr. Hamilton told me that you meant to open yourself thoroughly on the subject to Lord Harrowby, I thought it was better to wait till he came to town before I said anything on the subject to the Prince's confidential servants. I had a long conversation with him last night, and I have since communicated all the particulars which have come to my knowledge to the Cabinet, who entirely concur with me in opinion as to the expediency of your quitting Paris without delay.

It is at the same time of importance that this step should be taken in such a manner as would give the least umbrage to the French government, and not betray any alarm on our part as to the prospect of an internal convulsion in France. The notion of your coming to England to give

evidence on either of the court martials would not, in our judgment, answer the purpose, as neither of these pretences would warrant or account for an absence of more than ten days or a fortnight.

Two ideas have occurred to us for carrying our purpose into effect. We are perfectly ready to leave the decision between them entirely to you. We only request that you would act upon one of them without delay, and that you would continue in Paris as short a time as possible after receiving this letter.

The first is, that you should go immediately to Vienna for the purpose of communicating with Lord Castlereagh on the subject of the frontier of the Netherlands connected with that of Prussia, Bavaria, and the other German Powers.

As a considerable difference of opinion exists as to these points, it is most natural that Lord Castlereagh should be desirous of conversing with you upon them, and that the government here should wish the question not to be decided till such communication has been had between you.

Your departure from Paris on this account would not appear extraordinary, and the less so since the departure of General Pozzo di Borgo from Paris to Vienna in consequence of the orders of the Emperor of Russia. You might in this case leave the business of the mission with Lord FitzRoy Somerset: the establishment at Paris had better remain as it is for the present. Your residence at Vienna might continue for a month or six weeks, as might hereafter be judged expedient, and you might then return to London either before or with Lord Castlereagh. Although it is most probable that you would not, under such circumstances, be desired to resume your functions at Paris, this question might very properly be left open till after your return to England. You would still be nominally ambassador, and no successor need therefore be appointed for the present.

The other idea which has presented itself to our minds is, that you should be appointed to the chief command in America, and that you should go out with full powers to make peace, or to continue the war, if peace should be found impracticable, with renewed vigour.

We are truly sensible that we have no right to call upon you to undertake this service, and we wish you even to consider the proposal as not having been made to you, if it is in any way repugnant either to your views or to your feelings.

We cannot, however, conceal from you that great public advantage would arise from your accepting this command. The more we contemplate the character of the American war, the more satisfied we are of the many inconveniences which may grow out of the continuance of it. We desire to bring it to an honourable conclusion; and this object would, in our judgment, be more likely to be attained by vesting you with double powers than by any other arrangement which could be suggested.

If you should concur in this second idea, you will, of course, immediately return to England. Your appointment, as soon as it was known, would fully account for your recall from Paris, without its being possible for the French government to be offended at it; but it would be better that nothing should be said on the subject of it before your return to England.

You might state, in either case, to the King that you were called home, or desired to proceed to Vienna, in order to give your opinion on some military points of importance.

I have thus stated to you explicitly the sentiments of the government in consequence of the late communications. We are ready to place the decision on the two points above mentioned entirely in your hands. We only request that you would lose no time in leaving Paris, and that you would keep your departure from thence as secret as possible, till you are about to execute it.

I shall send a copy of this letter to Lord Castlereagh.

I beg you will write to me by a special messenger as soon as you have come to a determination.

Believe me, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Major-General C. Macaulay to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY LORD,

Downing Street, No. 17, 31st Oct., 1814.

I had the honour yesterday of leaving a letter from the Duke of Wellington at Fife House for your Lordship. I received it on Sunday, but I saw his Grace both on Monday and on Tuesday. Had your Lordship been in town, my intention was to have forcibly represented the very perilous situation in which Lord Wellington appears to me to be placed at Paris, under the existing circumstances of general discontent and perverted feelings in France; and I should have awaited your Lordship's commands for my attendance, was not my mind strongly impressed with a conviction of the indispensable necessity for His Majesty's government taking the subject into their early and serious consideration: this conviction has emboldened me to intrude upon your Lordship's indulgence without loss of time.

The King of France's government is notoriously weak, disunited, and unpopular, while he himself is exposed to unfavourable suspicions. The body of the military is disaffected, and the Jacobins and men out of employ, and Republicans, are aiming at the subversion of the government. This state of things moves in its natural progress towards an explosion. A crisis seems to me fast approaching, and with such very combustible materials a small spark would light the whole kingdom into a flame. Any event, for instance, taking place, such as a public insult to the Duke of Berry, or the mutiny of a single regiment near the capital, would, in all human probability, be likely to prove the signal for a general rising, followed by the massacre of the whole of the Royal Family. It will appear scarcely credible to Englishmen that atrocious deeds like these should form a theme of cold, unfeeling calculation with thousands and thousands in France; but so it is.

With respect to the Duke of Wellington, I consider his personal safety as much more exposed to danger than even that of any branch of the Royal Family; for if a ferment, however produced, occurs, whatever party is uppermost will take measures to prevent his quitting France. On the morning of the day I left Paris I inquired of a person well and intimately acquainted with the sentiments and views of the leaders of all parties, whether, in case of a movement in France, he thought it possible that at this day, in violation and contempt of the laws of nations, a civilized people could go the length, the unwarrantable length, of arresting one clothed with the sacred character of ambassador? His reply was, "Yes: not only will the Duke of Wellington be arrested, but his arrest will be justified to France, and in their judgment to Europe, by the circumstance of your having 60,000 men in Belgium, whom he is eventually to command."

Your Lordship will, no doubt, have learned from other quarters that the French Marshals, and generally the superior officers of the French army, manifest a disposition to misconstrue the motives for the appointment of Lord Wellington to the Court of France. It forms, unfortunately, a subject for considerable jealousy and irritation; and there can be no doubt that his presence there serves still farther to increase the feelings of irritation towards England which are so widely spread over France.

It is not for me to presume to offer one word to your Lordship upon the universal feeling that would be excited in England by the arrest of the Duke of Wellington. It is sufficient to observe to your Lordship that should my Lord Wellington remain in Paris, this event, or something more dreadful to him personally, though perhaps not more fatal to the interests of his country and of the world, appears to me far from improbable or distant.

The only difference of opinion that can exist upon this serious subject can arise only from a difference as to the degree of danger in which the Duke of Wellington stands; for as to the existence of danger I presume there is no difference. The view I take of it is formed from information received from sources acknowledged by most in Paris to be authentic, and from an attentive observation of the present state of the temper and disposition of various classes of society in France.

If I might presume (without at present entering upon other details of a serious nature connected with this subject) most respectfully to offer any suggestive remedy to your Lordship, I would, with all deference, venture to propose that the Duke of Wellington be immediately called over to England; your Lordship permitting it to be rumoured abroad, and stated in the papers, that Ministers have required his attendance to consult with him on the plan of operations for the ensuing campaign in America, and possibly with the view of sending him thither to conduct the war in that quarter to a happy issue. It appears to me that some such reason being given for his absence from Paris, after the intelligence recently received from America, might be likely to satisfy the Court of France and the other Courts of Europe.

This suggestion I have mentioned only to one person, upon whose discretion the amplest reliance may be placed. It did not occur to me before I left Paris, otherwise I should certainly have endeavoured to ascertain the Duke of Wellington's sentiments upon it. He is, as your Lordship well knows, disposed and ready to submit his own judgment to that of His Majesty's government; and although I have no authority from him to say so, yet I consider it a matter of serious and sacred duty to your Lordship and to my country to inform you that he dislikes Paris, and that the whole routine of ceremony and business there is no less uncongenial to his feelings than it is proved to be unserviceable to the main interests of his country.

I trust that your Lordship will forgive the freedom with which I have presumed to submit any opinion of mine to your Lordship. I rest my justification altogether upon the Duke of Wellington's letter, and on the vital importance of the subject. There is no one who more sincerely and anxiously wishes success to your Lordship's administration than, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient and faithful humble servant,

C. MACAULAY.

The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Fife House, 4th Nov., 1814.

It is most probable that you may not have an opportunity of making any communication of importance to the King before you leave Paris. I will, however, take my chance of such an opportunity occurring; and if it should not, you may leave this letter with Lord FitzRoy Somerset, in order that he may make use of the opinions contained in it if the King of France, Monsieur de Blacas, or any other person in the King's personal confidence should afford him an opportunity of conversing on the subject.

Independent of any recent information, there can be no doubt that a convulsion in Paris, or at least an attempt to create one, is not at all unlikely, considering the number of desperate characters, disaffected to the government or out of employment, who must be at present in the capital.

I think it very desirable, therefore, that the attention of the Royal family should be called to the following precautionary measures. If due regard is paid to them, they may prevent the blow being struck at all; or if it is struck, they may limit the evil effects of it.

The first measure of precaution to which I would call their attention is never to allow a reunion of the whole Royal family in Paris at any one time.

Whatever rash act a few desperate men may be prepared to perform, the purpose never could be fully answered except by seizing the whole Royal family at once. I do not know that there is any one of them against whom there exists particular or personal resentment, and the King, I should imagine, would in this respect be more safe than any other member of the family. The object, therefore, in seizing or destroying him is to seize and destroy the dynasty, and the safety of any member of the dynasty must contribute to the safety of the whole.

The next measure of precaution I would suggest, I took the liberty of mentioning to the King of France on board the yacht the day he sailed from Dover. Let the south of France never be without a Prince. The south of France (with perhaps the exception of La Vendée) is the only part of the country in which there appears to be any sentiment of loyalty. From all accounts there exists throughout the southern provinces a great degree of enthusiasm for the House of Bourbon. This spirit and sentiment should be kept alive by the continual presence of one of the Royal family. If any convulsion should arise at Paris, he should be prepared to raise the Royal standard at once.

If these precautionary measures are attended to, I am persuaded the Bourbons may keep their hold of the country, even though a personal calamity should happen to any one of them.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, very sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

Viscount Castlereagh to the Emperor of all the Russias.

SIRE,

Vienna, 4th Nov., 1814.

I have received the Memorandum* your Imperial Majesty has been so gracious as to transmit to me, with a becoming sense of this additional instance of your Imperial Majesty's condescension and personal favour, to which I attach, Sire, the greater value, as I consider it the strongest proof of your Imperial Majesty's desire still to examine with deliberation the public question to which it refers.

Confiding in your Imperial Majesty's favourable interpretation of the part I have taken, it is a great relief to me to have to observe upon a paper which I consider not as your Imperial Majesty's, but as the argument of the person who is the advocate with your Imperial Majesty of the measures against which I have ventured to reason.

That the judgment of a Sovereign can never be finally concluded or compromised by any suggestion which may through his intervention be brought into discussion, and that the Royal ear is to be considered as always open to the influence of argument, is the particular prerogative to which his subjects are naturally most attached, as being in itself the best security for their interests.

In this view I have again, I trust, not improperly, certainly not without all due humility, presumed to submit some remarks upon the paper in question. If they are written in the freedom of discussion, it is only to bring before the tribunal of your judgment, Sire, the principles upon which I dissent from the writer of the Memorandum; and if any expression of warmth is to be traced in those observations, I entreat your Imperial Majesty will be assured that it has alone been dictated by, I hope, not an illaudable impatience of any statement which could represent me as defective in those sentiments of respectful deference which I owe to your Imperial Majesty.

I am sensible that I am indebted for the indulgence I have presumed to use altogether to your Imperial Majesty's condescension and liberality.

It would be painful to me in the extreme if you thought, Sire, that I had abused it.

But having been encouraged by your Imperial Majesty to submit to you my sentiments on this subject, I feel that I shall best discharge my duty by doing it unreservedly.

I am, Sire, with the most entire deference and profound respect,

Your Imperial Majesty's, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Memorandum.

4th Nov., 1814.

However painful it may be to protract a discussion on such a subject, it is a public duty not to suffer the Memorandum, to which this is an answer, to

* See p. 388.

pass without some remarks, not only on account of the importance of the subject matter to which it immediately relates, but as disclosing maxims of public law perfectly novel in themselves, and subversive of every received principle of confidence and good faith between States.

The writer commences by impeaching the validity of the Treaty of Reichenbach, which he denies to be now of force to regulate the disposition of the Duchy of Warsaw. He does this on two grounds:—1st, that this treaty was “*purement éventuel*,” and that in consequence of the extraordinary successes of the war it ceased to be binding; and 2ndly, that if there was any ground for doubting the soundness of this conclusion, it was removed by the treaty of the 9th September, by which the previous treaty was annulled.

Let us examine under what circumstances and with what views these treaties were made, and ascertain with somewhat more of precision than the writer has manifested what has occurred to annul their provisions, or to place at the disposal of one of the contracting parties, namely, Russia, the rights of the two others without their express consent.

The treaty of the 27th of June was the treaty upon the faith of which Austria, being still at peace with France, bound herself to engage in the war if her mediation failed to effect a peace upon certain principles agreed upon with the Allies.

In determining thus to hazard her existence in the field, Austria stipulated two conditions, both of local importance to her interests and military security. The one was the recovery of her Illyrian provinces; the other was that she should receive a proportion of the Duchy of Warsaw, which had in part been constructed of territories but recently wrested from her own dominions.

There is no cavil as to the nature of the engagement itself; there is no allegation that Austria has forfeited her right under the treaty by any breach of its conditions, either as a mediator or as an ally. There is no suggestion that Austria has, by any act or consent on her part, released her ally from the obligations of this covenant, or agreed to accept an equivalent. On the contrary, it is matter of notoriety that the equitable partition of the Duchy has never ceased throughout the whole period of the alliance to be a matter of anxious and earnest discussion with her ally, as immediately affecting the security of her frontier. What has then deprived Austria of her rights to this specific object? It is said the treaty was “*éventuel*.” “*Eventuel*” upon what? Not upon Austria fulfilling her engagements with good faith; not upon there being the means of giving what was promised; but “*éventuel*” upon this extraordinary principle, that there being more than ample means to satisfy the treaty, a new right accrued to Russia, another party to the treaty, to decide according to her pleasure whether Austria should obtain the object stipulated, or accept, in lieu of it, what Russia deems an equivalent at the opposite extremity of her dominions. It is a new position in public law that the obligations of a treaty shall be equally dissolved and defeated by success and by failure. If Buonaparte had triumphed, the Emperor of Austria would have lost his Polish frontiers, and probably his crown. The Allies prevailed, and he is equally doomed to lose his Polish frontier. On what security will treaties rest, if they can be thus constructively annulled?

But it is said that His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria has received a full compensation in other quarters.

This is not the question under the treaty. The question is, Did the Emperor of Austria, upon due and fair notice, consent to receive it as such? Did he consent, in consideration of an extension of his former possessions in Italy, from the Adige to the Ticino, to relinquish his right under the Treaty of Reichenbach to be protected on the side of Poland? Did the several

Powers who were parties to the Peace of Paris, when assigning the Po as the Austrian boundary in Italy, suppose they were sanctioning an extension of territory on the side of Italy in exchange for a military barrier between Russia and Austria on the side of Poland?

Can it be supposed that the British government was a deliberate party to such a principle? Or that Great Britain, in the honest execution of her avowed system of laying down her conquests for the sake of restoring to the Continent independence and repose, could have either been expected or desired to do so for the purpose of inverting, and not of restoring, the deranged balance of Europe?

If not, the Treaty of Reichenbach is in full force, and it is under the obligations and in the spirit of that treaty the parties are yet to adjust by negotiation their pretensions. The same reasoning applies to Prussia.

But it is alleged in the Memorandum that, admitting the rights as contended for under the treaty of June, these rights were extinguished in the Treaty of Töplitz; that a new disposition was then made, and that the claims of Austria and Prussia upon the Duchy were no longer the same. If it be contended that they rested from that period on a footing less favourable to those Powers, what is the ground for such an assumption? Can it be argued from the then state of the campaign as rational or possible to suppose that Austria would have signed a new treaty gratuitously surrendering in September pretensions to which she had in June, for obvious reasons, attached the first importance? The Allied armies, previous to the 9th of September, on which day this instrument bears date, had obtained important successes before Berlin, in Silesia, and at Culm; but they were still confined within the defiles of Bohemia: Buonaparte was in force at Dresden and on the line of the Elbe, and the fate of the campaign was in suspense. On the side of Italy, General Nugent's first occupation of Triesté did not take place till the 12th of the same month.

If there was no credible motive on the part of Austria for then making such a surrender, it cannot surely be inferred from the mere change in the wording of the article. It will not be contended that "*un arrangement à l'aimable entre les trois Cours de Russie, d'Autriche, et de Prusse sur le sort futur du Duché de Varsovie*" can entitle Russia to exclude Austria from the equitable share the treaty of June gave her under the express word *partage*, or that it can enable Russia to dispose politically of the Duchy without an arrangement to be made in concert with the other Allied Courts.

The obvious meaning and history of that treaty establish conclusively an opposite inference. The treaty of September was not intended to annul or to alter the treaty of June in any of its essential features, but on the contrary to confirm and extend its provisions. The treaty of June had fixed the offensive arrangements of the Allied Courts in the event of the mediation terminating in a war. The treaty of September re-affirmed these, and added to them defensive engagements, with specific stipulated succours, regularly assigned to be furnished by each Power. The treaty of June, in Article 6, covenanted to give effect in case of war by positive stipulation to the Russian and Prussian notes of the 16th May. The treaty of September carried those notes into effect, covenanting the reconstruction of the Austrian and Prussian monarchies "*sur l'échelle la plus rapprochée de celle où elles se trouvoient en 1805.*" If the article stopped here, there would have been no solid ground to contend that, in the event of complete success, and more than ample means being acquired for satisfying the treaty, the choice and allocation of those means were at the arbitrary discretion of the third Power; but as if to mark the reverse, and to evince the unremitting interest attached to the fate of the

Duchy of Warsaw, this was again brought forward as a special object, and the co-ordinate rights of the three Powers to arrange as to its final disposal were again solemnly recognized by treaty.

Where, then, is there to be found, either upon the face of the treaties themselves or in any writer upon the law of nations, a pretence, much less a justification, for this dispensing power (which the writer of the Memorandum attributes to a single Power), in the event of success, to substitute other arrangements in the room of those covenanted by treaties, and obviously on military grounds the most important to the two weaker Powers?

When the argument of frontier is urged, it is met in two ways. Sometimes it is denied that the position of the Duchy in the hands of Russia is menacing to the other Powers, at other times that His Imperial Majesty's known moderation and friendship for his Allies render such a consideration unimportant.

Upon the first point it will be difficult to persuade Europe that incorporating into the contiguous mass of the Russian dominions nearly the whole of those military positions (which Buonaparte studiously severed from the neighbouring states, as the instrument by which, remote from the mass of his own immediate resources, he was to hold both Russia and Austria in check) can be wholly co-operative for such a purpose. If these Powers are to be really independent, and not exposed to an influence which, if not in degree so overwhelming as that which connected the kingdom of Italy and the Confederation of the Rhine with the French empire, is nevertheless in itself a just object of European jealousy and alarm, the claim to have an adequate frontier assigned to them is surely irresistible, and cannot be reasonably combated either by what may be offered to them elsewhere, or by any pressing necessity that Russia can feel, upon a defensive principle, to possess herself of the whole of the Duchy in a military point of view.

The argument drawn from the Emperor's personal character is not less exceptionable. Whatever may be the virtues of the monarch, it is not upon personal confidence or upon the life of an individual that the liberties and security of states should be built.

Such an homage it would be as inconsistent for His Imperial Majesty to receive, as for the Sovereign of another state to pay. Concerns of vital importance such as these must be adjusted upon other and more solid grounds.

Neither can it be expected that the alarms of a Polish monarchy under a Russian dynasty can be at once allayed in the adjacent states either by personal confidence, or even by the proposed guarantee.

The writer of the memoir has informed us, when arguing on the Article of 1797, that with the first war, or even what he calls a change of circumstances, the guarantee, however solemn, is dissolved.

His series of reasoning is that war cancels the guarantee; that successful war justifies demands for additional compensation, and a new partition, consequently further incorporation into the new monarchy under the Russian sceptre of the adjacent Polish provinces, thus supposed to be secured by a guarantee to Prussia and Austria.

The complacency with which this progress is contemplated, and the facility with which the pretensions of neighbouring Powers are to be satisfied, by extending the partitioning principle beyond the pale of Poland to other parts of Europe, are certainly not calculated, should such an authority be unfortunately listened to, to dissipate apprehensions as to the future.

But it is alleged that, admitting the treaties to be still binding, the arrangements intended by Russia with respect to the Duchy of Warsaw will amply and liberally fulfil their stipulations. What these arrangements are is not

specified; but a general description is given of them, founded upon a statistical evaluation of the extent and population of the Duchy of Warsaw, which assigns to it nearly 1,100,000 less than is attributed to it in the reports of the best authority.

The annexed official tables will serve to illustrate the specimen given to us of the writer's accuracy, both as to population and revenue.

The arrangement proposed for Prussia it appears is of a substantive character, whether sufficient in amount or upon military principles can only be judged of upon a more precise specification; but that it should have occurred to the writer to produce the Rayon of Cracovie, and the half of the Salines of Wieliczka, as a satisfaction "*à l'aimable*" of the treaty either of June or September, supposing them different, instead of concurring instruments, is such a condescension in statement as has never before been put forward in justification of any measure.

What? That the Emperor of Austria, having expressly, studiously, and repeatedly stipulated for a concurrent voice as to the future fate of the Duchy of Warsaw, and having repeatedly urged his claims to a participation, with a view to the military security of his dominions rather than to their territorial extension, should be expected to receive in full satisfaction of his rights six square leagues of territory, with a population of 15,654 souls, not affording in point of extent or position the slightest cover to his frontier, can never surely be brought forward as a serious or substantial execution of such an engagement. The substitution of three millions of florins as the Polish half of the revenues of the Salines, instead of three hundred thousand, is another proof with what caution the calculations as well as the counsels of the writer of the Memorandum should be received by the Emperor of Russia when he shall come to decide what, in generosity as well as in justice, he owes to those Allies with whom he has shared the hazards of war, and with whom he must desire to preserve the closest connection.

It would be endless to trace the successive misrepresentations of the paper to which this writer attempts to give an answer, which abound in every page of this Memorandum, or to protest sufficiently against its studied purpose to cover defect of argument by an attempt to represent a frank but respectful discussion of important measures of state as an insinuation against the sacred person of his Sovereign. Such practices can never succeed to effect their purpose with the high personage to whom they have been directed, whose noblest profession has always been to wish to hear the truth; nor can it divert those whom it is meant to embarrass from an unreserved but decorous discharge of a public duty. With this avowal, it will be sufficient to touch upon a few leading instances.

He represents the appeal made to the Emperor's justice and moderation, founded upon the alleged sense of Europe, as a menace and an appeal to arms. The writer well knew that the question between the Allies has never in the most remote degree been reasoned upon a hostile or military principle, but avowedly the contrary; and he also knew that if there was a Power in Europe peculiarly interested in preserving both the peace and the alliance, and which could have no possible interest in the question other than what it derived through the public good, it was that Power on which he has thought fit to reflect; but if he meant to discountenance menace, instead of to sow discord, he might have spared his comparison of the power of Russia with other the greatest states of the Continent combined. His modesty as to the ability of Russia to sustain such a shock as nothing but the fatal revival of a system similar to that which has been so lately overthrown can ever bring upon her, will go but a little way in establishing that the adjacent Powers can

live in security or in peace in the presence of such a military Power when stripped of their frontiers ; nor will Europe feel satisfied with that equilibrium for its daily protection which is stated to require its whole military power to be displaced and put in motion upon every aberration of a particular state from the line of its duty. Is this the species of equilibrium that the author deems it prudent to demand for his master from Europe assembled in Congress?

His charge of exaggeration in the statements of the writer, and particularly in the picture given of the recent acquisitions of Russia, is not less indiscreet. They were not invidiously brought forward ; they were, on the contrary, treated with studied moderation. But when he brings these successive acquisitions into view (constituting more than a powerful kingdom in amount) as mere defensive precautions, he ought to have foreseen the inference that Russia, thus relieved from disquietude on all her hitherto vulnerable frontiers, is not only upon the point of establishing herself in advance of the Vistula, but that she has thus rendered disposable nearly the whole of her military force, and that she can now pour upon the Oder and the Danube at her pleasure those armies which before were either comparatively ineffective, or spread over the extent of an exposed frontier. If Russia has sought for frontier against Turks and Persians, can she complain if Prussians and Austrians should seek for frontier against Russian troops, especially if Russia is hereafter to wield a Polish national army as a new and most formidable instrument of war ? The picture is not exaggerated ; and if the Emperor of Russia desires to cultivate peace, and to make Europe love rather than fear him, it would have become the writer to counsel him to soften by his present arrangements, and not to aggravate, the features that belong to it.

To resume. It is established that the treaties of Reichenbach and Töplitz are concurrent engagements, and at this day in full force ; that Russia has no right to annul or alter their stipulations, or to substitute one object for another, in satisfaction of the claims thereby established, except upon a distinct consent previously obtained from the other contracting parties ; that although the war has furnished ample means of fulfilling the rights of the parties, however it may upon a liberal and generous principle of negotiation with each other afford new and important facilities in their adjustment, that the extent of success does not, however, release any or all of the parties from the duty which they owe to Europe not to aggrandise themselves unduly, either to the subversion of its just equilibrium, or to the unnecessary prejudice of its weaker states. The principle so universally contended for by the writer of territorial compensation for expenses incurred in war, unless qualified in the strictest sense by its bearing upon the general system of Europe, cannot be too strongly condemned.

The great military Powers of the Continent who have triumphed in the war, and especially Russia, to whose security acquisition can be least of all necessary, should recollect that they avowedly fought for their own liberties and for those of the rest of Europe, and not for the extension of their dominion. That it is false as an universal principle that nations have a right in all cases to claim additional territories in compensation for expenses incurred in war, and much less under circumstances that tend to expose the military security of neighbouring and allied states. The peace of the world cannot co-exist with such a doctrine. Besides, accession of territory, although it may satisfy national ambition, seldom fails to bring with it burthens and discontents fully equivalent to its resources. With these principles in view, if the Allied Powers act liberally to each other, and indulgently to other states, they may look forward to crown a glorious war by a solid and lasting

peace, and posterity will revere their names, not only for having delivered by their arms the world from a tyrant and conqueror, but for having restored by their example and by their influence the reign of moderation and justice.

II.

TABLEAU Officiel des Pertes de l'Autriche en Pologne.

	Lieues, 15 au degré.	Population.
A. La Gallicie Occidentale	866	1,202,265
B. Dans la Gallicie Orientale :—		
1. Le cercle de Zamosc	94	185,980
2. Les districts cédés par l'Autriche à la Russie, 1809, dans les cercles de Zloc- zow, Brzezan, Tarnopol, et Zaleczezyk	106	400,000
3. Rayon sur la rive droite de la Vistule, ser- vant d'arrondissement à Cracovie ..	5½	13,783
4. Partie dans les Salines de Wieliczka ..	0¾	1,871
Total	1,072¼	1,803,899

N.B. Suivant l'article 3 du Traité de Vienne du 14 Octobre, 1809, le territoire et les revenus des Salines de Wieliczka appartenaient en commun à S.M. l'Empereur d'Autriche et du Roi de Saxe en sa qualité de Duc de Varsovie. La quote part de l'Autriche dans les revenus des dites Salines monte à peu près à 300,000 florins (profit, net).

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Downing Street, 4th Nov., 1814.

Lord Liverpool will communicate to you the two propositions which are to be submitted to your Grace for your decision. The only point which the government makes is that you do not remain at Paris. I should not, therefore, have been disposed to have added a private letter to my public despatch from this office (which you will only consider yourself as receiving in the event of your having decided to come home, instead of proceeding to Vienna) if I were not apprehensive that my silence might appear a mark of indifference on a question in which I cannot but feel personally deeply interested.

I hope it is unnecessary for me to make any assurances to your Grace on this point. Strongly, however, as I feel it, I must beg you not to allow a sense of military duty to decide your conduct. The question is not whether you ought to accept the command when offered, but whether you think, as a statesman, that, under the present circumstances, not of Paris exclusively, but of Europe, it is better for the Duke of Wellington to go to Vienna or to America.

If you accept the command now, there would arise the great advantage of your being invested with the double character of negotiator and Commander-in-Chief before the rupture of the existing negotiation. But pray decide (I must repeat it), not as a soldier, but a statesman.

I ought to add that I saw Lord Niddry last Monday. He was confined with his wound, which had again opened, and it is certainly out of his

power to accept any active situation at present; and I have heard since that his surgeon cannot give any assurances of his being well, or even materially better, by the spring.

I am, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

[808.]

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 5th Nov., 1814.

General Fagel has just sent to inform me that he is going to send to Vienna a person in whom confidence can be placed, and I take the opportunity of sending you the enclosed letter from Lord Liverpool, and two or three despatches, and of writing you a few lines, which you will receive before the courier will arrive who will leave this on Monday night.

I have this instant had an interview with Monsieur de Blacas. I found him very much displeased at the continued obstinacy of the Emperor of Russia respecting Poland; on which he says that he understands that His Imperial Majesty declared, before he quitted Vienna to go into Hungary, that he considered all matters settled; that he was to be King of Poland, and the King of Prussia King of Saxony; and that he had given Monsieur de Talleyrand to understand that he would not depart from his plan on either of those countries.

Monsieur de Blacas said that the result would be, that the King, and most probably the Prince Regent, would withdraw their ministers from the Congress, declaring they would not acknowledge these arrangements; and that Europe would remain in a feverish state, which sooner or later must end in war.

I again urged him in the strongest manner to have instructions sent to Monsieur de Talleyrand to lay aside all considerations upon small points, and to unite cordially with you in a great effort to produce the union of all the Powers in Europe against the projected aggrandizement of Russia.

Monsieur de Blacas then stated that he considered that there were three great objects for arrangement, Poland, Naples, and Saxony, upon which the King felt an equal interest; and that he did not think your Lordship was inclined to act so directly to effect the views which the governments of both countries professed to have as he had expected, and that he wished that

you should receive further instructions on the subject from home. I told him that he was quite mistaken; that I had not the papers to show him, but could assure him that language could not be stronger than that which you had used both verbally and in writing to the Emperor of Russia to dissuade him from his Polish scheme, which was the foundation of all the mischief; and that you were directing all your efforts to connect the ministers of the other Powers of Europe in the same views and measures with you on this point; that you considered other points as comparatively unimportant, and that, moreover, the ultimate decision of them depended more or less on the decision of the Polish question, which went to whether there should or not be in Europe any system whatever of equilibrium. I reminded him that I had already apprised him that Monsieur de Talleyrand was running after these small objects, instead of looking to that principal one; and he admitted that he was not himself satisfied with his conduct.

He then proposed that Great Britain, France, Spain, and Holland should agree by treaty not to recognize the Polish arrangement, and he pressed this point strongly and repeatedly as being the best mode of drawing with us Austria and Prussia. I told him that all combinations of this description created jealousy, and that the first and immediate effect of such an arrangement would be to separate us from our old Allies.

He gave up this idea; and he went away at last, as he said, convinced that the best method to be adopted was for all to unite for the object of opposing the Emperor's views in Poland; laying all minor points aside, and promising to endeavour to remove from the King's mind the impression that you were not decided in your measures on this point.

In the course of the conversation he again adverted to the notion of increasing their army; but it is quite obvious that this measure is not determined upon, and that I before did not understand him as he intended I should: or, it is possible that he intended to augment the army if I had encouraged the notion.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM FOR HIS EXCELLENCY THE MINISTER
OF MARINE. [809.]
*

5th Nov., 1814.

His Majesty having determined, by his orders issued to the department of the Marine, that the slave trade shall not be carried on on that portion of the coast of Africa which lies to the northward of Cape Formoso, it becomes necessary to take measures for insuring the execution of his benevolent views. The following measures are submitted to the Minister of Marine :

1st. To inform the Governors of the French settlements on the above-mentioned coast of Africa respecting the intentions of His Majesty, and to order them to watch over their execution.

2nd. To despatch one or more men-of-war to that coast, with a view of guarding by sea against any infringement of the same.

3rd. To order that any vessel, &c., detected in carrying on the slave trade in the prohibited latitudes, and captured in the same, shall, together with her cargo, be condemned as a good prize to any of His Majesty's ships, to the troops, or to any authority that may have taken her.

4th. To order that any vessels taken in those latitudes where the trade shall be prohibited, and having slaves on board, shall be considered as having carried on the slave trade in those latitudes, and shall be considered, with her cargo, as a good prize.

5th. To establish in the colony of Senegal, or at Goree, a prize court, for taking cognizance of any infraction of His Majesty's orders on this subject.

6th. To determine on the means of establishing and subsisting such negroes as may be taken on board ships in the latitudes where the slave trade is prohibited, after the manner practised in the English settlement at Sierra Leone.

WELLINGTON.

[810.]

To Colonel Colin Campbell.

MEMORANDUM.

6th Nov., 1814.

1. By my power of attorney of the
I appointed Colonel Colin Campbell and Archibald Campbell
to be prize agents of the army for the captures, &c., made at
Oporto; which powers I propose should be in force.

2. By my power of attorney of the
I appointed Colonel Robe to be the agent for the army for the
recovery of the value of the ordnance and stores captured by the
army between the service at Oporto and the entry into France
in the month of October, 1813; that is to say, from the 1st of
June, 1809, to the 1st of October, 1813.

3. I am desirous of extending the powers of Colonel Robe to
all stores and prize whatever to which the army can lay claim
captured in the same period, and to include the name of
Mr. William Campbell in the same powers.

4. This last arrangement is proposed, however, only as one
for Colonel Robe's convenience; and if Mr. Campbell is ap-
pointed, Colonel Robe is to fix what portion of the profits of the
agency he shall have.

5. I am desirous of appointing Colonel Campbell to be the
Prize Agent for the army for all captures of ordnance, as well
as other articles, from October, 1813, to the close of the war.

6. If Colonel Campbell wishes it, Mr. Campbell's name shall
be included in the same powers; he (Colonel Campbell) settling
the portion of the remuneration which Mr. Campbell shall have.

7. It must be observed that I had originally intended that
Mr. Ogilvie and Colonel Campbell should have this agency;
and I appointed Mr. Ogilvie and Captain Eckersley, the latter
at the desire of Colonel Campbell, to be Commissioners for the
prize captured at Bordeaux; intending to reward Mr. Ogilvie
by appointing him to the agency, and to leave Captain Eckersley
to be rewarded by Colonel Campbell.

8. It appears that Mr. Ogilvie having unfortunately been a
bankrupt, he cannot with propriety be appointed an agent; and
I can't consent that such a deduction from the prize of the
army as 2 per cent. for commission should be taken, besides
5 per cent. for agency.

9. I therefore make the arrangement specified in the 5th,

6th, 7th, and 8th paragraphs of this memorandum, on the condition that of the agency of 5 per cent., 2 per cent. shall be allotted to Colonel Campbell, Mr. Ogilvie, and Captain Eckersley, to remunerate the two latter for the trouble they had as commissioners; and the remaining 3 per cent. to Colonel Campbell, with such proportion as he may think proper to remunerate the trouble of Mr. Campbell.

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

[811.]

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 7th Nov., 1814.

Fagel had no courier to send on Saturday, and therefore you will get my letter of the 5th only by that which will pass from London this evening.

I saw Monsieur de Blacas again last night: he told me that he had repeated to the King what I had mentioned to him on Saturday, and that His Majesty had received with the greatest satisfaction, and gave entire credit to the assurances which I had given him of your determination to give every opposition in your power to the views of Russia, and to endeavour to unite all the Great Powers in Europe against those views.

He told me that orders were to go this day to Monsieur de Talleyrand to direct him to co-operate with you in every way to produce an effectual opposition to the Emperor's Polish schemes, which the King concurred with us in thinking the foundation of all the evil which was likely to result from the Congress at Vienna.

Monsieur de Blacas desired me to assure you that you might depend upon the King's concurrence in your views, and upon his support, and said that if I was not satisfied with what he had said to me, I might see the King, who would give me the same assurances himself.

Both the Palace and I are so much observed, that I thought it better to decline this offer, with which Blacas appeared pleased; but he told me that he could let me see the King whenever I wished it, without its being known.

There is a report in circulation here of Murat's movements in Italy, which are the objects of the speculations of the curious and ill-intentioned with which this town abounds. I take the

truth to be, that Murat has made no movement, but that he has written a kind of threatening letter to an agent he has here, which has been circulated among the disaffected; and the intended movement has, with usual exaggeration, been announced as one that has actually taken place.

You may depend upon it, however, that it will be necessary for the Emperor to watch very closely the conduct of Murat, and to take great care of the tranquillity of Italy.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[812.]

To the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 7th Nov., 1814.

I have received your letters of the 4th, and you will have seen by that which I wrote Lord Bathurst on the same day that I feel no disinclination to undertake the American concern; but to tell you the truth, I think that, under existing circumstances, you cannot at this moment allow me to quit Europe. You might do so possibly in March next, but now it appears impossible.

You already know my opinion of the danger at Paris. There are so many discontented people, and there is so little to prevent mischief, that the event may occur on any night; and if it should occur, I don't think I should be allowed to depart. I have heard so frequently, and I am inclined to believe it.

But I confess I don't like to depart from Paris, and I wish the government would leave the time and the mode at my own discretion. To go to Vienna is a bad pretence; there is no good reason for going; and it would be better to be called to England for a few days to attend the court martial, and afterwards to be detained. It must likewise be observed that to go at all at the present moment is, in the opinion of the King's friends, to allow him and ourselves to suffer a defeat, and we must not do that. I would likewise observe that I flatter myself I am daily becoming of more use to Lord Castlereagh here, and am acquiring more real influence over the government, and it would not answer all at once to deprive him of this advantage. All these considerations induced me to defer performing a promise which I made to Lord Harrowby to write to

you and Lord Castlereagh upon this subject; and I confess that although I entertain a strong opinion that I *must* not be lost, government ought to take care that in withdrawing me they do not afford ground for suspicion that they do so because they apprehend the consequences of leaving me; they must not withdraw me in a hurry, and must not sacrifice the advantages which they would derive in leaving me here a little longer.

I send Lord Castlereagh a copy of this letter with those you have written him.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

I shall expect to hear from you by the return of the messenger.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

[813.]

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 7th Nov., 1814.

I enclose copies of two letters which I have written to Lord Castlereagh. I think we now stand here upon a better footing in respect to influence than we have since the signature of the Treaty of Peace.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

[814.]

MY LORD,

Paris, 7th Nov., 1814.

In consequence of the debates in the Chamber of Deputies on the Emigrants' Estate Bill, and in both Houses on the Civil List Bill, and his usual attendance upon the King, I was not able to see Monsieur de Blacas so as to speak to him till Saturday; when I was quite convinced from what passed that there was no intention of augmenting the army immediately, and that his former conversation on this subject, reported in my despatch of the 25th October, was intended solely to discover what I thought on this measure, even if it can be supposed that it had ever been seriously in contemplation at all. I certainly thought otherwise when I wrote the despatch of the 25th October; but so much time has elapsed since, and nothing has been done,

and from what passed in the recent conversations with Monsieur de Blacas, I am now convinced that no such intention is entertained.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[815.]

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Paris, 7th Nov., 1814.

I have the honour to enclose the copy of a letter from the Minister of Marine, Monsieur Ferrand, relative to the cession of the French colony of Guiana by Portugal, adverted to in my despatch of the 5th instant, No. 62.*

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[816.]

To the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 9th Nov., 1814.

The messenger for England was despatched so immediately after I received your letter of the 4th, that I had not time to write to you upon many of the points which occurred to me upon it.

My safety here depends upon the King's; and although I hear every day of the discontents and of their probable result, and I have reason to believe, from a communication I have had with the Duc d'Orléans, that Blacas is inclined to give more credit to both than he has ever acknowledged to me, and that I don't see what means the King has of resisting the brisk attack of a few hundred officers determined to risk everything, I can scarcely bring my mind to give credit to so infamous a design. It is impossible, however, to conceive the distress in which individuals of all descriptions are. The only remedy is the revival of Buonaparte's system of war and plunder; and it is evident that that remedy cannot be adopted during the reign of the Bourbons. I am quite certain that the population of the country, and even of Paris, is favourable to the Bourbons.

The discontented and dangerous class are the reduced officers and employés civiles, particularly those returned from being

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xii., p. 174.

prisoners of war; and of those the worst, especially in hatred to the English, are those who have been prisoners in England.

I am quite clear, however, that if you remove me from hence, it must be to employ me elsewhere. You cannot, in my opinion, at this moment decide upon sending me to America. In case of the occurrence of anything in Europe, there is nobody but myself in whom either yourselves or the country, or your Allies, would feel any confidence; and yet, for a great length of time, whoever you employ would have to operate upon a system which would be approved only because he who should carry it on would possess the public confidence.

If, therefore, you persist in thinking you ought to remove me from hence, you had better avail yourself of the pretence of the court martial, leaving all my establishments, &c., here; and the duration of my absence might easily be drawn on till the period at which you might see whether you could or not send me to America.

I have already told you and Lord Bathurst that I feel no objection to going to America, though I don't promise to myself much success there. I believe there are troops enough there for the defence of Canada for ever, and even for the accomplishment of any reasonable offensive plan that could be formed from the Canadian frontier. I am quite sure that all the American armies of which I have ever read would not beat out of a field of battle the troops that went from Bordeaux last summer, if common precautions and care were taken of them.

That which appears to me to be wanting in America is not a General, or General officers and troops, but a naval superiority on the Lakes. Till that superiority is acquired, it is impossible, according to my notion, to maintain an army in such a situation as to keep the enemy out of the whole frontier, much less to make any conquest from the enemy, which, with those superior means, might, with reasonable hopes of success, be undertaken. I may be wrong in this opinion, but I think the whole history of the war proves its truth; and I suspect that you will find that Prevost will justify his misfortunes, which, by the bye, I am quite certain are not what the Americans have represented them to be, by stating that the navy were defeated, and even if he had taken Fort Moreau he must have retired. The question is, whether we can acquire this naval superiority on the Lakes. If we can't, I shall do you but little good in America; and I

shall go there only to prove the truth of Prevost's defence, and to sign a peace which might as well be signed now. There will always, however, remain this advantage, that the confidence which I have acquired will reconcile both the army and people in England to terms of which they would not now approve.

In regard to your present negotiations, I confess that I think you have no right from the state of the war to demand any concession of territory from America. Considering every thing, it is my opinion that the war has been a most successful one, and highly honourable to the British arms; but from particular circumstances, such as the want of the naval superiority on the Lakes, you have not been able to carry it into the enemy's territory, notwithstanding your military success, and now undoubted military superiority, and have not even cleared your own territory of the enemy on the point of attack. You cannot then, on any principle of equality in negotiation, claim a cession of territory excepting in exchange for other advantages which you have in your power.

I put out of the question the possession taken by Sir John Sherbrooke between the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy Bay. It is evidently only temporary, and till a larger force will drive away the few companies he has left there; and an officer might as well claim the sovereignty of the ground on which his piquets stand, or over which his patrols pass.

Then if this reasoning be true, why stipulate for the *uti possidetis*? You can get no territory; indeed the state of your military operations, however creditable, does not entitle you to demand any; and you only afford the Americans a popular and creditable ground which, I believe, their government are looking for, not to break off the negotiations, but to avoid to make peace. If you had territory, as I hope you soon will have New Orleans, I should prefer to insist upon the cession of that province as a separate article than upon the *uti possidetis* as a principle of negotiation.

I am sure you will excuse the liberty I take in giving you my opinion on this subject, on which government intend to employ me; but I do so only that we may thoroughly understand each other before I undertake the concern.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

H. Goulburn, Esq., to Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD,

Ghent, 10th Nov., 1814.

After ten days' consideration the Americans have sent us the projet of a treaty, accompanied by an explanatory note. We send it home by the present opportunity, with a request for instructions as to certain parts of it. The part to which we more particularly allude is that which relates to the boundary of Louisiana. To accede to the proposition which the Americans have made of discussing the boundary of Louisiana might be considered as a recognition by us of their right to occupy the country ; and to accede to it with the reservation proposed as to the country beyond the Stony Mountains would be to abandon to their encroachment the north-western coast of America, on which they have already made some settlements. The greater part of their projet is by far too extravagant to leave any doubt upon our minds as to the mode in which it could be combated ; but there is some doubt whether it would be useful to comply with the request of the American Commissioners, and state specifically the reasons which induce us to object more or less to all the articles proposed by them. Such a statement, though not difficult, would be voluminous. We are prepared, however, to do so immediately on receiving your instruction with respect to Louisiana. In case you should consider it advisable for us to give in our specific projet in compliance with the request of the American plenipotentiaries, we send for your consideration a rough draft of what we consider as the substance of our projet. The boundary is not specified, but we will arrange it in strict compliance with our last instruction, or with any other which you may consider it advisable to give us. The want of time alone prevented our completing the boundary article to-day. The American note did not reach us till ten o'clock last night ; and besides the copies which we send you, we have been obliged to send copies also to-day to Lord Castlereagh, which has given us some occupation. By some mistake the bag intended for Lord Castlereagh was sent to us, and ours, it appears, is gone to Vienna : we therefore thought it right to send off a messenger immediately in hopes of catching our bag at Paris, and forwarding Lord Castlereagh's.

You will observe that we have drawn our projet without any reference to the maritime questions and those connected with them. We have thought that it would be more advisable in the present state of Europe not to agitate them. We have therefore not inserted articles in our projet asserting the claims of Great Britain on these subjects, although the tenor of our instructions (by which we are directed to state that if the question is to be mentioned, it must be decided entirely in favour of Great Britain) might appear to require them, provided we comply with the request of the American plenipotentiaries to specify all our demands. Had I time, I could trouble you with many remarks, but I believe they are unnecessary.

Yours ever most truly,

HENRY GOULBURN.

Sir R. H. Kennedy to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

No. 47, Welbeck Street, 12th Nov., 1814.

Upon my arrival in London I delivered the letter at Fife House which your Grace had been so good as to give me for Lord Liverpool, and I was honoured with an audience by his Lordship on the subject of it about three weeks ago.

I beg to be permitted to relate to your Grace the conversation that passed at that interview.

His Lordship observed to me that there was every disposition on his part to comply with your Grace's recommendation in my favour, but he thought it would be more satisfactory to me to receive a reward after the examination of all my Peninsula accounts than at the present moment, and that he would quote one of the most honourable men ever known, the late Sir Brook Watson, who would accept no reward nor enter Parliament until his accounts had been examined and passed.

I begged in reply to assure his Lordship that he would find upon inquiry that Sir Brook Watson's accounts for the campaigns in Flanders are not all passed at this day; that he was made a baronet before his accounts for the expenditure in those countries had been even given in for examination; and that as he had accepted the office of Commissary-General in England upon his return from the Continent, I presumed that he could not at the same time have held a seat in Parliament; that Sir Brook Watson's services abroad amounted to two years and a half on the Continent, and about ten months in America.

In respect to myself, his Lordship would find that all my accounts for the late service in France and the Peninsula, and for every other service that I have been employed upon, have not only been made up, but have been examined by the Audit Office, and that I have not one outstanding account at present. That I have therefore done everything that depended upon me to do, and I trusted his Lordship would take those facts into consideration, and allow me to hope that my reward would not be deferred until the passing of all the Peninsula accounts; a task which does not rest with me to perform. I added that, being under orders to return to Portugal at the end of this month to assist the Auditor-General in his duties, it would be gratifying to me to carry with me some mark of approbation from the Prince Regent for my services under your Grace's command, and painful to me to go back without it, after a knowledge of the honours and favours which have been conferred upon the military and civil officers who had served in the Peninsula under your Grace's command.

His Lordship replied that at all events I could hardly expect that the Prince Regent would make me a baronet singly; that there were other persons under consideration for that advancement also; but a further discussion should take place upon the return to London of the Treasury Secretary, Mr. Harrison.

I then begged to leave with his Lordship a written memorandum to the following effect, and having read it, his Lordship was pleased to express himself very favourably towards me:—

“That I had served upwards of twenty-one years as a commissariat

officer; on five distinct services as head of the department. That I had served in the Peninsula in every year of the late war in that country.

“That all the money I have saved in the commissariat up to the present time does not amount to three thousand pounds. That by way of example to my department, and to show that I would take no advantage whatever from my situation in money concerns, I remitted my money to England invariably *at par*, and by bills upon the Treasury; and which may be at any time ascertained by reference to the Treasury books.

“That by that mode of remitting my money I gave up to the public while I was in the Peninsula full two thousand pounds sterling by the exchange.”

Having ascertained that Mr. Harrison could not, from illness, be removed from the coast for some weeks, I called upon Mr. Arbuthnot a few days ago, on his return to London, and I requested he would do me the favour to say whether the Treasury had any objection to my being rewarded for my services. He said, “No,” and that on the following day he would see Lord Liverpool and remind him of his promise; and that I might state to your Grace that a baronetage would be granted to me.

I must not omit, however, to mention that in a conversation which I had with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, he told me that he had been dissatisfied with me for not paying off all the commissariat bills at Lisbon, which had been so frequently made the subject of complaint to the Treasury by the bill holders; and also for not having sent home to the Commissary-in-Chief all the information that the Treasury had been desirous of receiving from me.

I begged to assure Mr. Vansittart that had the bills been discharged as required by the bill holders, your Grace's operations in the field could not have been carried on; that the commissariat would have been without money, without cattle, without transport at the opening of the campaign in 1813; and the exchange in all probability at 86*d.* instead of 72*d.* per milree.

That I was not aware of having omitted to forward to the Commissary-in-Chief any information that I had been directed to transmit, or that I conceived could be important to the Treasury to be in possession of; and that as my only object was to merit the good opinion of your Grace and the government, it could hardly be supposed that I would intentionally have neglected any part of my duty towards the government.

Mr. Vansittart appeared perfectly satisfied with the explanations which I gave him.

I have now to apologise for having troubled your Grace with this long letter; but being full of gratitude to your Grace for your kindness to me upon all occasions, and for the confidence reposed in me in the execution of my public duties in the Peninsula, I feel most anxious to prove to your Grace that I have never been unmindful of those obligations, and that the Lords of the Treasury have had every reason to be satisfied with my conduct.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,

Your Grace's most obedient and faithful servant,

R. H. KENNEDY.

The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Fife House, 13th Nov., 1814.

I received at the same time your two letters of the 7th and 9th instant,* and have communicated them to the Cabinet.

We are all as anxious as ever for your leaving Paris without delay, though we have not thought it right to give you an official order for this purpose.

We are not insensible to some advantages which might arise from your remaining there at present, but we cannot allow ourselves on public grounds to place them even for a moment in comparison with the dangers to which you are exposed, if the information we have now received from so many quarters can be credited.

With respect to the ground for your removal, the Court Martial on Sir John Murray would not, in our judgment, answer the object, as it cannot be instituted till the arrival of the officers who have been sent for from Spain, and they cannot be expected for five or six weeks.

The command in America would give general satisfaction here, and would appear at Paris sufficiently to account for your not returning. It would not be necessary that you should leave this country for America immediately. Your departure might be deferred partly on account of the season and partly on account of the state of the negotiation. If the negotiation should end satisfactorily, the command will of course cease; if, on the other hand, it should terminate unfavourably, your sailing might still be delayed till the months of February or March; and if the course of events should render your continuance in Europe at that time necessary, we should have sufficient ground for making some new arrangement as to the command in America.

Your appointment therefore to the command in America does not render your going there by any means necessary, if it should hereafter be judged inexpedient; but it is the best ground for getting you from Paris at this moment, and it may have an advantageous effect upon the negotiations at Ghent.

With respect to those negotiations, we are waiting anxiously for the American *projet*. We consider the question as quite open to us; and without entering into particulars now, I believe I can assure you that we shall be disposed to meet your views upon the points on which the negotiation appears to turn at present.

Upon the question of the Lakes in North America, we are fully aware of the importance of establishing a naval superiority upon them. Every effort is making for that purpose, but it is impossible to give any decided opinion as to the result, as it must depend upon the exertions which the enemy are capable of making, especially in building and equipping; and it must always be recollected that they are close to their resources, and we are at an immense distance from ours. If I were to give an individual opinion on this subject, I should say that there were some of the Lakes on which I think we ought to be able to acquire and maintain a decided superiority, and that there were others on which we could not expect to

* See pp. 422, 424.

maintain that superiority permanently, even if it were possible to acquire it. For example, I should say that Lake Champlain was so conveniently situated with respect to the United States, with the populous province of Vermont on one side and that of New York on the other, that the Americans ought to have the means, even with ordinary exertions, of increasing their force more rapidly than we could increase ours, considering the scanty resources of Canada, and the distance of Canada from Great Britain. On the other hand, they have not the same advantages with respect to Lake Ontario, and it is understood that we can build larger ships at Kingston than they can build at Sackett's Harbour. If therefore our superiority were once decidedly established on this lake, I think we ought to be able to maintain it. You may depend, however, upon every exertion being made in this branch of the service which is practicable, and no means would be withheld which you might think it important to propose for this purpose.

If after having considered, however, all that I have said about the command in America, you are still of opinion that it is not the best ground on which you can rest your departure from Paris, and any other reason should appear to you to have fewer inconveniences attending it, we have no objection to your availing yourself of that reason, whatever it may be. We only beg that you would let us know what it is, in order that we may be ready, immediately on your arrival, to assign it as the cause of your return to England.

I cannot, however, avoid again repeating that whatever may be the ground which it may be proper to assign for your quitting Paris, we shall not feel easy till we hear of your having landed at Dover, or, at all events, of your being out of the French territory; and in leaving the precise time and mode of departure to your discretion, we most earnestly entreat you to return to England with as little delay as possible.

The necessity and nature of any communication to the French government, previous to your departure, must be left entirely to your own discretion; but we are of opinion that your intention of leaving Paris should be as little known there as possible before it is actually carried into execution.

Believe me, &c. &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Foreign Office, 13th Nov., 1814.

I have the honour to transmit to your Grace the accompanying copy of a despatch to Lord Strangford, written in conformity to the request of the French government, contained in your Grace's, No. 64, of the 7th instant, on the subject of the surrender of the colony of Cayenne, by the Portuguese authorities, to the person charged to receive the same by His Most Christian Majesty.

I am, with great truth and respect, my Lord,

Your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Earl Bathurst to Viscount Strangford.

MY LORD,

Foreign Office, 13th Nov., 1814.

I have the honour to transmit to you, for your Lordship's information, the accompanying copy of a despatch from his Excellency the Duke of Wellington, together with its enclosures, by which you will perceive that the French government have requested the Prince Regent's interference with the Court of Portugal in order to procure the early restoration of French Guyana in pursuance to the 8th and 10th Articles of the Treaty of Paris. I have therefore to request that your Lordship would use your best endeavours with the Prince of Brazils for a compliance with the wishes of the French government in this respect, and that His Royal Highness would be pleased to direct that the necessary orders might be issued from the Brazils with the least possible delay, in order that His Most Christian Majesty's servants and forces sent from France immediately after the ratification of the treaty should be received at Paris, should obtain possession of that colony upon their arrival; and as the occupation thereof was only postponed till these ratifications should have been received, owing to the desire of doing what would be agreeable to the Court of Portugal, I trust you will experience no difficulty in obtaining this concession from the Prince Regent of Portugal, particularly as the season is now fast approaching at which it is necessary that the colony should be occupied, and that it has been represented that a more protracted delay would be attended with very serious inconvenience.

I am, &c.,

BATHURST.

H. Goulburn, Esq., to Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD,

Ghent, 14th Nov., 1814.

When I wrote on Friday I had not time to say half what I had intended respecting the American projet: I hope therefore you will excuse my troubling you now. The projet, I think, evidently shows that we shall have no peace with America unless we accede to their proposition of placing things upon the same footing, in point of privileges as well as rights, as they stood when war was declared, to which I presume we are not ready to accede. If even they were to consent to cede Niagara and Michillimackinac, which I think improbable, the fisheries would still be a point upon which we should split. If you concur with me in opinion that our insisting on either of these propositions will break off the negotiation, the question to be decided will be merely upon which of the two it would be most advantageous to us to break off. I am inclined to think that the fisheries would be the point upon which we should have the country most with us, and which would only interest one half of the American people.

With respect to the particular articles of the projet (if you decide upon our answering them specifically), it appears to us that it would be proper to object in toto to all those articles of which the object is the appointment of Commissioners for the settlement of disputed points (not on the real ground, which is, that the Americans always cheat us, but) on the

ground that the plenipotentiaries on both sides are more competent to decide such points, more especially as most of them can only be settled by compromise; that we are ready to discuss those points, but that we consider it inexpedient to leave open at a peace any question which might tend to revive past differences. We would, however, except from this objection the third article of the projet relative to the Passamaquoddy islands only, because that article is inadmissible altogether, because it raises a doubt as to the title of Great Britain to a part of Nova Scotia, which we are prepared to prove is as much a part of the British empire as any spot on which the Americans have not encroached. Commissioners for the mere purpose of ascertaining the geographical position of certain places, if disputes should hereafter arise (such as the head of the Connecticut river, &c.), do not appear liable to the same objection.

If we go into discussion as to the boundary of Louisiana, it would be most desirable to have the map of Canada as claimed by the French in 1760, which was given up to us on the surrender of that province, and which must be somewhere in the office.

The maritime articles will of course be met by us in the mode pointed out in our instructions, by refusing to enter into the subject at all unless it be decided in our favour altogether. We are, as I believe I mentioned on Friday, anxious to know whether we ought not to advance in our projet the articles which we mean to insist upon if the subject is agitated, and to state in our note the grounds upon which we bring them forward.

The proposal of indemnifying America for captures made by us previous to the war is inadmissible on every ground. I think we might safely promise to pay them whenever France has satisfied their demands. In not requiring a specific indemnity for the loss sustained at Washington they have a little disappointed us, and have, with some dexterity, concealed their real object under an article apparently reciprocal. It is open to us, however, to express our regret that the disavowal of the acts of the American officers in Canada was not accompanied at the time by an offer of indemnifying the sufferers, as this might have prevented the necessity of recurring to measures of retaliation; but as every effort has been made to prevent the retaliation from being disproportionate to the object it had in view, we do not think it necessary to enter into discussion as to the degree of injury sustained by each party, which circumstances render it very difficult to estimate accurately.

I send you the boundary article which was omitted in our projet. The projet will also want an article ceding to Great Britain Niagara and Michillimackinac, which we withdraw. Might not we find some island in Lake Huron or Superior to give for Carlton Island? There seem to be many islands there to us perfectly useless.

Yours ever most truly,

HENRY GOULBURN.

The Duc de Bouillon to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

Bagatelle, Jersey, 15th Nov., 1814.

I had but a day or two before taken leave to address your Grace my most respectful thanks for the condescending interests your Excellency had shown in recovering and securing the ancient independence of the small sovereignty of Bouillon, when the faithful Godard acquainted me that the orders were at length given by the French government for its liberation from the despotic douanes that so heavily oppressed its population; on which information I could not refrain again importunating your Grace, with a repetition in mine and their name of the unbounded gratitude we can never cease to feel for your Grace's successful interposition, without which our appeal to justice would, we are confident, have been without avail.

I beseech your Grace to believe in the profound and grateful respect with which I am, and ever will be,

Your Excellency's obliged and very faithful obedient humble servant,

D'AUVERGNE, Duke of Bouillon,
Vice-Admiral, &c. &c.

[817.]

To the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 16th Nov., 1814.

I received this morning your letter of the 13th, and will make immediate arrangements for quitting Paris. These will take some days, and I shall not announce to the King, or, of course, to any body else, my intention till I shall be quite prepared to put it into execution. I shall be obliged to you, therefore, if you will say nothing upon the subject till you will hear farther from me.

No man is a judge in his own case; but I confess that I don't see the necessity for being in a hurry to remove me from hence.

There is nothing new of any description. They have news here from Vienna to the 7th. I have not seen Monsieur de Blacas, but Monsieur de Jaucourt told me yesterday that he understood that the Emperor of Russia was willing to restrict himself in Poland to the line of the Vistula, and that the King of Prussia was disposed to depart from his pretensions in Saxony.

The King and Royal Family have been this night at the Comédie Française, and were remarkably well received.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

W. Wilberforce, Esq., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

Near London, 16th Nov., 1814.

It cannot be necessary for me to state to your Grace with how much joy I received the intelligence of the actual issuing of the French prohibitory order, which, having been out of London, I learned from your Grace's obliging letter of the 4th instant, when on my return to town. I know not why it did not reach me sooner, for I am assured that it was brought to my house, during my absence, only on Sunday the 13th instant. I only mention this to account for my not sooner returning your Grace, as I now beg leave to do, my most cordial acknowledgments for your most obliging attention to me. And permit me to congratulate your Grace on this bloodless victory, which, if less dangerous in the achieving of it, will have, I trust, the same effect as your other victories, and to at least as great an extent, that of rescuing mankind from oppression and violence, and of enabling them to live in the enjoyment of the comforts of social and domestic life. I will continue to attend to your Grace's suggestion, of the propriety of which indeed I am fully sensible, and to impress it on others, though for my own credit's sake I must say that I dare not engage for the prudence of all the friends of our cause, whom, however, I have really been able to keep in order (if to your Grace I may venture to use such a phrase) better almost than I had expected. I will continue my best efforts.

May I avail myself of the opportunity of writing to your Grace to take the liberty of begging to be permitted to introduce to your Grace's notice a young man, a friend of mine, who is passing through Paris shortly, on his way to the south of Europe, for his health's sake. He is grandson to the late Lord Barham, whose title and estate he will inherit after his mother's death, as at his father's the estate of the Earl of Gainsborough. He inadvertently neglected before he left London to furnish himself with proper letters, and has written to me to beg me to obtain for him a recommendation to your Grace's protection. I am aware that I am by no means warranted to render him this service, but happening to be writing to your Grace, I hope I shall not have presumed too much on your Grace's kindness to me by naming him. His name is the Honourable Charles Noel.

Begging pardon for detaining your Grace so long,

I remain always, with great respect and attachment,

My Lord Duke,

Your Grace's most obliged servant,

W. WILBERFORCE.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

[818.]

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 18th Nov., 1814.

The report that I am about to quit my situation has been published in the English, and copied from them into the French newspapers, and has created so much anxiety here that I think

it worth sending you another messenger. Those who know the state of affairs consider my departure as a defeat. Those who do not, and the public in general, consider it as a sign that the two countries are not on such good terms as they ought to be, or as they really are. Those who do not believe the report consider it as fabricated by the disaffected.

I really don't like the way in which I am going away. To take me away eventually is quite right, as I entertain no doubt, from many circumstances which have come to my knowledge, that my presence here is disagreeable to many; and there is in Paris such a confusion of ideas regarding right and wrong, so many enormous crimes have been committed in the last twenty years, and are either passed unnoticed or are considered as services and virtues, that I entertain no doubt that if I were deprived of the King's protection I should be detained, and that this measure would be justified by some sophistry or other, and approved by the nation at large. But we must not disgrace ourselves by the manner in which we get ourselves out of the situation in which we are placed. We must not act with precipitation. There is really no evidence of danger, excepting general discontent; and you are going to get yourselves and your friends here into difficulties long before there is any necessity for it.

I have already told you that I have no objection to going to America, and I will go whenever I may be ordered. But does it not occur to your Lordship that, by appointing me to go to America at this moment, you give ground for belief all over Europe that your affairs there are in a much worse situation than they really are? And will not my nomination at this moment be a triumph to the Americans and their friends here and elsewhere? It will give satisfaction, and that only momentary, in England; and it may have the effect of raising hopes and expectations there which, we know, cannot be realized.

Then I beg to observe that if once appointed to go to America, your Lordship will not find it so easy to take me from that employment for any other on which you might prefer to employ me.

I declare it appears to me that we are proceeding on this occasion with a precipitation which circumstances do not at all justify, and that we shall get into disgrace and difficulties which a little patience would enable us to avoid.

Sir John Murray is now here, and he might be ordered to continue his journey to England; and as soon as arrived the court martial might be ordered to assemble, and I might be ordered to attend it. My establishments, &c., might remain here. The government and their friends would soon find that they could go on without me, and would be under no alarm on my first departure, as they would expect my early return. But to be called away at an hour's notice to go to America, and then not to go for four months, does betray so clearly the motive for withdrawing me, and my departure will be so much felt, that I cannot avoid making this one more effort to persuade the government to alter the mode of their proceeding.

I must say that I feel my own character a little concerned in this transaction, and I hope, therefore, that the government will allow their object to be accomplished in the way with which I shall be the least dissatisfied.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Fife House, 18th Nov., 1814.

I trust this letter will not find you at Paris. I confess I am anxious for your leaving it on all accounts. The dangers to which you are exposed have become matter of conversation within these few days, and I should be very sorry that you had not left Paris before the inhabitants of that capital had any idea that it was your intention to do so, and had time enough before them to take precautions either for preventing your going or for stopping you on the road.

We have heard nothing from Lord Castlereagh since the 24th of October.

The Navy in Canada have made serious charges against Sir George Prevost. They say that they never would have attacked the American fleet at anchor off Plattsburgh if he had not promised to attack the fort at the same time; that if he had fulfilled his engagement, the misfortune to the fleet would not have occurred; and if even the fleet had been obliged to capitulate, it might have been retaken if the fort had been captured, as it was some hours before the Americans, in their crippled state, were able to take possession of the British ships.

There are not many letters yet arrived from the officers of the Army, but one which I have seen appears to corroborate, at least to a considerable extent, the accusation of the Navy.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, very sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Fife House, 18th Nov., 1814.

I send you a copy of my last letter to the Duke of Wellington. There has not yet been time to hear from him in reply, but I trust no farther difficulty will occur respecting his leaving Paris; and the knowledge that he is to have the command in America, if the war continues, may be expected to produce the most favourable effects. We have under our consideration at present the last American note of their projet of treaty, and I think we have determined, if all other points can be satisfactorily settled, not to continue the war for the purpose of obtaining or securing any acquisition of territory.

We have been led to this determination by the consideration of the unsatisfactory state of the negotiations at Vienna, and by that of the alarming situation of the interior of France. We have also been obliged to pay serious attention to the state of our finances, and to the difficulties we shall have in continuing the property tax.

Considering the general depression of rents, which, even under any corn law that is likely to meet with the approbation of Parliament, must be expected to take place under such circumstances, it has appeared to us desirable to bring the American war if possible to a conclusion.

From what has passed in Parliament on this subject it is quite evident that the continuance of the war upon what is called a new principle would be violently opposed: besides, you are probably aware that it is the Duke of Wellington's opinion that no material military advantage can be expected to be obtained if the war goes on, and he would have great reluctance in undertaking the command unless we made a serious effort first to obtain peace without insisting upon keeping any part of our conquests.

Our parliamentary campaign has hitherto gone on very well, but the Opposition are particularly raucorous, and evidently mean to find us good employment. We shall most probably be able to adjourn about the end of the first or beginning of the second week in December, and we can carry our adjournment, I think, to about the 7th of February.

I still hope that you may be able to settle all that is material before the end of January.

I ought to apprise you that there is a strong feeling in this country respecting Saxony. The case against the King appears to me, I confess, to be complete, if it is expedient to act upon it; but the objection is to the annihilation of the whole of Saxony as an independent power, particularly considering the part which the Saxon troops took in the operations on the Elbe.

Considering the prominent part which Saxony has always taken in the affairs of Germany, it would certainly be very desirable that a *noyau* of it at least should be preserved, even if it were under some other branch of the Saxon family; and I am fully convinced that the King of Prussia would gain more in character and influence by agreeing to such an arrangement than he would lose by any reasonable sacrifice which he might make for this purpose of territory.

We have no despatches from you later than the 24th of October, but we

perfectly understand that the uncertainty in which affairs might stand in the first days of November may have led you to defer writing till you could afford more light as to our future prospects.

LIVERPOOL.

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

[819.]

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 19th Nov., 1814.

I enclose copies of two letters which I have written to Lord Liverpool, from which you will see how the matter stands regarding my departure. I think government are rather in a hurry ; and though I feel no particular wish to remain here, I don't like to be frightened away. There is nothing new. Blacas told me last night that, according to their last accounts from Vienna, matters appeared improved. He said that he did not think you had yet reason to be quite satisfied with Monsieur de Talleyrand, but he hoped that his recent letters would produce an improvement.

You'll see that matters look a little angry in parliament.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Note by Sir James Mackintosh on Mr. Barrett's communication respecting the Papers of James II. sent by Mr. Bagot, at the desire of his Grace the Duke of Wellington.

19th Nov., 1814.

It appears from the minute attested by M. Daunou that, among other property of the English Benedictines at Paris, there were taken from them by the officers of government, in the year 1794, three small wooden cases, said to contain "the Correspondence of the late James Stuart." Whether this name denotes King James II. or his son does not appear from the minute. The papers spoken of by Mr. Fox, and seen by Mr. Macpherson, Mr. Carte, Sir John Dalrymple, Mr. Hume, and many others, in the custody of the Scotch College at Paris, were not correspondence of James II., but a journal of the life of that Prince written by himself, in nine or eleven volumes, and a narrative of his life collected chiefly from the journal by an anonymous writer about the year 1767, in four volumes, folio. The journal is said by Mr. Fox, and generally believed, to have been destroyed at St. Omer's in 1793. Two copies of the narrative are in Great Britain ; one in the hands of Bishop Cameron, another in the library of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, among other Stuart MSS. procured for him from Rome, which he was graciously

pleased to permit me to peruse at Carlton House in the summer of 1813. Among these papers I read an original deed of James II., executed a year before his death, by which he conveys to the Scotch College at Paris the MS. journal of his life.

This journal, which thus certainly appears to have belonged to the Scotch College, is the great object of historical curiosity and interest. But the correspondence of James II., or even of his son, may be of considerable importance to history. It seems undoubtedly to have been the property of the English Benedictines; and having been taken from them in times of lawless violence, they appear indisputably entitled to restitution on every principle of justice. The accompanying papers prove the unjust seizure of these papers, but they contain no evidence of their subsequent history and present situation. Mr. Barrett, however, states that he has such evidence, though he does not particularise it.

J. MACKINTOSH.

[820.]

To the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 21st Nov., 1814.

I have received your letter of Friday, and have read the comments in the newspapers upon my supposed return, which might as well have been omitted. They render it more than ever necessary to proceed with caution in withdrawing me.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[821.]

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Paris, 21st Nov., 1814.

I have received intelligence that orders have been issued that the semestriers should join the regiments forthwith, by which the effective army will be very considerably augmented.

I have not yet been able to ascertain whether this measure is to be attributed to the desertion which had taken place to a very great amount, or to the desire of being able to assume and to support the assumption of a higher tone in the Congress; but it is certain that it has given occasion to the expectation of the renewal of hostilities, and to the conversations and discussions which attend such expectations.

The discontents of the army are still very prevalent, and the reduced officers are as loud as they have ever been in their complaints.

General Dufourgues has been sent from Paris to the Château de * . I believe that I informed your Lordship of the real cause of his arrest in my despatch of the 3rd instant, notwithstanding that various other causes have been assigned for it since that period.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Emperor of Russia to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Vienne, le 21 Nov., 1814.

Ayant pris connaissance du mémoire† que vous m'avez transmis en dernier lieu, j'ai jugé nécessaire qu'il y fut fait réponse, tant pour refuter quelques assertions peu solides qui s'y trouvoient consignées que pour donner une nouvelle preuve de la pureté de mes intentions, et de l'invariabilité de mes principes.

J'espère, my Lord, que cette envoi fera la clôture de cette correspondance particulière, vous priant de faire passer vos papiers d'office par la voye habituelle.

Recevez l'assurance de ma considération très distinguée.

ALEXANDRE.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

MEMORANDUM.

Le second mémoire Anglais, plutôt que de simplifier les questions et de faciliter le rapprochement des opinions divergeantes, paroît tendre à prolonger une discussion qui, en s'écartant des vues qui l'ont motivées, devient polémique, et ne peut conséquemment promettre aucun résultat.

Cet écrit, par contre, a pour but de la terminer. Sans répondre donc d'une manière circonstanciée au mémoire mentionné ci-dessus, on se bornera à rectifier quelques assertions qui y sont consignées, et qu'on ne saurait admettre sans manquer à la justice et sans méconnaître la vérité.

Créer des suppositions pour les combattre, ce n'est pas discuter. L'auteur du mémoire suppose à la Russie des intentions qu'elle n'a jamais eues.

Ce n'est pas à elle seule qu'elle réserve la décision du sort du Grand Duché de Varsovie. C'est conformément aux principes d'une stricte équité, c'est de concert avec les puissances alliées qu'elle désire le régler, et c'est ce dont il s'agit maintenant.

Dire que le Traité de Reichenbach n'est qu'éventuel, ce n'est pas prétendre qu'on le considère comme nul et non-venu, mais c'est lui donner son véritable caractère.

En effet cette transaction est éventuelle, parceque seule et dans un sens absolu elle ne pouvoit dans aucun cas régler tous les intérêts qui résultent des succès de la guerre, et des événements postérieurs.

Ce traité a été conclu au moment où l'on ignoroit encore si Buonaparte ac-

* Blank in manuscript.

† See p. 410.

cepteroit la médiation offerte de l'Autriche. Il la rejetta, et le traité du 19 Septembre fut conclu au fort de la guerre. Les succès des armes des alliés donnant lieu à de nouvelles combinaisons, l'article relatif au Duché de Varsovie fut stipulé dans des termes plus généraux, du consentement des mêmes puissances qui avoient participé à celui de Reichenbach.

Si Buonaparte eut accepté la médiation de l'Autriche, si les armées alliées avoient été obligé de s'arrêter sur l'Elbe, si l'Italie, la Hollande, et le Bas-Rhin étoient demeurés au pouvoir de la France, alors le Traité de Reichenbach, modifié par les circonstances mêmes, eut dicté des combinaisons nouvelles, et produit des effets différentes. Une semblable modification nécessitée par l'état des choses aurait dû avoir lieu dans toutes les hypothèses, attendu que la proportion des dédommagemens à prendre et les limites à tracer dans le Duché ne se trouvaient nullement déterminées dans cette stipulation, et qu'il étoit aussi juste qu'indispensable de modifier ces proportions selon les résultats de la guerre. Mais il y a plus : l'histoire de la diplomatie fournit plus d'un exemple de traités qu'une des parties contractantes ne considéra pas comme obligatoires à cause d'un changement total des circonstances.

L'Angleterre elle-même, en se fondant sur ce principe, se crut autorisée à ne point exécuter celui d'Amiens. La Russie est bien loin de vouloir se restreindre à la force de cet argument. Elle ne s'écarte point des stipulations, et c'est, au contraire, en suivant fidèlement les maximes qui ont présidé à toutes ses transactions politiques depuis le commencement de la guerre qu'elle ouvre aujourd'hui une discussion libre sur les acquisitions qu'elle croit juste de conserver.*

Ces maximes étant le résultat de l'expérience fixoient irrévocablement la règle de conduite que l'Empereur s'est imposé pour parvenir au grand but de délivrer l'Europe du joug qui l'opprimoit, et de rétablir conséquemment un système politique fondé sur la justice et sur un équilibre solidement combiné.

La justice établissoit pour règle immuable de toutes les transactions entre les états coalisés, que les avantages que chacun d'eux seroit appelé à recueillir du triomphe de la cause commune devoient être proportionnés à la persévérance de leurs efforts et à la grandeur des sacrifices.

La nécessité d'un équilibre politique prescrivait à son tour de donner à chaque état une consistance et une force relative capable de placer la garantie des conventions politiques dans les moyens que chacun d'eux auroit eu lui même pour les faire respecter.

C'est en se conformant invariablement aux deux principes qui viennent d'être énoncés, que l'Empereur se détermina à faire la guerre, à la soutenir seul dans son commencement, et à la pousser, moyennant une coalition, jusqu'au terme unique où la pacification générale de l'Europe pouvoit être fondée sur les bases solides et inébranlables de l'indépendance des peuples, et des droits sacrés des nations.

La barrière de l'Oder une fois franchie, la Russie ne combattoit plus que pour ses alliés, pour augmenter la puissance de la Prusse et de l'Autriche, pour délivrer l'Allemagne, pour sauver la France des fureurs d'un despotisme, dont elle portoit seule tout le poids à la suite de ses révers.

Si l'Empereur avoit fondé sa politique sur les combinaisons d'un intérêt particulier et exclusif, lorsque l'armée de Napoléon rassemblée pour ainsi dire aux dépens de l'Europe eut trouvé en Russie son tombeau, Sa Majesté auroit pu faire la paix avec la France, et sans s'exposer aux chances d'une guerre dont l'issue étoit d'autant plus incertain qu'elle dépendoit des déterminations d'autres cabinets sans imposer à son peuple de nouveaux sacrifices, se con-

* Ci-jointe une annexe contenant la réfutation des notions statistiques du Memorandum sur le Duché.

tenter d'une part de la sûreté acquise pour son empire, et de l'autre acquiescer aux conditions que Buonaparte, instruit par une triste expérience, se seroit empressé de lui proposer. Mais l'Empereur, dans l'entreprise magnanime à laquelle il s'est livré, se servit de l'élan généreux de son peuple pour seconder les vœux de toutes les nations Européennes. Il a combattu pour une cause à laquelle se rattachent les destinées du genre humain avec des vues désintéressées. Fidèle à ses principes, Sa Majesté a constamment travaillé à favoriser les intérêts des puissances ralliées à la cause commune en ne plaçant les siens qu'au second rang. Elle a prodigué ses ressources pour faire prospérer leurs efforts réunis, dans la ferme persuasion que ses alliés, loin de trouver dans une conduite aussi pure des motifs de reproche, lui sauroient gré d'avoir subordonné toutes les considérations particulières à la réussite d'une entreprise qui avoit pour but le bien général.

C'est pour réintégrer le système d'un véritable équilibre politique, c'est pour frayer des voies régulières et légitimes aux stipulations dont il doit être le résultat, c'est pour le faire reposer sur la base solide de la force réelle et intrinsèque de chacune des puissances, que la Russie s'est fait une loi de ne point anticiper sur les dispositions d'une pacification générale, tandis qu'il n'eut tenu qu'à elle de faire valoir ses droits sur un pays conquis par ses armes, sans aucune coopération étrangère. La Russie par contre s'abstint constamment de toute démarche arbitraire, et ajourna tout projet d'agrandissement légitime jusqu'au tems où ses alliés auroient eu la juste mesure de la puissance qui leur seroit échue en partage, et lorsque tous les états de l'Europe, rentrés dans la plénitude de leur indépendance, viendroient traiter de leurs intérêts, et contribuer par leurs suffrages à la juste conciliation de ceux des Alliés.

Il est hors de doute qu'en envisageant cette conduite dans la pureté des intentions qui l'ont dictée, aussi bien que dans les résultats qui en sont le fruit, Sa Majesté, vu la confiance sans bornes qu'elle place dans ses alliés, ne peut que s'applaudir d'avoir choisi pour énoncer et motiver ses justes prétentions l'époque actuelle où les Alliés étant mis à même d'obtenir des accroissemens considérables de puissance, sous le rapport territorial, militaire, commercial, et politique, ne peuvent légitimement contester à la Russie celui qu'elle réclame, non dans la vue d'augmenter ses ressources, mais comme un poids nécessaire dans la balance du système Européen.

Il suffira de jeter un coup-d'œil rapide sur les accroissemens de puissance relative réservés à chaque état en particulier, pour donner à cette vérité tous les caractères de l'évidence.

La puissance de la Grande Bretagne embrasse tout le globe. Elle domine l'océan, s'étend sur toutes les côtes maritimes, et se fonde sur l'irrésistible nécessité des communications entre les hommes. L'Angleterre possède dans l'Inde quarante millions de sujets, donne la loi au continent Américain, exploite la mine inépuisable du Levant, retient toutes les clefs de la Méditerranée, et sa puissance maritime et commerciale, par suite d'une révolution destructrice, ne rencontre nulle part, et n'a point à craindre de rivaux. Enfin, les rapports avec la Hollande ainsi que le recouvrement de l'Electorat d'Hanovre donnent à l'Angleterre une nouvelle prépondérance directe dans les affaires du Continent.

L'Autriche va étendre son sceptre et son influence sur la plus belle moitié de cette Allemagne couverte des mines de ses anciennes institutions. Elle est délivrée du fardeau que lui imposait une stérile suprématie. Elle possède ces belles contrées de l'Italie qui ne furent conquises que par les forces réunies de la grande ligue, sous les murs même de Paris. Elle réunit à son vaste territoire les provinces Illyriennes, qui la rendent maîtresse de l'Adriatique, et lui assurent une influence prépondérante dans la Turquie Européenne. Par sa po-

sition actuelle en Italie elle se voit en mesure de donner la loi aux royaumes de Naples et de Sardaigne, d'influencer puissamment la Suisse, et de maintenir contre la France la barrière des Alpes.

La Prusse recueille la partie septentrionale du grand héritage de l'empire Germanique, et consolide son pouvoir sur la Vistule, l'Elbe, et le Rhin.

L'Allemagne va reprendre une consistance politique qu'elle n'a jamais eue, et qu'elle doit en grande partie aux progrès de l'esprit de ses peuples, et à des institutions qui les réunit en corps de nation.

La France, circonscrite par les excès d'une ambition colossale, sans marine et sans commerce, n'a pour elle que la sagesse de son gouvernement. La Péninsule, épuisée et occupée d'une lutte funeste avec ses propres colonies, ne présente aucun point d'appui. Il reste à considérer la Russie. Quels sont les agrandissements de sa part qui menacent le repos de l'Europe, ou plutôt quel est le point d'appui sur lequel elle puisse se fonder, pour être sûre que la loi de l'équilibre ne sera pas enfreinte à son égard? Est-ce l'acquisition de la Finlande et de la Bessarabie qui peut autoriser des appréhensions de cette nature? Ne pourroit-on pas demander au contraire si c'est l'Allemagne ou l'Italie qui peuvent la rassurer sur les projets hostiles d'une puissance quelconque, qui tenteroit de se prévaloir des nouveaux avantages qu'elle vient d'acquérir? Il y a plus. La Russie pourroit-elle se flatter d'une parfaite sécurité dans son intérieur si elle n'obtenait pas une bonne frontière militaire, et surtout si elle abandonnait encore au désespoir et à la séduction les habitans du Duché de Varsovie? Il est d'un intérêt majeur pour la Russie de mettre un terme à toutes les inquiétudes des Polonais. Comprimées ultérieurement elles réagiroient un jour sous une influence étrangère, et cette réaction troubleroit nécessairement le repos de la Russie et de tout le Nord. L'expérience vient à l'appui de cette observation.

Enfin si à cet aperçu rapide de la situation respective des puissances on ajouterait l'évaluation rigoureuse et statistique de chacune à cette grande époque, nul ne pourroit contester de bonne foi à la Russie un agrandissement que la justice, le maintien de l'équilibre en Europe, et sa tranquillité intérieure reclament d'un commun accord.

L'auteur du mémoire, entraîné par la vivacité de la discussion, semble ne plus apprécier l'état d'indépendance et de bonheur auquel l'Europe est parvenue, et avoir oublié la situation désespérée de laquelle le continent est sorti.

On ne saurait non plus partager l'opinion émise que la Grande Bretagne n'eut pas voulu consentir à renoncer aux îles Françaises des Antilles, contre les grands avantages déjà acquis, ou à faire toute autre restitution de ce genre si elle avoit pu prévoir que la Russie obtiendrait une plus grande part du Duché de Varsovie, qu'elle ne croit devoir lui revenir.

On est au contraire dans la conviction que s'il falloit recommencer, l'Angleterre (même avec la certitude que tout le Grand Duché appartiendrait à la Russie) ne balanceroit pas pour soustraire l'Europe du despotisme qui l'asservissoit de sacrifier encore une fois le superflu de ces immenses colonies. Tous les autres états de l'Europe auroient certainement embrassé le même parti, s'ils étoient menacés de retomber sous le pouvoir d'une nouvelle dynastie créée par la révolution.

On a remarqué avec la plus vive satisfaction l'énergie que l'auteur du mémoire a déployée en plaidant les droits des nations. Il resteroit à désirer que cet élan pour un objet d'un aussi grand intérêt n'eut pas été accompagné d'un mouvement d'impatience. On n'en doit pas moins juger favorablement sur le fonds des sentiments du Cabinet Britannique, et l'on en tire un heureux présage pour la prospérité et le repos futur du monde.

S'il étoit possible que tous les états Européens se replaçassent spontanément

dans la situation où ils se trouvoient, si toutes les acquisitions qu'ils ont faites et les changements qu'ont dû subir nécessairement leurs relations politiques pouvoient être considérés comme non avenus, il est hors de doute que l'Empereur de Russie eut été le premier à donner l'exemple des plus grands sacrifices pour contribuer à ce grand résultat. Mais cette hypothèse paroît contraire aux dispositions des autres états. La Grande Bretagne elle-même seroit appelée à des restitutions importantes. On lui demanderoit des concessions qu'elle auroit sûrement beaucoup de peine à accorder, quelque essentielles qu'elles pussent être au bien général, et à l'indépendance véritable des nations dans leurs rapports extérieurs.

Ainsi plutôt que de plaider vaguement la cause des principes du droit public Européen, il paroît préférable de travailler dans l'état actuel des choses à assurer aux nations les avantages relatifs auxquels elles ont des droits, et au moyen desquels on peut plus raisonnablement espérer une paix et une concorde fondée sur l'aptitude à la maintenir entre les grands états. On finira par observer que l'intervention d'un médiateur dans toute discussion est sans doute à désirer, et peut devenir salutaire, toutes les fois qu'elle sert à rapprocher les esprits. Dans le cas contraire il est préférable de laisser aux parties intéressées le soin de débattre leurs différens, et de s'expliquer entre elles surtout lorsque une intimité et une confiance réciproque constitue le principe le plus actif de leurs négociations.

Le véritable caractère de conciliateur convient sans doute éminemment à la Grande Bretagne, et ses ministres, en le soutenant dans toute sa pureté, pourront rendre les plus grands services à la cause de l'Europe et de l'humanité entière.

II.

21 Nov., 1814.

Il est connu jusqu'à quel point l'on peut faire fond sur des tables statistiques : leur validité n'est jamais complète ; et celles que citent le Mémoire Anglais n'ont pas droit à plus d'authenticité que celles qu'il veut combattre.

Cependant l'auteur a été fortement induit en erreur par les sources qu'il a consultées relativement au revenu des Salines de Wieliczka, qui peut se vérifier avec plus de certitude que d'autres objets de statistique. Les budgets annuels du Duché sont connus, et on pourra y trouver la preuve que le gouvernement de ce Duché, ayant le monopole de la vente du sel, en retiroit annuellement jusqu'à neuf millions de florins de Pologne de revenu net. L'Autriche, en vertu d'un contrat de ferme conclu pour huit ans, fournissoit au Duché 450,000 quintaux de sel, et elle avoit déjà reconnu que cette quantité ne répondoit pas à la moitié des salines appartenant au Duché, d'autant que de nouveaux travaux pouvoient considérablement augmenter l'exploitation annuelle de sel, dont le gouvernement du Duché pouvoit pour sa part reprendre l'administration. Conséquemment la somme de 3,000,000 de florins d'Allemagne n'est rien moins qu'exagérée ; surtout quand on y ajoute le revenu des fondières de souffre de Swortzowice.

Pour ce qui est de la population, dont les calculs ne sont pas également faciles à vérifier, l'on peut affirmer, sans avoir recours à un déguisement dont on n'a nul besoin de se servir, que d'après l'état actuel de ce Duché, et avec les cessions que l'Empereur est disposé à faire, il ne gardera dans ce pays que deux millions et quelques cent mille âmes au plus.

III. *Tableau*

III.

Tableau des Possessions de la Russie en Pologne.

La Russie possède de l'ancienne Pologne les gouvernements de—

	Population.
Mohilow	795,000
Witepsk	745,000
Minsk	890,000
Wilna	816,000
Grodno.. .. .	546,000
Volhinie	1,158,000
Podolie.. .. .	1,197,000
La Courlande	405,000
Par le Traité de Tilsit une partie du cercle de Bialystock	162,000
Par le Traité de Vienne, en 1809, dans la Galicie Orientale	400,000
Total de ses possessions actuelles ..	7,114,000
Elle réclame de plus la plus grande partie du Duché de Varsovie, dont la population monte à	4,334,600
Ce qui porterait les acquisitions de la Russie en Pologne depuis 1772 à moyennant ce que serait donné à la Prusse ou à l'Autriche	11,448,600
La Prusse ne possédait en Pologne, après la paix de Tilsit, que—	
1. Dans la Prusse Occidentale.. ..	376,089
2. Dans la Lithuanie	365,851
	741,940
L'Autriche, après la paix de Vienne, 1809, dans la Galicie Orientale	2,962,400
Tous les Etats Polonais comprennent par conséquent aujourd'hui une population de	15,152,940

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Vienna, 21st Nov., 1814.

I send you, under a flying seal, my diplomatic budget since I last wrote. You will trace some indications of light on the horizon, but we must not too sanguinely calculate upon a change of substance because our intercourse has assumed a more becoming exterior. However, it is something to find that we are allowed to treat, and not bound to receive the Emperor's pleasure as law.

I cannot sufficiently express to you my thanks for your most useful and seasonable co-operation. You have succeeded in rendering the French influence here much more accommodating; and if I have not been able to bring the Prince de Talleyrand to the point of common exertion, His Highness has been to me personally most obliging and conciliatory, and has ceased to thwart me as he did, possibly unintentionally, at first.

The day after I received your letter of the 7th, Prince Talleyrand called on me when I was from home. I happened to dine with him that day, and we fixed an interview for the following morning. As my hopes of Prussia had considerably abated, I could not give him much assurance of the progress I was making. I gave him the general outline of the state in which things were, and endeavoured to draw from him his ideas upon the future conduct of the negotiation. He spoke apparently with openness, his mind always returning to the old notion of urging Austria to finish the Polish question as well as she could, and then to turn the whole combination upon Saxony. In judging of the correctness of Talleyrand's reports to his government of my conduct, it is but fair to observe that I have not deemed it prudent to disclose to him my operations in detail, finding that he was not always discreet, and that I should lose useful influence in other quarters if I was understood to be in too close confidence with the French minister. I have endeavoured, however, to treat him with all possible regard, and to keep him generally informed of my endeavours to promote our common objects. He is become infinitely more accommodating in our general conferences than at the outset.

It sounds incredible, if it is not a proof of Talleyrand's systematic reserve, that he should treat the notion of any agitation at Paris as wholly unfounded.

Happening to hear of General Dufourgues' arrest from Prince Hardenberg, I inquired what the fact was upon the authority of the Prussian reports, without quoting yours. He said the Emperor of Russia had been circulating such a story at a ball the night before, but he gave it no credit; at least he assured me that he had letters from the King, from M. de Blacas, and M. Jaucourt, from the 4th to the 9th inclusive, none of which mentioned the subject. His Highness did not, however, succeed in quieting my apprehensions on this point, however silent I was on the subject of them to him.

I need not express to you how deeply I enter into them, and how anxious I must feel that the decision with relation to them may be for the best. Your devotion to the public service does you the greatest honour.

Ever, my dear Lord, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LIVERPOOL,

Vienna, 21st Nov., 1814.

You may wish to receive, in a private letter, such speculations as to the possible turn of matters here as I can send you.

With respect to the Polish question, you must always combine it, to a certain degree, with that of Saxony, as Austria can ill afford to be foiled on *both* these points. The failure of Prussia to execute the concert as arranged, naturally threw back the negotiation between the two Courts into the state of embarrassment from which I had laboured to extricate it. Austria no sooner saw, or thought she saw, that she was abandoned by Prussia, than her disposition to resist the Saxon arrangement revived. It

is the deliberate opinion of many of their officers, and, I may add, ministers, that, rather than have the Russians at Cracovie and the Prussians at Dresden, they had better risk a war with such support as they can get.

Whether this is a sound opinion is another question ; but, in point of fact, the war tone was much augmented amongst the Austrians immediately subsequent to the receipt of Prince Hardenberg's memorandum, and I have reason to believe that a dislocation of their troops was ordered in consequence.

Prince Metternich told me that, in his interview with Prince Hardenberg, he had opened himself unreservedly, and declared to him that no Austrian minister could sign a treaty giving way on Poland, Saxony, and Mayence ; and urging him to modify his views on Saxony, arguing the impolicy of attempting to extinguish totally that monarchy, against the declared purpose of France and the prevailing feeling of Germany.

I need not trouble you with the various arguments which I understand have been brought forward on the present critical state of the negotiation. It is enough to give you the opinions of the two chiefs. Prince Hardenberg told me last night that he thought it would end in an arrangement, and that Prince Czartorinski had promised him to urge the Emperor to make some concessions. Prince Metternich gave me the same opinion, and added that he felt assured that Prussia would listen to modifications on the Saxon arrangement, to which his Court attached the greatest importance. I give you these two opinions as the best, indeed the only means I possess of forming a judgment, stating at the same time that both these ministers are sufficiently sanguine in their mode of viewing things. I think this question must now be brought to a decision, one way or the other, in the course of a few days.

Should these ideas be realised, you may calculate upon an immediate progress in matters here. I have not deemed it prudent to push the Prince of Orange's interests to a decision at present, considering the territory on the left of the Meuse to be secured by the Treaty of Paris, without any pretence to claim a surrender of his hereditary possessions in Germany. Under these circumstances it is better not to discuss the open question of military frontier beyond the Meuse till we know what is disposable. I consider the projet of giving Luxemburgh to Bavaria as *non-avenue*.

The affairs of Switzerland are in progress, but nothing finally decided.

In Italy we have nearly settled the projet for uniting Genoa to Piedmont. You will receive it by the next messenger. Austria seems disposed to restore Parma and Plaisance to the Queen of Etruria, if some compensation can be found for Marie Louise. It has been suggested to charge this upon the Legations, and to restore the remainder, being the greater part, to the Pope. If this is agreed to, we must try to make the restoration of Olivença to Portugal the condition of Parma, &c., being restored. There will then only remain the point of Naples to decide, on which question France and Spain will press for a decision, but they will not object to take it last. I consider the Ionian Islands as a point to be reserved for decision, in connection with the final winding up of all arrangements, not only in Italy, but elsewhere.

The Emperor's illness is an erysipelas, brought on by over-fatigue and cold. He has danced without intermission the whole night, and almost

every night, since he came to Vienna, in the hottest rooms, and been on horseback early the following morning. The disorder will probably confine him for ten days or a fortnight.

Believe me to be, my dear Liverpool,

Ever most sincerely yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

London, 21st Nov., 1814.

I have this moment received your letter of the 18th;* and as the government can have no idea of urging you to do anything which is contrary to your feelings, and repugnant to what you consider as due to your character, I have only to desire on their part that you will use your own discretion both as to the time of your leaving Paris, and as to the reason avowed for your departure. Though we cannot refrain from looking at your present situation with the greatest anxiety, we shall be perfectly ready to approve and support your determination, whatever it may be.

I would not lose a moment in returning an answer to your letter, and I therefore avoid entering into particulars on this or any other subject at this time.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

To Baron Marchand.

[822.]

A Paris, 22 Nov., 1814.

Le Duc de Wellington a eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre de S.E. Monsieur le Baron Marchand du 8 Novembre, contenant les réclamations des Sieurs Bouillon et La Forte, Cebot et Fuel, pour le fourrage, la viande, et le vin, qui resta à leur charge après le passage des troupes Anglaises au mois de Juin.

Le Duc avoit déjà reçu des représentations à cet effet des Sieurs Cibot et Fuel, et de St. Samie, boulanger, et il avoit chargé le Commissaire-Général attaché à cette colonne de lui communiquer tous les renseignemens possibles sur la justice de leur demande.

Le Duc a maintenant l'honneur de remettre à S.E. Monsieur le Baron Marchand les comptes des Sieurs Cibot et Fuel, et en même temps de lui transmettre le rapport qu'il a reçu de Monsieur Boys, qui fera voir à Monsieur le Baron que ses réclama-

* See p. 435.

tions et celle de St. Samie ne sont pas bien fondées, et que les fournisseurs furent instruits par le Commissaire qui parcouroit la colonne du nombre des rations de provisions et de fourrage qui seroient requises.

Quoique la réponse de Monsieur Boys paroît décisive sur toutes les demandes qu'on peut offrir de cette espèce, le Duc, désirant montrer à ces individus qu'il ne refuse pas à leur demande sans en avoir raison, a envoyé à Monsieur Boys les comptes des Sieurs Bouillon et La Forte, et le moment qu'il reçoit sa réponse il s'empressera de la transmettre à S.E. le Baron Marchand.

[823.]

To the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 24th Nov., 1814.

I have received your letter of the 21st, and I am very glad that you have thus decided. Since I wrote to you I have received several intimations of the injury which would result to the Royal Family from my departure, but none of them, nor their ministers, have said one word to me on the subject. I likewise heard yesterday that it was reported I was about to depart, as I entertained apprehensions for my personal safety. In a little time these reports will be forgotten, and you may depend upon my taking the earliest opportunity of quitting Paris.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will take an opportunity of contradicting the reports which have been published in all the newspapers, as if by authority, that I have been ill treated by the King and his Ministers, and that I am on bad terms with the Marshals. Nothing can be more unfounded. It is impossible to be on better terms than I am with the King and all his family, and his Ministers, Marshals, &c.; wherever I go I am treated with the greatest attention; and the eagerness of all descriptions of persons to come to this house is astonishing. However, there is no doubt that I ought to be withdrawn, and I'll go as soon as I shall think I can with credit to the government and myself.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Vienna, 25th Nov., 1814.

I send my report home of such events as have passed since I last wrote.

I add a copy of my correspondence with the Emperor of Russia, to remain with you in case you should wish, through Monsieur de Blacas, to afford to the King this proof that, whatever may be the issue, I have not failed to do my best.

I have allowed Prince Talleyrand to peruse these papers, and he may probably have spoken of them to his government. I should be glad if His Majesty, if he sees them, were informed in what manner the correspondence arose, and that it was the close, and not the commencement, of a long intercourse upon the subject to which it has reference.

Believe me to be ever, my dear Lord, very sincerely yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD,

Vienna, 25th Nov., 1814.

The insinuation with which the Emperor's last memorandum closes, that the intervention of Great Britain in the questions pending between him and his allies had not been conducted in the true spirit of mediation, induces me to trouble you with a few observations on this subject.

If the correspondence which has taken place had been the first and only description of proceeding on this subject, the observation might have been just; but the fact is, that almost from the period of my arrival at the Allied head-quarters in January last I have, at the instance of the two Allied Courts, been employed to endeavour to prevail upon the Emperor more precisely to explain himself, and to adopt a course with respect to Poland less alarming to their interest. That this task was performed in a manner sufficiently conciliatory to His Imperial Majesty is evident from the manner in which the Emperor has always received me; but that it was wholly abortive to its object is also proved from this simple fact, that the memorandum in question is the very first instance in which the question has been rendered, on the part of Russia, avowedly one of negotiation.

In all my interviews, as well as in the first paper received from the Emperor, it was treated as a question upon which Russia was alone to pronounce. His Imperial Majesty's language uniformly was, "Je donnerai ce qu'il faut à la Prusse, mais je ne donnerai pas un village à l'Autriche. J'ai conquis le Duché, et j'ai 480,000 hommes à le garder." Having, in successive interviews during the campaign, at Paris, in London, and in two long audiences since His Imperial Majesty's arrival at Vienna, employed in vain every conciliatory representation to place the question upon a footing to which a mediation could be applicable, it appeared to me that the only remaining hope was to try so to place the argument upon the treaties before him and upon the general aspect of his decision, as to awaken his mind to a sense of the possible consequences to which his conduct might lead.

I was aware that this might place me, as the Prince Regent's Minister, on a less satisfactory footing with the Emperor, and render my position less available for purposes of mediation ; but where there appeared nothing upon which a mediation could be built, this was, comparatively, a small inconvenience ; whereas, in giving to my representations a more decided and more earnest tone, my *appui* became the more authoritative for Austria and Prussia to found a negotiation upon.

Whatever may be the result, I am confident the Emperor would never have submitted himself to a negotiation at all if this course had not been adopted, but would have stood firm upon the despotism of his military tenure. The fruits that may result from this concession may be small or none, but it is something to bring him down in doctrine to a level with other Powers ; and although, from my experience of His Imperial Majesty's character, I expect nothing from his friendship to his allies, and as little from his generosity or his sense of justice, yet I still hope for something from his fears. The general sentiment of dissatisfaction and alarm occasioned by his conduct is becoming too strong and too universal to be any longer a secret from him. It exists extensively amongst his own subjects, and I have reason to believe that this fact has not been concealed from him. Under these circumstances, and profiting by the reflections for which his illness has afforded an occasion, perhaps His Imperial Majesty may moderate his pretensions ; in which case, with all the motives for peace that present themselves, and the danger of a new war arising out of a speculative rather than an actual danger, it certainly will not be my disposition to push him to extremity upon the conditions. The moral advantage of gaining something against such lofty pretensions is not inconsiderable in itself : it may give a check at the outset to a career to which passive submission might have added an additional impulse. If Prussia and Austria could have taken a tone of authority together, I should have thought the precise terms obtained of still less importance. I am afraid His Imperial Majesty has now ascertained the subserviency of one of his allies, and will presume upon it.

Believe me to be ever, with great truth, my dear Lord,

Very sincerely yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

H. Goulburn, Esq., to Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD,

Ghent, 25th Nov., 1814.

I received to-day, within a very few hours of each other, your three letters of the 21st and 22nd. I need not trouble you with the expression of my sincere regret at the alternative which the government feels itself compelled by the present state of affairs in Europe to adopt with respect to America. You know that I was never much inclined to give way to the Americans : I am still less inclined to do so after the statement of our demands with which the negotiation opened, and which has in every point of view proved most unfortunate. Believing, however, in the necessity of the measure, you may rely upon our doing our utmost to

bring the negotiation to a speedy issue; but I confess I shall be much surprised if the Americans do not, by cavilling and long debate upon every alteration proposed by us, contrive to keep us in suspense for a longer time than under present circumstances is desirable.

Had we never mentioned the subject of the fisheries at all, I think that we might have argued the exclusion of the Americans from them on the general principle stated by Sir W. Scott and Sir C. Robinson; but having once brought forward the subject, having thus implied that we had (what Lord Castlereagh seemed really to have) a doubt of this principle, having received from the American plenipotentiaries a declaration of what they consider to be their right in this particular, and having left that declaration without an answer, I entirely concur in your opinion that we do practically admit the Americans to the fisheries as they enjoyed them before the war, and shall not without a new war be able to exclude them. I ought to add, however, that Dr. Adams and Lord Gambier do not agree in this opinion. You do us but justice in supposing that, without positive instructions, we shall not admit any article in favour of the American fishery, even if any such should be brought forward by them: indeed, we did not at all understand your letter, either public or private, as implying any such concession.

It will not be in our power to send you to-night a copy of the note and amended projet which we propose sending to the Americans to-morrow. We have not made any material alterations beyond those pointed out by you. The principal alteration is in the article respecting an amnesty. We thought it better not to ground its inadmissibility upon the mode in which it was worded, because that might operate as an invitation to propose some article on the subject; whereas by rejecting the article altogether, though in terms less definitive than those applied to the other articles, we give ourselves a chance of their not proposing another, though, in the event of their doing so, we are not precluded from discussing it. In the articles which stipulate for the appointment of Commissioners we have uniformly introduced words to provide for the case of a Commissioner refusing to act, a mode of evasion which the Americans are not unlikely to resort to. The arrangement as it now stands certainly gives a better chance of a fair decision upon disputed points, if it can be carried into effect; but I fear it will be difficult to find any Sovereign willing to peruse the reports of two Commissioners upon such insignificant points, and to decide their differences.

We understand your intention with respect to the Passamaquoddy islands to be that, until the right to them is decided, we should retain possession of them. The Americans will undoubtedly fight hard to get possession in the first instance, and therefore if we have mistaken your intention upon this point, we should be obliged to you to give us an early intimation of it.

It will not be a very easy task to find a proper successor to Sir G. Prevost, nor will the officer who undertakes it have a pleasant situation. The differences which appear now to prevail between the officers of the naval and military service, when added to the system of thwarting and abusing the Governor which has long prevailed in Canada, must impede the exertions of any officer, however distinguished. I am glad that Sir G. Prevost is recalled. The affair at Plattsburgh is to me still unaccountable,

and I am, though perhaps unjustly, disposed to give weight to the charges brought forward by Sir J. Yeo.

I thank you for the article in the 'Times.' The writer of the New York paper writes with more reason and moderation than is usual on that side of the Atlantic. I had till I came here no idea of the fixed determination which prevails in the breast of every American to extirpate the Indians and appropriate their territory; but I am now sure that there is nothing which the people of America would so reluctantly abandon as what they are pleased to call their natural right to do so.

Believe me, my dear Lord, yours ever most faithfully,

HENRY GOULBURN.

[824.]

To the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 26th Nov., 1814.

Sir Robert Kennedy has sent me an account of the conversation he had had with your Lordship and Mr. Vansittart regarding his promotion to be a Baronet, and he has since informed me that he has reason to be apprehensive that he is not to be promoted upon the next occasion at which persons are to be promoted to that rank.

Sir Robert Kennedy has already given your Lordship so many testimonies of his merits that I have nothing more to say upon the subject. It appears that he has given in all his accounts; and I beg to observe that the period of their being passed does not depend upon him, and that it would be hard upon him if his reward were to be withholden when all objections to him by his superiors were at an end, because a defective public arrangement prevents his accounts from being passed.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer does not persist in his objection to Sir Robert Kennedy. If he did, I should say the objection ought to be made to me, who gave Sir Robert the orders under which he acted, and to Lord Bathurst, who approved of those orders.

I hope, therefore, that your Lordship will extend your protection to this deserving public servant.

When I was in England I sent you an application from Mrs. Coghlan, the mother of the late Colonel Coghlan, of the 61st, who fell at the battle of Toulouse. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know whether you can do anything for her.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Fife House, 6th Dec., 1814.

I have received your letter respecting Sir Robert Kennedy. I was in hopes the explanation which I had given to him when I saw him some weeks ago would have satisfied him, but I had since heard from Arbuthnot that he had applied to you again upon the same subject, and I desired Arbuthnot therefore to write to you and explain to you the difficulties in which this application really places me.

I told Sir R. Kennedy when I saw him that I was ready to give him every assurance that as soon as his accounts were passed your recommendation should be carried into effect; but that I felt I was exposing myself, not unjustly, to some degree of censure if a different course was adopted in his instance from that which had been followed in the case of Sir Brook Watson, who had always been acknowledged to have been a most honest and able servant of the public in the same line, and who had himself disclaimed receiving any mark of public approbation for his services until after his accounts had been passed. The difficulties in this respect are certainly not diminished in consequence of a notice having been given in the House of Commons of a motion respecting the Commissariat after the recess; and it has been invariably the rule under such circumstances, even with respect to individuals of the highest character and of the most approved services, to suspend the conferring of rewards until either the motion was abandoned, or that it was brought to some decision.

I must further observe that I understand Sir Robert Kennedy's accounts have been given in, and that, according to his own report, many months cannot elapse before they will be settled.

You will understand that I am not by any means desirous of depriving Sir Robert Kennedy of the honour he solicits. I am, on the contrary, ready to give the most positive assurance in my power that at the proper time it shall be conferred upon him; but I think it would not be creditable to the government, and still less creditable to him, that he should press his pretensions at the present moment.

I enclose a note which my private secretary has received from Mr. Lukin, of the War Office, by which you will see that your recommendation in favour of Mrs. Coghlan was attended to at the time, and a pension accordingly granted to her.

Believe me, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Fife House, 26th Nov., 1814.

I can assure you that it is not to any person connected with the government that you are to ascribe the paragraphs which you have seen in the English newspapers respecting your present situation at Paris. We have been most deeply concerned at these publications; but the truth is, every individual who has recently arrived from France speaks openly on the

subject; and although General Macaulay assured me that he had talked only to one person, in whom he could safely confide, and that I might entirely trust his discretion, I have since had reason to know that he has communicated his apprehensions regarding you to several others unconnected with government, and that his authority is quoted for the truth of some of the statements which have been made public.

The English newspapers will have given you full information of the publications which have taken place in America of the first conferences at Ghent. Mr. Madison has acted most scandalously in making this communication at the time he did; and his letter to the Congress, which conveys the papers, contains a gross falsehood. We have no means of knowing what are the instructions which have been transmitted to the American Commissioners by the *Fingal*, but we sent an answer to their last note and projet on Monday; and a few days will therefore inform us whether we are likely to have peace, or whether the American government will have advanced new pretensions in consequence of the clamour which they have excited throughout the country on account of the demands brought forward by us in the month of August.

We are very much distressed at the last accounts we have received from Vienna. The course which the negotiation has taken is particularly embarrassing. Lord Castlereagh has been substantially right in all his points; but I wish we had not been made so much *principals* in the Polish question. I never thought that question could be satisfactorily settled after it had once become a subject of contest.

If the arrangements respecting the Duchy of Warsaw could have been quietly agreed upon amongst the three Powers, as the result of the Treaty of Kalisch, and of that of the 9th of September, 1813, there need have been no difficulty on the subject. It would in that case have been wholly unnecessary, and, I think, very imprudent, for us to have ever started the idea of Poland or of Polish independency. This question has, however, now been forced upon us all by Russia. It would be visionary to suppose that Poland can really be established, after all that has passed, as an independent country; and we are thus brought practically to struggle for a question of partition, which is always odious in itself, in which we might have acquiesced as the result of former engagements, but for which it is painful to be obliged to contend on any other ground. Whatever may be the result of this question, I sincerely hope, however, that there will be no war on the Continent. It may be quite true that if the Emperor of Russia does not relax in his pretensions, the peace of Europe may not be of long duration; but considering the present state of France, of the Low Countries, and of Italy, I should regard a peace for two or three years as a great blessing. It might reasonably be expected that during that time the revolutionary spirit in those countries would in a great degree evaporate; that the restored Sovereigns would find the means of consolidating their authority; that the populations would return to peaceful habits; and that if a war should then arise, it would not be a revolutionary war, but that it would resemble in its character and effects those wars which occurred in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, before the commencement of the French Revolution.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, very sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Fife House, 27th Nov., 1814.

We have all been very much surprised at the account which has been published in the foreign newspapers of what passed at Dresden in the beginning of this month, upon Prince Repnin delivering over the administration of Saxony to the Prussian authorities.

We understood by your despatch of the 9th October that you had agreed to the provisional occupation of Saxony by Prussia, but that you had consented to the eventual annexation of that country to the Prussian dominions only conditionally; and the conditions on which that annexation was to take place had not certainly at the time to which I refer been complied with.

Even if you had stated your intention of agreeing to the annexation unconditionally, such a communication could only have been confidential till the subject had been brought before Congress, and it was not decent, therefore, that the annexation should be announced as a decided point amongst the great Powers under present circumstances. I have no doubt that this is really a trick of the Russians for the purpose of making their own point of Poland more secure, and, in fact, of deciding it without any reference to the Congress. I submit to you, therefore, whether some official notice should be taken of this extraordinary proceeding of Prince Repnin.

Believe me to be, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

[825.]

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 28th Nov., 1814.

You will see my despatch of this date regarding the seizure of Lord Oxford's papers; which measure, however harsh, was certainly founded upon good information of his Lordship's conduct and conversation, and of the nature of the correspondence of which he had taken charge.

M. de Blacas apprised me confidentially of the intention to seize Lord Oxford's papers before it was carried into execution, and he has this morning expressed the King's desire that I should acquaint your Lordship confidentially of the fact, in order that the Prince Regent might be aware that the King would not have ordered such a measure to be adopted regarding an Englishman without previously acquainting me.

It is desirable, however, that this fact should not be made public.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Besides the papers of Lord Oxford the papers of a M.

Fihadral have been seized, who had letters of very great importance from persons here to persons in Italy.

[826.]

To the Earl of Oxford.

Paris, 28th Nov., 1814.

The Duke of Wellington presents his compliments to the Earl of Oxford. By some accident the letter which the Duke wrote to the French Minister yesterday to request to have an audience on the subject of the seizure of his Lordship's papers did not reach the Minister till 12 at night, and the Duke therefore did not see him till this day. Five o'clock this day is the time appointed for one of the gentlemen attached to the embassy to attend at the police to break the seals upon the papers, and to return to his Lordship those belonging to him; and if the Earl of Oxford will be at the Duke's house at a quarter before 5, Lord FitzRoy Somerset will have the honour of attending him to the Hôtel de la Police.

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Fife House, 29th Nov., 1814.

Having just received the enclosed letter, I think it right to forward it to you. As it furnishes me with no clue for tracing the writer, I am unable to make inquiry into the circumstances which have come to his knowledge on the subject of his communication.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, very sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

[ENCLOSURE.]

"A Loyal Subject" to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY LORD,

28th, Eleventh Month.

Unless Duke Wellington is instantly recalled from France, and in as private a manner as possible, he will be privately assassinated: a plot is forming to complete the horrid deed. Pray lose no time in despatching a messenger to caution him to be on his guard. I dare not say more, as my life is now in danger from my absence. I landed yesterday from France, and have lost no time in communicating to you the intention of the enemies of my good old King. In doing this I think I have discharged a duty I owe to my King and to England for my late protection.

My Lord, your Lordship's most devoted humble servant,

A LOYAL SUBJECT.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Vienna, December, 1814.

By my last letter from Lord Liverpool I find that the Parliament has been adjourned to the 9th of February, as the latest day to which the recess can be extended, it being necessary, before the 25th of March, to renew the Bank Restriction Bill and the Property Tax, upon the latter of which measures they expect to encounter very considerable opposition.

You will perceive from the course of the debates that the Opposition are harassing, especially upon points of foreign politics. Lord Liverpool expects that this game will be pushed with increased vigour after the holidays, if our business here should then be unterminated; in which case it is his opinion, and that of the government, that my return is of importance; and he suggests for my consideration the expediency of my being in England the middle of February, if I see no prospect of closing the whole here within that time.

In order that I may have it in my power to comply with the wishes of my colleagues, I must look to some arrangement without delay to take charge of the conduct of the business here, in the event of its being protracted and of my departure; and I take the liberty of consulting you thus early and without reserve on this subject, as the time will admit of my hearing from you before it is necessary for me to take a final decision upon my movements.

Would *you* feel a disinclination in this case to replace me here? There is no person in whom the government, the public, or myself could feel the same confidence; and as we have hitherto been, in a great measure, conducting the negotiation together, the business would be more familiar to you than to any other person. Should you accept, it would nevertheless be desirable that we should pass a week or ten days here together before my departure.

There is a case, however, that may arise, and upon which I should wish beforehand to know your feeling, viz., that the negotiation on all the important points may be terminated before my departure; but the treaty in all its details may not be perfected, or, if perfected, it may not have been submitted in form to Congress, which will be more a formality (when approved by the eight Powers) than a substantial proceeding. I can well conceive that, although otherwise disposed to lend your assistance, you might not wish to engage in the concern under these circumstances. Pray tell me your feelings without reserve upon this supposition. In the event of your preferring not to come to Vienna in such a late stage of the business, I should leave Clancarty and the two other plenipotentiaries to bring it to a close. In short, if your decision would depend *upon mere remaining points of substance* still in discussion, I will endeavour, as the period approaches, to keep you more precisely informed of the probability of this than I can now attempt to do.

It may, however, be desirable to give you some sketch of the state of our business at present. I consider the Polish question as settled: Prussia never contended it in earnest, and Austria consequently has yielded. The Saxon question is now the only one that is of much difficulty. The point of Naples being one of principle, and not of detail, cannot lead to delay. I should think, if the Prussian possessions were settled, that there would not

be much difficulty in the Prince of Orange's arrangement, or in the other territorial questions. The Swiss Commission will report this week, and that for the north of Italy is in progress. There is another nominated to settle precedence, &c., amongst ambassadors; a second to arrange the navigation upon the Rhine and other rivers; and a third to be charged with the business of the slave trade, as soon as I receive instructions from home on the Portuguese demands. The Genoese arrangement is completed. This will give you a sort of idea of the extent of our concerns. What time they will require, it is impossible yet to calculate. The Saxon point is apparently the only one of much difficulty, or that can lead to serious consequences.

If you should come here, you would, of course, be entrusted with the same latitude of discretion that I now exercise, and the whole conduct of the negotiation be exclusively in your hands. As the chief plenipotentiary, you would find the others useful in matters referred to subordinate commissions to report upon, but they take no part in transactions between Cabinet and Cabinet. I can venture to assure you they will all work most cordially under your orders; and we find that without such means of getting rid of details, hearing Swiss deputations, &c., the time of the Chief Minister would be wholly thrown away. All the other Powers, except Spain, have more than one Minister, and France the same number as Great Britain.

I trouble you with this hasty letter, and shall write further as soon as I can judge of the turn things here are likely to take.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

H. Goulburn, Esq., to Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD,

Ghent, 1st Dec., 1814.

We have been for the greater part of the day closeted with the American plenipotentiaries. The result is stated in our public despatch. Knowing from your private letters the anxiety of the government to have an early and favourable termination of this negotiation, we felt ourselves somewhat inclined to give up the 8th Article of the projet, and with it the free navigation of the Mississippi, more particularly as we had obtained from the Americans the important admission that our right to the navigation of the Mississippi and their right to the fisheries both rest on the footing of a stipulation in a treaty; and consequently if we give up the Mississippi, we have a full right to exclude them from the use of our territory for purposes connected with the fishery. As, however, we had a specific instruction from Lord Castlereagh on the subject of the Mississippi, confirmed more recently by the introduction of that demand into the projet sent lately from home, as we could not find any opening for the exercise of any discretion on this subject, and as we did not understand what were the advantages expected from the free navigation of the river, it was agreed to refer home on this point.

As to the disputed phrase in the 1st Article, I think the Americans

mean to yield ; but we should be equally obliged to you to tell us (if you have not already done so in reply to my private note of the 26th) whether you think it worth insisting upon, as we may be mistaken in our opinion of the intentions of the Americans. They certainly evinced no anxiety to sign the treaty now. We told them that if they would concede the disputed Article, we were ready to sign immediately ; but that if by declining they compelled us to refer home upon that point, we must be understood as not being bound to accede to the Articles already agreed to. This, however, produced no effect, and we therefore await your final instructions.

You will of course consider whether it is most to our advantage to leave out the disputed part of the 8th Article, or the whole of it ; whether we gain more by the definition of our boundary to the north-west than we lose by implying a right on the part of the United States to territory beyond the Stony Mountains, where I do not believe they have a right to an acre. I will only just suggest, in conclusion, that the sooner we receive an answer from home the better, as the American Senate are necessarily dissolved on the 2nd of next March, and their concurrence is necessary to the ratification of any treaty. Allowing, therefore, the time necessary for the ratification in England and for the transmission to America, and calculating the probable delays of a voyage across the Atlantic at this season of the year, there is not much time to lose.

Believe me, my dear Lord, yours ever most truly,

HENRY GOULBURN.

In the Article defining periods for the restitution of prizes, we have varied from the Article in the projet by beginning from the American coast as nearest the place of ratification.

In the event of our signing the treaty, I conclude that you would wish us to send the earliest information to the Duke of Wellington at Paris, and Lord Castlereagh at Vienna. I therefore send home a decayed messenger, with a petition to Hamilton to send us another in his room.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Fife House, 1st Dec., 1814.

You will see that both Houses have adjourned to the 9th of February, which is the latest day to which it was possible to defer our meeting after Christmas, consistently with the state of public business.

Your necessary absence has been the cause of a great deal of inconvenience in the House of Commons, and it is quite essential, therefore, that you should be in your place when we meet again in February. If you think there is any prospect that the business of the Congress can be brought to a conclusion so as to enable you to return to England by the meeting of Parliament, or within a week after, everything may as well remain in its present course ; but if you should be of opinion that the discussions at Vienna are likely to be prolonged beyond the end of January, or the beginning of February, it will be quite necessary in that case that some arrangement should be made for conducting the negotiations on our part in your absence.

In the present state of affairs in Europe, it is quite impossible for any person to do justice to the cause of this country without a full discretion to act for the best, according to circumstances; and such a discretion the Prince Regent and his government would not like to entrust to any individual out of the Cabinet, except to the Duke of Wellington. In addition to this consideration, he is the only person after yourself who could be expected to have any personal authority over the Allied Sovereigns or their ministers, and his name would reconcile the people of this country to arrangements which might be viewed with considerable jealousy and distrust if concluded by any one who did not possess a large share of public confidence.

You will have received copies of the correspondence which has taken place respecting his removal from Paris. If his assumption of the command in America should be rendered inexpedient or unnecessary in consequence of the favourable turn of the negotiations at Ghent, his going to Vienna would certainly furnish the best pretence for his leaving Paris without éclat or offence to the French government. Indeed it would be generally considered as quite natural that the government should appoint the Duke of Wellington to conduct the negotiations at Vienna, if your presence in Parliament should render your return to England necessary.

You will receive this letter about the 14th or 15th of December, and you will then be able to form some judgment of the probable duration of the negotiations at Vienna. If they are likely to be terminated in the course of the month of January, they had better remain in your hands; but if it should be probable that they would be further delayed, we are very anxious that you should write as soon as possible to the Duke of Wellington to inform him of the sentiments of the government and of your own as to the expediency of his coming to Vienna, and of his being there in time to have a full conversation with you before you leave it to return to England.

It is possible that he may come to England on account of the court martial on Sir John Murray, before he receives your letter; but I shall not write to him on the subject at present, as I think it would be better on many accounts that the proposition should in the first instance come from you.

Believe me, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD,

Vienna, 5th Dec., 1814.

I regret that I cannot confirm the expectations I last sent you of an early settlement, founded upon the opinions of Prince Metternich and Prince Hardenberg. I thought them sanguine in their views at the time, and the result has not kept pace with the hopes which had been formed from the Emperor of Russia's professions to both those ministers, as well as to the Emperor of Austria, in a visit he made him immediately upon his recovery.

Looking upon it now as certain that nothing upon an enlarged and liberal scale of policy can be expected, and that the arrangement in its most important feature, as far as the balance of power is concerned, I mean in

the adjustment of frontier between Russia and the adjacent states, must remain both defective and unsatisfactory, my deliberate wish is nevertheless that, having left no effort untried to make it better, we should bring the whole arrangement, subject to this great and obvious defect, if possible to a tolerable close in its other details, rather than risk a contest to meet anticipated danger, and to correct faults that will always more or less abound in all extended transactions of this nature.

Although such is my wish, and although the view of policy on which it is founded will guide my conduct as far as circumstances will permit, yet you must see in the difficulties that surround us how impossible it is to answer for the result, where so many conflicting interests prevail, where larger objects are to be contended for than at any former period, and where all are armed to support their pretensions.

You may rely that, in the absence of instructions, I shall leave nothing undone which I think will promote the public service, and that I shall not be deterred by considerations of personal responsibility from any decision which appears to be called for by an adequate necessity ; but as extraordinary exigencies may arise, and the wisdom of dealing with them may in a great measure, if not altogether, depend on the disposition and ability of the government at home to support a given line of policy, I am the more anxious to receive from you and my colleagues such instructions or suggestions as may assist me in the conduct of my mission.

Upon the existing state of affairs, extremely entangled in themselves, my opinion is, that it may unexpectedly assume a better aspect, but that it may equally lead to a total stagnation, and that it may, as Europe is more extensively armed than at any former period, suddenly end in war.

In the first alternative my task will be comparatively easy, and I shall only have to combine, according to circumstances, the fragments of the arrangement, and to give to it the best form.

In the second supposition, if no general decision should be come to, and the ministers of certain of the leading Powers should absolutely decline to concur in the pretensions of others, I should wish, as far as you can instruct me, to learn the sentiments of the government as to the extent and period of my stay here.

But the object to which I should most wish to draw your attention is to the third case, of actual or impending war ; and to ascertain, if possible, by anticipation, what my province will be, either in endeavouring to avert or, if that shall be impossible, to counteract the dangers with which it may menace our interests.

In the first case it is only a question of absence from my duty at home, the considerations bearing upon which will be best estimated perhaps when we more nearly approach to the period when Parliament must reassemble after Christmas.

The second case is more critical, and by no means improbable, namely, such an adherence, short of war, to their own views, that the leading Powers, remaining armed, may refuse to accede to each other's pretensions, and the Congress terminate either in a general state of provisional occupancy, or in the partial adjustment of particular parts of the European arrangement amongst the Powers locally most interested.

But the most important, and, if we cannot agree upon some general

system, the most likely case to occur is that of hostilities; and where all are armed, and none can long support the burthen of their existing establishments, the chances are that the warfare will be early and general.

Take the case of Russia and Prussia: if they are determined to make common cause on their respective objects, and cannot succeed in prevailing upon the other Powers to acquiesce in their demands, it will not suit the exhausted finances of Prussia to remain long armed and inactive; nor can Russia expose herself indefinitely to the incumbrance of large armies remaining unemployed beyond or on the verge of her own frontier. I think the probability therefore is, that one or both of these Powers, if they do not relax in their pretensions, will provoke rather than procrastinate the war.

If war should, under these circumstances, arise, I think it has every prospect of becoming general in Germany. That France must and will enter into it, I have no doubt; and with Holland, the Low Countries, and Hanover exposed, in addition to the interest we must take in the fate of the Continent, it will be difficult for Great Britain long, if at all, to abstract herself from the contest.

The questions I should then wish you to weigh are, whether we should at once appear as a party in the war, or whether we should rather interpose as armed mediators, if possible to stop the war, or remain inactive till, by an attack on some interest of which we are the immediate guardians, our interposition is rendered indispensable.

In examining the first question I am inclined to be of opinion, that having no duty in point of alliance imposed upon us which the unfortunate divergence amongst our late Allies will not discharge us from, we ought not to contract any new obligations of so serious a nature upon any of the points now in dispute between those with whom we have been recently acting; for however deeply we think that we may trace in them a new danger to Europe, the nation, after so long a war, could not be brought forward with effect in support of a question either of Polish or Bohemian frontier. Our interposition must therefore be, if inevitable, not as auxiliaries to any particular state, but as principals upon some grounds of policy which Great Britain will consider it her duty and interest to maintain.

The first and most popular of all interests perhaps that we could look to is that of preventing war. In this view it deserves consideration whether the sense of our justice and the dread of our arms and resources could at any time, and at what, be brought forward in the shape of an intervention to enforce peace upon the contending parties.

It next deserves to be weighed, whether this attempt, if wise, should be made singly or in conjunction with France. There are many points of view in which the appearance of France at all in the field must be viewed as a danger the most serious in itself; but this will not exclude her from interference; and the question is, what species of interference will render her *marche* the least prejudicial to the interests of Europe, and give the King, in whose probity and honour we may venture to confide, the best means of preventing his army from imposing upon him, when in operation, a line of policy which his principles would naturally lead him to abjure.

I am inclined to think that the best mode in which France could inter-

vene, if this risk must be run, would, in the first instance, be to avoid war; and that, in this character, her intervention might be advantageously combined with ours. The two Powers might truly and powerfully put forward to Europe a coincidence of interests and a similarity of views. Neither have any direct interest at issue before the Congress; both have the strongest and most obvious interest in peace: if such an appeal could be successfully made, every purpose would be answered; if it failed, the connexion of France with Great Britain would bring her into the war as it were associated to an anti-revolutionary policy. It will be a solemn disavowal, at the outset, of her former wild schemes of frontier and dominion; and the army would be taught when taking the field that the King was not again embarking them by degrees in their former views of plunder and spoliation, which might be further guarded against by suitable engagements between the two Courts, in which the Prince of Orange might be included.

If there were any clear and definite principle upon which we might hope altogether to keep out of the war without the incumbrance of remaining armed throughout the period of a protracted contest, the policy of engaging either separately or in conjunction with France in an armed intervention might be more than doubted; but where we are embarked so deeply in the formation and protection of a system in the Low Countries, I can hardly conceive the possibility of our finding ourselves long dispensed from the necessity of maintaining by arms in such a contest either these particular interests or the interests of Europe in the larger sense.

I have suggested the idea of an armed mediation as an expedient short of actual war, because I think there may be an interval after hostilities had commenced during which Great Britain and France might assume this character, to give weight to which the army of the Low Countries and Hanover might be united under the Duke of Wellington on the Lower Rhine, whilst the French army was concentrated on the side of Strasburg. In this situation they might invite other Powers to associate themselves to their object of arresting the war; whilst Austria and Bavaria, whose united means are represented to amount to 600,000 men, would have to bear, if it did explode, the first shock.

I throw out these ideas for your consideration without any formed opinion which I should wish to press upon the adoption of my colleagues.

Believe me to be ever, my dear Lord,

Yours very sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Vienna, 7th Dec., 1814.

You will perceive we make but little way here; as yet I see no real spirit of accommodation; perhaps it is too much to expect that this Congress should differ so much from its predecessors. It unfortunately happens that never at any former period was so much spoil thrown loose for the world to scramble for. If Russia had, in the abundance of her territory, been more disinterested, her influence, united with that of Great Britain and

France, would have made the settlement comparatively easy ; as it is, there is an absence of that controlling authority which is requisite to force a decision upon the ordinary details of business.

The Emperor of Russia is recovered, and, as usual, in the ball-room, which is more popular than the Salle des Conférences.

Ever, my dear Lord, most sincerely yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

[827.]

To the Right Hon. W. W. Pole.

MY DEAR WILLIAM,

Paris, 8th Dec., 1814.

I enclose the 'Times' of the 30th November, with a paragraph marked in it, which contains, in my opinion, an impudent libel upon me, upon which I wish to take the opinion of the Attorney-General, and to order that the editor may be prosecuted, if the Attorney-General should be of opinion that the prosecution would be successful.

The facts are as follows :—King Ferdinand did, on or about the 7th of March, a day or two after he passed the frontier, write me a letter, I being then in Gascony with the army, in which he confirmed all the honours and grants made to me by the Cortes. To this letter I wrote an answer, acknowledging His Majesty's favour.

The King went to Valencia, I being all the time on the Garonne, from which town His Majesty set out on the 4th of May, on which day I was in Paris. He issued his proclamation, dated the 4th of May, against the Cortes, on the 11th May at Aranjuez, when I was still at Paris, and I did not see His Majesty till May 24th, when I arrived at Madrid ; nor had I any communication with him or his ministers, excepting to receive from the Duque de San Carlos, about the 17th of May, the copy of the King's proclamation of the 4th, which I received in the neighbourhood of Tarbes ; and between that and the 24th of May to report to the Duque de San Carlos the measures I had taken to prevent the 3rd and 4th armies from interfering in the internal politics of the country.

I received no confirmation from the King of the honours and grants conferred upon me by the Cortes, excepting that of the 7th of March, which, as it appears by the above statement, was previous to all his measures regarding the Cortes ; and I had

no communication with him excepting to thank him, till a fortnight after these measures were published, and three weeks after they were adopted, and I was at such a distance, and so situated, that it is clear I could not have had any.

As for what passed afterwards between the King and me, or the Duque de San Carlos and me, regarding the Cortes or the persons imprisoned, or any other matter connected with the King's proclamation or conduct, I do not consider myself accountable to the editor of the 'Times.' I contend for it that he has no right to accuse me of having advised or countenanced a line of policy inconsistent with the interests of Great Britain, from the corrupt motive of obtaining a confirmation of honours and grants made to me by the Cortes, and accepted by the consent of my own government.

If I possess any advantages in point of character, I consider myself bound to set the example to others of a determination to prevent the blackguard editors of newspapers from depriving us of our reputation by their vulgar insinuations.

The truth is, I refused to employ a relation of the editor of the 'Times' in my family, and that is the reason he has accused me of corruption; but that is no reason why I should bear it.

Ever yours most affectionately,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Liverpool to E. Cooke, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fife House, 9th Dec., 1814.

I cannot sufficiently thank you for the trouble you have taken in giving me so much information of all that has been passing at Vienna. It has afforded a clue to many of the public proceedings, which I should have found it difficult otherwise to unravel.

The conduct of the Emperor of Russia has not surprised me. He is vain, self-sufficient, and obstinate, with some talent, but with no common sense nor tact. I am strongly impressed with the opinion that this business of Poland will ultimately prove his ruin.

If he detaches the Polish provinces incorporated with Russia from that country for the purpose of forming a Polish kingdom, he never will be forgiven by the Russians. If, on the other hand, he annexes the Duchy of Warsaw to Russia, and considers the whole as a mere territorial question, the Poles will justly reproach him as having deceived them, and they will

become his bitterest enemies. In short, I see nothing but future commotion out of this Polish arrangement, let it now end as it may.

We were happy to find that Lord Castlereagh's last paper had had so much effect, and that the Emperor had lowered his tone, and had begun to admit the subject to be one on which he must condescend to negotiate.

The next accounts will therefore probably bring us some project of arrangement. I hope you will be able to save a part of Saxony. The King of Prussia may, from his great exertions, be fairly entitled to some portion of it, especially if the King of Saxony is to be restored. But I do not like the annihilation of ancient independent states. I am persuaded the annihilation of Saxony would produce the worst moral effects in Germany and throughout Europe. I think likewise the feelings of the King of France on this question ought in some degree to be considered: it is the only great point on which perhaps we may have an opportunity of gratifying him.

When Poland and Saxony are disposed of, I think all the other points will settle themselves without much difficulty, excepting Naples.

If the Great Powers at Vienna had been cordially united in sentiment from the beginning, there might have been some chance of frightening Murat out of Naples with the aid of a compensation. I have no hopes of such a result now. He will have gained both strength and confidence from the known divisions of the Allies; and if I am not misinformed, he is too powerful at Naples to be driven from thence without a great military effort. I cannot wish, under present circumstances, to see that effort made. Such a war would not long be confined to Naples. It would, besides, be very difficult for us to take a prominent part against Murat, however we might wish it, unless we had stronger proofs of his treason than any I have yet seen.

It will be absolutely necessary that Lord Castlereagh should return home by the meeting of Parliament. The Opposition are determined to show no forbearance, and the experience of our short Session has proved that it would be impossible to go on in the House of Commons without some one person who is competent from information to know when answers can be given and when they ought to be refused, and who, from his situation in other respects, commands the confidence of the House.

I am sorry to hear you have been so nervous, but I cannot be surprised at it, considering what you have all had to go through.

I have some idea of going to Bath at Christmas for a fortnight or three weeks, but this must depend on the issue of our negotiations with America, and the light we receive in the interim of your further progress at Vienna.

Believe me, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

The Hereditary Prince of Orange to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Brussels, 9th Dec., 1814.

I send March with this letter, not wishing to trust its contents to the post. The great preparations which are, as much as we can learn, making on the French frontier; the raising of men by offering very large bounties

the calling out the national guard; the nomination of Soult as Minister of War; the transports of horses that continually go through this country; their enticing our men to desert, and their enlisting them, as it is reported, in the regiments *d'étrangers*; and lastly, their having arrested men of the German Legion that were going home on furlough, and forcing them to enter the army; all of which are such warlike proceedings, that I should like to know your opinion about the state of things, and in how far we are to be prepared on our side. Reports from the French side say further, that the corps d'armée is to be assembled about Lille on account of the English wishing to dismember France, and to join the Département du Nord to Belgium.

I thought it the best way to learn the truth by addressing myself to you to know what they mean by their arming, and whether it is likely to be against us here. I know that the British Cabinet, the Dutch, and the French are, to all appearances, on the best terms; but yet do you not suspect the French of playing a deep game, or can we be certain to have them with us should war be declared against some other Power? How long would their preparations take before they could get a formidable army in the field? and what is your opinion as to the point of this frontier which they would most likely attack? It seems to me that the country between Tournay and Charleroi, being the most open, would on that account be the point of attack for the French, unless they might try to turn the whole frontier by the left, where it would at present become the business of the Prussians to oppose them. The right of the frontier line, by the strong places there being in a better state, and the country being more intricate, seems to me the strongest part, or at least most fit to be made so, and would less require the assistance of a strong army, which I think ought to be placed so as to guard the open part between Tournay and Charleroi, or as far as Namur, if one has the means to extend so far.

My dear Duke, for ever yours most truly and sincerely,

WILLIAM, HEREDITARY PRINCE OF ORANGE.

Colborne is going with the 1st battalion of the 52nd to America, and must leave this for England immediately. I am therefore very much distressed for a military secretary; and if you can spare Burgh, and if he does like it, I should wish nothing more than to see this situation filled by him; but I conceive likewise that he would be a loss to you, and wish not therefore that he should accept of the situation without your consent.

For ever yours,

WILLIAM, HEREDITARY PRINCE OF ORANGE.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Fife House, 9th Dec., 1814.

We have received your despatch of the 21st ultimo on the subject of the slave trade. Your private secretary has made a mistake by sending dupli-

cates of the enclosed B, and no copy of the enclosure A. We can only collect, therefore, the tenor of the Portuguese proposition from your despatch, and this does not afford sufficient means to enter into particulars.

Upon the general question we have no difficulty in giving an opinion. It is certainly desirable to endeavour to induce the Congress to adopt the measure of immediate abolition, and to have at least some record that the proposition to this extent had been brought before them. After the answer, however, which you have received from Prince Talleyrand of the 5th ultimo, there can exist little prospect of success as to the attainment at present of this object. It is very material that we should, if possible, join cordially with the French government in this question, and it is of the highest importance that we should not adopt any course which might lead that government to make common cause with Spain and Portugal.

I am quite ready to admit that we should not perhaps be warranted, under all the circumstances, in driving the Spanish and the Portuguese governments to extremities, by forcing them to go greater lengths than we have admitted as to France; but I think we are fairly entitled to expect that they will go the same length, and that the most prejudicial consequences might arise from protracting the continuance of the trade in their favour to a period which has been refused to the French government. By such a measure we should incur the risk of letting France loose from the engagement into which she has entered. The French planters and merchants interested in the trade would say, with some degree of plausibility, "Why are we not to enjoy the advantages of the traffic for as long a period as Great Britain and the Powers at the Congress have granted to Spain and Portugal?"

We should not be dealing fairly by the King of France, who has acted personally very honourably towards us as to this question, who has many prejudices to encounter amongst his own subjects, and who has incurred some degree of unpopularity from being supposed to have yielded so far to the wishes of Great Britain.

We are, therefore, decidedly of opinion that we ought to insist, with all the earnestness in our power, upon the *general* adoption of the arrangement already agreed upon between Great Britain and France, that is, the total abolition of the slave trade at the end of five years, and the immediate abolition of it north of Cape Formosa.

If the Spanish and Portuguese governments should decline acceding to this proposal, we should endeavour to induce the Congress to take the best means in their power for enforcing it, by the adoption of a law on the part of the several States to exclude the colonial produce of those countries who shall refuse to comply with this system of abolition.

If the instructions of the plenipotentiaries of Spain and Portugal should be limited, a reasonable interval might be allowed for them to signify their acquiescence in the decision of the Congress; but it ought to be decided that the prohibitory system should take effect, if within the period specified the acquiescence of the above-named Powers in the decision of the Congress was not signified, according to some form to be agreed upon.

With respect to your proposal for establishing a Committee of the Powers interested in the abolition, to be resident at Paris or at London, with a view of concerting the means necessary for carrying into execution the demand

of the Congress on this subject, we think it excellent, and are most desirous that it should be adopted. We think it likewise of very great importance that the respective Powers should agree mutually to assist each other in carrying the abolition into effect by authorising, under certain regulations, the search of ships on the coast of Africa; but we are apprehensive that many difficulties will be made to an arrangement of this nature.

Whenever the trade shall have been abolished by all or nearly all the Christian States, it would be quite right that the governments should come to some determination to consider those who might continue to engage in the traffic as guilty of an offence proscribed by civilised nations, and as such not to be peaceably tolerated.

Before I close this letter I am anxious to inquire whether you have had the communication you intended with the Court of Rome on this question. I should conceive that the Pope might, without much difficulty, be induced to anathematise the trade if he found he was likely to be supported by the Powers of Europe in general, assembled at the Congress. Such a proceeding could not fail to have considerable effect in the Roman Catholic countries, and would, I am inclined to believe (together with the measure of prohibiting colonial produce from countries engaged in the trade), effect the object we all have in view at no very distant period.

Believe me to be, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

H. Goulburn, Esq., to Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD,

Ghent, 10th Dec., 1814.

At a conference to-day we did our utmost to give effect to your wishes, as conveyed to us in the last despatch. What the result will be cannot be known until the Americans have finished their deliberations. They certainly received our propositions with a better grace than usual, and if any judgment can be formed as to their future intentions from their manner at this day's conference, I should conclude that they were not prepared to make a very serious resistance, except perhaps upon that part of the new Article which states the right to the fishery to be derived from the treaty of 1783. The conversation which took place after the material business of the conference was concluded clearly showed that they contemplated the signature of the treaty at no distant period. Mr. Adams was anxious to provide against accidents in transmitting the treaty or our ratification of it to America, and with this view suggested the signature of triplicates of the treaty, and if our ratification could not be sent out also in triplicate (which being an instrument under the Great Seal I should suppose impossible), the substitution throughout the treaty of the date of the last ratification for the exchange of the ratifications. In these remarks he was supported by some of his colleagues.

As to the prospect of procuring from them a renunciation of the fisheries in return for a renunciation on our part of the navigation of the Mississippi, I consider it hopeless, for I do not think they would propose it, and to propose it on our part would be to imply a doubt of our right to exclude

them from the fisheries without such a renunciation. I confess my own opinion to be that the question of the fisheries stood as well upon the result of the last conference as it can do upon any reply which they may make to our proposition of this day. On the protocol of the former conference we have a distinct offer from them of an equivalent for the fisheries, from which they cannot recede. The arguments which they used at the time will certainly be to be learnt only from the *ex parte* statements of the negotiators ; but the fact of their having attempted to purchase the fisheries is recorded, and is an evidence (to say the least of it) that they doubt their right to enjoy them without a stipulation. If they receive our proposition, all will be well ; but if they reject it, they may derive from that rejection an argument against what we wish to deduce from the protocol. This will, I think, improve their situation.

The Slave Trade Article was well received. It does not certainly mean much ; but if we wish to do more hereafter, it leaves an opening for future negotiation. The Americans moreover have received from their government no instructions on the subject.

The amendment in the 7th Article, which limits the validity of titles to land to those granted previous to the war, was readily acquiesced in.

Believe me to be, my dear Lord,

Ever yours most faithfully,

HENRY GOULBURN.

I do not see any reason to suspect them of bringing forward their residuary claims for indemnities as a set off against our claims for the maintenance of prisoners of war. The American government may try to do so ; but I think that the Commissioners have no such idea at present.

[828.]

To Lieut.-Gen. Slade.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

Paris, 11th Dec., 1814.

I have received your letter of the 1st December, for which I am very much obliged to you. The rules which I formed for my own guidance in the recommendations I was to make of officers to receive the Order of the Tower and Sword did not allow me to recommend you while you were serving with the army, and I am afraid it is now too late. I assure you, however, that I should be happy to have any opportunity of doing any thing which should be agreeable to you.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

E. Cooke, Esq., to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD,

Vienna, December, 1814.

Lord Castlereagh has delayed writing, wishing to send something indicative of a result ; but he

“ Finds no end, in wand'ring mazes lost.”

I mentioned that the Emperor of Russia had made a direct attack on Metternich, and abused him violently before he set out for Bude. At Bude he made a most violent complaint against him to the Emperor of Austria. The latter warmly replied that his minister only acted by his orders ; that he had taken the advice of his Council of State, and that they were more determined than Metternich. The Emperor of Russia said he hoped they should never quarrel, but that if they were to do so, he trusted they might be at peace at least for two or three years ; to which Francis replied that if they were to quarrel, the sooner the better.

On his return from Bude the Emperor of Russia tried to bribe Metternich. A paper was shown him with the following passage in it :—“ Une personne de la plus grande distinction s'est mise en apparence sur le pied de la brouillerie avec votre Altesse. Elle a une influence très directe sur vos intérêts personnels. L'intérêt des deux nations étant le même, si votre Altesse cesse de s'opposer à ses vues, elle en éprouvera la reconnaissance. Cette reconnaissance consiste d'abord dans un million en argent comptant (100,000*l.* sterling) à être payé par les meilleurs traites sur les banquiers les plus assurés de Vienne. L'autre V. A. le comprendra lui-même.” Then followed another sentence which my informer does not recollect, engaging him to accept the offer, and threatening him with the evils to ensue if he refuses it. *L'autre point* was a woman of rank whom Metternich wanted to get. When this paper was shown, Metternich was unprepared and off his guard, tossed it aside, and pretended not to understand it. The next day he sorely repented of his folly in losing such an opportunity to get the Emperor in his power. The Emperor then began to seek reconciliation with Metternich, and sent person after person to him to make apologies. The Archduchess was one employed ; and the Emperor expressed in person to Metternich his regret that his temper had carried him away, and begged to renew intercourse with him.

As soon as he had sent his answer to Lord Castlereagh, he allowed it to be shown to his people. They were all outrageous against the piece, said it was nothing but a tissue of *sottises* and *bêtises*, and that it tended to ruin the Emperor's cause and character. The Emperor got alarmed, and formed a resolution not to receive a reply ; and in order to be beforehand with Lord Castlereagh, he made up to Prince Hardenberg at a ball, talked to him at length and with eagerness, and invited him to an interview, and then fixed the King of Prussia to be present. In that conference he exerted himself to the utmost to work on the King and Prince, and not without some effect, and he tried to inspire them with jealousy of Austria and her insincerity. This certainly had an influence on Hardenberg (who acts with Humboldt, and the latter plays to the feelings of the King with a view to supplant and succeed the Prince) ; and he, in stating the result of the conversation, though he said nothing was given up, was *chancelant* in his determination, and

begged Castlereagh not to give in his reply, through fear of irritating the Emperor. Of course this feebleness did not make any impression on Lord Castlereagh, and you have a detail from him of what passed as to the delivery of his paper.

Your Lordship from this statement, in addition to Lord Castlereagh's letters, will see the difficulties to which his Lordship is subjected, and which nothing but his firmness can relieve him from. On that firmness I still rely, and in proportion as the treachery and duplicity of the Emperor of Russia develops itself, I trust the other Allied Powers will partake of and strengthen it. We have our character to stand upon, and Lord Castlereagh will not suffer that base to be shaken.

Hot rooms are so prejudicial to me, that they keep me from the evening assemblies, and prevent my being so active as I might be if I had health.

The person most efficient against us is Humboldt. He has talents, and industry, and perseverance, and knows society, and is without principles; and knowing his master's personal feelings for the Emperor of Russia, plays that game to second his own personal views. The King is not fond of him; but every man likes the person who falls in with his inclinations. His constant policy is to keep the management of affairs in a small committee of four, trying to govern Hardenberg, and caballing with Nesselrode and Metternich, studiously combating every idea of an assembly of Congress or a public appeal. His early conduct inspired me with distrust, and that distrust is becoming general; and I hope means may be found to expose and defeat him, which are beginning.

It is wonderful how quiet Vienna is. We hardly know, but at fêtes, that so many Sovereigns are here. There are but little politics in the town, no coffee-houses of reputation, and it is said the people are desired not to talk on politics; and the people here are the most tractable and obedient you can conceive. Lady Castlereagh continues her suppers, and we have curious medleys almost every night, which I sometimes shirk. Lord Stewart gives a ball to-night; but I am afraid to encounter the heat. The Emperor of Russia, the Empress, and the King of Prussia will be there.

We have near eighty English here—Duke of Argyle, Lord Percy, Long Wellesley, Sir S. Smith, &c. &c. &c. One of the Rumbolds has a most serious flirtation with Prince Augustus of Prussia: very foolish, which can only hurt the girl, who is very pretty.

There is a talk that the Emperor of Russia means to remove to the palace of Razamowski and stay here till March, and that he says he must remain to settle his affairs.

It is said the marriage between the Archduchess and the Crown Prince of Wurtemberg is going forward, which is somewhat confirmed by his representing, contrary to truth, that the Emperor of Austria had said he would not concede the Saxon point to Prussia. He might have said so *conditionally*; but the Prince sunk the conditions. Niemen told me he was with his master to-day, who told him he had used the most peremptory language to the Emperor of Russia. Lord Castlereagh does not much embarrass himself with the minor states at present; though the Bavarian pretensions to think form a serious difficulty.

Your Lordship sees that although an useless and premature opening of Congress is adjourned, the power is reserved to resort to that assembly when-

ever necessary. About sixty-eight full powers have been given in to the examining plenipotentiaries; but a third of them must be struck out, and I should think some general meeting will soon be necessary for determining the Powers who are to be represented.

The French are much in the background, and they acknowledge themselves to be objects of universal hatred and dread. A disunion of the great Powers may give them scope for activity, and you know that preparations are making at Paris accordingly in augmenting their army.

Old Talleyrand has not been very fortunate in his doctrines as to Congresses and the *Droit des Gens*. It seems that the French, having worked twenty-five years under revolutions and Buonaparte, have quite forgotten the old-established principles of the law and usage of nations. He has been of use incidentally in inculcating the necessity of enlarged meetings and public appeals, and he has been of disservice in canvassing against the Saxon point and alarming Prussia, whom he hates most cordially; but a man who has been so bribed has not much weight.

After all, and reflecting calmly, it is not wonderful that Austria and Prussia should be very unwilling to break up the alliance, and place themselves in the gap, and to risk a new war. In addition to the danger, old hatreds and jealousies work; and the adjustment of relative powers, interests, and points of defence, is a work of extreme difficulty.

I am however of opinion, whether justly or not, that if they can unite and if they will be firm, there is no danger of war. I think the Russian sentiment is so averse to the Emperor's designs both as to their policy and justice; all his ministers, except the Poles, so adverse to his conduct; his character as a gentleman in so long submitting to be the guest of Austria, so deeply compromised; the voice of Europe so unanimous against him; his case so desperately bad in itself, and rendered so infinitely worse by his own defence of it, that if Austria and Prussia, backed by England, speak to him in a firm tone, he will not venture an appeal to the voice of Congress, much less an appeal to arms.

The ball at Lord Stewart's went off just as I supposed—a continual marked attention by the Emperor, Empress, Archduchess, and all the Russians to Lord and Lady Castlereagh and the English. The Emperor danced polonaises with Lady Castlereagh, country dances with Lady Matilda, and the Archduchess polonaised with Planta. The Emperor rather complained to Lord Stewart of Lord Castlereagh's letter, but said it should be answered.

Oh fallacem hominum spem! I had heard of Prussian defection, but understood that Prince Hardenberg denied it. To-day came other accounts. I conceive them in reality a complete surrender by order of his King. The hope, therefore, of putting a stop to Russian views at the present seems gone. What line is to be followed I have hardly a guess till Lord Castlereagh has seen Metternich. All our world but myself are gone to a masked ball at his house.

I saw Mr. Vansittart's memorandum, who writes under the pressure of America and finance feelings—very naturally; but I lament he should look at the Polish question in the light he does. He chooses to conceive that the holding out the reconstruction of a Polish kingdom, though under a Russian dynasty, is somewhat plausible and popular, and that may capti-

vate in debate. It is a great misfortune when there is a tendency to look at things in this view, and nothing is more dangerous. But that any man can suppose the Emperor of Russia has seriously such a design (especially a man who knows the Emperor's character) is building upon very shadowy grounds. I have no doubt the Emperor will establish something of a Vice-regal government at Warsaw, possibly a Polish treasury, possibly a judicial appeal to the Warsaw tribunals; and he may raise a mere Polish army, with which he will garrison Petersburg and Moscow, whilst he garrisons Warsaw with Russians. But that the Emperor will give the Poles a constitution which will put them out of his absolute control is itself incredible, even if he had made no declaration on the subject. On arguing, I think, with Lord Stewart, who hinted the dangers from a separate kingdom, he said, "he ought to know him too well to suppose that he should allow the Poles to be ever out of his control." No: his aim is not to give constitutions, but to gain power and territory; and if any person gives him credit for a sincere good design, they do him ample injustice.

When Prince Hardenberg yields to him from deference to his master, he states the Emperor to be the most perfidious, treacherous, usurping character, and infinitely more dangerous than Buonaparte.

I will acknowledge that the Poles hate the Russians to the extreme, and they catch at any lure which gives them a ray of hope for ultimate emancipation. I believe the Polish leaders as false to the Emperor as he to them; and he has his spies everywhere, and will watch his opportunity to retake whatever he may give at the moment. He knows well enough that a too popular game with the Poles will ruin him with the Russians, and he will not wish to encourage a *révolution du palais*.

10th, at night.

We know not what the Emperor of Russia is meditating. Neither Arnstehn, nor Stein, nor Pozzo, nor Radzivil, nor Nesselrode, have seen or heard a word from him on Lord Castlereagh's paper. Hardenberg still asserts his determination to act with Austria. He wants what we all want, to avoid war, which can best be avoided by an union of tone and authority, and *that* his King, at least, seems unwilling to use.

The case is this: that if the Emperor of Russia can carry his Polish plans by menace and dictation, there can be no means of stopping his usurping influence in every other question. If he cannot be resisted or appealed against upon measures affecting frontier security and the faith of treaties, which have direct influence on the security of Europe, how can he be resisted on all minor points?

We understand the Emperor of Russia sets off for Grätz on the 20th, and means to go on to Venice, and not to return to Vienna for eighteen days. He wishes to make the amiable to the Italians.

I began this letter four days ago: it is now the 11th. Lord Castlereagh has been waiting in the hopes of seeing some real light; but we are still as when we arrived. Prince Constantine left this place yesterday for Warsaw, and we know not what instructions he carries. The Council of Vienna is certainly warlike, much more so than Metternich, and even the most pacific members are very violent, at which I cannot wonder under all circumstances.

The only move we have lost is the conference between the Emperor of Russia, the King of Prussia, and Hardenberg. When the latter pressed the Emperor in argument, the latter turned round to the King and said, "You see how ministers will act; but we are friends, and we must take the business from the diplomates:" and he then cajoled the King with expressions of friendship. It is this *cajolerie* and *duperie* which may be the ruin of affairs. I do not see how the conference could have been prevented. It is said that even Humboldt now sees the danger, and is preparing a paper. Pray do not show my scribble, though it is curious.

Ever most obediently,

E. COOKE.

To His Royal Highness the Hereditary Prince of Orange.

[829.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Paris, 12th Dec., 1814.

The confidence which your Highness has been in the habit of reposing in me, and the kindness with which you have always received the suggestions which the interest I feel in your welfare has from time to time induced me to make to you, encourage me to address you a few lines upon a circumstance which has been frequently mentioned to me by your friends, and which I see has at last found its way into the English newspapers. It is that you entirely neglect the Belgians, and confine your attentions almost exclusively to the English.

I entertain no doubt that this report, if not entirely groundless, is much exaggerated; but it is so likely to be injurious to you and your family, that I earnestly entreat you to attend to it, and so to shape your conduct as that there may be no ground for it whatever. Considering where you were educated, and how you have passed your life, it is natural enough that you should like the society of the English; but a person in your high situation must get the better of his inclinations in many cases for the value of those higher interests committed to his charge.

I am certain that there is no well thinking Englishman who would not be satisfied to see a marked preference in favour of your new subjects. I desired Fagel to speak to you on this subject, and I intended to have written to your Royal Highness upon it by him, if I had not forgotten the day on which he had fixed his departure.

I likewise desired him to speak to you, and intended to have written to your Highness, upon a plan which I heard you had

in contemplation to visit Paris *incognito*. You could not quit the Netherlands without the consent of those Powers whose troops you command; nor particularly without the consent of your father. Then your *incognito* must be merely formal, and the King of France and everybody else must know that you are here. You cannot come otherwise without exposing yourself to inconvenience, and without having your motive suspected by the King, and even giving him just grounds for offence.

These letters will be delivered to your Royal Highness by General Fagel, who is going to Brussels.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

General Dumouriez to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

Londres, ce 14 Déc., 1814.

Je suis très sensible à la continuation de votre amitié, que je mérite par celle qui m'attache à vous pour la vie. Vous êtes destiné à vous trouver employé toute votre vie à des besognes difficiles en guerre ou délicates en politique, et votre bon génie vient à bout de tous les obstacles.

Le tableau que m'a fait le Général Macaulay se rapproche un peu du ton funèbre de mon bon Morgan. D'un autre côté les insipides journaux Français peignent tout en beau. Votre lettre me donne la moyenne proportionnelle entre ces deux exagérations contraires, et fixe mon jugement. Je compte beaucoup sur la sagacité et les vertus paternelles du Roi. Ne connaissant pas à son arrivée les gens qui sont venus se ranger autour de son étoile naissante, connaissant trop bien ceux qui l'ont suivi à son retour, il a dû d'abord commettre des erreurs inévitables dans le premier choix de ses ministres, et cette erreur a dû retarder et barrer le cours de ses bonnes intentions. Mais il me paraît s'occuper à les rectifier par les changements qu'il vient de faire.

Le pauvre Dupont ne s'est pas mieux tiré de son département que des défilés de la Sierra Morena, qui n'auraient pas dû le conduire à cette place. Le Maréchal Soult, qui le remplace, a des talents, de l'esprit, et de l'énergie, il est grand travailleur, et il a la confiance de l'armée. C'est beaucoup; car il y a plus à travailler sur le moral que sur le matériel de ce premier corps d'une monarchie, qui depuis plus de dix ans était purement gouvernée par une soldatesque insolente, méprisant toutes les loix, tous les liens sociaux, et ne sachant obéir qu'aux ordres arbitraires d'un despote plus méchant qu'elle. Ce despote n'est pas mort; il a été placé très imprudemment à l'île d'Elba, entre la France et l'Italie, où la flamme révolutionnaire n'est pas encore éteinte, et son esprit règne encore dans l'armée Française, et s'alimente d'espoir. Il faut un bien grand courage et surtout une grande fidélité pour entreprendre de rendre une pareille armée Royaliste et nationale. Il faut surtout se hâter; car, si on perd du tems, l'armée et le

ministre se tâteront, et alors, ou le ministre bridera l'armée, ou l'armée bridera le ministre. Le dernier est bien à craindre.

C'est de l'armée que dépend tout dans cette régénération universelle. Car on aurait beau faire les plus beaux plans du monde; ils seraient tous renversés par les premiers troubles intérieurs qui pourraient éclater, ou par la première guerre extérieure, qui replongerait l'armée dans son ancienne frénésie.

Je crois le choix de M. Dandré pour la police très bon; il a du courage, de l'esprit, des talents variés, et il est travailleur.

Je ne suis pas aussi content du choix de Beugnot pour la Marine. C'est un département très difficile, entièrement désorganisé, et qui exige plus de fermeté, d'esprit d'ordre, et d'amour de travail, que ce ministre, d'ailleurs honnête homme et estimable, n'en a déployé dans la gestion de la police, département aussi difficile qu'important dans un tems aussi orageux.

Comptez toujours, Monsieur le Duc, sur le constant attachement de votre fidèle serviteur,

DUMOURIEZ.

H. Goulburn, Esq., to Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD,

Ghent, 14th Dec., 1814.

We send you the American note, which we have just received. Their proposition respecting Passamaquoddy Islands will satisfy us, provided they withdraw that part of it which stipulates for the restoration of those islands to America in the event of the decision respecting them not being made within a limited time. As this would be giving them an additional inducement to decline acting, or to practise some fraud in order to delay the decision of the Commissioners, we shall certainly resist it.

Although they have not complied with the arrangement mentioned in our despatch, viz., that of tendering us an Article with respect to the fisheries which should not preclude us from acting on our rights in that respect, yet they seem to be approximating to our proposition, and you will, therefore, see in this an additional necessity for giving us our instruction with the utmost expedition. Without instructions we do not feel ourselves by any means authorised to draw such an Article, though we do not conceive that there would be any particular difficulty in doing so. It is easy to imagine that the Americans may be unwilling to tender one, as it might expose them hereafter to a charge of having proposed an Article on the subject of the fisheries which did not secure their admission to them, and which might possibly afford some argument for their exclusion.

We really think upon the whole that such an Article as that mentioned in our last despatch is the best arrangement which we are likely to make, unless you should deem it better to leave out altogether any stipulation respecting the fisheries and the Mississippi, and content ourselves with an answer to their note, in which we may state as distinctly as (or perhaps more so than) the Americans have done the rights which we consider ourselves to possess, and our determination to exercise them.

Yours ever most faithfully,

HENRY GOULBURN.

The Earl of Liverpool to Earl Bathurst.

DEAR BATHURST,

15th Dec., 1814.

I doubt very much the policy of instructing the Duke of Wellington on the subject of the Prince of Orange's complaint. If the individuals in question were really subjects of France, as natives of Alsace, has she not a right upon our own principles to detain them? I am satisfied, however, we ought not at this moment to begin a quarrel in that quarter, except upon very strong grounds. The alleged grievance, if even it can be considered as such, would better be passed over in silence for the present.

I quite agree that it may be very desirable to have a full Cabinet on our foreign relations before we separate for the holidays; but I think we cannot form any opinion of what it may be proper to do till our next despatches from Vienna arrive. There is every reason to believe that they will bring us the decision, whatever it may be, as to Poland and Saxony. By sending Castlereagh instructions at this time we might only puzzle him, especially as they must be formed in total ignorance of what has been settled respecting the great objects in question.

I have not the alarms about Alexander which you entertain. I am persuaded he is forming a sea of troubles for himself, and that this question of Poland cannot now be decided in any manner without his making either the Russians or the Poles his enemies. With respect to a good understanding with France upon all Continental points, I think it very desirable; but I do not see how you can instruct Wellington to come to close quarters upon this idea until we know what Castlereagh has done about Saxony. I think it may be very right to desire the members of the Cabinet not to leave London till the next despatches from Castlereagh are received.

Ever yours,

LIVERPOOL.

If the American Treaty shall be accompanied with any reservation in any form, it ought not to be announced to the public till a Cabinet has been summoned to consider of it.

[ENCLOSURE.]

12th Dec., 1814.

Our foreign relations have essentially changed since Lord Castlereagh's departure. Our governing object then was to keep entire, if possible, the Grand Alliance of Austria, Russia, and Prussia with Great Britain. From an apprehension of disturbing it, Lord Castlereagh in his interview with Louis XVIII. repressed the advances made by His Majesty closely to act with us at the Congress. But this alliance is now virtually dissolved; for our attempts to mediate between the three other members of the alliance have failed, and we have clearly incurred the resentment of the Emperor Alexander by the attempt. As Prussia has shown that her own immediate safety will not prevent her becoming subservient to the views, we must expect her to be equally so to the resentments, of Alexander: so that of this Grand Alliance we must consider two, viz., Russia and Prussia, as practically ranged against us in any object we have at heart, and Austria alone with us. It is therefore evident that the fifth great European Power, which is France, must turn the scale.

It is submitted whether this entire change of our foreign relations does not require us to consider, before we separate, whether it ought to make any change in our policy, in order that Lord Castlereagh may have the satisfaction of knowing whatever may be the result of our deliberations.

It appears to me that France must avail herself of this virtual dissolution of the alliance, and that the questions for us, therefore, to consider are : 1st. What are the objects the attainment of which we can, consistently with our own interests, propose to France, in order to induce her to join Austria and us? 2nd. What would be the consequence of her siding with the two Northern Allies?

The objects which France has at heart and with which we can concur are : the preservation of Saxony ; the restoration of the King of Sicily to Naples ; the integrity of what remains of the Turkish dominions, and consequently obliging Russia to execute what by her last treaty she had consented to restore. To these may be added a better division of Poland.

By a cooperation with France, all these points could be carried without a war ; for a memorial requiring the immediate evacuation of Saxony by the Prussian troops, if it were signed by Austria, France, and ourselves (and Prince Repnin's proclamation fully justifies our joining in such a demand), would not be resisted ; and then one instance of retrocession on record, it may be expected the rest will follow.

The objection to thus cooperating with France is, that we thereby re-establish her influence in Germany and Italy. But if we dread the increase of her influence by engaging her on our side, what will she become by uniting with the Northern Allies?

By such an union she may hope to recover Flanders up to Antwerp, if not extend her boundary to the Rhine. To this the Emperor Alexander would not object, and in his present temper cheerfully concur in it as the means of humbling us. If France promised to pay the three millions which we shall probably refuse to him, it would be an irresistible temptation.

Should the acquisition of Saxony, which for such an object France would abandon, not secure the concurrence of Prussia, the expectation of ultimately obtaining Hanover would not fail to reconcile her to the danger to which, by the annexation of Flanders to France, her boundary would be exposed.

What, then, could we oppose to an invasion of Flanders with the consent of Russia and the acquiescence of Prussia? Austria, with her frontiers exposed and threatened, could not detach troops to our support. They could not arrive without passing a neutral or hostile country, and we could not expect her, menaced as she would be, to invade France by way of diversion. All Europe, from Sicily to Sweden, would acquiesce, some secretly, others openly, wishing France success. Even the troops of Hanover must be withdrawn from Flanders, as her frontier would be threatened. Holland herself would be impatient to secure by a peace her ancient territory, rather than continue a hopeless contest.

The truth is, that a war with England would at this moment be so popular in France, and the recovery of Flanders so desirable in the opinion of all parties in that country, that nothing would prevent France from joining the Northern Allies but the influence of some personal and some national feelings, which at present operate in our favour.

The reluctance of Louis XVIII. to engage immediately in a war against England, where he had been so recently protected, and to whose influence he more immediately owes his restoration ; his dislike to the Emperor Alexander ; the common wish entertained both by the King and the nation for the preservation of Saxony ; and the national irritation which is felt reciprocally by Prussia and France against each other, keep the parties at a distance. If by joining

with us France should not extend her own dominions, she would at least remove the alleged necessity of so doing by restraining the aggrandisement of her opponents.

But these estrangements and motives for forbearance will soon lose their influence. Lord Wellington could make the union by personal conferences now; but when France becomes more prepared to act (and it is evident she has the will as well as the opportunity of doing so), it may no longer be in our power to give to her actions the right direction.

The Earl of Liverpool to Mr. Canning.

MY DEAR CANNING,

Fife House, 15th Dec., 1814.

I have received your letter from the Tagus of the 29th ultimo. We are all very much obliged to Casamajor for his attention in detaining the Lisbon packet for some days, as we have thereby escaped the alarm which the report of the destruction of the *Leviathan* must have excited in the minds of all your friends and of all those who are in any way connected with the persons who were on board of her. The circulation of the report is altogether unaccountable, as we have no knowledge of any accident having happened to any British ship on the coasts of Spain and Portugal or in the Bay of Biscay at that time.

We have letters from Lord Strangford of the 12th of October. It appears that every effort had been used to prevent the Prince of Brazils from returning to Europe, and that he had actually announced his intention of remaining for some time longer at Rio Janeiro. It remains, however, to be seen what will be the effect of the arrival of Sir John Beresford and his squadron. It is not improbable that the Prince Regent may be led, upon that event occurring, to change again his determination, especially if he should entertain the apprehension that the British squadron would not be suffered to remain at Rio de Janeiro beyond a certain time, and that he may be precluded, therefore, from the advantages of such a conveyance altogether, if he is not disposed to profit by it at present.

I should inform you that some time after your departure Count Funchal desired permission to wait upon our Prince Regent at Brighton, and he there delivered to him a letter from the Prince of Brazils, of which he had no copy, and of which he professed (I believe truly) not to know the contents.

This letter contained a strong application to our Prince to recall Lord Strangford on account of offensive language which he had held on several occasions, but more particularly to His Royal Highness personally, respecting Monsieur d'Aranjo.

We thought it better to defer taking any notice of this letter for a short time; but the last mail has brought us some further accounts of proceedings of Lord Strangford, which, however well intended, cannot regularly be justified, and we have judged it right, therefore, to withdraw him, but without any disgrace, resting it partly on the ground of the Prince's letter, and partly on the probable return of the Prince of the Brazils to Portugal, and of your having been appointed Ambassador there to meet him.

This measure, if the Prince should return, may be of advantage, as he

cannot fail to regard it in some degree as a concession to him, and as it may, therefore, mollify his mind and render him more manageable upon other points.

The last accounts of the discussions between Marshal Beresford and Monsieur de Forjaz were very unfavourable. I quite agree with you in the propriety of keeping the military arrangements as much as possible in statu quo until the Prince's return, or until at least we know after Sir John Beresford's arrival that His Royal Highness does not mean to return. I have no doubt, however, that in either of these alternatives it will become expedient to bring the business to a short point, and to inform the Portuguese government explicitly that if they will not receive Marshal Beresford's services upon the only conditions on which he can consider them as likely to be useful, the British government cannot consent to allow Marshal Beresford to remain in Portugal, but must employ him and the British officers who are under him elsewhere.

I am sorry to say that the instructions of the Portuguese government to their ministers at the Congress at Vienna respecting the abolition of the slave trade are very unsatisfactory. They have declared that they are not authorised to agree to the total abolition of the trade in less than eight years. I have written to Castlereagh to inform him that whilst we think it might be unfair to require of the Portuguese government harder terms than we have granted to France, it was quite essential that the French terms should be the limit of our concessions to other Powers; that unless we adopted this course of proceeding, the French government might have some pretence for flying off from their engagements, and that we should be acting besides with great unfairness towards the King of France, who had agreed to abolish the trade immediately north of Cape Formosa, though in making this concession he was acting against the prejudices of a very large party in France; that it was very desirable, therefore, that the Congress should consider the engagements of France as the utmost relaxation of the general principle to which they could subscribe; and that with regard to those Powers who would not concur in the measure to this extent, they should adopt the suggestion of excluding them from all commerce in their respective ports in articles of West India produce.

LIVERPOOL.

Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD,

Vienna, 17th Dec., 1814.

Although I cannot announce to you the result of our Saxon negotiation, I think it right to apprise you in a private letter of a diplomatic explosion which has taken place since I last wrote between Austria and Prussia, and which has been productive of very animated discussions between these Courts and the Emperor of Russia.

It arose out of Prince Metternich's answer, now sent, refusing Saxony to Prussia. This exasperated the Prussians, and induced our friend Hardenberg to do a very incorrect act, to which he must have been pushed on by others, possibly with a view to his own overthrow, namely, to com-

municate to the Emperor of Russia parts of the confidential correspondence that had passed between himself and Prince Metternich with respect to Poland, and their concert against the views of Russia.

These secret papers were accompanied with an insinuation that Austria now broke faith with Prussia upon the point of Saxony, in consequence of Prussia *refusing* to enter into a hostile alliance against Russia.

Upon the receipt of this intelligence the Emperor of Russia went to the Emperor of Austria and reproached him with the alleged hostile purpose. The Emperor very naturally replied that if his minister had written such a letter, it was without his knowledge, and that he must be called on to explain.

Under these circumstances Prince Metternich had no other alternative but to carry to the Emperor of Russia, in his own justification, all his *own* letters, leaving it to Prince Hardenberg to produce *his* or not, as he thought fit. The fact happens to be, that the only really objectionable letters are the Chancellor's own. Metternich's are perfectly fair diplomatic papers, avowing in very proper terms the objections of his Court to the Russian views; whereas Hardenberg, in order to escape an avowed opposition to Russia, in which he found himself disavowed, did not simply confine himself to being most unnecessarily the advocate of peace, but undertook to show that the Emperor must soon be ruined by his own politics, that in a few years his military power would become comparatively feeble, and that it was then the Allies *might seize an occasion of doing themselves justice*.

It is hardly credible that with such appendant matter he should venture to risk the communication of Metternich's replies, all of which originate in papers of his own, more or less indiscreet, and infinitely more inconsistent, particularly with the Prussian relations with Russia, than anything Metternich had written. In truth Prince Metternich's letter of the 22nd October, which I have sent home, evinces a sincere desire to conciliate, and not to quarrel with Russia.

The whole, as you may imagine, made for two days a great sensation, but the result perhaps may serve to prove what I have ventured before to allege, that the climate of Russia is often the more serene after a good squall. The justificatory interview between the Emperor of Russia and Metternich was not the less stormy, from a little *private* note of the latter, denying, in terms not very measured, some reported insinuations of His Imperial Majesty's against *his* fidelity to Prussia. This note was, either most ungenerously or most unaccountably, amongst the papers sent, and served not a little to exasperate. The audience terminated by His Imperial Majesty's saying he should give his answer to the Emperor in person.

The interview between the Emperors took place the following morning, and, according to the report I have received, was marked by peculiar conciliation on the part of the Emperor Alexander; a wish to settle all differences, and to be the best possible friends; regret that he could not meet the Emperor of Austria's wishes about Cracovie, which the Poles could not bear he should alienate as the tomb of their kings; but that in lieu thereof, and as a proof of his regard, he would cede the circle of Ternapole, which he had received from Austria by the Peace of Vienna. This district contains a population of not less than 400,000 subjects; and although the cession will not serve Austria in point of frontier, it is cer-

tainly the most substantial proof of a disposition to treat *à l'aimable* which His Imperial Majesty has yet afforded. The Emperor expressed his hope that Prussia would also accommodate, and that all might be arranged.

I may be mistaken, but I cannot but infer from what has occurred that this disclosure has produced rather a salutary impression on the Emperor's mind. Had these ministers spoken as bold truths to His Imperial Majesty in their interviews as they did to each other in their letters, and had they supported *me* in the clear and decisive tone which their official correspondence entitled me to expect, my persuasion is that the Emperor of Russia would have come to a suitable arrangement with respect to the point of Poland, notwithstanding the embarrassment he had previously created for himself by hopes given to the Poles. In this correspondence the Emperor clearly perceived that I had not been mistaken in representing to him the real feelings of his Allies; and I have no doubt that they made their impression even after the concert had failed. I am afraid, however, the disclosure will operate prejudicially on the relations between Austria and Prussia.

Believe me to be, with great truth, my dear Lord,

Very sincerely yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

The Earl of Liverpool to Earl Bathurst.

DEAR BATHURST,

Fife House, 18th Dec., 1814.

I have considered the subject of the Duke of Wellington's letter, which you showed me yesterday; and I am quite satisfied that (though it might be more desirable, on the King of France's account as well as for other reasons, that the offer should not be made) if the offer of an estate in France is made to him, he cannot refuse it after having accepted similar marks of favour from Spain and the Netherlands.

Ever sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD,

Vienna, 18th Dec., 1814.

I forwarded by the last messenger an unofficial paper received from the Duke de Campochiaro, with some very interesting and important comments upon it by Count Nugent. You will observe by the enclosed public and private letters that I have sent both these papers to Lord William Bentinck for further elucidation.

I send home such part of the correspondence relating to this subject as you have called for. I think Murat's pretensions to be acknowledged by us cannot be sustained: they do not rest upon any formal engagement. The whole claim turns upon an assurance contingent upon two conditions: 1st. His effective cooperation; 2ndly. The King of Sicily being indemnified.

Neither of these conditions have or are now to be realized. If Murat's conduct in the war had been such as we were entitled to expect, it might be urged that he ought not to suffer from the King's refusal of indemnity, even were it possible to propose one for his acceptance, which it is not; but where the whole course of Murat's proceedings was, in the judgment and view of the whole army, dilatory, wavering, and suspicious, and when we know from the Viceroy, although he will not be an evidence on the question, that he was engaged the greater part of the time in a traitorous intercourse with him, it appears to me impossible to suffer the contingent assurance given by Lord William Bentinck to the Marquis di Gallo on the 1st of April, under the authority of my letter from Châtillon of the 21st of February—an assurance which you will observe from the enclosed was given under expressions of pointed qualification at the time—to supersede all the claims the Sicilian family have to the favour and protection of Great Britain, much more to engage the employment of our power, under such circumstances, to secure an usurper against them in their kingdom of Naples.

Prince Talleyrand a few days since spoke to me on this subject; and as I found that the Emperor of Russia had been making overtures of concert with him on this point, in hopes of rendering France less adverse to his views in other quarters, I thought it of importance to enter so far into the question as to make him understand that I considered the British government as not bound to Murat. I stated the circumstances under which the assurance of the 1st of April had been given, and my reasons for being of opinion that the conditions had not been fulfilled on Murat's part. The Prince added some circumstances which had come to his knowledge, which also went to establish Murat's treachery. I suggested that possibly something might be found in the offices at Paris to prove this fact. He promised me to have immediate search made, but stated that he believed both Murat's and the Viceroy's correspondence was carried on directly with Buonaparte, and did not pass through any of the offices of government.

Prince Talleyrand pursued the subject with a view to some understanding as to the course to be taken on the question here. Not deeming it proper to show any indisposition to meet his views upon this point, I repeated to him the satisfaction the Prince Regent would feel in contributing as far as prudence would justify to restore his ally to the throne of Naples; that I should be glad to know the ideas of his Court as to the steps advisable to be adopted, short of war, to effect this object. I used the terms "short of war," as any concert of this nature would require time, could only grow out of the previous failure of milder measures, and must ultimately be influenced by circumstances not capable of an immediate estimate. I begged the Prince would give me a confidential memorandum upon this point, that I might profit by the interval to consult my government upon the most suitable course to be adopted.

I now enclose this memorandum. In receiving it from Prince Talleyrand, I had a further conversation with him upon the subject. I urged the importance of distinct proofs of Murat's treachery, if such could be procured at Paris, not only as making our case more clear both before Parliament and the world, but also for the purpose of liberating Austria from the embarrassment of her existing engagements. I think I succeeded in making

Prince Talleyrand understand our real situation on this subject ; that he was satisfied of the desire we felt to concur with France on this object ; and that the danger that might have arisen from a doubt in the mind of his Court, either as to our ability or our inclination to support the King of Sicily's pretensions, a doubt to which the publications and discussions in England were but too much calculated to give countenance, has been obviated.

As the object of my asking for this memorandum was to secure, if possible, a reference home before we were called upon to take a final decision, I thought it better to elicit, as far as possible, Prince Talleyrand's views rather than anticipate the discussion of what ought, under all circumstances, to be our final measure. I clearly perceived that France is as little disposed as we are for immediate war to enforce compliance. You will perceive, to quiet the alarms Austria and Sardinia feel of a French army crossing the Alps, he formally declares against any hostile operation by the north of Italy, which leads to all the delays of a maritime attack, the distant period of which may be estimated when France and Spain are to be prominent features in its execution.

Prince Talleyrand's main reliance for getting rid of Murat is the pledge proposed to be taken against his pretensions, and which he hopes all the Powers except Austria would concur in. This would for the time save the honour of his government ; but I doubt its having any serious effect upon Murat's situation, or inducing him, as Prince Talleyrand expects, to come forward with terms of accommodation. On the other hand, there is always an inconvenience in such abstract declarations, unaccompanied with any practical measure, either of war or negotiation, and which are capable of being represented, in theory at least, an interminable bar to the relations of peace being re-established between the principal States of Europe and the kingdom of Naples.

It appears to me that this species of declaration would be open to peculiar inconvenience in a Parliamentary point of view. I think it would not be difficult to satisfy Parliament and Europe that Great Britain owed it to herself to concur in a negotiation to remove Murat from the throne of Naples, under all the circumstances of the case, viz. the existing state of Europe, now comprising two great States, viz. France and Spain, who cannot be expected to acknowledge Murat ; the strong, I may say the almost irresistible claims, now incapable of being satisfied in any other manner, which the Sicilian family have upon those States, with whom they have co-operated throughout the war, and the very small claim established by Murat by his conduct in the field to be protected against the ancient family.

I should, therefore, prefer an actual offer of terms to Murat, whether successful or not, to a more insulated declaration. If liberal, they would reconcile the public feeling to any future policy of a more hostile nature. The case against him in reasoning is abundantly strong to bear out this first step. The mere fact of the negotiation is by inference a denial of his title and a recognition of his adversary. A refusal on his part would justify his non-recognition, and leave open all future measures to prudential consideration. The attempt on the part of so many preponderating States to restore the ancient family must tend to weaken Murat's authority within the country, and call forth a sentiment, if such exists, in favour of Ferdi-

nand IV., without seeming to provoke insurrection by a sentence of illegitimacy passed upon Murat, unaccompanied, however, by any expedient to facilitate a favourable settlement between these rival pretensions.

The future course to be pursued would remain fairly open to decision. The public mind of Europe, once satisfied of the propriety of the first measure, would be gradually prepared for any ulterior proceedings, and we should close the transactions before Congress without any further embarrassment than a dissent on the part of Austria alone to the institution of a negotiation to settle, if possible, amicably a point which certainly in its present shape menaces most seriously the peace of Italy, if not of Europe.

I enclose a short memorandum, suggesting for your consideration the course which I should myself prefer to that proposed by Prince Talleyrand on this question.

CASTLEREAGH.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Viscount Castlereagh's Projet respecting Murat.

Under the existing circumstances of Europe, the impossibility of finding any adequate territorial indemnity to propose to Ferdinand IV. as an inducement to His Majesty to cede his rights to the kingdom of Naples, and the avowed purpose not to accept of any indemnity in exchange for such his pretensions, we are of opinion that the peace of Europe (which must be dangerously menaced so long as a disputed succession with respect to so important a kingdom shall exist) can alone be effectually consolidated by the restoration of the ancient and legitimate family to the throne of Naples.

We are further of opinion, regard being had to the circumstances under which Murat now exercises the powers of government in Naples, and the importance of avoiding measures that might compromise the public tranquillity and involve the Neapolitan people in the horrors of a civil war, that it is fit and proper that an adequate and permanent provision, as far as may be, of a pecuniary nature should be secured to Murat and his heirs for ever.

Should Murat, in deference to the sentiments of Europe, and preferring the repose and safety of the nation to the gratification of his own ambition, consent peaceably to abdicate in favour of the ancient Sovereign, that every assurance be afforded him, on the part of our respective Sovereigns, that he may rely on receiving from them, towards himself and his family, every mark of consideration and attention; and that, in the event of his thinking fit to establish his future residence within any of their dominions, that he may expect from them the most cordial and hospitable reception.

That as a farther and honourable motive to induce him to make this sacrifice to the repose of the kingdom of Naples, we are prepared, and consider it our duty, to offer our united efforts to procure a settlement, as the condition of his abdication in favour of Ferdinand IV., by which, under the solemn guarantee of our respective Sovereigns, a complete oblivion of the past and an abjuration of every vindictive or unkind feeling as to the future shall be secured, on the part of His Majesty Ferdinand IV. and his successors, to the Neapolitan people. We are also ready to provide, as the condition of His Majesty's resumption, that he shall secure to his Neapolitan subjects such rights and privileges as, in addition to a general amnesty and confirmation of the existing state of property, may be just and reasonable. That a joint commission be appointed to open a communication with Murat upon the principles above laid down, and

that they be authorised to assure him of the sincere desire which animates our respective Courts to give to this overture the most amicable and friendly character, consistent with what is due to the rights of the legitimate family and to the paramount duty imposed upon us of adequately providing for the future repose and tranquillity of Europe.

II.

Viscount Castlereagh to Lord W. C. Bentinck.

MY LORD,

Vienna, 10th Dec., 1814.

Having heard that your Lordship is in Italy, I take advantage of a courier proceeding to Genoa with despatches to transmit to your Lordship a confidential paper received some time since from the Duke de Campochiaro, with the remarks of a General officer thereupon.

I shall be much obliged to your Lordship to consider both these papers attentively, and favour me with such comments upon them as may assist the British government in justly appreciating Murat's conduct throughout the period of the late campaign.

Your Lordship will be so good as to state the date and circumstances under which your note to the Marquis di Gallo was presented, as referred to by the Duke de Campochiaro, accompanying the same with such remarks as to Murat's conduct, subsequent to the presentation of the said note, as the course of events may have suggested.

I have, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

III.

Viscount Castlereagh to Lord W. C. Bentinck.

MY DEAR LORD,

Vienna, 18th Dec., 1814.

As our relations with Sicily and Naples are likely to become a subject of important consideration both here and in England, I am anxious to obtain every information that can throw light upon the conduct of Murat under the engagements he had contracted. I shall be very thankful to your Lordship if you will assist me in this object, both as far as your own observation goes and by recurring to any other sources that you can avail yourself of without attracting attention.

The messenger who carries this letter to your Lordship is also the bearer of my order to General Sir J. Dalrymple to transfer, as far as depends on him, the provisional government of Genoa to the King of Sardinia, and to act with the troops under his command as an auxiliary corps in His Majesty's service till further orders. I hope your Lordship will be satisfied that if we have not felt it possible to preserve to Genoa her separate existence, we have acted up to the spirit of the assurances of protection which you gave the people.

I trust you will approve the safeguards obtained for the rights and interests of the Genoese, and that you will employ your personal influence to bring them and their future Sovereign together under the most conciliatory auspices.

I have the honour to be, my dear Lord,

Very sincerely and faithfully yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

P.S. The paper of remarks I send to you is from General Count Nugent.

IV.

The Prince de Talleyrand to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Vienne, le Déc., 1814.

Vous m'avez invité à vous faire connoître de quelle manière je conçois que l'affaire de Naples doit être réglée au Congrès ; car, pour ce qui est de la nécessité de l'y régler, c'est un point sur lequel il ne sauroit y avoir un seul moment d'incertitude dans un esprit tel que le vôtre. Ce seroit à jamais un sujet de reproche, et je dirai même un éternel sujet de honte, si le droit de souveraineté sur un ancien et beau royaume, comme celui de Naples, étant contesté, l'Europe réunie pour la première fois, et pour la dernière peut-être, en Congrès général, laissoit indécise une question de cette nature ; et consacrant en quelque sorte l'usurpation par son silence, donnoit lieu de penser que l'unique source du droit est la force. Je n'ai point non plus à établir, vis-à-vis de Votre Excellence, les droits de Ferdinand IV. L'Angleterre n'a jamais cessé de les reconnoître. Dans la guerre où il a perdu Naples, elle étoit son alliée ; elle l'a toujours été depuis ; elle l'est encore. Jamais elle n'a reconnu le titre que prend celui qui gouverne à Naples, ni les droits que ce titre suppose. Ainsi, pour concourir à assurer ceux du Roi Ferdinand, l'Angleterre n'a qu'une chose bien simple à faire, qui est de déclarer en Congrès ce qu'elle a toujours reconnu, que Ferdinand IV. est le légitime souverain du royaume de Naples.

Peut-être que l'Angleterre, jusqu'ici l'alliée de Ferdinand IV., peut-être croira-t-elle sa gloire même intéressée à l'assister, si besoin est, de ses forces pour rentrer en possession du royaume dont il aura été reconnu souverain ; mais ce n'est point une obligation qui puisse découler d'une reconnaissance pure et simple des droits de ce Prince ; car la reconnaissance d'un droit n'emporte naturellement d'autre obligation que celle de ne rien faire qui lui soit contraire, et de n'appuyer aucune prétention qui lui soit opposée. Elle n'emporte point celle de combattre pour sa défense.

Il se peut que je me fasse illusion ; mais il me paroît infiniment probable qu'une déclaration franche et unanime des puissances de l'Europe, et la certitude qu'auroit celui qui gouverne à Naples de n'être soutenu de personne, rendroit inutile l'emploi de la force ; mais si le contraire arrivoit, ceux-là seuls seroient les alliés nécessaires du Roi Ferdinand qui jugeroient à propos de lui prêter leur appui.

Craindrait-on que, dans ce cas, la guerre ne s'étendit hors des limites du royaume de Naples, et que la tranquillité de l'Italie ne fut de nouveau troublée ? Craindrait-on que des troupes étrangères ne traversassent l'Italie ? On obviendroit facilement à ces craintes en stipulant que le royaume de Naples ne pourroit être attaqué par le continent Italien. L'Autriche paroît s'être engagée envers celui qui gouverne à Naples à le garantir de toute attaque de ce côté ; et si elle ne s'est engagée qu'à cela, comme on doit naturellement le présumer (car comment supposer que l'Empereur d'Autriche ait garanti, contre les droits d'un Prince à la fois son oncle et son beau-père, la possession d'un royaume qu'il a perdu en faisant cause commune avec l'Autriche ?), elle ne peut-être embarrassée de concilier avec la justice et avec les sentimens naturels les engagemens que des circonstances extraordinaires lui ont fait prendre.

Il me semble donc que l'on peut satisfaire en même tems à tous les devoirs, à tous les intérêts, et à toutes les convenances, par un article tel que le suivant :—

“ L'Europe réunie en Congrès reconnoît S.M. Ferdinand IV. comme légitime Roi de Naples. Toutes les puissances s'engagent à ne favoriser et à n'appuyer

directement ni indirectement aucune prétention opposée aux droits qui lui appartiennent à ce titre ; mais les troupes que les puissances étrangères à l'Italie et alliées de sa dite Majesté feroient marcher pour sa cause ne pourront traverser l'Italie."

Je me persuade, my Lord, que Votre Excellence est suffisamment autorisée pour souscrire à une telle clause, et qu'elle n'a pas besoin d'une autorisation plus spéciale. Si toutefois elle en jugeoit autrement, je l'inviterois à demander cette autorisation sans délai, ainsi qu'elle a bien voulu me le promettre.

Recevez, My Lord, etc.,

LE PRINCE DE TALLEYRAND.

V.

Lord W. C. Bentinck to the Duke di Gallo.

Bologna, 1st April, 1814.

In the event of any written confirmation being required by the Neapolitan government of the sentiments already verbally expressed by Lord Castlereagh, which document hitherto has not been asked for, and appeared to be unnecessary, the undersigned was authorised officially to state that the British government entirely approved the treaty made between the Austrian and Neapolitan governments, and consented to the addition of territory therein specified, upon the condition of the immediate and active cooperation of the Neapolitan army, and that the refusal to sign a treaty *in limine* proceeded alone from feelings of delicacy and honour, which forbade that the hereditary possessions of an ancient ally should be sacrificed without an indemnity ; and the undersigned was instructed to invite the Neapolitan government to exert its utmost efforts for the same object. Such were the sentiments of the British government.

It would be inconsistent with the frankness of the undersigned if he did not express his individual opinion that the hopes founded on this treaty will have been sadly disappointed. The main object for which this alliance and these sacrifices were made, the prompt and active cooperation of the Neapolitan army, has not been gained. The Austrian army stands still paralysed upon the Adige, which, by the immediate advance of the Neapolitan army, would long since have reached the Alps ; the most doubtful negotiations are carrying on with the enemy, while at the same time the British cooperation, more necessary and interesting to the Neapolitan government, if it be sincere, than to any other of the Allies, is rendered impossible by the refusal of the means of security and subsistence.

While such is the military conduct pursued by the Neapolitan government, its political arrangements are not less suspicious. The Neapolitan government pledges its agreement to all the arrangements of the Allies for Italy. It first declares that the countries shall be immediately given up to their legitimate Sovereigns. It is next officially declared that these countries must be retained till the peace. In the mean time all the arrangements for interior administration have the air of permanent occupation, and all the language of the Neapolitan agents and papers tends to the same end. They all clearly bespeak views of ambition and aggrandisement totally foreign to the intentions of the Allies, objectionable if such additional power and resources were loyally directed, but in the greatest degree dangerous when there is no certainty in which scale they are to be thrown.

The undersigned does not offer these remarks in the spirit of reproach and enmity : they are exacted by friendship, and by a sincere desire to give effect to the intentions of the Allies. The war is not over, and there may still be time to repair all doubts and dissatisfaction.

The undersigned therefore earnestly recommends to the Neapolitan government :

To give its instant and cordial cooperation to the Austrian army ;

To afford to the British expedition that aid which is indispensable to its co-operation and due to the dignity of the British government, by a fair division of the Tuscan territory. If the cession of that which is the right of another can be called a sacrifice, it will be highly repaid by reciprocal confidence and assistance ;

To give up all views of a separate and independent policy ;

And, above all, to restore without delay the sovereign Pontiff to his throne. The cruel sufferings of this venerable personage, combined with his extraordinary virtues and firmness, have excited, as we have seen, the greatest enthusiasm. When the conduct of the ruler of France in this respect has, more than any other act of his life, excited universal detestation, it would be an evil policy to refuse the adoption of a measure acknowledged to be of the utmost necessity by all who are anxious to behold the reestablishment of social order on its base of religion and morality.

The undersigned has the honour to renew to the Duke di Gallo the assurance of his high consideration.

W. C. BENTINCK.

E. Cooke, Esq., to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD,

Vienna, 18th Dec., 1814.

I have been so little in the world lately that I have little gossip to send.

Metternich plumes himself much on his last interview with the Emperor of Russia. The Emperor was very violent in his language to him. In his reply, Metternich observed that he hopes His Imperial Majesty would forgive the patience with which he submitted to his language, as for the course of eight years he had been accustomed to similar language from Buonaparte. The Emperor was conciliatory to the Emperor of Austria, and attributed all their differences to his enemy Metternich. He has been and is attempting to displace him, and has been courting Prince Schwarzenberg.

I believe he hinted his wish to make Schwarzenberg minister to Talleyrand.

Prince Hardenberg has been much distressed since his foolish *démarche*, of which he is ashamed ; and he expresses himself most violently against the approaches which he sees Metternich is making to Talleyrand.

I am confident Metternich's mind has been made up within these few days to an alliance with France ; and I shall not be surprised if he makes a direct overture, without consulting Lord Castlereagh, in case Talleyrand is favourable upon his overture as to Saxony. This is my conjecture. This will be with a view to put us at the tail of such an alliance. And the Austrians begin to think that they see a way out of their engagements with Murat, who, I hear, is active, and on the move.

I understand the language in the coffee-houses here grows very violent against Russia.

The general language of the Plenipotentiaries is most strongly for peace ; and I understand the result of the war has been so severe to the land-

holders, especially in the North of Germany, that they feel despair on the idea of a new war. Yet all allow the peace, with Russia advanced to the Oder, is not likely to last.

Notwithstanding all Lord Castlereagh's efforts for conciliation, I am confident no one here can answer for events. There is great irritation in the Cabinets. If Austria goes on, and succeeds in her overtures with France, and a tone of pacific authority is taken, it is not improbable that Prussia will compromise. Talleyrand expressed to me the utmost rancour against Prussia some time ago; and the Prussian Generals so conduct themselves in the occupied countries as to make their government hated. Besides, were a war to take place, Prussia, not Russia, would have the burden; and the former would lose Saxony altogether, if not also the provinces they expect from the kingdom of Westphalia and on the left bank of the Rhine.

They talk of the match with the Archduchess and the Prince of Wurtemberg as settled, although he is a lover of the Princess Bagration at present. He is also a great intriguer for the Russians, and a great circulator of self-fabricated reports.

They say the Kings of Bavaria and Wurtemberg set off the 23rd.

Ever most truly your Lordship's most obedient servant,

E. COOKE.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Fife House, 22nd Dec., 1814.

In the event of the discussions at Vienna leading to some general settlement of the affairs of Europe, it has occurred to us that you may be pressed to become a party to the arrangements of the Emperor of Russia with respect to Poland, or rather to his acquisition of the Duchy of Warsaw.

If this should be proposed to you, we have no objection to your agreeing to it, provided it is distinctly stipulated in the treaty that at least the Polish provinces incorporated with Russia since 1791 shall be reunited to the Duchy of Warsaw, so as to form a distinct kingdom of Poland, under a free Constitution.

As this is in conformity to the Emperor of Russia's own suggestion, and to the language which he has invariably held regarding Poland, he cannot in fairness object to this proposal; and if the Crown of Russia is to be aggrandized to the extent now proposed, it would afford some security to Europe, however inadequate, that the empire should consist of two distinct kingdoms, and that the Crown and one of those kingdoms should be subject to the control of a government more or less popular.

In case, however, the Emperor of Russia should object to any such stipulation in a treaty or instrument to which other Powers were parties, it may be of importance that you should take means of informing Prince Czartoriski and the other Poles who may be at Vienna that you were authorized by your government to propose such a stipulation.

I feel it necessary only to add that whatever may be now the result of

the arrangements respecting Poland, our taking any part of the Russian debt to Holland as a charge on this country will, we trust, after all that has passed, be considered as entirely out of the question.

LIVERPOOL.

The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Fife House, 23rd Dec., 1814.

I send open for your perusal several letters which, with the concurrence of the Cabinet, I have written this day to Lord Castlereagh; and although cross-negotiations are most objectionable, and generally involve the governments which have recourse to them in difficulties, I can see no objection to your seeking an audience of the King of France, to your explaining to him generally the feelings and sentiments of the Prince Regent's government towards him, and thereby preparing him for any communication Lord Castlereagh may make to Prince Talleyrand at Vienna.

The more I hear and see of the different Courts of Europe, the more convinced I am that the King of France is (amongst the great Powers) the only Sovereign in whom we can have any real confidence. The Emperor of Russia is profligate from vanity and self-sufficiency, if not from principle. The King of Prussia may be a well-meaning man, but he is the dupe of the Emperor of Russia. The Emperor of Austria I believe to be an honest man, but he has a Minister in whom no one can trust; who considers all policy as consisting in *finesse* and trick; and who has got his government and himself into more difficulties by his devices than could have occurred from a plain course of dealing.

We must not conceal from ourselves, however, that an avowed union between Great Britain and France would be likely to be unpopular in both countries. Questions might arise, and opportunities might occur, which would, not unnaturally, lead to it; but a measure of this very delicate nature should not be precipitated; and we gain our purpose sufficiently at present if we can establish a complete confidential intercourse with the French government which will give to neither party any pretence to enter into engagements to the prejudice of the other, or indeed into any engagements at all which, under present circumstances, it is not willing to communicate to the other.

We should be much obliged to you if you could let us have some information of the present numbers and condition of the French army, as well as of the progress of the measures which are now taking to recruit it.

We understand that the report which had created so much alarm in the Low Countries some time ago, of the assembly of a large force at Lisle, turns out to be unfounded.

Believe me, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Fife House, 23rd Dec., 1814.

I have been under the necessity of deciding to send Sir Charles Stuart immediately to the Hague, as I do not think that in the present state of affairs in Europe we should be justified in leaving the business of a mission of such importance to so young a man as Gordon.

The Prince of Orange has written to Lord Bathurst within these few days to request that artillery and other means may be sent him for putting Ostend, Nieuport, Furnes, &c., in a state of defence against a coup-de-main. Measures are taking for this purpose; and though we may justly have the fullest reliance on the good faith of the King of France, I am sure you will see that we should not be justified in leaving such essential interests to any risk.

The intelligence we have recently received from the Netherlands respecting the disposition of the people is very favourable, but considerable inconvenience is found to result from the degree of uncertainty which must continue to prevail till the negotiations at Vienna are brought to a close, and till the fate of the country is irrevocably determined.

You will have seen by the public papers the account of the meetings which have taken place on the subject of the property tax. Such a spirit has arisen on this subject that I fear it will be quite impossible to carry the tax this year without an engagement to give it up afterwards if the war shall not be renewed, and thereby not to keep any part of it to defray the expenses of our peace establishment.

This, as well as other considerations, makes us most anxious to get rid of the American war. I trust our last communication will enable the Commissioners to bring the negotiation to a close. But even if peace is signed, I shall not be surprised if Madison endeavours to play us some trick in the ratification of it. It will be stipulated, however, that hostilities shall not cease till after the exchange of the ratifications at Washington. Baker will have charge of the Prince's ratification, and will be instructed only to receive a simple and unconditional ratification from the government of America. If they demur to this, he will inform them that he is not authorized to suspend hostilities on any other condition. And Sir Edward Pakenham will, I trust, be in the Chesapeake or Delaware, with a large force, at the end of February or the beginning of March. The disposition to separate on the part of the Eastern States may likewise frighten Madison; for if he should refuse to ratify the treaty, we must immediately propose to make a separate peace with them, and we have good reason to believe that they would not be indisposed to listen to such a proposal.

LIVERPOOL.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Fife House, 23rd Dec., 1814.

I cannot resist stating to you the feeling which exists in all our minds as to any endeavour on the part of Count Munster to carry additional acquisitions of territory for Hanover. I know nothing which would discredit the government more completely than an arrangement not satisfactory with respect to Poland and Germany generally, accompanied with considerable gain to Hanover. I know Count Munster never will understand that the security of Hanover to the Brunswick family will rather be diminished than increased by any additions to it. Hanover is a point of honour, and a point of honour only, to this country. But the point of honour is Old Hanover; and the people of this country may say, not unreasonably, "We will defend the ancient domain of our King if he will be contented with it, but we shall consider ourselves released from any such engagement if he chooses to add to it." Indeed, if you ask me my opinion fairly, I doubt very much whether it would be possible to engage the country in a war at this time, even for the defence of the ancient territory, if it were in danger.

The more complicated our affairs become in Europe, the more essential it is that you should be here by the meeting of Parliament. In truth, as the government is now circumstanced, we could not go on without it. If you cannot complete your business in time, I know of no resource but Wellington relieving you. I conclude before this you will have had some communication with him on this subject.

LIVERPOOL.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Fife House, 23rd Dec., 1814.

You appear to be of opinion that the French government might be conciliated to our views on most other points by our agreeing to make common cause with them on the point of Naples.

This question is full of difficulty. The first point to be considered is, how far we can enter into any concert against Murat with good faith; and this must depend upon whether he is to be regarded as having fairly fulfilled his engagements after the conclusion of the Peace between him and Austria.

If he acted fairly, or I should rather say if he did not act unfairly, by the Allies in the subsequent operations of the armies, he had certainly reason to depend upon our favourable disposition towards him; and though we were no parties to the treaty of peace, and are not bound to defend him, we should not be justified in assisting to dethrone him.

We have read the copy of his statement which you have sent us, and the paper of observations upon it. If the latter be the production of General Nugent, his opinion is deserving of considerable weight, as well

from the situation which he held in that part of the Austrian army whose operations were most immediately connected with those of the Neapolitan forces, as from the appeal which Murat appears to make to him.

If it should have been drawn up by any other person, I should recommend that both the papers should be referred to General Nugent for his opinion upon them.

You have done quite right in sending these two papers to Lord William Bentinck, and we must leave it for you to decide upon the best evidence you can obtain how far Murat's conduct has or has not absolved us from all obligation towards him.

It is of the utmost importance, however, that before we are committed on this question you should refer to the correspondence on that subject, and particularly to the assurances given in your despatch to Lord William Bentinck of the 3rd April last. An extract of this despatch has been published by Murat, and it is quite essential therefore that the case against him should be such as will enable us, after such assurances, to justify our change of conduct towards him to Parliament and to the world.

Supposing, however, his treachery or wilful and culpable inactivity to be clearly established, how are we to get rid of him? If he will accept of a compensation, and such compensation can be found, the difficulty is solved; but if he is determined to defend himself, who is the power to be charged with expelling him? Would it be safe, under the present circumstances of Italy, and the unpopularity of most of the governments re-established there, especially those of Austria, to revive a state of war in that country?

We are inclined to think that it would be more safe and prudent for the Powers of Europe to tolerate Murat than for any of them to undertake hostilities for the purpose of expelling him. A war carried on by France, however, in Germany or the Low Countries, would be so much greater an evil to Great Britain than a war carried on by her in Italy, that if the former can be avoided only by the occurrence of the latter, it appears to us incomparably the least evil of the two; but we can only be justified in encouraging or giving our sanction to such a line of policy by the conviction that the conduct of Murat subsequent to his engagements with Austria had been of a nature to discharge us from all our obligations towards him.

Believe me, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Fife House, 23rd Dec., 1814.

We have received your despatches of the 5th and 7th instant,* and the very important private letter addressed to me of the former date.

The contents of these papers have been fully considered, and we are decidedly and unanimously of opinion that all your endeavours should be directed to the continuance of peace; that there is no mode in which the arrangements in Poland, Germany, and Italy can be settled, consistently

* See pp. 462, 465.

with the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris, which is not to be preferred under present circumstances to a renewal of hostilities between the Continental Powers. Such an event could not at this time take place in Europe without the danger of our being involved in it at no distant period unless we were prepared to purchase neutrality by sacrifices which would be neither consistent with our character nor our safety.

With these sentiments deeply impressed upon our minds, we must not disguise from you that it would be quite impossible to embark this country in a war at present, except upon a clear point of honour, or for some distinct British interest of sufficient magnitude to reconcile the country to it.

The defence of Holland and the Low Countries is the only object on the continent of Europe which would be regarded in this light, and for which we could reasonably expect the support of Parliament in imposing or continuing those burthens on the country which our being involved in a war would render indispensable.

If the Austrian government is once satisfied that they have no chance of receiving subsidies from Great Britain, they will not be disposed to urge their pretensions to the extent of war, and the differences between them and the other Powers will, I trust, be in some way or other arranged without an appeal to arms.

We are ready, notwithstanding these considerations, to give full weight to the opinion contained in your private letter of the 5th instant, that adverting to the actual situation of the great Powers on the Continent, how generally they are armed, and how little they are all able to support the expense of their existing establishments, a state of war may possibly arise amongst them, if not from any deliberate view of policy, yet out of the circumstances in which they may find themselves placed.

We concur with you that if war should be renewed on the Continent, it would be in vain to expect that France could long be kept out of it; and if France were once embarked without a previous understanding with Great Britain, her efforts might, in the first instance, be directed, if not against Belgium, at least against the countries between the Meuse and the Rhine, which are now principally occupied by the Prussian armies.

We agree, therefore, that a *rapprochement* between this country and France is most desirable at the present moment; and we shall entirely approve of your proceeding to open a confidential communication with the French government on all the subjects now under discussion, both through Prince Talleyrand at Vienna, and through the Duke of Wellington at Paris.

On whatever points France and England might be found to agree, the knowledge of a good understanding upon those points between two such Powers could hardly fail to give their united opinion considerable weight.

With respect to the line of conduct which it may be expedient for us to adopt in the event of the sudden renewal of war upon the Continent, it must depend upon such a variety of circumstances, and must be influenced so materially by the character which the war may assume, that after the fullest consideration we have found it impossible to frame instructions which can be applicable to the various contingencies to which the renewal of the war may give rise.

We are not insensible to some of the advantages which might be derived in such a case from a joint armed mediation on the part of Great Britain and France; but a measure of this kind would be so novel and extraordinary, and might be attended with so many consequences which cannot now be foreseen, that it appears to us to be quite impossible to determine upon it as a course of policy before we are distinctly acquainted with all the circumstances under which the war shall have originated, with the immediate cause of it, and with the different pretensions and expectations of the Powers who may have engaged in it.

We do not see any considerable inconvenience that can arise from our deferring any decision on this, and on other points connected with it, until the occasion shall arise, especially as we have no particular nor national interest in any of the objects which are most seriously contested at this time, and as the avowed purpose, therefore, of our policy is not to carry any point of our own, but to consolidate the peace concluded at Paris by an amicable adjustment of the differences which have unfortunately occurred amongst other Powers.

It may be of the utmost importance, in the mean time, to anticipate the Emperor of Russia, who, having carried his objects in the East of Europe, may be disposed to purchase the concurrence of France by an acquiescence in her views in other quarters. The known honour of the King of France will, however, be our best security against his contracting any engagements inconsistent with the stipulations of the peace which he has concluded, and contrary to his good faith towards us, provided we treat him and his government with that consideration and confidence which they regard not unjustly as due to them, and which may induce them to look to a cordial understanding with Great Britain as the best prospect of recovering their fair portion of influence in Europe.

We know these were the sentiments of the King of France and of his Minister when you saw them in your way through Paris in the month of August last, and we have no reason to believe that their sentiments in this respect have undergone any change since that time.

Believe me, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Downing Street, 23rd Dec., 1814.

MY DEAR LORD,

I have received your letter of the 12th two days ago, enclosing one from the Hereditary Prince of Orange, which I return.

He wrote to me much in the same style of apprehension, but I have heard that on sending an officer to Lisle on some pretence or other, he became satisfied that these alarms had no foundation. I took occasion, however, in my answer to suggest to him that we should not be able to keep British troops in the Netherlands long after the separation of the Congress; and that I hoped his father had taken measures to replace them. I also hinted to him that in making communications to you, it would be better to send any

person but an aide-de-camp, as it gave to your embassy a military appearance, which it was very advisable to avoid.

I received, at the same time that I received his private letter, a public despatch, with the complaint of several Alsatians having been detained by the French on their return back to join our regiments, although they had been furnished with passes by the French government. I answered that although the case was one which furnished fair ground of complaint, yet it was better not to appear upon the watch for complaints, and that, too, on a subject on which we were engaged in controversy with the United States of America, viz., that natural-born subjects (which the Alsatians were) could not shake off their allegiance.

Although this was not a case in point, yet it approaches enough to it to occasion a charge that we hold a different language in Europe from what we hold in America.

I will attend to your despatch to which you call my attention. We have been for the last two days so occupied with the subject of Lord Castlereagh's despatches, that I have not had time to think of anything else.

Yours ever sincerely,

BATHURST.

The Prince of Orange to Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD,

Brussels, 23rd Dec., 1814.

I received your answer to my letter a few days ago, and am very glad to find that you think with me of the possibility of a sudden attack from France upon this country, and that you recommend me to be prepared as much as possible. I am on that account very happy to see that you are willing to send me the cannons I asked for, and lose no time in sending you a return of the artillery and ammunition I am most in need of. Antwerp and Ostend are already armed, and in a very defensible state. Nieuport, Ypres, and Tournay are not so; but I fixed upon them to be immediately armed because the works at Nieuport are in a tolerable state, and can easily be defended on account of the power of the inundation by which it can be surrounded, Ypres from the tolerable state of its works, and the power of connecting it with Nieuport by inundation; and lastly, Tournay, from the strength which can be given to its citadel, and being on the direct line of march that the enemy would take from Lille to Brussels. I wish you would send me an order to restore these places with earth-works in the shortest possible time. I shall have to write to you very fully by the next post, but I have no time to-day.

Most truly yours,

WILLIAM, HERED. PRINCE OF ORANGE.

Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD,

Vienna, 24th Dec., 1814.

Although no overture has yet been made to me by any of the Powers with respect to the Ionian Islands, and as my object has been to keep this possession in our hands to the last, as a security for the due observance of all engagements in which we are interested, I am desirous of throwing before you some ideas upon this point, in order that I may learn, if possible, before I am called upon to explain myself, the general view the Cabinet now take of this question.

We have hitherto never laid claim to retain these islands as a British possession: on the contrary, at Châtillon and at Paris there was a sort of understanding that they were to be given to the King of Sicily as a part of his indemnity. So long as he is excluded from Naples, to this appropriation, if not declined by him, I think we might hold, to the exclusion of any other project; and so long as Ferdinand IV. does not occupy the continent of Italy, Austria will not object to his having the Ionian Islands: but she would object, and justly, to both shores of the entrance to the Adriatic being in the hands of the same Power.

The events that have passed since the Peace of Paris, and especially the conduct of Russia with respect to the Duchy of Warsaw, might afford ground for a new claim on our part to further advantages; but if our policy is to try the chance of peace, I doubt the prudence of directly hazarding a new demand of this description on our own part.

In disposing of these islands there are, as it appears to me, two paramount objects to be attended to: the one to provide adequately for the protection of the people who have so long confided themselves to our care, the other not to suffer Russia to acquire any establishment in those islands to the hazard of the internal tranquillity both of Greece and Hungary, which latter kingdom is full of Greeks.

With respect to the first of these objects, it might be secured by some arrangement resembling that lately framed for Genoa; but in order to steer clear of the old republican form of government, which might afford a pretext for the revival of Russian protection, it appears to me desirable to give a direct sovereignty over these islands, under whatever conditions may be thought right, to some acknowledged European Power; and if this Power cannot be Great Britain, in order to exclude Russia we may insist that the sovereign authority shall belong to a local Power, that is, to the King of Sicily or to the Emperor of Austria, according as the kingdom of Naples may remain with Murat or return under the dominion of the ancient family: in the latter case the sovereignty to belong to Austria.

The principal utility of the Seven Islands to Great Britain being the convenience of their harbours for purposes of refreshment and commerce, especially in war, might not they be neutralized, as was intended with respect to Malta in 1801, and their ports rendered free, on very moderate duties, to all nations? If this were the object, perhaps the works at Corfu should be demolished, and the system guaranteed by all the great Powers.

A sovereign authority ought, nevertheless, to be confided to some neighbouring State, to guard against local cabals, and to give unity and weight

to the executive government; but this sovereignty, I apprehend, by a special capitulation might be rendered consistent with such a system.

There is a native of these islands, M. Capo d'Istria, now here. He is a man of ability, has for some time acted as Russian Plenipotentiary in Switzerland, and is at present much employed by the Emperor. In speaking of these islands one day to Mr. Cooke, he said that, as a Russian Minister, he must promote whatever objects his Court might give him in charge; but that, as a native, his opinion was that these islands, for their own happiness and prosperity, should remain under the protection of Great Britain, as the greatest maritime Power, the best able to secure to them the advantages of their flag, and the freedom of their commerce.

I should be glad if you would ask Lord Bathurst whether any reports have reached him of General Campbell having taken up an unusual system of terror, if not of severity, to the people of Corfu since his arrival there. Such a report was communicated to me some time after my arrival here, and, upon inquiry, I have reason to believe there is some foundation for it. He is represented as an honourable, just, and well-meaning man, but as having shocked the prejudices of the people, and rendered us unpopular, by hanging culprits in chains, and erecting the gallows and other engines of punishment in the public walk of the town. I desired Mr. Cooke to apprise him in a private letter of these stories, that he might enable us to correct misrepresentations.

Believe me to be ever, my dear Lord, very sincerely yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

E. Cooke, Esq., to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD,

Vienna, 24th Dec., 1814.

I have received your Lordship's letter of the 8th.

Matters here go on slow. I think the Commission of the Five Powers, to ascertain the disposable number of *souls*, may be of use, and lead to accommodation, though the Prussians talk loudly.

What chiefly delays us is, that the Emperor of Russia does not like to return to Petersburg. The Russians cannot brook the idea of separating the Polish provinces acquired by Catherine. I know the Emperor begins to confine his plans of a Polish kingdom to the Duchy of Warsaw; and my belief is he will give up even this. His great object is to extend himself as near the Oder as he can; and I fear he will succeed; and the consequences are alarming, whatever confusion may arise for a moment. He trusts in having the King of Prussia as his vassal.

You will observe from the new *démarche* of his communicating in person the Prussian Memoir to the Emperor of Austria, his dirty views of overturning Metternich, also his silly courting of Prince Schwarzenberg. This game is too plain. The latter is a firm, honourable man; and the Emperor of Austria will not suffer Russia to dictate to his Ministers.

Talleyrand's paper is shabby on the Polish point. His nonsensical tirade about the rights of kings is a copy of the note of which I gave your Lordship an account, and which I induced him to postpone. It is a device

to kill two birds with one stone: to preserve the Saxon, and restore the Sicilian. The doctrine is not very suitable to our meridian.

He was in an amazing rage at the idea of his being left out of the *Population* Commission, and threatened to order his horses. Lord Castlereagh managed the admission of his Plenipotentiary with some difficulty.

Metternich, though he has been forced to use France on the Saxon point, will not go further till driven. He still hearkens to Naples, and will cling to that point as long as he can. I think him very silly: for your Lordship observes that Talleyrand keeps his game open with Prussia; and I am certain France and Austria will never unite till the Neapolitan point is conceded.

The only point I really fear for us is the Dutch loan. Is it not capable of statement so as to affect our honour as a nation after Russian conduct and our protests against it? Lord Castlereagh does not seem to dread it; but I doubt. I think the subscribing the Polish arrangement, on other matters being adjusted, defensible, but adding six millions as a bonus very difficult to swallow. Is it not a reward for an encroachment dangerous to Europe, incompatible with durable peace, and a glaring defiance of the most solemn treaties, and of their binding quality? As I told your Lordship I was very nervous, you will impute my fears to my bad health.

I understand the Russian troops are leaving Holstein, &c. The evacuation is not rapid; they march in *pelotons* of 2000 men.

Ever your Lordship's most obedient and faithful servant,

E. COOKE.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

[830.]

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 25th Dec., 1814.

You will see my despatch to Lord Castlereagh about Murat, the duplicate of which I send to Vienna with a request to Lord Castlereagh to say nothing upon the subject till he will hear from you.

I concur very much in opinion with the King that the chances of disturbance, particularly in this country, are very much increased by leaving Murat on the throne of Naples. If he were gone, Buonaparte in Elba would not be an object of great dread. You must be the best judge whether you ought or can come forward upon this occasion. If you should determine to do so, what follows will show you the means which are requisite, which are in your power, and my opinion of the probable expense.

If the British government should undertake this operation, it should be performed by the armies of the Allies of the Peninsular War, which might be got in the following proportions: viz. 10,000

infantry from Spain, 12,000 infantry from Portugal, 20,000 of all arms from Great Britain, and 10,000 of all arms from Sicily, with 60 pieces of field artillery and a battering train from Great Britain. The whole to assemble in Sicily in transports to be found by Great Britain. This force, with 40,000 men which might be sent from the southern ports of France by sea into the Roman States, would be more than sufficient to insure the object almost without striking a blow. I conceive that there must now be disposable in Sicily and other parts of the Mediterranean and Gibraltar of British troops 10,000 infantry; the remainder would come from Flanders when relieved from the occupation of that country and from England, including 1500 or 1600 dragoons and ten companies of artillery.

This operation would probably last four months from the time the troops would embark in the Peninsula till their return; and calculating all their expenses at the round sum of a dollar a day for each man, which is a large allowance, as the calculation is founded upon the Peninsula prices, the expense would be 1,200,000*l.*; to which would be to be added about 300,000*l.* for transports, which I suppose would be in the service for six months; from this sum would be to be subtracted the pay and ordinary expense of the British troops for the four months.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[831.]

To the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 25th Dec., 1814.

I wish to recommend the pretensions of Mr. Lionel Hervey to your consideration. He has now been with me for some time, and has conducted himself much to my satisfaction. He possesses talents to become a very useful servant to the public, and I should wish to see him employed in some situation in which he would be paid for his services.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

A SHORT STATEMENT OF FACTS RELATING TO THE CLAIMS
OF BRITISH CREDITORS ON THE FRENCH FUNDS. BY
MR. Q. CRAUFURD.

25th Dec., 1814.

The treatment received by the British creditors in the French Funds has hitherto excited little of the public attention; it has been supposed by some to be a subject involving the interests of a few individuals only: a plain statement of facts will show that the honour of the nation is as much implicated in it as the interests of its subjects.

The commercial and pecuniary transactions between Great Britain and France during the Monarchy and the first three years of the Revolution (before the war broke out), in which period the debts at present due to British individuals from the French government originated, took their rise from the Commercial Treaty of 1786. It was at that time thought by the Legislature conducive to the interests of the nation to encourage and guarantee transactions of that nature by the utmost protection they could derive from the faith of nations solemnly pledged. The second article of the Treaty is as follows:—

“For the future security of commerce and friendship between the subjects of their said Majesties, and to the end that this good correspondence may be preserved from all interruption and disturbance, it is concluded and agreed, that if at any time there shall arise any misunderstanding, breach of friendship, or rupture, between the Crowns of their Majesties, which God forbid! (which rupture shall not be deemed to exist until the recalling or sending home of the respective Ambassadors and Ministers,) the subjects of each of the two parties residing in the dominions of the other shall have the privilege of remaining and continuing their trade therein without any manner of disturbance, so long as they behave peaceably, and commit no offence against the laws and ordinances; and in case their conduct should render them suspected, and the respective governments should be obliged to order them to remove, the term of twelve months shall be allowed them for that purpose, in order that they may remove with their effects and property, whether entrusted to individuals or to the State. At the same time it is to be understood that this favour is not to be extended to those who shall act contrary to the established laws.”

The British subjects who have, unfortunately for themselves, entrusted their property to individuals or the State in France, have incurred some degree of obloquy from persons who, it must be supposed, were ignorant of the provisions of this Treaty. Such persons will see, by the perusal of the above article, that they must withdraw that censure, unless they have the presumption to extend it to the Legislature of that time, and the great statesman then at the head of His Majesty's government, who did all in their power to promote the intercourse, now reprobated, between the two countries.

It never was contended here or in France that the new government which arose at the Revolution was not bound by the Treaties of the old one. The manner in which the French government executed this article of the Commercial Treaty, when a misunderstanding arose between the two countries, was by throwing all the British subjects in France into prison, and sequestering all their property.

Was it not incumbent on the British government, when peace was restored, to provide that its subjects should not suffer by so flagrant a breach of treaty? The Legislature and Ministry of that time at least thought so. They im-

mediately, as a measure of retaliation, sequestered all the French property here; for what end, unless to ensure a mutual restoration and reciprocal justice?

According to this principle the late Ministry uniformly acted. When a negotiation for the restoration of peace took place at Lisle, in the year 1797, Lord Malmesbury delivered the projet of a treaty to the French negotiators, of which the following was the eighteenth article:—

“All sequestrations imposed by any of the parties named in this treaty, on the rights, properties, or debts of individuals belonging to any other of the said parties, shall be taken off; and the property of whatever kind shall be restored in the fullest manner to the lawful owner, or just compensation be made for it.” It then provides for the decision of all questions of property between individuals in the regular courts of justice, and concludes thus: “And if any complaint should arise respecting the execution of this article, which complaint shall not be settled by mutual agreement between the respective governments within twelve months after the same shall have been preferred to them, the same shall be determined by sworn Commissioners, to be appointed on each side, with power to call in an arbitrator of any indifferent nation; and the decision of the said Commissioners shall be binding, and without appeal.” This article was one of the few that remained unobjected to by the French government; but, unfortunately for the British creditors, the negotiation broke off on other points.

The preliminaries of the late Peace were signed October 1st, 1801. The twelfth article is as follows:—

“All sequestrations imposed by either of the parties on the funded property, revenues, or debts of any description, belonging to either of the contracting Powers, or their subjects or citizens, shall be taken off immediately after the signature of the Definitive Treaty.” It proceeds to provide for the decision of disputes between individuals by the competent tribunals of the respective countries, and concludes thus: “It is agreed moreover, that this article, immediately after the ratification of the Definitive Treaty, shall apply to the Allies of the contracting parties, and to the individuals of the respective nations, upon the condition of a just reciprocity.”

When the Preliminary Treaty was published the British creditors had reason to regret that the execution of this article in their favour was not secured, as was proposed in the former negotiation, by the appointment of Commissioners to decide on their claims, in case the French government should be indisposed to do them justice. But, upon the whole, they were satisfied that their own government would support them in the prosecution of their rights, as they did not imagine that by the condition of a just reciprocity could be understood that the French creditor in the English Funds should receive his whole property, principal and interest, undiminished; and that the English creditor in the French Funds should receive such a proportion only as the arbitrary and unjust government of France should be pleased to bestow on him, which has turned out to be, as might be expected in the latter case, nothing at all. The English creditors thought themselves under the protection of their own government, as they had a right to be, and not the unprotected victims of a foreign despotism. They met, and appointed a Committee, who waited on the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to request and claim that protection in the ensuing negotiation at Amiens.

Lord Cornwallis began the conferences with J. Buonaparte, the French plenipotentiary, at Amiens, in January, 1802.

In the conference of the 19th January (29 Nivose), as stated in the protocol, or official document, published by the French government, “Lord

Cornwallis demanded that the article relative to the sequestrations should be inserted literally in the Definitive Treaty as it stood in the preliminaries, and in the projet presented by his government. He observed that the additional clause of the French contre-projet, which says 'that English creditors in France cannot be more favoured than the French themselves,' would be prejudicial to the English nation, inasmuch as the English government had not touched the property, effects, or funds of any Frenchman : that of France, on the contrary, had seized all that the English had in France, and had made only imaginary reimbursements. Whatever right the French government had to proceed in this manner towards French citizens, according to the law of circumstances, it could not so dispose of what belonged to the English citizen." From this extract we see that the idea of treating the British creditors in the French Funds on the footing of Frenchmen, and thereby setting aside "the just reciprocity" stipulated for in the Preliminary Treaty, originated in a contre-projet of the French government, and that it was resisted by Lord Cornwallis, as so unjust and degrading a proposition deserved. It appears by the subsequent proceedings that it was successfully resisted ; for in the same protocol it is stated that France renounced, among many others, this article of her contre-projet : and it is further stated in the protocol of the 6th of March, "That the Ministers of the French Republic and His Britannic Majesty having met, Citizen J. Buonaparte presented the note and projet following. The undersigned has removed from this projet everything that might protract the discussions ; it is composed, first, of articles taken literally from the preliminaries ; they are unattackable." Among these the twelfth article of the Preliminary Treaty is named ; and the fourteenth article of the French Projet is as follows : "All the sequestered property placed on either side in the Funds, Revenues, and Trusts, of whatever sort they may be, belonging to any one of the contracting Powers, or to its citizens and subjects, shall be delivered up immediately after the signature of this Definitive Treaty."

Thus was the proposition of treating the British creditors on the same footing with Frenchmen, brought forward by the French plenipotentiary at Amiens, rejected by Lord Cornwallis, and given up by J. Buonaparte ; yet most unaccountably, when the Definitive Treaty was concluded, the last clause of the article respecting the mutual restoration of sequestered property was left out. The words omitted are these : "It is agreed moreover, that the article, immediately after the ratification of the Definitive Treaty, shall apply to the Allies of the contracting parties, and to the individuals of the respective nations, upon the condition of a just reciprocity."

The immediate consequence of the signature of the Definitive Treaty to the French creditor in the English Funds was, the restitution of his principal, and the payment of all arrears of interest in pursuance of it. The English creditors demanded the same justice, and the same execution of the Treaty at Paris. In answer to this demand, they were informed that the Treaty of Amiens had no relation to their case ; that they had no reason to expect better terms than the Dutch and Genoese, who had been the friends and allies of France ; that they must be content to lose the whole arrears of their interest, two-thirds of their capital, which had been paid off or reimbursed (as they call it) during the war, and for the remaining third must receive an inscription in a Five per Cent. Stock, taken as at par, though the price was then 50. So that according to this proposition, a creditor for 6000*l.*, besides the loss of all his interest, found his capital reduced to 1000*l.* Some, in despair, accepted these unequal terms ; but their compliance was useless to preserve even a wreck of their property, for they could never obtain a farthing.

Other English creditors, who did not despair of the honour and justice of their own country, applied to Mr. Merry, the English resident at Paris, for protection against this injustice. Mr. Merry promised to apply for instructions to his own government, and make an application to that of France for the execution of the treaty. If any application was made by him, the French government treated it with silent contempt.

Finding no hope from Mr. Merry, the English creditors, in September, 1802, assembled in London, and appointed a Committee for the prosecution of their claims, who, requesting an audience of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stated their case to him, and presented a memorial, claiming the assistance of their country against this injustice and breach of treaty. The Secretary of State promised them an answer as soon as the opinion of His Majesty's Ministers could be taken upon it. The memorial was presented on or about the 20th of September. No answer was received till about the 11th of January, when the Committee reported to the creditors, that although they had reason to lament many opinions expressed by the Secretary of State in the course of their conference, and although he considered them as having no right to better terms than French citizens (notwithstanding his Lordship was reminded that such a proposition was made by the French plenipotentiary at the negotiation, and positively rejected by Lord Cornwallis), yet they were happy to add that his Lordship had promised to write to Lord Whitworth at Paris, to obtain such justice as they were entitled to.

In order further to elucidate this subject, and to show at once the difficulties of the principle rejected by Lord Cornwallis, and revived (apparently in direct contravention of the spirit and letter of the Treaties of Peace) by Lord Hawkesbury, viz. that of putting the English creditors on the footing of French ones, it will be useful to state the following facts. During the late war the several factions that rose to power in France pretended uniformly to respect and pay the utmost attention to the claims of the public creditors. The interest was regularly paid till September, 1796, either in specie or in assignats and mandats, the current paper of the country. These to Frenchmen, however depreciated in comparison of specie, were of considerable value, being receivable for all taxes and contributions; and while the law of the maximum lasted, a legal tender at a fixed price even for the necessities of life. From that period to March, 1797, the dividends were ordered to be paid one-fourth in specie, and three-fourths in Bons; a species of paper having an advantage over the assignats and mandats, as being receivable in the purchase of national property. From March, 1797, to March, 1798, the dividends were paid entirely in Bons, which were circulated at a trifling loss. About this time two-thirds of the National Debt (converted into capital by valuing the Life Annuities at ten, and the Perpetual at twenty, years' purchase) were paid off (reimbursed, the French call it) in Bons, not bearing interest, but convertible by French creditors only into national property, and consequently to them of great value. The remaining third of the debt was funded in a Five per Cent. Stock at par, called the *Tiers Consolidé*: the interest of this remaining third was paid from March, 1798, to September, 1799, in Bons, which, when issued, were at a very small discount; from September, 1799, to September, 1800, in Bons of another description, which had nearly maintained their value at the commencement of the present war. Since September, 1800, the interest of the *Tiers Consolidé*, now called the *Cinque pour Cens*, though sometimes six months in arrear, has been paid in specie. Most of the French paper formerly in circulation had been annihilated by the Directory, or funded at the rate of about two per cent. by a Consular Decree, before any of it could possibly come into possession of any English creditor.

This short statement shows how extremely difficult it would have been, if not impracticable, to adjust the equivalents to be received by the English creditors for the various advantages enjoyed by Frenchmen during the war (independent of the reimbursement), which could not be common to them. But the French government, to show they had no serious design to do justice to the English creditors, even upon this principle, had, since the Peace, passed a decree (evidently aimed at them), which postponed all funding of unbooked debts to the 22nd of September, 1803, and declared that such debts should only bear interest from that time. This, at one blow, struck off ten years' interest from the claims of the English creditors, and seems, upon all principles, a direct breach of the Treaty of Amiens. So secure was France of making her will the law.

Such was the state of the English creditors, when Lord Whitworth was sent ambassador to Paris: the well-known manliness and energy of his character revived their hopes that the dignity of their country would again be established on its ancient ground, and that Englishmen would no longer be injured and insulted with impunity. They were not deceived in their expectations: upon receiving a statement of the creditors' case, his Lordship presented a vigorous remonstrance to the French government, and declared he would never cease to demand for them the same justice which the French creditors had received in England, and which he conceived was due to them by treaty, unless he should be prohibited from persisting by the government of England. Nor was it only by memorials that Lord Whitworth asserted the rights of the nation he represented; in his famous conference with Buonaparte of the 21st of February, 1803, as reported by himself to Lord Hawkesbury, he says, "I alleged, as a cause of mistrust and jealousy, the impossibility of obtaining justice, or any kind of redress, for any of His Majesty's subjects. He asked me in what respect. I told him that, since the signing of the treaty, not one British claimant had been satisfied, though every Frenchman of that description had been so within one month after that period." This dignified and firm conduct of Lord Whitworth, so worthy of the ancient character of his country, promised to produce the happiest effects for the interests of the British creditors. A proposition had been made by Lord Whitworth to the French Minister, and accepted by him on the part of his government, to appoint Commissioners of both countries for the liquidation of the claims of the British creditors; and this proposition was actually lying before our Ministry, for their confirmation and approval, when the war broke out.

Upon the renewal of the war, after the short peace of Amiens, discussions on the justice and policy of that measure took place in Parliament: on that occasion Mr. Pitt, in a speech which was considered by all who heard it as one of the most powerful effusions of his great mind, but which unfortunately was lost to the public by being delivered when the doors of the House of Commons were closed, insisted strongly on the conduct of the French government to the British creditors as a just cause of war. It was not to be expected that the great author of the Commercial Treaty, though no longer at the head of His Majesty's councils, should patiently endure the outrage and contumely to which British subjects had exposed themselves by pursuing objects pointed out to them as legitimate and desirable by the measures of his public policy. For the effect of that speech, and the conviction it produced, the creditors can only refer to the Members of Parliament who heard it. When Mr. Pitt soon afterwards resumed his seat at the head of the Treasury, he had an opportunity of publicly testifying his sense of the duty of the King's Ministers, in a case analogous to that here stated, though not attended with circum-

stances so aggravated. The Spanish Ministers, under the influence of France, as soon as the war broke out, sequestered all the property of British subjects vested in their government paper. Fortunately for the Spanish creditors, some frigates, captured before the declaration of war, became the property of the Crown, as droits of Admiralty. Mr. Pitt, immediately, on the application of the creditors to him, directed the proceeds of those frigates to be applied to the extinction of their debt; though they had only to complain of the violation of a general law, and not of a particular treaty.

The fact above stated proves how heavy a loss the British creditors of France sustained by the death of Mr. Pitt, which, in addition to the public causes of mourning which involved the whole empire, they lamented as a private calamity. When, however, a negotiation was opened with the French government by his successor, Mr. Fox, they stated their case to him, in full confidence, from the candour and manliness of his character, that he would freely state the impression it made on him, and vigorously support the rights of British subjects, and the honour of His Majesty's government, of both which he was then the guardian. They were not deceived in their expectations. Though Mr. Fox's health was at that time such that it was impossible for him to admit the Committee of Creditors to a personal audience, he assured them, through his secretary, Sir Francis Vincent, "that, although he could not pledge government to anything specific, they might rely on his disposition to do for them everything in his power."

Such has been the process of the losses and disappointments under which the creditors have suffered during upwards of twenty years. In answer to their demand of justice, at Paris, after the Treaty of Amiens, they were amused by the revolutionary government with arguments and statements, manifestly inapplicable to their case, till the renewal of the war put an end to their hopes. It was not, indeed, surprising that even the Ministers of this country should be awed by the predominating power of Buonaparte, at which the rest of Europe trembled; it was not surprising that the claims of the creditors should be contemptuously rejected, when even the British Ambassador, in the Palace of the Tuileries, was subject to contumely and outrage. Happily the scene has lately been completely reversed. Great Britain has with glory resumed her seat among the nations of Europe: good faith and honour will, we trust, re-establish their influence over the councils of France. It is to be hoped that the British Ministry will have no very arduous task to perform in securing justice to its own subjects from that illustrious House which, under Providence, is principally indebted for its restoration to the dauntless and indefatigable perseverance of the British nation; and were the equity of their case less firmly grounded than it is in the principles of public law and national honour, were the government of France less urged by the clearest dictates of policy to a full restoration of British property entrusted to the faith of the nation solemnly pledged, the creditors could scarcely be considered as too romantic, during the period of universal jubilee, in expecting to find a powerful auxiliary in their gratitude.

E. Cooke, Esq., to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD,

Vienna, 25th Dec., 1814.

Your Lordship will see the appearance of a new effort of the Emperor of Russia to keep everything in his own hands. He has managed his Polish

business, or nearly so, between the three Powers without England. He is evidently trying to do the same by the Saxon point; and if he can conciliate Austria in this arrangement, I fear he will use all his arts to settle every other question in the same exclusive manner. This may be dangerous.

Ever most faithfully your Lordship's servant,

E. COOKE.

Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LIVERPOOL,

Vienna, 25th Dec., 1814.

I am always unwilling to think sanguinely of things in progress, but various concurring circumstances induce me to consider the probabilities of a settlement greatly increased. This feeling transpires from so many quarters, and the irritation so visibly subsides, that if France and the King of Saxony will assist us in assigning liberally to Prussia out of Saxony, I think we shall at last work it through. Russia, notwithstanding the embarrassment in which Prince Repnin's proclamation has placed her, will not encourage Prussia to resist, now she has secured her own arrangement in Poland. We must be as liberal as we can to Prussia, notwithstanding her shabbiness. Humboldt's *calcul*, I always suspected, was *to take great care* not to save so much of Poland as to weaken their claim to the whole of Saxony. I was aware of this device when I wrote my letter of the 11th of October, which expressly bars the precise case which has occurred as not giving any claim for British support, viz., Saxony being the compensation for an excessive cession of territory to Russia on the side of Poland.

You will see that the correspondence between Austria and France essentially alters the posture of the latter Power. France is now a principal in the question. Talleyrand's note is written for impression. He was urgent in his language to me two days since to begin with an engagement between France, Austria, and England. I told him that I thought we were already united in opinion, and that to form an alliance prematurely might augment the chances of war rather than of an amicable settlement, which I trusted was the object we all had in view. His tone was very high and hostile to Prussia. Austria is, on the contrary, as conciliatory as is consistent with the preservation of a substantive position in Saxony to the King.

I am, my dear Liverpool, yours sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

[832.]

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 26th Dec., 1814.

I send you the copy of a letter which I have written to Lord Liverpool with my despatch regarding Murat. The King is

anxious that nothing should be said upon the subject at Vienna until I shall receive an answer from England.

Blacas explained to me last night how it happens that the King can give only 40,000 men. He says that they cannot venture to employ upon this service either Generals, officers, or troops who have served immediately under the command of Murat, and that they must therefore select them.

Adverting to the temper prevailing in England, and to the state of the finances, I think it most probable the government will not enter into this scheme, and that Murat will escape. After all, our coming forward as principals is rather a delicate matter under all the circumstances of the Austrian treaty, and the suspension of hostilities, and the Austrians being so far satisfied with Murat's performance of his engagements as not to join in an attack upon him.

However, of this I am very certain, that Murat's continuance at Naples increases the chances of disturbance in France, which would again disturb all Europe.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[833.]

To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley.

MY DEAR HENRY,

Paris, 27th Dec., 1814.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from the King's Plenipotentiaries at Ghent, announcing the signature on the 24th instant with the Plenipotentiaries of the United States of a treaty of peace and amity. Pray communicate this intelligence to Mr. Canning.

Ever yours most affectionately,

WELLINGTON.

Mr. and Mrs. Pole arrived on Saturday with my boys and your Gerald. They are all very well, and Gerald much improved.

The Earl of Liverpool to Mr. Canning.

MY DEAR CANNING,

Fife House, 28th Dec., 1814.

I have received your private letters of the 9th inst. I am sorry to find that you should have been visited at Lisbon by a fit of the gout. As a warm climate has, however, generally been found to be the most effectual remedy for this disorder, I trust the next packet will bring us an account of your entire recovery.

You will hear by this conveyance of the restoration of peace between this country and the United States of America. The general nature of the terms is accurately stated in the public papers. I will endeavour to send you a copy of the treaty by the next packet.

You know how anxious I was that we should get out of this war as soon as we could do so with honour. This anxiety was increased by communications which I had (after you left London) with the Duke of Wellington. He had agreed to take the command of the army in the ensuing campaign, if the war should continue; but he was particularly solicitous for peace, being fully satisfied that there was no vulnerable point of importance belonging to the United States which we could hope to take and hold except New Orleans, and this settlement is one of the most unhealthy in any part of America.

We might certainly land in different parts of their coast, and destroy some of their towns, or put them under contribution; but in the present state of the public mind in America it would be in vain to expect any permanent good effects from operations of this nature.

The continuance of the war for the purpose of obtaining a better frontier for Canada would, I am persuaded, have been found impracticable; for when that question came to be argued, it would be stated, and stated with truth, that no additional frontier which you could possibly expect to obtain would materially add to the security of Canada.

The weakness of Canada consists in this: that the United States possess 7,500,000 people; the two Canadas not more than 300,000. That the government of the United States have access to Canada at all times of the year, whereas Great Britain is excluded from such access for nearly six months. As long as we have the larger and better army we shall be able to defend the country, notwithstanding all these disadvantages; but the frontier must in any case be of such prodigious extent that it never could be made, as frontier, defensible against the means which the Americans might bring against it.

In addition to these considerations, we could not overlook the clamour which has been raised against the property-tax, and the difficulties we shall certainly have in continuing it for one year, to discharge the arrears of the war.

From all I have heard, I do not believe it would have been possible to have continued it for the purpose of carrying on an American war, even though the negotiation had turned upon points on which persons were more generally agreed than on the question of Canadian boundary.

The question therefore was whether, under all these circumstances, it was not better to conclude the peace at the present moment, before the im-

patience of the country on the subject had been manifested at public meetings or by motions in Parliament, provided we could conclude it by obliging the American Commissioners to waive all stipulations whatever on the subject of maritime rights, by fulfilling our engagements to the Indians who were abandoned in the Treaty of 1783, and by declining to revive in favour of the United States any of the commercial advantages which they enjoyed under former treaties. As far as I have any means of judging, our decision is generally approved.

I wrote to Bristol and Liverpool the night the treaty arrived. I have had a most satisfactory answer this morning from Bristol, both respecting the peace and the terms of it. I shall probably hear from your friend Gladstone by the post on Friday.

The negotiations at Vienna are not proceeding in the way we could wish. Not that I think there is any chance of their leading to hostilities, but a great deal of irritation will, I fear, remain; and this consideration itself was deserving of some weight in deciding the question of peace with America.

Fortunately for us the fate of the Low Countries was decided by a secret article in the Treaty of Paris. We are not apprehensive therefore of any serious difficulty on this point.

The question likewise respecting the annexation of Genoa, under certain conditions, to the King of Sardinia's dominions, has been arranged to the satisfaction of all parties, even to that of the representative of the state of Genoa at Vienna.

The negotiations respecting Switzerland are likewise in a favourable course, and all might therefore have ended smoothly and well (except, perhaps, the very difficult question of Naples) if it had not been for the extravagant pretensions of the Emperor of Russia regarding Poland. On this subject we have only a distant and contingent interest, and we must endeavour to prevent the differences respecting it leading to a renewal of war on the Continent. It is a curious circumstance that all the Russians are against the Emperor. He does not even venture to trust them with the correspondence which passes through Prince Czartoriski, who at present holds no official situation under him.

I am persuaded, from all I hear, that the Emperor of Russia will never be able to carry his own views and promises respecting Poland into execution. The Russians never will submit to the Polish provinces (which have been incorporated with Russia) being severed again from the Russian Empire and reunited to the Duchy of Warsaw for the purpose of forming a kingdom of Poland. They will not be reconciled to it on the plea of the Sovereign being their own Emperor. Nay, some say that they would prefer the alternative (if Poland is to be reconstructed) that it should be reconstructed under an independent Sovereign.

If the Emperor of Russia cannot carry into effect the expectations he has held out to the Poles in this respect, they will be grievously disappointed, and he will not have accomplished the purpose of making them faithful and attached subjects. In short, in whatever way the affairs of Poland can now be settled, they will afford ample ground for war and confusion hereafter.

I think of going to Bath for a fortnight about the beginning of next week.

We must look forward to a very active session. I have not seen for several years so much party animosity as appeared during the three weeks of November whilst Parliament was sitting.

A great struggle will probably take place on the Property-Tax. I hope we shall be able to carry it for a year: in which case, if peace continues, substitutes may be found, though none in my judgment so equal and just; but many of the persons who have been praising the tax for the last ten years as the greatest discovery in finance, are now the most loud in disapproving and objecting to the continuance of it.

I send you a copy of the treaty with America, a few copies of which, for the sake of convenience, have been printed at the private press in the Foreign Office. As the treaty cannot, however, properly be published until the ratifications of it are exchanged, I shall be obliged to you if you will not let this copy go out of your own hands.

I shall be most happy to hear that Mrs. Canning and your family are well, and have not suffered in consequence of the passage, and particularly how the climate agrees with your eldest son, and whether you think he gains ground in consequence of it.

LIVERPOOL.

The French Commissioners to the British Commissioners.

28 Déc., 1814.

Les Commissaires de Sa Majesté Très Chrétienne voient avec le plus grand regret dans la note que Messieurs les Commissaires Anglais leur ont fait l'honneur de leur adresser le 16 courant que Messieurs les Commissaires de Sa Majesté Britannique ne reconnaissent pas la justice des bases de la liquidation des rentes sur la France appartenantes à des créanciers Anglais qui ont été exposées dans la note des Commissaires Français en date du 10 de ce mois.

Messieurs les Commissaires de Sa Majesté Britannique pensent que l'article 4 additionnel du traité de paix du 30 Mai dernier révoque en faveur des créanciers Anglais les lois de déchéance et de réduction intervenues sur le fait de la dette publique en France depuis l'année 1792.

Les Commissaires de S.M. Très Chrétienne ne peuvent partager cette opinion: ils sont convaincus, au contraire, que si l'intention du gouvernement Français en souscrivant ce traité de paix eut été de révoquer ces lois dont l'exécution est en vigueur, et générale depuis plusieurs années, le traité de paix du 30 Mai en eut dû contenir et en eut contenir la stipulation formelle et précise. Ils pensent qu'une révocation de faveur d'une loi commune et en vigueur ne peut se déduire par induction, et qu'ils s'écarteroient de leur devoir s'ils se permettaient ainsi d'interpréter le traité de paix du 30 Mai dernier, et de porter, jusqu'à y ajouter un supplément de cette importance, l'extrême désir qu'ils ont de se trouver d'accord avec Messieurs les Commissaires Anglais.

Messieurs les Commissaires de Sa Majesté Britannique réclament la réciprocité des procédés libéraux du gouvernement Anglais envers les créanciers étrangers qui n'ont pas été soumis aux taxes nationales. Les Commissaires de S.M. Très Chrétienne ne peuvent que donner des éloges justes et sincères

à cette conduite du peuple Anglais, et que regretter amèrement que les derniers gouvernemens Français s'en soient écartés ; mais le traité de paix du 30 Mai dernier n'autorise pas les Commissaires de S.M. Très Chrétienne à reparer les torts ou les erreurs des derniers gouvernemens Français, ni à recommencer la législation.

Pour que la stipulation de réciprocité fit une loi aux Commissaires de S.M. Très Chrétienne d'excepter les créanciers Anglais de l'effet des lois Françaises sur le fait de la dette publique, il faudrait qu'ils eussent à imiter une loi Anglaise qui eut excepté les créanciers Français, intéressés dans les fonds publics Anglais, de la rigueur d'une loi portée contre les créanciers étrangers en Angleterre. Une telle loi n'existe pas. Tous les créanciers étrangers intéressés dans les fonds publics en Angleterre ont été traités avec une faveur égale. Il n'y a point de faveur particulière accordée aux créanciers Français.

Cependant, pour répondre autant qu'il est en leur pouvoir aux principes libéraux du gouvernement Anglais, les Commissaires de S.M. Très Chrétienne ont proposé de relever les créanciers Anglais de la déchéance prononcée par les lois Françaises contre tous les intéressés dans la dette publique Française non liquidée, et cette exception est uniquement et exclusivement en faveur des créanciers Anglais ; elle n'est accordée à aucun autre créancier étranger ni même à aucun régnicole.

Messieurs les Commissaires de S.M. Très Chrétienne ne peuvent exprimer à Messieurs les Commissaires de Sa Majesté Britannique à quel point ils souhaiteraient les trouver sensibles à la justice de ces principes et de ces observations, persuadés comme ils le sont de l'extrême désir de leur Souverain de donner en toute occasion des témoignages de ses sentimens particuliers pour le gouvernement et le peuple Anglais.

Les Commissaires de Sa Majesté Très Chrétienne ont l'honneur de renouveler à Messieurs les Commissaires de Sa Majesté Britannique l'assurance de leur haute considération.

DUFRESNE ST. LEON.
KESNER.
PERNOT FONTENOY.

H. Goulburn, Esq., to Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD,

Ghent, 30th Dec., 1814.

I am very much obliged to you for your kind congratulations, and assure you that I shall gladly avail myself of the opportunity of returning home as soon as I can leave this place with propriety ; but the civility of the inhabitants, and their unfortunate disposition to celebrate the signature of our treaty by a fête, will detain me here till the end of next week.

I regret that you should consider any difficulties likely to arise from the alteration made by us in the treaty with respect to the period at which hostilities were to cease. The alteration was certainly suggested by the Americans, who stated themselves to be desirous of preventing any unnecessary prolongation of hostilities, to which a delay in the transmission of the ratification might give rise, and who strongly pressed the point as

one which they were bound both by their duty and inclination to urge. We thought it more graceful in us to yield a point on which resistance might be construed into a desire to prolong hostilities, and we thought we did so quite safely in substituting the words recommended to us in our first instruction, which we thought equally calculated to prevent any chicanery on the part of the United States. I confess that I do not see how the word "alteration" can give rise to a quibble, for as it is the treaty which is to be ratified without alteration, it as much excludes the subduction or addition of an article as it does the alteration of any individual article. But in fact we give them nothing by the change, for hostilities cannot cease until the fact of Madison's ratification is officially communicated to our troops by some person specially appointed by us to ascertain the fact, and that person will in all probability be the bearer of the ratification. I trust, however, that I shall be better able to explain when we meet the grounds upon which this alteration was made.

By one of the American notes which we send home to-day you will see that they decline giving us the proof which they say they possess of our seducing and selling their negroes. I learnt, however, from Mr. Clay that there is but one deposition on the subject; that that one does not go to the real charge, because, as he said, it was impossible that the deponent, being resident in the United States, should have cognizance of the completion of the offence, which must have taken place in the British West Indies. He promised, however, to show me privately the deposition; and if he keeps his word, I have no doubt of yet finding means to prove the charge of the American government altogether unfounded.

I cannot conclude without thanking you, on the part of my colleagues and myself, for your kindness in expediting to us so immediately our order of recall.

Believe me to be, my dear Lord,

Yours ever most sincerely,

HENRY GOULBURN.

The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Fife House, 31st Dec., 1814.

I have received your private letter of the 25th instant, written in consequence of the communication which you had from Count Blacas on the subject of leaving Murat on the throne of Naples.

One of my letters to Lord Castlereagh, of the 23rd instant, which I left open for your perusal, will have explained to you the sentiments of the government on this point.

The first question is, whether we are released from all obligation to Murat in consequence of his having violated the engagements into which he entered with the Austrian government. I think it very doubtful whether he fulfilled these engagements; but I am not satisfied that the proof of his violation of them is sufficiently established to enable us to do more at present than to withhold all further recognition of him.

Supposing, however, the inquiries of Lord Castlereagh to lead to a

thorough conviction that Murat's conduct, after signing the treaty with Austria, was either so treacherous, or that he was so culpably and intentionally inactive, as to absolve us from all obligation to him, I should, in that case, deceive you if I did not state most explicitly that I am satisfied that, under present circumstances, the country could not be brought to sanction or support the employment of a British army, or of an army in British pay, for the purpose of driving him from the throne of Naples.

The utmost that could be done by us would be to take a *nominal* part against him, and (if operations were carrying on against him by other Powers) perhaps to blockade his ports with such ships as might happen to be in the Mediterranean.

I am far from undervaluing even a cooperation of this nature. From what I have heard from a person on whom I can depend, who has lately left Naples, Murat is supported by a large proportion of the nobility, but he is very unpopular with the people. They have no reason to hate him, for his government is a mild one; but they are *ashamed* of him: and as I know the English have always been particularly popular in Naples, and are so at this time, I have no doubt that a simple declaration on our part against him would make considerable impression on the country. We must recollect however, on the other hand, that he has an army which is not to be despised, and that his force, whatever it may be, is the more formidable from the discontented and inflammable state of a great part of Italy.

I am not insensible to all the inconvenience of his remaining on the throne of Naples; but I am convinced, on the other hand, that it will be most hazardous and inexpedient to attempt to drive him from it by force unless the force is of so commanding a nature as to place the accomplishment of the object out of all doubt, and to secure its accomplishment in the shortest practicable period from the time it is undertaken.

You will hear of course further from Lord Castlereagh on this subject when he has received my letter; but I was unwilling to delay putting you in possession of my general sentiments as at present informed upon it.

The employment of a British army for the purpose I consider as quite hopeless.

Believe me, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Fife House, 31st Dec., 1814.

I had just concluded my letters, Nos. 1 and 2, of this day, when I received yours of the 27th, and Lord Castlereagh's of the 18th.

I am most truly gratified that you have accepted his proposal of going to Vienna.

If it shall be necessary for Lord Castlereagh to return to England before the business of the Congress can be closed in its essential features, no circumstance will, I am persuaded, give so much confidence at home and abroad as your having been selected to succeed him.

With respect to your coming to England, I wish to leave it to your own decision. You will find, I believe, the instructions to Lord Castlereagh as

distinct and explicit on all points as it is possible to make them, considering the nature of the trust reposed in him. Much indeed must be left under such circumstances to the discretion of the person employed ; and I speak the sentiments of all my colleagues when I say that we should have the same confidence in you as we have had in him.

With regard to the question of Murat and Naples, I entirely approve of the course proposed in Lord Castlereagh's memorandum delivered to Prince Talleyrand, and enclosed in his despatch of the 18th instant.

As far as this proposition goes, there never could have been any difference of opinion. If this proposal, or a negotiation on the basis of it, should be rejected by Murat, it will then be to be determined what further steps shall be taken. I should be perfectly ready to agree to a joint declaration in concurrence with the other Powers against him, provided it was on other grounds deemed safe and expedient, and that you and Lord Castlereagh are satisfied, upon the inquiries now in progress, that Murat's conduct would enable us to justify such a proceeding on the score of good faith in the face of the world.

I have already stated to you the insuperable difficulties in the way of our becoming parties in any military operations for this object ; but, with this reserve, we can have no scruple of leaving the whole question to your discretion upon the principles already stated.

I have already informed you that I am going to Bath on Monday morning. I would wait here for your arrival if I thought that arrival certain, and if I were not obliged to be again in town between the 20th and 22nd of January. If, however, you come to England, I shall be most desirous of seeing you ; and I will certainly either come up to town or meet you at Salthill, if that would be equally convenient to you. I only beg in that case you will have the goodness to give me the earliest notice of your intention of coming to England.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, very sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

The Earl of Liverpool to Earl Bathurst.

DEAR BATHURST,

Fife House, 31st Dec., 1814.

I send you the private letter I have just received from the Duke of Wellington, together with the correspondence between Castlereagh and him relative to his going to Vienna. You will see by it that he has agreed to the proposal.

I send you likewise a copy of my answer to him. I have left it to his discretion to come to this country or not before he goes to Vienna, but I think upon the whole he would gain more by being a few days longer with Castlereagh than by his visit here. The projet of Castlereagh respecting Murat is to negotiate him out by means of a compensation. This is quite safe, and I think there can be no difficulty in leaving a discretion on the further points, with the qualifications and reserves stated. It was necessary to send off the letter to-night.

Castlereagh's despatches give a curious account of a *scène* at Vienna be-

tween the Emperor of Russia and Metternich, in consequence of a folly of Hardenberg's. It was not likely, however, to have serious bad effects. The point at issue now is Saxony, and Castlereagh appears to have no sufficient data to be able to say with certainty how it will end.

Send back the letters by the messenger.

I go on Monday.

Ever yours sincerely,

LIVERPOOL.

Claim of Prize Money on account of the Duke of Wellington's Army.

MEMORANDUM of Sums paid to the Bourbon Government out of the Duties of the Public Property captured at Bordeaux by the British Army under the command of the Duke of Wellington.

	Francs.
Loan on wine received by the Commissioners Depret on account of the Bourbon government	979,667
Paid to the Duchess of Angoulême	829,737
Received by M. Conseillant, the government agent for couriers	12,707
	<u>1,822,111</u>

Total amount paid to the Bourbon government .. 91,105*l.* 11*s.*

Exclusive of which there was in store, when the keys were given up by the British agent for the army, on the 1st April, 1815 :—

Tobacco and snuff	22,998 <i>l.</i> 0 <i>s.</i>	
Salt and colonial produce duties	4,000 <i>l.</i> 0 <i>s.</i>	
Confiscated duties	1,500 <i>l.</i> 0 <i>s.</i>	
	<u>28,498<i>l.</i> 0<i>s.</i></u>	
Tobacco sold by M. Conseillant	635 <i>l.</i> 0 <i>s.</i>	
Property between Leportez and Sore	2,000 <i>l.</i> 0 <i>s.</i>	
Tobacco at Cubsa	1,064 <i>l.</i> 7 <i>s.</i>	
Magazine of salt	800 <i>l.</i> 0 <i>s.</i>	
	<u>4,499<i>l.</i> 7<i>s.</i></u>	

Total amount of the public property captured by
the British army at Bordeaux 124,102*l.* 18*s.*

The amount claimed by the army in lieu of the above property was only 107,026*l.* 10*s.*

ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL,

One of the Prize Agents.

E. Cooke, Esq., to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD,

Vienna, 2nd Jan., 1815.

The American peace has made immense sensation. The Emperor of Russia, in congratulating Lord Castlereagh last night, at Court, said meanly, he thought it would be expedient that France should be admitted to the conferences. The Prussians very low, and begin to talk of modification. You will be entertained with the Emperor of Russia's *Projet* of Convention. Talleyrand said the preamble seemed to be the work of a mad freemason: he said so to Czartoriski. The whole is considered inadmissible. I know not what will be Metternich's answer to Hardenberg's Memoir. I trust now all the treaties made between the Powers will be called for, examined, and reported upon, as France is only bound to agree to the arrangements founded on the basis of the treaties *arrêtés* among the Powers. This may lead to revision of everything.

The Prussians have been very violent; and, having deserted Europe on the Polish point, they will now lose their bribe, viz. the whole of Saxony; and I shall not be surprised if, alleging themselves to be betrayed by Russia, they should turn round and try to regain ground in Poland.

To show how the Emperor of Russia uses his ministers, Nesselrode never saw the Emperor's *Projet*, though his Secretary of State, till Metternich showed it him.

We understand the dearness of every article at St. Petersburg is oppressive, and there are great discontents.

You see how the Emperor's *Projet* as to restoring the kingdom of Poland has evaporated in erecting his share of the Duchy of Warsaw into a kingdom, with such additions as he shall judge *convenable*. The fact, I believe, is that the Russians have determined to oppose his separation of the provinces united by Catherine.

Lord Castlereagh last night, in replying to the Emperor's congratulations, said, the whole world was now at length in peace, and "*il commence l'âge d'or.*" He did not mean to insinuate new subsidies; but it might have been understood so.

I think matters will at length be pacifically arranged; but I do not think the progress will be very rapid. Boundaries are nice points, and they will be fought inch by inch; and the allotment of such places as Mentz and Luxembourg will take time.

I have been so strongly urged by my medical friends to go to Italy, that I intend setting out on Thursday, so your Lordship will be relieved from my scribbles. I am not ill, but very weak and nervous.

Ever, my dear Lord, your Lordship's most faithful servant,

E. COOKE.

I trust you highly approve Lord Castlereagh's great and necessary measure.

General Dumouriez to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MONSIEUR LE DUC, MON HÉROÏQUE AMI,

Le 2 Janvier, 1815.

En vous souhaitant cette année tout le bonheur que vous méritez, et en vous priant de faire passer les deux incluses à leurs adresses, je joins mes remerciements les plus sincères pour l'intérêt que vous avez pris dans les démarches que mes amis ont faites pour faciliter ma rentrée en France. Mon ami Adair m'a assuré que vous aviez porté votre amitié pour moi jusqu'à vous engager à me faire accorder par votre gouvernement tout ou partie du traitement honorable dont je jouis depuis douze ans en Angleterre par la noble générosité de votre excellente nation : votre vue en cela était de balancer la modicité du traitement qu'on m'offre dans ma patrie.

Mais ce n'est pas là le point de la difficulté. On met à ma service une condition que je ne peux pas accepter absolument. On m'offre les appointements de Lieutenant-Général en activité, ce qui est en contradiction avec l'assurance qu'on me donne que ma vieillesse me rend inutile à aucun service quelconque, et que le Roi ne trouve aucun moyen de m'employer utilement. Il devient alors injuste de m'accorder cette grâce au détriment d'officiers distingués de ce grade dont les services peuvent être utiles au Roi et à la patrie. En acceptant, je me reconnaitrai invalide, et à charge au Roi, qui n'a déjà que trop de sinecures à payer, et cela répugne trop à ma délicatesse. Je préfère sans contredit continuer à mériter un pain honorable en Angleterre à végéter sous la honte d'une aumône onéreuse en France.

Je crois d'ailleurs avec toute l'Europe, et surtout avec votre nation, que le genre de mes services me met hors de ligne ; qu'ils me donnent un titre à la reconnaissance éternelle de ma patrie, et par conséquent aux récompenses du Roi, que j'ai servi personnellement avec zèle et utilité. J'ai sauvé ma patrie dans cette même Champagne, devenue depuis le tombeau de la gloire et du despotisme de Buonaparte. J'ai gagné cette bataille de Jemappes, cité dernièrement dans le Sénat par mon élève et mon ami Macdonald ; j'ai relevé le courage, la discipline, et l'honneur dans cette armée Française, désorganisée par une hideuse révolution. Je lui ai appris à connaître sa force, à s'estimer, à combattre, à vaincre. Je peux passer pour son père. Je ne l'ai quittée que lorsque le plus énorme des crimes et la tyrannie la plus absurde ne permettaient plus de rester en France. Depuis lors, dans tous les pays où le sort m'a conduit, et dans tous j'ai été appelé par le Souverain, en Russie, en Autriche, en Angleterre, j'ai travaillé de tout mon pouvoir pour la cause sacrée des Bourbons.

Voilà avec la plus grande vérité quels sont mes services et mes droits. Quant à ma prétendue caducité, elle n'existe ni au moral ni au physique. Vous me connaissez personnellement et par écrit. Je suis aussi sain de corps et d'esprit que Suvarof, Kutusof, Blücher, et même que tous les serviteurs qui entourent notre bon Roi. Je ne pourrais donc rentrer en France que si, persuadé que je suis encore en état de le servir utilement, il me faisait Maréchal de France, ou s'il me plaçait dans la Chambre des Pairs.

Mais je n'élève aucune prétention. J'attends tout de la pénétration et de la justice de ce Prince éclairé, et que je reconnais par son caractère et ses vertus comme le seul dans le monde qui fut convenable pour le salut de la France. Aussi, du fonds de ma retraite je fais les vœux les plus ardents

pour sa santé et son bonheur, liés si intimément au sort de ma patrie, dont il est le restaurateur et le père.

D'ailleurs je ne murmure pas sur mon ostracisme. Je suis, en attendant ce que la Providence pourra déterminer sur mon avenir, estimé, heureux, tranquille, au milieu des compatriotes de mon héros, devenu presque Anglais par la générosité d'une grande nation et de douze ans de services réels et d'habitudes amicales. Je serai très heureux quand au retour de votre ambassade l'excellent Wellington viendra un jour honorer la retraite de son fidèle et vieux, mais non pas décrépît,

DUMOURIEZ.

Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.

DEAR LIVERPOOL,

Vienna, 2nd Jan., 1815.

Our conference this morning was postponed till to-morrow. I understand they mean to give way upon the point of admitting France. I had an opportunity, in a private conversation with Baron Humboldt, of reinforcing what I stated in conference upon Hardenberg's menace. I told him he may rely upon it that it was a pretension Great Britain would resist with her whole power and resources, and that every man in Parliament, of whatever party, would support the government in doing so. I thought it material above all things to extinguish, if possible, this project of a *coup de main*, as Prussia will treat about Saxony rather than remain armed and inactive. I believe they are shaken by the tone in which their menace has been met.

The courier from Ghent with the news of the peace arrived yesterday morning. It has produced the greatest possible sensation here, and will, I have no doubt, enter largely into the calculations of our opponents. It is a most auspicious and seasonable event. I wish you joy of being released from the millstone of an American war.

The Emperor of Russia kept me with him for nearly two hours when I last attended him; and, after the slave-trade was disposed of, went as usual over the whole of our situation. He announced to me the intention of inviting me to assist in the intended negotiation, and urged the importance of keeping the four Powers together. The motive for this was sufficiently evident. At the ball last night at Court I understand he addressed himself to Talleyrand, and said he had declared that *he* would not negotiate without France. Talleyrand, who knew everything that had passed, replied that he had understood England and Austria meant to propose his admission, and that it gave him great pleasure to find they would have His Imperial Majesty's support.

Our Statistical Commission has made such progress as to give us the means of speedily arranging the territorial claims if we can once bring Prussia to admit the principle.

This American peace will give you comparatively quiet times in Parliament, and enable me to regulate my departure from hence more with reference to the state of business here. Might not you take the property-tax for six months, and reserve the final decision to be taken after Easter in connexion with the state of Continental affairs? I do not think this

could be seriously opposed; and I have no doubt before the time of your reassembling, if we do not break up altogether, that you will be enabled to speak so decisively as to the period of my return, and also of the time when this business will be in a shape to come regularly before Parliament, as to justify a peremptory refusal of indirect discussion.

I hope you will not think my treaty an improvident one. It pledges you absolutely to nothing beyond the value in money at which the force is calculated, whilst it puts Holland, &c., under, I trust, a friendly protection. Should the case on which the treaty is founded ever, for the disgrace of the times, arise, it is quite out of the question that we should remain quiet spectators; and I know no mode in which more could have been secured and more effectually, and by which we could have remained more completely masters of the species of exertion in which we may think it wise to engage, the principle on which is such as could create no difficulty in Parliament, whilst it may save Austria, and consequently the Continent.

Ever, my dear Liverpool, yours very sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

Pray expedite the ratification.

Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LIVERPOOL,

Vienna, 3rd Jan., 1815.

I think the Prussians relax. Hardenberg has desired a confidential interview with me to-morrow evening to see what can be done to arrange matters. As we are now come to close quarters, I expect in a few days to be enabled to give you the result, which, with a due proportion of firmness and conciliation, may yet, I hope, prove satisfactory.

Ever yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Foreign Office, 3rd Jan., 1815.

I have the honour to transmit to your Grace the accompanying extract of the legal opinion given to His Majesty's government upon the construction of the 4th additional article of the Treaty of Paris, which the French Commissioners have attempted to establish in their note of the 10th December addressed to His Majesty's Commissioners.

As it appears by your despatch No. 93, that the question has been referred to Lord Castlereagh and to the Prince de Talleyrand at Vienna, I have no further instructions to give to your Grace upon that subject until Lord Castlereagh's answer shall have been received.

I am, with great truth and respect, my Lord,

Your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*Extract of a Letter from Sir C. Robinson to Lord Viscount
Castlereagh, dated 29th December, 1814.*

"In obedience to your Lordship's directions, I have the honour to report that the claims of the British creditors appear to be justly stated and supported by proper and forcible observations in the note of the British Commissioners; and I am of opinion that it will be advisable to adhere simply to that representation at present, without additional argument. If the French government shall still resist the claims, and contend for a different construction of the Treaty, it will be more advantageous for His Majesty's government to enter upon the discussion in that form, and after the proposed reference has been made to M. de Talleyrand. The French Commissioners observe, 'that they do not find in the article any specific terms to support the claim to the *inscription intégrale*.' But the words are as comprehensive as possible. If any limitation was intended, it should have been suggested on the part of the French government, who alone could be supposed to be acquainted with the particular modifications which these debts had undergone. Under the Treaty, as it is drawn, the British claimants are entitled to the most beneficial interpretation of it that is consistent with the natural equity of the case; and it is not a just answer to their claim so established to say that it may raise invidious comparisons between their condition and that of other foreigners and French creditors, who have not the benefit of such Treaty for their protection.

"CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON."

Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LIVERPOOL,

Vienna, 4th Jan., 1815.

I send you enclosed a copy of my letter to the Duke of Wellington.

In the present state of the negotiation I feel myself bound to urge that I should not be withdrawn from hence, at least till the important discussions now pending are closed.

With every deference to the Duke of Wellington's ability and great personal authority, he cannot at once replace me in the habits of confidence which a long intercourse with the principal actors has established, and which give at this moment facilities to my intervention to bring them together which could not attach to another for a length of time, whereas the fate of Europe may depend on the combinations of the ensuing month.

I must naturally have a strong desire to conduct to their close measures for which I stand so deeply responsible; but, independent of all personal consideration, I feel that the negotiation ought not to pass, as things now stand, into other hands except under the pressure of some necessity upon which the Prince Regent's government can alone decide, but which, under the new circumstances which have arisen both at home and abroad, I do not myself conceive to exist since our peace with America has been secured.

I think the probability is, that I shall be enabled, in the course of four or five weeks from the present time, to bring all the territorial arrangements of Europe to a close. The constitutional system of Germany may run into more length; but this I have no doubt we can separate, and refer to a

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special inquiry. The point of Naples will be a short one, *here at lesat*. After I receive your answer to my letter of the 18th, whether it is to be pursued by war or negotiation, it cannot occupy more time than belongs to the decision of the principle.

I am, dear Liverpool, ever faithfully yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Vienna, 5th Dec., 1814.

I am much obliged to you for your letter of the 27th, and for your kind compliance with my wishes.

I have written to Lord Liverpool to state that, under the change of circumstances which has taken place affecting our home politics, and also the state in which the negotiation stands at present here, I shall not deem it consistent with my duty to leave Vienna or to transfer the conduct of it into other hands without express orders from home, given under a full knowledge of these combined considerations.

I am therefore desirous that you should delay your setting out for Vienna till you hear further from me, unless Lord Liverpool should call upon you to do so after the receipt of the despatches addressed to him by this courier.

I need not assure you of the confidence with which I should leave the business here in your hands; but there are moments in complicated concerns of this nature when, neither in justice to the parties nor to the public interest, a change of management ought to be hazarded except under the pressure of a paramount necessity, upon which the King's government at home can alone pronounce.

Believe me, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

E. Cooke, Esq., to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD,

Vienna, 4th Jan., 1815.

I have seen your despatches of the 23rd. From the first moment I came here to the present hour I never saw the least chance of preserving peace but by the union of Austria, Great Britain, and France, with Bavaria, Holland, Hanover, &c.

The Emperor of Russia's policy was to get a complete superiority in Europe by the purchase of Prussia by Saxony, and for this object to secure the Duchy of Warsaw, *enclaver* East Prussia, make that monarch his vassal, and get the keys of Berlin and Vienna.

Prussia played the traitor for him against Austria on the Polish point; and, when resisted on the Saxon, threatened immediate war. The Chief of their Etat Major was sent for, and it was not till Sunday, upon his representations, and the arrival of the American peace, that the project of immediate war was abandoned. I trust it is now really abandoned, and that modifications may be accepted and a compromise take place.

My fears have ever been lest our coolness to France, produced by the

necessity Lord Castlereagh felt not to break with the other Powers by bringing her forward, would lead in resentment France to hearken to Russia, who was ready, in order to prevent our junction, to play the whole game for France in the recovery of Naples; and on that object I think Russia will now be ready to turn against France unless she regains the Ionian Islands.

A policy is privately disseminated by Russian and Prussian agents as to the propriety of absorbing all the minor Powers into the greater; but I believe it meets with general opposition.

You see how the Russian projects of a Polish kingdom have dwindled. I do not see how the Allies can stipulate to regulate the Emperor's conduct as to the former Polish incorporations: it would be an attempt *ad invidiam*, which he has a right to resist, whatever he may have said. The only claim the Allies can have is to stipulate that the provinces now to be ceded shall have equal privileges as when under Saxony. If he offers more, they may assent; they have no right to insist on more, and I think not on that.

As to Naples, my ideas are, that if France is considered as firm with us, Russia and Prussia will be for Murat, though they can only act with their names.

Lord Castlereagh now hopes to wind up here, as he feels he has more influence than any other person, whatever his authority, could have. I certainly agree, if you can spare him.

I retire early to-morrow from this scene of constant anxiety, and I trust air and motion and Italian scenery will relieve me.

Ever most truly your Lordship's servant,

E. COOKE.

Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY LORD,

Vienna, 5th Jan., 1815.

I have every reason to hope that the alarm of war is over. I understand the point was considered on Sunday last in the Prussian Cabinet, and the opinions were in favour of a suitable modification of the Saxon question.

I last night had, at his request, a long interview with Prince Hardenberg. Preserving that reserve which it was wise for him to do in order to maintain the pretensions of Prussia to a large share of that country, the Chancellor explained himself to me unreservedly in favour of a settlement, and desired my good offices to effect it.

He intimated the intention of Prussia and Russia to admit France; they would, however, as a preliminary, call upon Austria and Great Britain to declare on the Protocol what I stated in our last conference: that we considered the question of Saxony not one to be negotiated with the King of Saxony, but that the Powers were bound to decide upon the arrangement which, all things considered, they deemed just between him and Prussia, and to leave the option of acceptance with the King. I was glad to find from Prince Talleyrand, this morning, that he concurred in this principle, and that although nothing but the King of Saxony's act could effectually close all pretensions hereafter, he nevertheless felt himself bound to support

Prussia in her occupation till that consent was obtained to what the Five Powers might deem just and reasonable.

In my conversation last night with Prince Hardenberg, I understood that an attempt was to be made to induce the King of Saxony to desire to be placed on the left bank of the Rhine. Although I have no notion His Saxon Majesty would listen to such a proposal, I thought it material to dissuade the Prince from a plan so inexpedient. To place a weak Prince, from a variety of causes likely to be dependent on France, in so advanced a position, occupying Luxembourg and the countries between the Meuse and Moselle, was to expose all our defences on the left bank of that river to be turned, and to place that family in the situation the most calculated, at a future day, to be an instrument in the hands of France to invade Saxony with a view to its resumption. Prince Talleyrand has expressed himself with great propriety upon this point. He said, for purposes of ambition and conquest he must favour the plan; but as his sincere desire, and that of his Court, was to put a restraint upon any extension of the existing boundaries of France, he was against the project. His wish is that the Prince of Orange should have Luxembourg rather than the Prussians.

It is difficult to describe to your Lordship the impression produced here by our pacification with America.

I have the honour to be, with great truth, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LIVERPOOL,

Vienna, 5th Jan., 1815.

I send you a very interesting and confidential document. As it will not make me less anxious to keep well with Russia and Prussia, I think we are under some obligations to Prince Hardenberg for giving us so good a basis on which to establish our *rapprochement* with France.

Ever yours, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Prince Talleyrand to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Vienne, le 5 Janvier, 1815.

J'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer la copie de l'excellente lettre que je recevais ce matin au moment de votre arrivée. Les nobles sentiments qu'elle exprime ne m'empêchent pas de vous faire remarquer que c'est en toute confiance que je vous la donne. Votre délicatesse saura l'usage qu'elle en peut faire, et celui qui ne peut jamais en être fait.

Mille hommages.

TALLEYRAND.

II.

The King of France to Prince Talleyrand.

MON COUSIN,

Paris, ce 27 Décembre, 1814.

Je viens de recevoir la nouvelle qu'un traité de paix et d'amitié a été signé le 24, entre l'Angleterre et les Etats-Unis. Vous en serez sûrement instruit avant que cette dépêche vous parvienne, et je ne doute pas des démarches que vous avez faites en conséquence. Néanmoins, je me hâte de vous charger, en félicitant de ma part Lord Castlereagh sur cet heureux événement, de lui faire observer tout le parti que la Grande Bretagne peut en tirer. Libre désormais de disposer de tous ses moyens, quel plus noble emploi en peut elle faire que d'assurer le repos de l'Europe sur les bases de l'équité, les seules qui soient vraiment solides ? Et peut elle y mieux parvenir qu'en s'unissant étroitement avec moi ? Le Prince Régent et moi, nous sommes les seuls désintéressés dans cet affaire. La Saxe ne fut jamais l'alliée de la France. Jamais Naples ne fut même à portée de l'assister dans aucune guerre, et il en est de même relativement à l'Angleterre. Je suis, il est vrai, le plus proche parent des deux Rois, mais je suis, avant tout, Roi de France et père de mon peuple.

C'est pour l'honneur de ma couronne, c'est pour le bonheur de mes sujets, que je ne puis consentir à laisser établir en Allemagne un germe de guerre pour toute l'Europe, que je ne puis souffrir en Italie un usurpateur dont l'existence, honteuse pour tous les Souverains, menace la tranquillité intérieure de tous les états. Les mêmes sentimens animent le Prince Régent ; et c'est avec la plus vive satisfaction que je le vois plus en mesure de s'y livrer.

Je viens de vous parler en Roi. Je ne puis maintenant me refuser de vous parler en homme. Il est un cas que je ne devrais pas prévoir, où je ne songerais qu'aux liens du sang. Si les deux Rois mes cousins étaient, comme je le fus longtemps, privés de leur sceptre, errants sur la face de la terre, alors je m'empresserais de les recueillir, de subvenir à leurs besoins, d'opposer mes soins à leur infortune ; en un mot, d'imiter à leur égard ce que le Prince Régent a fait au mien, et, comme lui, je satisferais à la fois mon cœur et ma dignité. Mais ce cas n'arrivera jamais. J'en ai pour garants certains la générosité de la plupart des Souverains, le véritable intérêt de tous. Sur quoi je prie Dieu qu'il vous ait, mon cousin, en sa sainte et digne garde.

LOUIS.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Bath, 6th Jan., 1815.

I have at last received the Portuguese memorandum on the subject of the slave trade. I never read so unreasonable a proposition in all its parts. I think you were right in proposing to indemnify them for the captured ships, provided they would agree to the immediate abolition of the slave trade north of the Line ; but I am convinced we ought not to go further in concession on this subject. Let the question be brought before Congress, and urge in every possible manner the adoption of the French rule. This is, in fact, the utmost latitude the Addresses of the two Houses of Parliament have given us ; and if the Congress will adopt it, and the principal

States agree to enforce it by excluding colonial produce from those countries which will not agree to it, the measure will soon be successful.

The demand of eight years on the part of Portugal is inconceivable, as it is now seven years (if I mistake not) that they agreed to the stipulation in the commercial treaty gradually to abolish the trade, and no one step has ever been taken for that purpose. Under these circumstances Portugal can surely not ask in reason to be placed on a more favourable footing than France. You will recollect that Souza said last summer that to this extent he thought his government would and ought to go, though no further.

As to the proposition of suspending the treaty of commerce, this might be agreed to upon the condition of Portugal consenting to the French terms in their full extent; but it ought not to be conceded for any less favourable arrangement.

LIVERPOOL.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Bath, 6th Jan., 1815.

I have received your letter of the 24th on the subject of the Ionian Islands. It is certainly not our desire, under present circumstances, to retain them, and it would, therefore, be very imprudent to manifest a disposition to this effect. If the King of Sicily should recover the kingdom of Naples, we should prefer their belonging to Austria, to whose lot it would be natural they should fall; but if this arrangement should create jealousy, and on that account be found impracticable, we should not object to their being assigned to the King of Sicily or to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, or indeed to any other Power, with the exception of France and Russia.

It will be quite right, in whatever arrangement may be made respecting the fate of these islands, that an adequate provision should be stipulated for the interests of the inhabitants, and certain constitutional and commercial privileges secured to them upon the same principles (as you suggest) of what has been recently agreed to respecting Genoa.

Believe me to be, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Bath, 6th Jan., 1815.

I have received your letters of the 20th and 25th. I have little to add to what I have already said on the Saxon question. The idea of indemnifying the King of Saxony by giving him a part of the territory between the Meuse and the Rhine would be the worst possible arrangement for the interests of this country. Our object should be that the King of Prussia should be there to protect Holland and the Low Countries, and that the King of Saxony should remain between Austria and Prussia, to prevent as much as possible collision between those two Powers.

As France and Austria appear determined to be firm on this question, I will still hope it will end in a fair compromise. It is just that the King of Prussia should gain, but the total and unnecessary annihilation of one of the oldest Powers of Europe would revolt the feelings of all mankind.

You can scarcely have an idea of the extent of our financial embarrassments. There would not be the most remote prospect of our carrying the Property Tax for more than one year, and I think our success thus far very doubtful. Many of our best friends are against us, and the landed interest cry out loudly for the relief that will thus be given them under the fall of their rents. In this state of things you cannot be surprised that we should feel anxious on the subject of the Dutch loan. If our honour is committed, we must incur the inconvenience; but if I recollect the paper that was drawn up at your house, and the communications that have since passed between you and the Russian Ministers, I cannot but consider the Emperor of Russia's conduct respecting Poland to have absolved us from everything like an engagement on this head. I go farther: I think it will be considered as an act of humility to agree to it after all that has happened. No person in this country would like to go to war for Poland; but you would have great difficulty in persuading them to do an act of bounty and munificence, at their own expense, for a Sovereign who has shown so little consideration of the country or its Minister.

Believe me, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

To the Duc de Feltre.

[834.]

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

A Paris, ce 10 Janvier, 1815.

Je reçois de Monsieur Dunmore une note du 6 Janvier que Monsieur le Commissaire Ordonnateur Barbier lui a envoyé avec des lettres des Préfets des Départemens de la Meuse et des Ardennes, et du Sous-Préfet de Rocroy; et je le crois de mon devoir d'en écrire à Votre Excellence.

C'est très vrai que j'ai le * Décembre ordonné que le tarif annexé à la convention militaire soit mis en exécution dans le contingent Britannique; et que je l'ai également ordonné le * dans les autres contingens. Mais V. E. me permettra de vous dire que je crois avoir surpassé mes devoirs en cet arrangement, parceque dans le fait le gouvernement Français n'est nullement préparé de mettre en exécution le tarif en aucun des départemens occupés par les troupes alliées.

La vérité exige aussi que je vous prévienne, Monsieur le Duc, qu'à compter du général jusqu'au soldat il ne se trouve pas un homme du contingent Britannique qui n'ait pas eu

* Blank in manuscript.

grande raison de se plaindre non seulement de la quantité, mais de la qualité des rations qui lui ont été fournis depuis que j'ai ordonné que le tarif soit mis en exécution, surtout dans ce qui regarde le bois ; et, comme je vous l'ai fait dire par les Généraux Decaux et De L'Espinoit, ce n'est qu'à force de discipline et de punitions que j'empêche le mal que l'état de misère où se trouvent les troupes même en Paris les invite à commettre. Si les choses sont ainsi sous mes yeux et sous les yeux du gouvernement ; si les plaintes réitérées que j'en ai fait faire n'ont jusqu'à présent produit aucun résultat, est ce possible de croire que le gouvernement est mieux préparé de mettre en exécution le tarif du 20 Novembre dans les provinces lointaines ? Je vous le répète, Monsieur le Duc, que jusqu'à ce que justice soit faite aux besoins du soldat, ce n'est guère possible de le tenir en ordre, et que tous les désordres dont on se plaint dans la note dont il est question ici se rapportent à ce que le soldat n'est pas suffisamment ni justement pourvu.

Pour ce qui regarde le refus du Général Ziethen de mettre en exécution le tarif jusqu'à ce que le prix de la ration de l'officier auroit été déterminé, je crois que le tarif exprime le désir que la ration de l'officier soit toujours donné en argent ; et je ne conçois pas la raison pour laquelle Votre Excellence a donné ordre aux Préfets des Départemens des Ardennes et de la Moselle de ne pas mettre en exécution l'accord qu'ils avoient fait avec le Général Ziethen de payer provisoirement les rations des officiers aux taux de 3 francs par jour. Si le gouvernement prend sur lui des mesures comme celle là, en même temps qu'il n'est pas lui même préparé par ses marchés de prendre un alternatif, il faut bien que la confusion s'ensuive. J'ai aussi à me plaindre de la manière dont est traité le contingent Britannique sur cette question des rations des officiers. Le tarif est clair sur les portions des officiers, et qu'elles doivent être payées à un prix moyen par jour ; et j'ai ordonné qu'on fasse un accord sur ce prix avec les employés Français. Mais j'ai trouvé qu'on a fixé le prix de ces portions à à-peu-près les deux tiers de leur vraie valeur à laquelle elles peuvent s'acheter ; et la conséquence est que les officiers jusqu'à présent prennent leurs portions, et que j'ai des plaintes journalières sur leurs qualités.

Vous voyez donc, Monsieur le Duc, que ce n'est pas le gouvernement Français seul qui a à se plaindre sur l'exécution de ces arrangemens. Le fait est que les subdélégués de V. E. ne

font pas leur devoir, et que le gouvernement n'est pas encore en état de mettre en exécution ce qu'il a promis ; et je dois vous prévenir que jusqu'à ce qu'il se trouve en état de le faire, il m'est impossible de faire tout ce que je voudrais faire et tout ce qu'il est de mon devoir pour rendre l'arrangement aussi peu onéreux à la France que c'est possible de le rendre.

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Bath, 11th Jan., 1815.

I have received your letters of the 8th instant. I am glad upon the whole that you have determined to go to Vienna without first coming to England. I shall be glad to hear that you have set out, for it is very desirable that there should be some interval at Vienna between Lord Castlereagh's departure from it and your arrival, and it is of the utmost consequence that he should be in London by the 9th of February, or a few days after.

Upon the question of our engagements to Murat I think we are quite agreed. There can be no difference of opinion likewise as to the policy of removing him from the throne of Naples, if it is just and practicable. The only question that can occur on this part of the subject is, how far we are likely to succeed, and whether the chances of failure, or the chances of his continuing in undisturbed possession of Naples, are most to be apprehended. I am satisfied that those who are on the spot must be better judges on this subject than we can be here, and we can therefore have no hesitation in leaving these considerations entirely to your discretion. The only point which I wish to impress upon you is, the absolute impossibility in the present state of the circumstances and feelings in this country of our engaging in military operations for the purpose of expelling Murat. I do not mean that it is either necessary or would be prudent to make any such avowal public, least of all that Murat himself should be apprised of our difficulties ; but it may become indispensable that some of our Allies should know on what they have to reckon, and at all events it is fit that you should be fully informed of our situation.

I have never thought that Austria would make any serious difficulty in consequence of her Treaty with Murat, if the other Powers of Europe were determined to get rid of him : her real interest must be to destroy every remnant of the revolutionary system in Italy.

She may likewise feel considerable apprehensions about the march of a French army through the north and centre of Italy ; but if security is given to her (as appears to be intended) on this last head, and if the other Powers are determined to declare against Murat, she will, I am persuaded, throw no obstacles in the way of their operations, and I should not despair of her even joining in the cause.

It will remain therefore to be seen whether he will submit willingly, or be compelled to submit by the Neapolitans, to the general voice of Europe declared at Vienna. I shall be sanguine on this head if a good provision is held out to him, and it must surely be the interest of the Powers of Europe to get out of such an embarrassment in such a manner. If he is determined, however, to risk everything for the purpose of keeping his throne, the labouring oar of expelling him must rest on France. Spain can afford little aid; we might blockade his ports by sea; Russia might send a body of troops, or at least threaten it; and I should think that with such a combination of external means, the country itself would be led to declare against him. The English name has always been, and is still, particularly popular in Naples. The alarm I entertain is not about Naples, but about other parts of Italy, where a very different spirit exists, and where Austria is unfortunately very much disliked.

I have thus given you my sense on this subject, and I should hope that after talking the matter fully over with Lord Castlereagh, you may be able to put this very delicate and difficult question into as satisfactory a course as the nature of it will allow.

Believe me, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Downing Street, 13th Jan., 1815.

I am very glad you have decided on not coming over here before you went to Vienna. In such complicated negotiations as those are which have been passing for some time there, and when so much more passes than can be conveyed in despatches, you will not be on a par with the rest unless you arrive there a reasonable time before Lord Castlereagh sets off on his return.

You must allow me to call your attention to the fate of the Ionian Islands, which Lord Castlereagh has purposely left for the last, and is therefore a subject which you will probably find nearly untouched.

It seems settled that they are not to be, where I am sure it is most for the happiness of the inhabitants and the tranquillity of Europe that they should be, under British protection. Whoever is in possession of them becomes at once formidable in the Mediterranean. The probable emancipation of Greece, growing out of the gradual decline or the immediate consequence of the sudden dissolution of the Turkish Empire, gives them an additional importance; and as the French have made Corfu impregnable, we must not hope to recover a false step in this business.

We have a right, I think, to prescribe the terms on which we shall surrender them. I hope they will not be so disposed of as to give them directly or indirectly to Russia. Every principle of policy must make us watchful to keep her out of the Mediterranean. We shall give them to her indirectly if we allow them to be independent Republics. In Corfu she a prevailing faction, in the other islands an active one.

If we give them to Sicily as an indemnity for Naples, we give them to a Power who will barter them for Italian possessions, and thus put them at the disposition of France or Russia, whichever Power shall happen to promise most liberally.

If we give them to Murat as an indemnification for Naples, we must be careful that they do not become a subject of barter for some large possessions in France or elsewhere. I have been always inclined to think that our promising to pay him a perpetual subsidy of fifty thousand pounds annually at the least, under the colour of making the indemnification more liberal, would be the best way of securing the possession of the islands in his family, and under our influence.

Austria is of all countries that to which we might give them with the least danger. We might leave the fortifications in that case as they are.

Russia is the Power to which I think we should be the least inclined to give them. It is my jealousy of her having any influence in that quarter of the world which makes me object to that part of Liverpool's letter to you (which goes by this mail) in which he speaks of a Russian army co-operating with France in Italy against Murat.

Pray do not give any encouragement for Russia to have any army or navy in the Mediterranean. Depend upon it we shall never get them out of that quarter of the world again.

The Hereditary Prince has written me word that General Pfhul, the Russian ambassador at the Hague, has persuaded the Prince of Orange that it will be better to leave the Low Countries quite open, strengthening only Maestricht, Liège, and Namur, and the Dutch line of defence. This has made the young one very suspicious of Russia, which I am not sorry to see.

The King of Sardinia has an only daughter married to Archduke Francis. The succession is likely to be disputed between her and her uncle, unless previously arranged. It was Lord Castlereagh's intention, I believe, to bring it before Congress. Has he done so?

Yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

The Earl of Liverpool to Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR BATHURST,

Bath, 15th Jan., 1815.

I send you the very important despatches from Castlereagh, which I believe you have not seen. You will see that any connection between Russia and France is effectually frustrated. I wish you would summon a Cabinet as soon as you can of those who are near town. There can, I think, be no difference of opinion about the ratification of the treaty; and as soon as the ratifications are ordered to be prepared, Hamilton will send my private letters to the Duke of Wellington and Castlereagh by a special messenger. It is very material that the former should set off for Vienna immediately, and that Castlereagh should be apprised that the American peace makes no difference in our opinion of the necessity of his being here by the 9th of February, or a few days after it.

Hamilton will show you my letters and take your orders about sending them. If there should be any difference of opinion about the ratification, I will come to town.

I will answer your letter respecting Canada to-morrow.

Ever sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

I shall be obliged to you to take care that a proper communication is made to the Regent.

The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Bath, 15th Jan., 1815.

I have this morning received your private letter of the 10th instant, together with Lord Castlereagh's very important despatches of the 1st and 2nd of this month.

I wrote to him a few days ago to press his return to England by the 9th of February, or at latest by the 14th or 15th. I agree with you that he does not appear to be aware of the necessity of his presence here. It is an old saying, that after a calm a storm, and I can assure you that I have not known for some years so much party spirit and rancour as exist at present. The restoration of general peace, though it may relieve the country from great difficulties, does not make the government more easy to be conducted in the House of Commons. During a war so eventful as the last, all minor questions merged in a considerable degree in the great interest; now every question, however subordinate, will create a conflict; and if the government in the House of Commons should lose credit, and be considered as beat in debate before Castlereagh returns, it will be no easy matter for him or for any man to recover the ground which has been lost.

Under these circumstances I cannot but feel very anxious that you should set out for Vienna without waiting for any further communication from Lord Castlereagh. I shall write to him to inform him that this is the decided opinion of the government. It must, at all events, be a great advantage to both of you to have some days for full and unreserved conversation upon all the points of business likely to occur before he quits Vienna.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, yours very faithfully,

LIVERPOOL.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Bath, 15th Jan., 1815.

I have this morning received your very important letters of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd. We are thoroughly satisfied with the treaty which, under all the circumstances, you have concluded, and the ratifications shall be forwarded as soon as they can be prepared.

You are quite mistaken in supposing that the conclusion of the American peace makes any difference as to your return to England. It may appear extraordinary, but I can assure you that it is some years since I have seen party spirit and rancour exist in the same degree as they do at present. Believe me, the conduct of the government in the House of Commons will for some time be more difficult than during war. During a war so eventful as the last, most minor questions merged in the great interest: now every question may create a conflict; and if the government in the House of Commons should lose credit and be considered as beat in debate before you return, it will be no easy matter to recover the ground which has been lost.

Under these circumstances, I have written to the Duke of Wellington to say that it is, in the opinion of government, best that he should set out for Vienna without further delay. It must be of advantage to both of you to have time for full and unreserved conversation before you quit Vienna, and I trust nothing else will retard your departure longer than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, from the state in which the business is now placed, I should hope that unless some very inauspicious event should occur, all the material points will have been substantially settled before you receive this letter.

LIVERPOOL.

The Duke of Brunswick to the Earl of Liverpool.

MY LORD,

Brunswick, 15th Jan., 1815.

I have been honoured with your Lordship's letter of the 24th of December, and I request you to present my sentiments of the highest gratitude to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent and His Majesty's government for the gracious manner in which the services of the officers of my light infantry regiment have been rewarded. I have addressed myself to the agents, Messrs. Greenwood and Co., respecting the form which may be required for the officers to receive their allowances, and of the manner of drawing the same.

The undecided state of Germany requires a new exertion of this country, and so many circumstances appear to cause the belief of a new war. The geographical situation of the Brunswick country, together with the efforts of the subjects to the common cause, will involve me again in some new difficulties. The Hanoverian troops are stationed in Flanders, and I should stand in such a case quite alone. Decided to answer force with force, I should be perhaps obliged to leave for a short period this open country, in which case I should wish that it may be allowed by His Royal Highness the Prince Regent to send my different authorities to Hanover, there to follow the instructions which His Royal Highness may think proper to give His Majesty's Hanoverian government, and to allow that in case of necessity my children can return to England. I shall provide for them sufficiently, and give to Mr. Hammersley such directions that they shall not be of any expenses to government; but I wish that His Royal Highness may in such a case graciously condescend to grant them his further Royal protection.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient servant,

WILLIAM DUKE OF BRUNSWICK.

The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Bath, 16th Jan., 1815.

Lord Castlereagh has transmitted to me a copy of the letter he wrote to you on the 4th instant. I send open for your inspection the answer which I have found myself obliged to return to it. I see not the least reason to alter the opinion which I gave you in my letter of yesterday respecting the expediency of your setting out for Vienna. Castlereagh is quite mistaken in supposing that the American peace will relieve us from our difficulties in Parliament. There is no analogy whatever between the situation in which we are placed now and that in which we were placed last year. At that time every person's eyes were fixed upon the continent, and nobody would have listened to debates in Parliament. Now all eyes are fixed on home, and it is quite astonishing how little interest is taken in what is going on at Vienna. I trust, therefore, that under all the difficulties as I have represented them, you will not feel any objection in beginning your journey without waiting for any further communication from Lord Castlereagh.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Bath, 16th Jan., 1815.

I have this moment received your letters of the 5th, and sincerely wish you joy of the favourable turn which the negotiation appears to have taken.

I must at the same time inform you that it is the unanimous opinion of all my colleagues and of those members of the House of Commons whom we are both in the habit of consulting on such matters, and who are perhaps better acquainted with the House of Commons than any ministers, that it is absolutely necessary that you should be here as soon as possible after the meeting of Parliament. You can have no idea how much ground the government lost in the House of Commons in the short session before Christmas; and the unfortunate circumstance in our present situation is this, that the debates of most importance which are likely to occur during the session must take place before the beginning of April. The questions of contest will be the questions of finance, and the political questions will principally be discussed and brought on as auxiliaries. We do not feel that the American peace has in any degree relieved our embarrassments, for financial difficulties, however they might have afterwards increased, would not have pressed upon us more severely during the present year, if the American war had continued, than they do now.

If the negotiation had broken off upon popular grounds, we might even have derived immediate facilities from the rupture; but we shall now be placed in the situation of contending for what will be called a war-expenditure in time of peace, and that under the circumstances of a general cry among all classes of people on the subject of the property-tax, and of a deep alarm prevailing among the landed interest in consequence of the great and unexpected fall in the prices of every description of grain.

I can assure you that I feel, in common with my colleagues, the greatest reluctance in proposing to you to withdraw at this moment from Vienna. Last year we could spare you. Everything was quiet in Parliament; everybody waiting for the result, and no symptom of party spirit appeared. Now very few persons give themselves any anxiety about what is passing at Vienna, except in as far as it is connected with expense; and I never have seen more party animosity than was manifested in November, and I understand still appears at the clubs and in private societies.

I will hope that by the end of this month or the very beginning of the next, most of the material points will have been settled; but as it is absolutely necessary that the Duke of Wellington should have a full communication with you, upon the supposition of any part of the negotiation being transferred into his hands, I shall write to him to request that he will not delay his journey. There is no material business which need detain him at Paris, and no inconvenience can result from leaving the correspondence there for the present in the hands of the Secretary of Embassy.

LIVERPOOL.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Bath, 16th Jan., 1815.

In consequence of a passage in a private letter which I have received from Cooke, I feel it necessary to trouble you with a few lines on the subject of Poland.

When we said that we should not object to your agreeing to the Emperor of Russia's arrangements respecting Poland, provided the provinces incorporated with Russia since 1792 were detached from that empire and re-united to the Duchy of Warsaw, we were desirous of putting the sincerity of His Imperial Majesty's professions to the test, but we did not suppose that there was much chance of his acceding to any such proposal.

If, however, an arrangement to this effect should be found impracticable, it becomes of very great importance that you should be no party to the stipulations respecting Poland; and though the manner and degree in which you may think proper to protest against the Polish arrangement must materially depend upon circumstances, I am satisfied that some protest will be absolutely necessary to render the proceeding on the subject palatable in this country.

LIVERPOOL.

Major-General Sir H. Torrens to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

Fulham, Monday night, 16th Jan., 1815.

I have this day received your letter of the 13th, and I hasten to assure you that I shall take care the insignia of the Bath shall be sent to you as soon as possible. You should have heard in the first instance of your having been brought back to the Order, had not the Duke wished to write to you himself upon the subject, and His Royal Highness delayed the execution of his intention for some days. His letter, however, must have

reached you before this, and you will have perceived that he had it in view to send you the new insignia whenever it can be got ready. The star and badge are both altered.

It is impossible, my dear Lord, to disguise from oneself the unfortunate error which has been committed in the improvident and unnecessary extension of the second class of the Bath to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. Under the invidious difficulty of applying any honorary limitation to the wide field of merit which the exploits of the army afforded, it was thought expedient to mark the sense which the government entertained of the services of the Peninsular army by taking five medals as a standard upon which a line of selection should be drawn in regard to the subordinate officers in particular. I need not enter into an explanation of the proceedings with regard to what I must confess to be an ill-digested plan; neither need I reason upon the want of analogy between the principle upon which medals are given and that which should guide the selection for an Order. It was necessary, however, to adopt some line, and the one drawn is attended by the usual disadvantage of excluding many of stronger claims than several who are comprised in it. This, however, is a common evil attending all general arrangements, and I should be prepared to meet its difficulty; but I confess I am not equally ready to contend against the dissatisfaction of many officers of rank, and who have commanded divisions, at seeing even their own staff elevated to the same rank and decoration with themselves. Had the second class been confined to General officers and admirals, they would have been pleased, and the other ranks would, in fact, rather have looked forward to the attainment of knighthood when promoted, and in the mean time they would have been sufficiently gratified with the third class. One mode of remedying this evil has occurred to me, and my constant communication upon this sore subject with all ranks enables me to judge of the beneficial effect it will have: I mean the withholding the investment of the Post Captains and Colonels and Lieutenant-Colonels until they shall respectively arrive at the rank of Major-General and Rear-Admiral. In the mean while they will wear the badge of the Order without the star; and I think this distinction will satisfy their military feelings of what is due to superior rank, give them something to look forward to, and put the Admirals and Generals in good humour. Since the promulgation of this arrangement, I have undergone more anxiety and labour and worry than I ever endured.

The medals are not to be returned. This was a crotchet at the Admiralty. It is not however intended, I believe, that they should be worn with the insignia of the Bath; at least, that those who have the star are not to wear the medals. I cannot, however, speak positively of this. I only know that you certainly are not to return them.

Believe me, my dear Lord Duke, to remain

Ever your faithfully obliged,

H. TORRENS.

The Earl of Liverpool to Earl Bathurst.

DEAR BATHURST,

Bath, 17th Jan., 1815.

You will have received this morning the letters I wrote to Castlereagh and the Duke of Wellington, on receiving the letters of the former of the

4th instant. Castlereagh is under an entire mistake in supposing that the American peace relieves us from our difficulties in Parliament, and he is not sufficiently informed of the situation of the government in the House of Commons. I am strongly impressed with the idea that we shall have the greatest difficulty in going on, as the government is now formed, if he does not return. The distressing circumstance is, that all the debates of real importance must take place in the month of March, that is, before the expiration of the Bank restriction and property tax. After we have carried through our financial measures (whatever they may be), the Opposition know well that we may laugh at them, and they will, therefore, make all their efforts, either upon the finance measures, or during their progress through Parliament.

You will see that Castlereagh mentions four or five weeks, and I leave him a discretion in my letter, which will enable him to continue at Vienna about that time, if he should find it necessary. If he could arrive here before the end of February, I should be tolerably satisfied. What I am most anxious about is to get Wellington to Vienna; Castlereagh might then finish his business, if he can; if not, Wellington would be on the spot informed of the actual state of things, and ready to take up the negotiation where Castlereagh left it. I can quite understand this arrangement not being a very agreeable one for Wellington; but I can see no reason why Castlereagh should object to it.

I can have no doubt now that the Saxon point will be determined long before Castlereagh need leave Vienna, nor do I think that he will have any difficulty in settling the question about the territories between the Meuse and the Rhine, at least in principle, before he returns. The question of Murat will require more time, and if it gets into negotiation may require so much time as to render it out of the question his being here during the greater part, if not the whole of the session. This I think must be handed over to Wellington, who has thoroughly considered the subject, and is fully apprised of all our sentiments upon it.

If, after this explanation, you are satisfied with my letters, send them; if not, let me have a memorandum of what you think it would be best I should write, and I will write accordingly.

If you send my letters of the 16th, I wish you would likewise send those of the 15th, which I return. The dates will show that they were written before I had received his letters of the 4th; but there is always some advantage in a person seeing the progress which your mind has taken in any business.

You may communicate fully my letters, if you please, to Lord Sidmouth and Melville. There are obvious reasons why they cannot be communicated to Vansittart and Pole.

Ever sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

Our friend Van. thinks that everything in the House of Commons before Christmas went off well; but Bathurst is as much impressed as anybody with the necessity of Castlereagh's return.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Downing-street, 17th Jan., 1815.

The case of General Inglis is a hard one. The Duke of York seems to have considered him as gone by. It is impossible to add to the number ; but he ought to be considered as soon as possible.

All Field officers having five medals and upwards have been made without exception Knights Commanders. You have, I understand, sent in an additional list of officers for medals, which rather deranges this rule ; and as officers will, I understand, apply to you for medals whose names have been omitted, I hope you will decline sending more lists, for the number cannot be augmented ; and the consequence of these additions will be, that it will give to the officers who so apply prior claims to many officers whose superior merits would otherwise entitle them to be first considered.

It will also save you from much importunity if you consider the list of medals as closed by the publication of the order.

You will see that the defensive alliance is fully approved here. It was a bold measure, and I think a very wise one, as being most calculated to prevent a war.

The sooner you join Lord Castlereagh the better. Your readiness to go or to stay is highly creditable to the public principles I have always observed you to act upon.

I am yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Lisbon, 22nd Jan., 1815.

Your Grace will probably have heard, through England, of the misfortune which has befallen your correspondence, embarked on board a store-ship, which was wrecked in going over the bar.*

I wrote by the last packet to Mr. Hamilton, the Under-Secretary, to announce the fact of the wreck, and to enclose two of the letters which had just been picked up floating in the Tagus.

Many parcels of letters have since been found, and delivered up to me, to the Consul-General, and to General Peacocke ; and I have endeavoured to quicken the zeal of the finders by promises of reward. What proportion the papers recovered bear to those which are lost I cannot tell. Finding Major-General Peacocke to be the person to whom the care of embarking the correspondence (or at least of finding a passage for the man entrusted with it) had been consigned, I have thought it best to give the whole over into his hands, and he will forward it to England by a ship of war. Only one parcel (so far as I have heard) has passed through the hands of

* This loss has given much trouble.

the government here. I do not know whether it contained anything to gratify Forjaz's curiosity.

Ever, my dear Lord, your Grace's most sincerely and faithfully,

GEORGE CANNING.

P. S. I wrote to your Grace by a courier to Madrid on the 15th of this month, to thank you for your kind loan of the *Necessidades*, in which my family is now comfortably established.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

[835.]

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 23rd Jan., 1815.

I saw M. de Blacas last night, who again spoke to me by the desire of the King on the subject of Naples. He said that he was very anxious to know what Great Britain would do.

I told him what you had stated in your last letter on this subject, and added that I was convinced the nation was so anxious to enjoy the benefits of a general peace, that there was no number of individuals who would bear to hear of its being disturbed by us, at least for any secondary object.

He said the King was determined to undertake the operation, even though he should be obliged to undertake it alone; and he was very desirous that I should be able to inform M. de Talleyrand, at Vienna, what would be the naval force in the Mediterranean employed in the blockade of the Neapolitan ports, and whether they could reckon upon receiving aid from it, particularly in transporting their troops. He also asked whether it would not be possible to have the co-operation of the British troops still in Sicily, at Genoa, and the disposable troops at Malta. I told him that I could give him no hopes of any aid of that description.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Baron Frimont.

[836.]

M. LE GÉNÉRAL,

A Paris, le 25 Janvier, 1815.

J'ai l'honneur d'envoyer à V.E. la copie d'une convention faite avec le gouvernement Français par les officiers d'état-

major des armées Autrichiennes, Russes, et Prussiennes, et le Commissaire-Général de l'armée Britannique, attachés à mon quartier-général, pour régler les prix qui seroient donnés par le gouvernement Français pour les portions des officiers de l'armée alliée d'occupation sous le tarif annexé à la convention du 20 Novembre dernier.

La somme d'un million quatre-vingt mille francs qu'il est convenu par l'article 1 que le gouvernement Français doit payer sera divisée en cinq parties, dont une pour l'armée Autrichienne, une pour l'armée Russe, une pour l'armée Prussienne, et deux pour l'armée Angloise et les contingents des Rois de Bavière, de Dannemarc, de Hanovre, de Saxe, et de Wurtemberg.

Je nommerai pour commissaires pour recevoir cette indemnité les mêmes commissaires Autrichiens, Russes, et Prussiens qu'ont nommés les Souverains pour recevoir les autres sommes à recevoir de la France, avec M. Dunmore, le Commissaire-Général de l'armée Britannique.

Les Commandans-en-Chef des armées Autrichiennes, Russes, et Prussiennes auront la bonté de décider quel sera le montant de la somme que les officiers des armées sous leur commandement respectif recevront pour la portion qui leur est dû sous le tarif du 20 Novembre, et la leur fera payer de la somme de * , qui sera mise à la disposition des commissaires ci-dessus nommés chaque mois, à commencer du 1er Novembre prochain.

WELLINGTON.

The Deputy Judge Advocate General to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD WELLINGTON,

Winchester, 26th Jan., 1815.

I have to acknowledge two letters from your Grace of the 19th, which I received only this morning. With regard to that which has reference to my own concerns, I beg to return you my most sincere thanks. I feel most sensibly your having paid such immediate attention to my last letter, and hope it is a proof that you were not offended with the liberty which I took in writing it.

I have only now to fear that by your kindness in acting as you have done so immediately upon my suggestion and request, which was intended only for the future, Earl Bathurst may conceive that I am discontented

* Blank in manuscript.

with the situation he has now proposed for me, and that I am ungrateful for what he has already done. I hope, however, that my letter will not bear that interpretation.

With regard to Sir J. Murray's case, I have proceeded nearly as you wished: the prosecution is closed, and Sir J. Murray commences his defence to-morrow. At present the Court appear generally to feel that the case on all the charges is very strong against General Murray, and they are very anxious to hear the answer. Much, I am convinced, will be explained; but how the case can possibly end in an honourable acquittal, which Mr. Harrison, who is General Murray's counsel, tells me he does not despair of, I cannot at all foresee.

Not having received your letter in time, and not observing anything to lead me to the precise reasoning as to the cavalry, my argument upon and construction of the 13th paragraph of your Grace's instructions was somewhat different from the line you point out, but I conceive not materially so. As the whole of my address was so much garbled, and in many parts misrepresented, in the newspapers, I take the liberty of enclosing a copy of that part only connected with this branch of the subject; and I will endeavour, if an opportunity shall offer in answer to General Murray, to make use of the suggestions contained in your letter, and to point out more strongly the application the 13th paragraph had to the Spaniards only.

The evidence, your Grace will have seen, is in general very tolerably correct in the papers, and the whole case is, by the directions of General Murray, to be published as soon as possible by Mr. Gurney, the short-hand writer; but if you wish for a copy of the proceedings at an earlier period, I will endeavour to forward one.

As matters stand, both the public, and I think the Court apparently, seem to feel that the case is fully proved, unless the explanation and answers given shall be satisfactory. I am told Sir J. Murray is to justify both the continuing the siege so long, and the hasty retreat, by the certain information received by him late on the evening of the 11th only of Suchet's approach; that as long as he only knew positively of Decaen's approach he continued the siege, and was justified in so doing, as he was always ready to fight the Barcelona army singly; and that it was only the last positive news of Suchet which made a change of plan necessary. From his letters, however, he certainly appears all along to have been aware of Suchet's approach before the 11th, though not of his arrival in the vicinity. I believe that he means to contend that both his own letters and your Grace's instructions bear another interpretation; and that however clear the latter appear to be, he acted upon them in the way he understood them, and that the continuing the siege to the very last moment, and even the second debarkation, near the Coll de Balaguer, instead of returning to Valencia, were both to be justified as being more conducive to the first object (when the second had failed), namely, the enabling the Spaniards to obtain possession of Valencia, than if he had returned there himself directly; and that he construes the part of the instructions as to the return to Valencia when he had failed at Tarragona, and the landing as far north there as possible, and the order to join immediately on the right of the Duke del Parque, to mean, not that he was in such case immediately to return, but that when he did return he was to join immediately or close on

the right, &c. I should not have troubled your Grace with these details, had it not been for the request contained in the latter part of your letter. If anything particular should occur, I will inform your Grace. In the mean time I must remain,

My dear Lord Wellington,

Your Grace's most obliged and obedient humble servant,

FRANCIS SEYMOUR LARPENT.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Extract from the Deputy Judge Advocate's Address on Sir John Murray's Case.

"It is impossible for me to foresee in what manner and to what extent General Murray may explain his conduct, and answer the different charges and arguments which have been produced against him. I sincerely hope he will be able to do so in a way which shall be deemed satisfactory; but as the Court must have observed that in more than one instance he has relied in his justification upon the 13th paragraph of his Instructions, and in one place has quoted the same, and stated that the mode in which the Generals were to conduct the campaign, and the degree of risk they were to run, were there clearly pointed out, it becomes necessary, before I conclude, to examine a little into this part of the Memorandum, and to see how far General Murray appears to be borne out in the inferences which he would wish to be drawn from that source. The paragraph is this:—

"It must be understood, however, by the General Officers at the head of *these* troops, that the success of all our endeavours in the ensuing campaign will depend upon none of the corps being beat, of which the operating armies will be composed, and that they will be in *sufficient numbers* to turn the enemy, rather than attack him in a strong position, and that I shall forgive anything excepting that one of the corps should be beat or dispersed."

"By what ingenious arguments this can be fairly made matter of defence on the present charges, or at least the two first, and more especially when considered as coupled and connected with the Duke of Wellington's letter in which the Memorandum was enclosed, I feel quite at a loss to discover. Scarcely can I see how it is at all directly applicable to the questions under consideration; but if at all, it does seem to be unfavourably so, and not as matter of justification. The meaning appears obvious. Several of the Spanish corps, it is well known, were composed of raw levies not to be depended upon when opposed to French veteran troops, more especially if the latter were assisted by position. It is also a matter of notoriety that many of the previous failures of the Spaniards had arisen from their Generals not being sufficiently impressed with this unpleasant truth, but, on the contrary, suffering their zeal and confidence to get the better of their prudence, and thus continually risking general actions, which ought, except in cases of decided advantages and superiority, to have been most carefully avoided. On the other hand, the only advantage which the Spaniards possessed, or for some time were likely to possess, over the French (excepting the good-will and assistance of the inhabitants, as far as their fears would permit), was superiority of numbers. The Memorandum therefore, looking to the real state of affairs, appears naturally to prescribe in consequence as a general rule in carrying on the campaign, the taking advantage of that which was favourable, and the avoiding that line of conduct the dangers of which had been already but too often apparent, and still existed in full force, and thus

making use of, and at the same time carefully preserving, that superiority of numbers which the Spaniards then enjoyed, and which the defeat and dispersion of any of their corps would have destroyed.

“How then does this apply to the situation and circumstances in which General Murray was then placed? First, I should say it was quite beside the question at issue; that it was not strictly a matter that the General should ever have considered as intended for his particular guidance at this moment, and in the particular case in question. Suppose, however, the contrary; the next question is, how can it apply? As a defence against a charge for not having fought, and risked a general action, when the result would have been attended with glory and benefit to the general cause of the world then at stake, it might indeed have been considered material, and would, I have no doubt, have had its due weight. Still, however, I cannot discover how it can be made matter of justification for the perseverance in the siege without object, for the consequent losses incurred, for the delay in coming to the decision of re-embarking that which was uselessly exposed on shore, for the apparent want of all previous arrangement, and (until explained in some other manner) I must say, for the improper haste and confusion attending the re-embarkation, when the measure was at last finally decided upon; and lastly, for the subsequent delay on the coast, and the relanding of the army. To the whole of this the 13th paragraph appears anything but a defence; and if the Court shall view the matter at all in the same light, they will, I think, come to the conclusion that, taken in its true sense and spirit, this paragraph is in fact just the reverse of a defence. Next to the loss of a whole corps, the loss of the equipments of an army, the loss of guns (particularly of the description of some of the guns which were left behind), the loss of stores, ammunition, and the means of carrying on those sieges which, in the general scope of the Instructions, were evidently looked forward to in the course of the campaign, were of the utmost importance. Such losses were objects of the very next, if not of equal value with the loss of a corps, more especially when the infinite difficulty of replacing them in Spain is duly considered; and I must submit that, according to the real meaning of the 13th paragraph, they ought to have been most cautiously avoided. This, though not literally expressed, must in all fairness be considered as implied in the true spirit of the part of the Instructions relied upon, and the natural operation I conceive should have been to have acted as the strongest inducement to employ every precaution, and to act with the utmost zeal and activity for the prevention of such losses.

“As to the remaining part of these transactions also, namely, that referred to in the second charge, General Murray, by this defence, appears to me to have placed himself in a dilemma from which it will be difficult for him by the utmost ingenuity to extricate himself.

“For, admitting now for the moment, that not only the refusal to give battle, but even the hasty re-embarkation with all its losses, was all to be justified by an anxious desire to comply with this 13th paragraph, how can the General do otherwise than condemn himself, upon his own showing, upon this very same principle, for again, and that almost immediately, and voluntarily, placing himself in direct contradiction to this same paragraph, according to Sir J. Murray's own interpretation, and clearly against the plain import of the remainder of the Memorandum, in the very same situation of danger from which he had but just made such sacrifices to extricate himself, and that at a time when the very strong temptation to run such forbidden risks, namely the preservation of a very material part of that with which he had been entrusted, and the natural anxiety which he must have felt to preserve the glory of His Majesty's arms untarnished, had altogether ceased to operate?”

MEMORANDA RESPECTING THE NETHERLANDS.

Office of Ordnance, 27th Jan., 1815.

No. 1.—To meet the views of the Duke of Wellington relative to the future defence of the Netherlands, it is proposed that a Committee of British Engineers shall immediately proceed to that country to enter into detailed projects for the restoration of such ruined fortresses and for the construction of such new posts as his Grace has pointed out in his report.

No. 2.—To ensure unity of action in the Committee, it is proposed to consist only of a president and two members, the commanding Engineer in the country being one; but to enable it to make a speedy report and to have the advantage of further professional talents, all the officers of the whole Engineer department in that country to be at the disposal of the Committee for drawing plans, making calculations, and assisting in all the detail of the service.

No. 3.—This being arranged, the Committee should proceed to inspect minutely the different towns named in the margin;* and on visiting each, having decided on the best mode of carrying into effect the instructions in paragraphs 4 and 5, &c., they will leave competent officers to make the plans and calculations which they will at different times of its progress inspect and consider, and thus, by frequently moving, the whole measure will be in a state of progress at the same time under the directions of the Committee, and their report may be completed in a limited period.

No. 4.—The attention of the Committee is to be directed generally to the following considerations:—

First, The time, expense, and readiest manner of putting each place into a state to oblige an enemy to open batteries against it.

Second, The expense and best mode of giving to each place an equilibrium of defence, so as to be able to resist for seven, ten, fourteen, or twenty days, open trenches, according to the magnitude of the fortress, and as in the opinion of the Committee the defence of the part of the frontier where it is placed may require.

Third, To accompany each project with a memoir, stating why such a particular degree of strength is recommended to be given to each fortress, as also a statement of the number of the garrison required.

No. 5.—The Committee will in particular attend to the following points:—

First, At Liège and Huy, to consider the necessity and best mode of restoring the works on the heights which command them.

Second, At Namur, the works of the citadel to be restored, and the front to be covered by a chain of strong casemated redoubts.

Third, At Charleroi, Mons, and Ath, to pay particular attention to the repair of such works as command the inundation of the country.

Fourth, At Tournay, to restore the works of the citadel, and to guard against the fortifications of the town favouring the attack of them, and to provide such defence for the town as shall secure the inhabitants from the depredations of marauding parties.

Fifth, At Courtray, Menin, Ypres, Nieuport, and Ostend, to prepare every thing which can be done to secure and improve the means of inundating the country at each place. At Ostend, to cover the great sluice of Sluykens, and

* Liège and Huy on the Meuse; citadel of Namur, Charleroi, Mons, and Ath; citadel of Tournay, Courtray, Menin, Ypres, Furnes, Nieuport, Ostend, Oudenarde; citadel of Ghent, Antwerp, Dendermonde, Grammont, and Louvain.

to propose the additions which are necessary to secure that place from an attack by the sand hills.

Sixth, At Grammont, to propose a work to be constructed on the high ground in rear of it at Notre Dame.

Seventh, At Dendermonde, to propose such works as its importance as a tête du pont upon the Scheldt, and its situation at the junction of the Dender with that river, would seem to require.

Eighth, At Antwerp (considering it as a place of importance in a military point of view), to complete the works already commenced, and to consider the propriety (in its several bearings) of destroying the works, called the Intrenched Camp, to the southward of the citadel.

No. 6.—The Committee will propose a good casemated work, to be constructed on the site of an old Roman work, near Binch, which will command the communication from Mons to Charleroi through that town.

No. 7.—The attention of the Committee is also directed, as a main feature of defence, to increasing the means of inundating the country, particularly those of the Dender, from Dendermonde to Grammont.

No. 8.—Though these points are laid down for the attention of the Committee, they are by no means to confine their observations to them, but are to take a comprehensive view of the defence of the whole Netherlands, and will be guided by their opinions thereon in whatsoever they may propose, and it is expected they will suggest whatever appears best to improve the defence of the country, whether or not contained in these instructions.

S. R. CHAPMAN, Lieut.-Colonel Royal Engineers.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Fife House, 27th Jan., 1815.

It must be uncertain whether this letter will still find you at Vienna; but as you express yourself desirous of receiving an answer on the subject of the Portuguese claims relative to the slave trade, I will not let the weekly messenger go without acquainting you that whilst we entirely approve your having offered the 300,000*l.* as a compensation for the Portuguese ships taken and confiscated, upon the condition of their government immediately agreeing to abolish the slave trade north of the Line, we cannot authorise your giving up the claim we have on the Portuguese government for their loan for so limited a measure as that above stated.

Our great difficulties for some time to come will be financial, and we must avoid, therefore, involving ourselves in new expenses which are not absolutely necessary.

I fear we shall be obliged to give up the property tax immediately. Indeed, the current of opinion is so strong against it, that I do not think we should have any chance of carrying it, even for a year. It will be better, therefore, to endeavour to make the public pay for the relief they are to obtain by some very efficient measure, which we may be able to carry in the first instance, as the price of giving up the property tax, but which it might be very difficult to induce Parliament to adopt under other circumstances.

I wish you joy on the successful progress of the negotiations respecting Saxony. I feel sanguine now that you will be able to settle substantially

all the questions respecting Germany and the Low Countries before you leave Vienna.

My letters to Wellington and yourself will have fully explained the sentiments of government respecting Naples. It is certainly of considerable importance to get rid of Murat, if we can; but it will be quite impossible for us, in the present state of things, to make any military effort or to put ourselves to any visible expense for the attainment of this object. Murat need not, however, be apprised of our difficulties; and if we are satisfied, as well as Austria, that he has no claim upon our good faith, we may perhaps be able to make him feel that he best secures his own interest by a timely compromise. Indeed it is scarcely possible that his power should ever amalgamate with the present system of Europe. This forms a most important consideration for removing him, if possible. I certainly should think negotiation the preferable mode of accomplishing it, because, amongst other reasons, I should look with serious apprehension to any military efforts being made against him, except with a very adequate force. Military failure in the prosecution of this object might lead to the most serious consequences in Italy, which might extend afterwards to other parts of the continent.

LIVERPOOL.

General Müffling to Major-Gen. Sir H. Lowe.

MON CHER ET DIGNE GÉNÉRAL,

Aix la Chapelle, 29 Jan., 1815.

Je vous ai promis de vous annoncer les mouvemens qui pourroient avoir de l'influence sur vos mesures en Belgique, ainsi je vous préviens qu'un corps d'armée, composé d'un quart de nos forces (que vous connoissez), avec une artillerie nombreuse, passera le Rhin. La marche est traitée comme un secret, et c'est ainsi que je vous donne la nouvelle, cher Général.

La direction donnée à ce corps de Vienne le met à même d'entrer en Saxe ou de se porter dans le cœur d'Allemagne.

Nous ignorons absolument ce qui s'est passé à Vienne, mais il paroît que nous sommes décidé à la guerre si on nous dispute la Saxe.

L'estime que notre armée, notre nation porte pour la vôtre, mon attachement pour vous, cher Général, me porte à vous confier l'état des choses, sans savoir s'il n'a réussi à l'intrigue d'exciter les passions jusqu'au point de désunir nos deux nations, ou plutôt les Ministres de nos deux nations, qui ne doivent jamais se désunir. Une lettre d'une personne de confiance me dit que nous avons les preuves que le Prince Metternich et le Général Langeron ont formé le projet de soulever le pays de Saxe contre nous, et qu'ils ont des liaisons dans l'armée Saxonne. On a arrêté plusieurs émissaires qui parcourent le pays de Saxe pour organiser la révolte.

Cette conduite me paroît indigne, et demande des mesures sérieuses. Je crois qu'il est impossible que Lord Castlereagh se range du côté de Metternich; et s'il est vrai que l'Autriche, la France, et la Bavière sont alliés, et qu'ils nous forceroient à la guerre, l'Angleterre ne peut pas rester neutre, et si elle se déclare ce seroit une chose inouïe si elle la faisoit avec la France.

Enfin, mon cher Général, j'espère vous me conserverez votre amitié, comme je l'aurois toujours avec tous mes loyaux camarades pour vous et votre nation, quand même la politique ne nous accorderoit pas de nous battre ensemble. J'espère toujours que les choses seront aplanies. Si M. voit que nous acceptons la guerre, malheureusement sa position l'engage à prendre des mesures extraordinaires pour se soutenir et conserver sa place comme Ministre.

Nos forteresses sont mis en état de siège.

Adieu, cher et digne Général. Notre digne Général Kleist reste à Aix-la-Chapelle.

Tout à vous,
MÜFFLING.

Viscount Castlereagh to Earl Bathurst.

DEAR LORD BATHURST,

Vienna, 30th Jan., 1815.

Many thanks for your letters. You may rely upon my joining you as soon as I can without essentially endangering the point immediately at issue; but you might as well expect me to have run away from Leipzig (if I had been there) last year to fight Creevy and Whitbread, as to withdraw from hence till the existing contest is brought to a point; and I think you do both injustice to your supporters, and too much honour to me, in supposing my presence so necessary.

You will find things go quite smooth at Genoa. Dalrymple, by his last letter, is perfectly content and pleased with Revel; the Genoese flocking to Turin to pay their court. Lord W. Bentinck had an apprehension that our troops might be unpleasantly committed at Genoa, and seemed disposed to move the 14th regiment, bringing in its room the battalion of Italians from Nice. When the Duke comes, I will beg him to confer with Dalrymple and arrange for the best. I send you enclosed a projet of incorporation of the Italian levies received from St. Marsan. I fully explained to him that we could not transfer the corps: it must be a new enrolment of both officers and men. Under these circumstances he appeared very desirous not to disorganise this force till the King's authority was better established in the Genoese territory.

Apsley quite well. Cooke gone to Italy, where he will look after Lord Pembroke's commands.

Yours sincerely,
CASTLEREAGH.

I beg you will not give any money at present to any of the Continental Powers. The poorer they are kept the better, to prevent them from quarrelling. Time enough to settle accounts when we know who deserves it.

The Prince Regent to Earl Bathurst.

DEAR BATHURST,

Brighton, 5th Feb., 1815.

I return you Lowe's letter;* and if you wish to have my sentiments upon the contents of it, I will give them to you in three words. In the first place, it seems to me quite clear that the letter was intended to be forwarded and shown here; and secondly, it appears to me equally evident that this partial movement of the Prussian army is a complete *ruse* to hold out *in terrorem* to us other consequences which may ensue, as they have at length discovered that of which they had not been informed before, from being no parties to it, namely, our late private treaty, and that therefore pique and resentment at this, as well as the hope of inspiring a general feeling of terror throughout Europe at the slightest possibility of any renewal of warfare, has dictated this very impolitic as well as unjustifiable measure. I am quite persuaded that holding our heads very high, a resolute, firm, and steady line of conduct, as well as a bold tone in our language towards them at this moment, will render the whole of this plan of theirs abortive, and secure to us that becoming conciliation and submission on their part which nothing else I am sure can accomplish. Adieu, in haste.

Always most sincerely yours,

GEORGE, P. R.

P.S. I propose being in town next Sunday evening, and shall expect to see you at Carlton House on the Monday morning.

Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool.

DEAR LIVERPOOL,

Vienna, 6th Feb., 1815.

The Duke of Wellington arrived here on the 3rd. The cold weather on the road, followed by some hot rooms here, has, I am sorry to observe, given him a heavy cold, which for the moment confines him to his room; but Dr. Franck considers it of no essential consequence. I hope to get away the 12th or 13th. My official despatch will apprise you that I have, after much difficulty, brought the parties to a settlement upon Saxony, which, in the shape the details were prepared, decides at the same time the five questions which relate to the centre of Europe, viz., the Austrian, Prussian, Bavarian, Orange, and Hanoverian. The points collaterally connected with them I hope to dispose of in the course of the week, and to establish, in concert with the other Powers, some understanding upon the point of Naples, the Ionian Islands, and the other less material arrangements still pending in the north of Italy.

I have had the satisfaction of talking over with the Duke of Wellington the business in progress, and was happy to find no divergence of sentiment on any point is likely to occur.

My wish was, after placing the business in a suitable shape to be delivered over, to pursue my journey by the shortest possible route; but

* See letter from General Müffling to Sir Hudson Lowe, 29th January, 1815, p. 550.

in consequence of a letter from the King of France, Prince Talleyrand makes so great a point of my seeing His Majesty for a day on my way, and being certainly impressed with a conviction that in doing so I may prevent difficulties hereafter on the Neapolitan question, I rather think I shall yield to his request, the rather as I am told the road by the Rhine will be very bad after the thaw we have had.

I propose setting out from hence on Monday next.

Believe me, my dear Lord, faithfully yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

NOTES by LORD LIVERPOOL, from a private Letter, detailing an Interview with Buonaparte at Elba, the latter end of January, 1815.

Rome, 9th Feb., 1815.

Conversation.

1. Tourist's uniform, militia.

B. What county?—Cornwall.

B. Face and productions of the county? Revenue of the Prince from the mines?

2. Journey of the tourist.

Buonaparte went entirely through it with him; and B. said, in reply to an observation respecting the badness of the road over the Col di Tende, part of the Maritime Alps, "that it was not made by him, nor did he care about it." "Comme je voulois dominer aussi sur l'Italie," my principal attention was directed to the upper part of the Alps, so as to connect that country as intimately as possible with France.

T. Inquired of B. whether he had not a project of uniting the Rhine and Danube. He said, "Oui, c'est bien facile; une affaire de 5,000,000 francs" (about 900,000*l.*); that he had united the Saône and the Rhine (the German Sea and the Mediterranean).

3. Conversation respecting Congress.

B. observed that peace should have been made at Frankfort, separating Germany entirely from the influence of France, and taking from him Holland, Italy, and Spain; but that Belgium should have remained as part of France. That he never could have agreed to a peace that would leave France less in territory than when he mounted the throne. (Qy. why Boney did not make peace at Dresden when these terms were offered him?) He intimated that the Allies were not sincere, and that affairs at that time wore a different aspect. Boney dwelt particularly on the bad policy of England appropriating to herself the Netherlands; that they would be a perpetual source of expense, and might draw us into a war, as any Power wishing the support of France would offer that country as a bribe. Suppose if Prussia were to say to her at present, "Let me have Poland, and do you take Belgium." He observed that we should withdraw ourselves within our island, and act when and where we chose, and not be obliged, with our vast colonies, to keep up a large standing army for the defence of a part of the continent, which, as we could not maintain ourselves on it as a Power of the first rank, we should probably lose on the first coup de canon, and a battle lost before Brussels would open the road to Holland.

On the subject of the late campaign, he observed that the peasantry were rising in the rear of the Allied army, and that he should have done very well had he not been betrayed. On my asking if by Talleyrand, he intimated that he had had a hand in it, but chiefly by his Generals Marmont and Augereau. Very angry with Marmont, and said that Augereau, with an army superior to the Austrians, had made his terms a fortnight before. Blücher, he observed, was a brave man, but no General; that he had lost two armies. Of Schwarzenberg he appeared to have a better opinion; but spoke with great contempt of the Austrian troops—that they could do nothing without a bellyfull. The Duke of Wellington he praised. The French soldiers, he observed, wanted only a little *ténacité* to render them perfect; that they were *peu constants*. Of the Spaniards he had a very mean opinion: their character was *l'opiniâtreté*, and to this he ascribed their defence of Saragossa, which I advanced against his assertion that they had done nothing gallant.

Buonaparte bewailed the fate of Italy, divided into petty States, observing that it should form one kingdom. I hinted at the difficulty of naming a King. He said, "Oh! some Italian; it matters not by whom the King is appointed;" and instanced Murat, whom he had placed on the throne of Naples. A sovereign, he observed, was made for his people. The Italians were excellent stuff for soldiers—*passionnés*, much of the old Roman still remaining: that he had found them effeminate, and living constantly with the women had done much to reform them. The Pope, he observed, was a *grand malheur pour l'Europe*; that the dominion of priests was detestable. Every sovereign should be at the head of his own Church; that we were much indebted to Henry VIII. for getting rid of him; that he had attempted it, but popery had no such fancy. As an individual he observed that the present Pope was a *bien bon homme*, and as such had been well entertained at Fontainebleau, but ignorant in the extreme; and that amongst the Cardinals, for he had seen them all at Paris, there was not one to whom he would give a seat in the fourth rank at his council. Ecclesiastic governments, generally speaking, were bad: the empire of the rulers was not of this world.

Speaking of affairs in Switzerland, and the desire of the Canton of Berne to recover the countries he had separated from it, he observed that there was no *joug si sévère* as that of a people.

Peace with America should have been made sooner, as it would have given us greater influence in the Congress. The Americans, he observed, wanted a ten years' war to make them a nation: at present they had no noblesse—a set of *marchands*. That we should in the course of time lose Canada; and of what great importance was it to England, with her immense possessions? That America would one day probably rival our navy; an attempt he had made, but failed.

In the course of conversation he remarked that France and England should be Allies. On my hinting at the difficulty of such an union, his observation was the following: "Pourquoi pas? Le monde est assez grand. La France n'a pas besoin de se mêler trop de commerce. Il y avoit un homme, Fox, qui pouvoit le faire: malheureusement il est mort."

End of the Interview.

On our joining General Bertrand in the anteroom, he (General B.) observed, looking at his watch, "Vous avez eu une bien longue séance—plus d'une heure."

General and Madame Bertrand most excellent people, kind and civil in the extreme. Saw a good deal of them. The Countess is related to the Dillon family; spent several years in England; has the manners and appearance of an Englishwoman, and speaks English tolerably well. What a sacrifice for a man who stands high (General Bertrand) in France to make! His name as General and Count is continued by the present government on the Army List.

Buonaparte is reduced to his last shilling. He has spent the little money he brought with him, and his pension has not been paid, although the six months have long since expired. This is abominable. He had not a sou in the English or any other funds, and on leaving France he did not take any of his private treasure, plate, or jewels with him.

They say that the Empress is much attached to Buonaparte, and wishes to join him; but that her father will not hear of it, or even allow her to write.

Respecting the rumour that Buonaparte was to be removed from Elba to St. Helena, it is said the Emperor declares he will only be removed per force. Buonaparte brought 800 Imperial Guards and about 150 Polish Lancers to Elba with him. Many of these have left, not liking the confinement, and things not being so cheap as in France.

Lord Ebrington is the only Englishman who has dined with Buonaparte. They had much conversation on the campaign in Egypt. The Turks that were shot Napoleon said were taken by the French, released on their parole, retaken in arms, and of course were liable to the laws of war; but that he should not have put them to death had there been anything to eat. "Il n'y avoit point de pain : ou les Tourcs ou les François devoient se briser contre la muraille. Je ne balançois pas."

As to the poisoned French sick soldiers, he said they were only two or three who had the plague, and could not be removed without endangering the health of the whole army; that he recommended an easy death by a little poison, but it was not administered, and they were left to be butchered by the Turks.

Boney goes to bed about nine, rises again about twelve, and reads for three or four hours in the morning. He generally drives out accompanied by General Bertrand or Drouet, a good sort of fellow, the Governor of the island; and such is the etiquette still kept up, that the person in the carriage remains uncovered until they are clear of the town. L'Empereur has also a navy, a brig of 18 guns.

Colonel Sir William Robe, Colonel Sir Colin Campbell, and Archibald Campbell, Esq., to Earl Bathurst.

MY LORD,

Suffolk Street, 9th Feb., 1815.

We have the honour most respectfully to submit to your Lordship, on the part of the Duke of Wellington and the army, the accompanying

memorial and statement, by which you will observe that we claim, on the part of the army, the sum of nine hundred thousand pounds and upwards as prize-money to be distributed to the army.

We have the honour to request that your Lordship will be pleased to submit the memorial to the favourable consideration of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent and the government, and, in case any further explanation or documents may be required, that we are ready to give them.

We have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servants,

WILLIAM ROBE, Colonel.

COLIN CAMPBELL, Colonel.

ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL.

A separate memorandum is herewith sent for the consideration of Earl Bathurst.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

MEMORANDUM for the consideration of the Right Honourable the
Earl BATHURST, &c. &c.

Suffolk Street, 9th Feb., 1815.

There is no claim whatever set forth in the memorial now presented for any of the captures made in the neighbourhood of Cadiz by the army under the command of Lord Lynedoch, Generals Cooke and Skerrett.

When the French army quitted the lines before Cadiz, in consequence of the battle of Salamanca and the advance of the army on Madrid, they left behind the whole of their artillery, amounting to nearly five hundred pieces of brass ordnance, which the Spaniards took possession of.

There were also found at Seville, when General Skerrett drove the enemy out of it, upwards of a hundred pieces of brass cannon, a great quantity of ammunition, and two large boats loaded with quicksilver; also their arsenal, foundries, powder-mills, saltpetre works, and stores entire, which were delivered over to the Spanish authorities.

There were taken at Barrosa eight pieces of brass field ordnance, which are now in England; and when the enemy were compelled to raise the siege of Tarifa, they left behind them fifteen pieces of heavy ordnance and a quantity of ordnance stores, one-third part of which was delivered to the British as their share, and part of which is now in England.

It is therefore submitted to the consideration of government (though no claim is made for the above) whether it would not be better to grant a round sum, so that the part of the army which were present at the above captures might benefit by the distribution, which they cannot do unless provided for in this manner, or by a separate grant.

WILLIAM ROBE, Colonel.

COLIN CAMPBELL, Colonel.

ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL.

II.

To the Right Honourable Earl Bathurst, His Majesty's Secretary of State, &c. &c.

THE MEMORIAL of Colonel Sir William Robe, and of Colonel Sir Colin Campbell, and of Archibald Campbell, on behalf of Field Marshal his Grace the Duke of Wellington and the Army recently under his command,

Showeth,

That your memorialists are appointed to act on behalf of his Grace and the army under his command in relation to all grants of the value of guns, ammunition, stores, magazines of provisions and stores, and ships, and vessels, and all other property captured from the enemy, which His Royal Highness the Prince Regent may be advised and graciously pleased to make the subject of grant to his Grace and the army as booty or prize :

That in consequence of various communications made to his Grace of His Royal Highness's gracious intention in favour of the army in relation to captures, measures were adopted by his Grace, on the British army entering France, by the appointment of different commissioners, and have since been adopted by your memorialists, for the purpose of ascertaining the amount and value of the various descriptions of property captured from the enemy, considered to be booty and prize to the army.

Your memorialists therefore now transmit an account of such property under distinct heads, with the grounds upon which they submit the claims of his Grace and the army to the favourable recommendation of His Majesty's government and the gracious consideration of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, in respect of the different subjects of capture, and their amount and value stated in the annexed paper.

1st. The first and most important is that of ammunition and ordnance stores captured from the enemy in the kingdoms of Portugal, Spain, and France, in different campaigns; upon which it is only necessary to observe that, in consequence of an intimation of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent's gracious intention to grant to the army the amount and value of all such captured ammunition and ordnance stores, whether applied to the service of Great Britain or to the use of the Spanish and Portuguese armies, full accounts of all such captures have been submitted to the Master General and Board of Ordnance, and valued, and that such valuation amounts to the sum stated in the annexed paper, without including the valuable arsenal at Seville, or the guns in the lines at Cadiz, or very considerable quantities of ordnance, which have been, upon various occasions and at different places, destroyed from unavoidable circumstances, and in respect of which your memorialists make no claim whatever here.

2nd. The second relates to magazines and depôts of stores, provisions, and forage, captured from the enemy at Merida, Olivenza, Badajoz, Ciudad Rodrigo, Levang, Salamanca, Almaraz, Segovia, Madrid, Arevalo, Vitoria, and numerous other places in Spain, during the different campaigns in the Peninsula. In principle, this stands upon precisely the same grounds as that which relates to the magazine at Mont de Marsan, the value of which has already been under consideration as booty and prize to the army; but from the peculiar nature of the service in which the army were then engaged, and from no instructions having been then received, or means used by the appointment of commissioners for ascertaining the value of those provisions or stores, and also from the Commissary-General, on whom your memorialists have called for returns of such parts of them as were taken in charge by his

department, being unable from the death of some, and the absence of others at Lisbon, America, France, and Germany, to furnish your memorialists with particular returns, they are unable to deliver such accounts as can furnish accurate grounds of calculation as to their amount and value, and are desirous therefore of putting their value at a much lower sum than would (as they are well satisfied) have been the amount of this head of claims, if accurate returns and valuations could have been procured. Great difficulties must always arise in forming any very precise estimate of such captures made by an army carrying on active operations in the field, even in the cases in which they can be delivered entire into the charge of the Commissaries; but, in addition to this, it is to be observed that large quantities of such stores and provisions are not always collected in single magazines or depôts; and it is well known that it is always very difficult, oftentimes quite impossible, even where they are so collected, to deliver entire depôts in the state in which they are captured into the charge of commissaries; and that the divisions of the army which first take possession of them immediately liberally supply themselves from such sources before any arrangements can be made for putting them under regular charge and distribution; and also that numerous captures of a minor description are entirely consumed by the army without coming at all into the regular charge or accounts of the Commissariat; but that all such supplies, nevertheless, contribute most materially to recruit an army exhausted in some measure by the very service which leads to the capture, and often, in such cases, at a distance from their own depôts, and still more materially contribute to the husbanding the supplies and saving the expense of distant transport of the stores and provisions of the capturing army. In addition to which it may be stated (without in the most distant manner meaning to impute the least particle of improper backwardness in public service) that Commissaries are, under such circumstances of rapid and uncertain movements, depending in some measure upon the enemy, from obvious causes not over anxious to be put in such charge of many of such magazines or depôts as would afford the means of accurate calculation of their amount and value. The unprecedented nature of the service in which most of these captures were made, and its extent and the difficulties occurring in it, could only be fairly estimated by those who were eyewitnesses of it, and will obviate all surprise at there not being very accurate accounts. Your memorialists, therefore, can do no more than refer to the general knowledge of the number and extent of such captures, so well known and so often mentioned in the despatches detailing the operations of the army. The particulars of the ordnance stores found at Madrid and other places in Spain, of which returns have been made, afford grounds of estimate for corresponding quantities of provisions, forage, and other articles not coming within the object of those returns; and when it is considered that they are the captures of three successive campaigns, in which the French were ultimately driven from that side of the Peninsula and the north of Spain; and that Madrid was the centre depôt of the whole of the enemy's army in the Peninsula; and that in the last campaign the enemy were deprived of the whole of the supplies upon which they depended for maintaining their ground and carrying on active operations in the north of Spain, all of which were captured; and that the depôts at Madrid were very large, and in value more than half the whole sum at which your memorialists put this head; and that those at Badajoz and Almaraz were also very considerable: your memorialists trust that they cannot be supposed to bring forward an exaggerated claim when they estimate this head at 150,000*l.*, which they are well assured is not more than two-thirds of the value at which they would have been justified in putting it, if they had possessed the advantage

of being able to bring forward detailed and particular accounts upon the subject.

3rd. Upon the third head, the only subject for the consideration of His Majesty's government is the manner in which the value fixed is to be paid here. Upon this your memorialists conceive that the principle upon which the claim of the army, as a meritorious one, rests, in such a case is, that the magazine captured affords a supply which must otherwise have been furnished or procured by the British Commissariat; and that whether purchased with money on the spot, or paid for by bills drawn on England, or furnished by a contractor, or in the country there, the exchange must necessarily have been added to the amount of the value as estimated by the Commissioners. The same rule would have applied if the magazine had been purchased for the purpose of dividing the value at the time among the captors, as it could in that case have been paid for in no other way: your memorialists submit therefore the amount of estimate on this head as stated in the annexed paper.

4th. The fourth head relates to public property captured at Bordeaux, as in the annexed paper.

5th. And the fifth head relates to the ships of war, marine stores, and merchantmen, also captured at Bordeaux; the amount of both of which heads has been duly ascertained in pursuance of directions from your Lordship for that purpose, as will appear by the accounts and particulars annexed to this memorial; and your memorialists therefore put these heads together, as the general observations arising upon them equally apply to both. It is necessary shortly to state the circumstances.

The battle of Orthez decided the fall of Bordeaux, and the movement of Marshal Soult on Toulouse uncovered it. The city of Bordeaux was entered by the army on the 12th of March.

On the next and following days, the government cellars and magazines at the Custom-House and Excise, and the dépôt of wine, with the magazines of supplies, were taken possession of and kept.

The shipping in the Garonne and the ships of war on the stocks, with the arsenal, powder-magazines, and victualling-office, were also taken possession of, together with the timber and anchors in the dockyard.

The city chest was respected, although it might in some respects be considered public property, being the duties levied on all articles brought into the city for sale.

The municipality were neither disturbed in their rights, nor questioned concerning their funds; but on the contrary, to avoid complaints on their part against the civil departments of the army, and to keep the dealers, contractors, and sutlers in a proper state of discipline, the city was authorised by the British army to levy the duties on every article (and even on the cattle) brought in for the army, and not to restore it except on a certificate of a British Commissary, stating that the articles were *bonâ fide* purchased for the troops, and this rule was observed until the army quitted Bordeaux.

The merchants' magazines were all indiscriminately respected, although they were filled with bales of goods only a few days or hours before taken from the Custom House cellars on bonds, and although it was perfectly evident that these goods were either imported from America or taken from British captured vessels.

When a return of the goods so taken out of the Customs on the approach of the army was called for, the Director of the Customs asked if the army claimed the duties on them contained in the bonds in his possession. He was informed that the Duke of Wellington had decided, that, as the bonds were

taken away by himself (the Director) when he fled, and the goods had passed into the hands of private people, neither the goods nor the bonds were claimed.

The magazines of the American merchants and Consul were even respected, although the predatory conduct of the American army in Upper Canada was well known, and although the propriety of retaliation had been suggested.

Your memorialists state all these circumstances to show that not only was there no eagerness rigidly to enforce the rights of hostile capture at Bordeaux, but, on the contrary, the utmost forbearance, and a determination to forego every claim upon which the slightest suspicion of doubt could arise, and many even of those which could most clearly have been established.

The property under these two heads has already been considered to be the subject of legal capture. The first was strictly public property, belonging to the government of the enemy, and more than one-third of the last consisted of the men of war and naval stores; and, with respect to the merchantmen, the enemy were so well satisfied of their being the subject of capture, that the Board of Commerce intimated its readiness to give a considerable proportion of their value for their redemption. The property, therefore, was completely within the power of the captors. The redemption of it could at any moment have been enforced by the threat of their destruction, and the only obstacle to immediate removal was Fort Bloye, which was too weak to have resisted the attack about to be made upon it, and was afterwards only permitted to remain in the possession of the enemy from the same spirit of forbearance, arising out of the extraordinary state of affairs, which ultimately induced the restoration to the enemy of the captured property uninjured. Your memorialists, therefore, submit that, as it was in the power of the captors to have destroyed immediately all obstacles to the final assertion of the right of capture by the removal of the property; that, as far as the enemy was concerned, it was completely in the power of the captors; under such circumstances no question could have arisen on any case regulated only by the legal consequences arising out of a termination of hostilities; for, in other cases, an actual treaty of peace is seldom or ever permitted to interfere with previous captures by fleets and armies, or even with those made subsequent to peace, until notice shall have arrived at distant places; and the privilege of booty and prize given by the sovereign to his subjects is permitted to exist after the relation of peace has been established between the hostile states. The circumstances of the present case were as unlike any which had preceded it, and as extraordinary, as the termination of the contest and the final result; and they could not but produce corresponding feelings in the minds of all those engaged in the contest, and exhibit the novel scene of the victorious General of one of the hostile armies seeking for excuses to justify the restoration of the property in his possession and power, instead of availing himself of his irresistible means of enforcing the rights of war and capture. A sacrifice which no ordinary state of circumstances could have required appeared to be called for by the then critical and singular state of public affairs, affecting not France only, but every state which had been engaged in the eventful contest which seemed about to terminate: every irritation of feeling which could interfere with the most cordial reception of the new state of things was to be avoided, and every means resorted to of proving that all hostile feelings ended with the termination of the usurpation in which they had originated. His Grace the Duke of Wellington, therefore, as Commander in Chief of the army, although apprised by the communication of the opinion of His Majesty's Advocate General of the articles captured being the subject of prize, determined, in the then very peculiar state of public affairs, and to avoid discussions of a very delicate

nature alluded to in that opinion, upon the restoration of the captured property as one of the means, and (considering the importance of Bordeaux as a port of trade, and its influence in the country in which it was situated) not an unimportant one, of producing a considerable influence in the public feelings in that country. Under all these circumstances, the question which your memorialists have to submit to His Majesty's government and to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, who has, by the different communications which have been made upon the subject of capture and booty, permitted the army to hope for his gracious consideration of their services in that respect, is,—Whether the spirit of moderation shown by the army in the first assertion of the rights of capture, and the subsequent sacrifice made at such a period under such circumstances and for such an object, and the readiness with which that sacrifice was made, do not increase the claim of the army to favourable consideration, and acquit the army of presumption in hoping that the nation will bear the burden of this sacrifice, and enable His Royal Highness to pursue his gracious intention in favour of the army in respect of these captures, as well as of those which have already come under consideration?

6th. Upon the sixth head, that of American ships captured at Bordeaux and still in charge of persons on behalf of the captors, and which have been legally declared subject of capture and valued at 22,048*l.*; no question can arise. Your memorialists upon this subject have therefore only to suggest to His Majesty's government whether, under all the circumstances, it might not be deemed more advisable that these captures should be taken out of the hands of the army, and the value consolidated with the other heads, and the value of the captures realised by the government instead of individuals; but this is left wholly for the consideration of His Majesty's ministers.

7th. The seventh head relates to the gold and silver taken at Vitoria, of which particulars have been given and the amount ascertained.

8th. The same observation applies also to this head.

Your memorialists are well aware that the aggregate sum will appear to be considerable; but they are, at the same time, satisfied that such a consideration will produce no indisposition in the nation to co-operate with His Majesty's government and His Royal Highness the Prince Regent in the favourable consideration of their services. The army has been engaged under its victorious and distinguished leader in seven laborious campaigns. The glory of their country, the honour of His Majesty's arms, and a successful conclusion of the eventful contest in which they have been engaged, and not capture or booty, have been the object of their unceasing exertions and invincible perseverance. They have been rewarded by the applauses of their Sovereign and their country, and by the proud consciousness of having contributed their efforts to establishing a character for the British army which will live in the recollection of posterity; they have been actuated by no mercenary feelings, nor are they now; but, having been led to hope for the distribution of the captures and booty made by their exertions, your memorialists have felt themselves bound, in justice to his Grace and the army, and in the discharge of the duty entrusted to them, to state their grounds of claim; and when it is considered that whatever sum is granted, however large, is to be divided among about 100,000 souls, and for seven years of service, in which upwards of twelve general actions, besides others of an inferior description, have been fought, and four or five sieges carried on, and in which no distribution of prize or booty has yet taken place; your memorialists trust that the sum specified in the annexed paper, for which they have thus ventured to prefer the claim of the army, will not be deemed more than, under the circumstances, they may be fairly entitled to expect; and your memorialists hope,

therefore, that they may presume to request the favourable recommendation of His Majesty's government to His Royal Highness of the claims of his Grace and the army under his command.

WILLIAM ROBE,
COLIN CAMPBELL,
ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL.

Suffolk Street, 9th Feb., 1815.

III.

STATEMENT of the Value of the Public Property captured in the Kingdoms of Portugal, Spain, and France, by the Army recently under the command of Field Marshal his Grace the DUKE of WELLINGTON, and claimed by them as Booty or Prize Money.

Number of each Article.	Nature or Description of the Property.	Amount.		
		£.	s.	d.
1	Ordnance, ammunition, and ordnance stores captured in the three kingdoms above mentioned, as by detailed accounts of particulars and vouchers delivered to the Board of Ordnance by the Commissioners appointed for that purpose, and which have been examined by that department, and which will be reported on	285,908	16	2 $\frac{3}{4}$
2	Provisions, stores, and forage taken at Merida, Olivenza, Badajoz, Ciudad Rodrigo, Levang, Salamanca, Almaraz, Segovia, Madrid, Arevalo, Vitoria, and numerous other places in Spain ..	150,000	0	0
3	Provisions, stores, and forage taken at Mont de Marsan and other places in France, as by the account of particulars and documents rendered by the Commissioners appointed for that purpose in pursuance of the directions contained in Earl Bathurst's letter, dated 4th May, 1814, to his Grace the Duke of Wellington, the amount of which has been recommended to be paid to the army, including the difference between the par and the rate of exchange at the time of the capture	139,868	3	7 $\frac{3}{4}$
4	Public property at Bordeaux, arising from the duties payable to the government of France on goods of various descriptions held by the government for the payment of these duties, which goods were captured by the British army, and are now in charge of the French authorities and an agent for the said army at Bordeaux; as by the account of particulars and documents rendered by the Commissioners appointed for that purpose in pursuance of the directions contained in Earl Bathurst's letter, dated 4th May, 1814, to his Grace the Duke of Wellington	107,026	10	0
	Carried forward	682,803	9	10 $\frac{1}{2}$

STATEMENT, &c.—*continued.*

Number of each Article.	Nature or Description of the Property.	Amount.		
		£.	s.	d.
5	Brought forward	682,803	9	10½
	Ships of war belonging to France captured	£.		
	at Bordeaux	64,095		
	Ordnance and Marine stores do.	17,000		
		81,095		
	Merchant vessels do.	96,768		
	as by regular valuation made at the time of capture, and accounts of particulars and documents rendered by the Commissioners appointed for that purpose in pursuance of the directions contained in Earl Bathurst's letter, dated 4th May, 1814, to his Grace the Duke of Wellington	177,863	0	0
6	American ships captured at Bordeaux, and still there in charge of the agents of the British army, as by accounts of particulars and documents rendered by the Commissioners appointed for that purpose in pursuance of the directions contained in Earl Bathurst's letter, dated 4th May, 1814, to his Grace the Duke of Wellington	22,048	0	0
7	Gold and silver taken at Vitoria, which was paid into the hands of the Commissary-General, including the regular exchange thereon; and also the value of 10 bars of silver lodged in the Bank of England	31,276	5	8
8	Gold and silver received at other places by sundry commissaries, as by account of particulars	2,459	7	0
	Total amount	916,450	2	6½

WILLIAM ROBE.
COLIN CAMPBELL.
ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL.

The Hereditary Prince of Orange to Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD,

Brussels, 10th Feb., 1815.

Having received an application from the Dutch government to give over to officers appointed by them all the articles belonging to the artillery and engineer department in the different fortified places occupied by British troops, I have refused doing so until I had received instructions from the British government on this head; and I beg leave to observe that it would be placing the British officers commanding in the different strong places in a very disagreeable situation if they thus became dependent upon Dutch officers of artillery and engineers, and would give rise to a great many

unpleasant discussions between them. I hope, therefore, you will send me directions not to give them up, which it seems to me could very easily be done on the plea of the departure of the British troops from this country not being very distant, and it being, therefore, desirable that till then every thing should remain on the same footing as it is at present.

Ever most truly yours,

WILLIAM, HERED. PRINCE OF ORANGE.

I beg you will send me an answer as soon as possible.

The Earl of Liverpool to Mr. Canning.

MY DEAR CANNING,

Fife House, 16th Feb., 1815.

You will perhaps have learnt from others both the fate of the property tax and the decision of government on the important subject of corn.

After all we recollect of the property tax and the patient manner in which the country has submitted to it for so many years, I could not have conceived that so strong a prejudice could have been created against it; but a variety of circumstances have operated very unfortunately with respect to this measure.

The farming interest throughout a great part of the country have suffered so considerably within the last few months, that it is very much doubted whether a large proportion of them could have paid their share of the tax. If we had once begun to modify it, there would have been no end to the difficulties in which we should have been involved. Indeed if the property tax was susceptible of modification upon any equitable principle, it must be obvious that we should have gone to the consideration of this question with every possible disadvantage at a moment when so strong a prejudice existed against the principle of the tax itself, and when an idea was prevalent, however erroneous, that the faith of Parliament was pledged to its expiration on the 5th April next. If we could have hoped to have carried the tax for three or four years, it would have been worth a severe contest; but it soon became quite clear that we had no chance of inducing Parliament to continue it for more than one year, and though this would have been a present relief to our financial measures, we should have been put to the same embarrassment about finding substitutes in the next session of Parliament, and it was thought, therefore, that by meeting the feelings of the country upon the question at this time, we should find them better disposed than they might be a twelvemonth hence to consider fairly those taxes which it is indispensably necessary to impose, upon the discontinuance of the property tax.

I will not now trouble you with the detail of the measures which Vansittart will propose in the Committee of Finance on Monday next; but in order that you may have a general idea upon the subject, I will just state that he intends to propose as nearly as possible 5,000,000*l.* of taxes, viz., 80 per cent. upon the assessed taxes of carriages, horses, and servants; a small addition to the house tax, but none to the window tax; an addition of about 800,000*l.* to the Stamps and Post Office, and about 400,000*l.* on

wine ; besides some other articles which are not yet quite settled, but will make up the difference.

These taxes, if they should pass, would fully defray the interest and sinking fund of any loans which it may be necessary to raise for the next four years, and in the spring of 1819 the sinking fund will have reached Mr. Pitt's maximum of a 45th part of the national debt ; that is, it will pay off the whole national debt at simple interest in forty-five years from that time. The accumulations of it will then, therefore, be fairly at the disposal of the public, according to his principle, either for the purpose of peace establishment or of reduction of taxes.

This plan, you will see, involves the inconvenience of peace loans for a much longer period than could be desirable ; but if the property tax is taken off, there is no way in which this evil can be avoided, and the amount of the sinking fund, which in 1819 will be 15,000,000*l.*, will more than compensate any inconvenience which loans to a small extent can be expected to have on the money market. There are many who doubt whether the market will be able to bear so large a sinking fund as 15,000,000*l.* in time of peace. This, however, can only be ascertained by experience ; and till experience warrants a reduction of it, I should feel an insuperable objection to depart from the original principle laid down when the sinking fund was first established.

We have had several meetings of members of all parties on the subject of the corn laws, and it is determined to take the matter up as a question of government. The country gentlemen in opposition and the Irish promise most cordial support. We do not propose to push the protecting price beyond 80*s.* per quarter ; but we shall meet with serious opposition in going thus far. I am satisfied, however, that such a price is desirable for the purpose of giving a proper stimulus to the agriculture of the country ; and if the measure should be adopted, I do not despair of the United Kingdom being able to feed itself in the course of a few years, except in very bad seasons. The deficiency of Great Britain may certainly be made up from Ireland, if due encouragement is given to investing capital in agriculture in that country ; and the measure will have the further advantage of civilising and improving that part of the empire more rapidly and in a greater degree than any other project that could be devised.

I am happy to find that you have been enabled to lodge yourself so agreeably, and that you go on with such perfect harmony with Lord Beresford. Lord Bathurst will write to you by this packet or the next on pecuniary affairs. We have no intelligence whatever from the Brazils of Sir J. Beresford's arrival.

LIVERPOOL.

The Earl of Liverpool to Mr. Canning.

MY DEAR CANNING,

Fife House, 16th Feb., 1815.

I have received your several private letters, for which I am much obliged to you. I have consulted Vansittart respecting Chinnery, and we have agreed to give him six months' leave of absence in consequence of the circumstances stated by you in your letter of the 23rd ult. It will be

necessary, however, that he should return to the Treasury at the expiration of the time fixed, as it has been very unusual to permit the clerks at the Treasury to be engaged in any official duty which shall draw them from the service of that department. You know as well as I do that the practice of attaching the clerks in the Foreign Office occasionally to ministers abroad is a most serious injury to the efficiency of that office, and yet there are reasons which justify such an indulgence as to the gentlemen in that department which would not apply to any other office under the government.

I have desired Hamilton to send you by this packet the copy of the treaties which have been concluded with Portugal at Vienna on the subject of the slave trade. The most material question of the total abolition north of the Line may be considered now as finally settled with respect to every Power except Spain, and it is mere perverseness that can induce the Spanish government to hold out on this part of the question, as they have neither factory nor settlement on the northern coast of Africa, and never, in fact, bought a slave there on Spanish account.

The Portuguese government, as well as the Spanish, are still desirous of putting off the final abolition for eight years. This has been resisted by all the other Powers at Vienna, and the Spanish and Portuguese plenipotentiaries have been desired to apply to their governments for further instructions. The French government has behaved very well upon the question, and I do not despair of inducing them to modify the original condition now that the fate of St. Domingo must be considered as determined. I think Wilberforce and Stephen are both satisfied that it has been much more prudent to manage France on this question than to drive her into a connexion with Spain and Portugal upon it, by taking too high and peremptory a tone.

We have indeed had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of France on all the points which have been under discussion at Vienna. On every material question we have agreed, and I entertain not the least doubt of the sincere desire of the King of France and of his ministers to repress all the lurking sentiments of military ambition which still pervade the army, and which we cannot expect should be wholly extinguished for some time.

Castlereagh found it necessary to make a formal protest as to the arrangement respecting Poland, and in this protest France has concurred. The question which has since created the most agitation is that of Saxony. We have reason to hope it will be amicably adjusted. Austria and France have both strenuously resisted the annexation of Saxony to Prussia. We think it fair that the King of Saxony, having been till he was made a prisoner the most steady ally of Buonaparte, should under such circumstances lose a part of his dominions, and that the King of Prussia should profit in consequence; but we do not wish to see Saxony annihilated as an independent state. It would create serious discontent and ill-blood throughout Germany; and if the project had been adopted of indemnifying the King of Saxony for the loss of his former dominions by placing him between the Rhine and the Meuse, such an arrangement would have been decidedly against the interests of this country. Our policy must be that Prussia should be in contact with the Low Countries, and if possible with France; and the intervention of a part at least of Saxony between Prussia and Austria, as it may prevent

collision between those two Powers, appears likewise, under present circumstances, to be for the general benefit of Europe.

You will have heard of the Duke of Wellington having gone to Vienna to replace Castlereagh as soon as the business can be conveniently transferred to him. I think we may, therefore, expect to have Castlereagh in his place in the House of Commons the end of this month, or the beginning of March.

LIVERPOOL.

F. S. Larpent, Esq., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD,

East Sheen, Surrey, 17th Feb., 1815.

As the decision in the case of Sir John Murray, which appears this day in the public prints, may perhaps be contrary to your Grace's expectations, and you may naturally feel some curiosity to know, in some degree, upon what grounds generally the Court proceeded in forming their judgment, I take the liberty of sending you these few lines, more particularly as you expressed a wish that I should communicate anything particular that occurred in the course of the proceedings. The Court seems to me to have considered that though the enabling the Spaniards to obtain possession of the open country in Valencia was the leading object of your Grace's instructions, the taking of Tarragona, if possible, was also an object of the greatest importance; and that Sir J. Murray was therefore justified in persevering in the siege and taking all chances as long as he was at the same time promoting the first object, and provided he left time to preserve the guns and stores which he had on shore.

The Court was also, I believe, satisfied that, in point of fact, he had time to have done so when he abandoned the stores and spiked the guns; and that Sir John Murray had no good grounds for believing that the French were in such force so near him as to make what he did absolutely necessary, as it appeared that it was only an advanced guard of Decaen which was at Villafranca, and only an advanced guard of Suchet which was at Perillo on the 12th, and not the main body in either case. Acting upon these grounds, the Court found Sir John guilty of abandoning the guns without cause, which was the principal part of the third charge, but acquitted him of the remainder as to the neglect of all previous preparations, &c., and also of the whole of the first charge, namely, the continuing the siege too long without any object, because the members considered that, under the instructions, every possible chance was to be taken advantage of to obtain Tarragona; and that, in fact, no previous arrangements were necessary before the night of the 11th of June, as he then, in truth, had time for every thing to have been preserved, had he attended accurately to the information, and had proper officers on the look-out, as to which there seemed to be some neglect. Conceiving, however, the whole conduct to have arisen only from an error in judgment, and not from a worse motive or cause, and considering the peculiar circumstances of the trial and the

* Deputy Judge Advocate General, on the staff of the Duke of Wellington in the Peninsula.

length of time it had hung over Sir J. Murray, the sentence was made as mild as possible for such a military offence, namely, to be admonished only. And as I conceive this will answer every reasonable purpose of preventing the employment of Sir John Murray in such a situation again, I should hope it would be, as I am told it is, a satisfactory sentence, and really approved by the Prince Regent.

With regard to the second charge, as to the disobedience of orders in not returning immediately to Valencia to assist the Duke del Parque, the Court thought that, upon the whole, the instructions gave Sir John a certain latitude as to the exact time of his return to Valencia, relying principally on the words, "When you shall have raised the siege, or, at all events, when you shall return," &c., provided he had good cause for the delay.

And considering that the second landing at the Coll de Balaguer and the delay there did, in fact, operate strongly as a diversion in favour of the Spaniards, and therefore came within the spirit of the instructions by keeping Suchet out of Valencia the longer, and giving the Duke del Parque a better chance of success, the Court conceived this to be a compliance with the first main object, and therefore acquitted Sir J. Murray on this second charge also. I conclude General Murray had discovered that his first ground taken in his letters to your Grace for this conduct, namely, the hope of cutting off the French division at Valdillos, was found untenable; and certainly he does appear to me to have mended his case in his present defence, and to have made it at least much more plausible, if not satisfactory to your Grace. I soon discovered the turn the case was taking, and it was on that account I replied on the two first charges in stronger terms than I should have otherwise done, lest it should be said that government had endeavoured to shelter Sir John, and had instructed me not to press hard upon him. I had also the less scruple in so doing as it obviously (in the views entertained by the Court) tended to lighten and relieve General Murray from the weight of the third charge. I was therefore almost doing him a benefit, rather than an injury, and doing my duty at the same time, which I hope your Grace will think I have not neglected, however the case may have terminated contrary to what you may have expected.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Grace's most obliged humble servant,

FRANCIS SEYMOUR LARPENT.

P.S. I have not received my final directions as to Gibraltar, but believe I am to go as soon as the arrangements are made.

P.S. I delayed sending this to the last, in the hope of procuring a copy of the order from the Horse Guards; but as yet, though the sentence is public, I have not been able to do so.

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

[837.]

MY LORD,

Vienna, 18th Feb., 1815.

The Baron de Wessenberg still continues unwell, and no progress has been made on any of the points remaining for negotiation when you left Vienna.

The French plenipotentiaries have concurred in leaving the fate of the Valteline to be decided hereafter, and the Emperor of Russia has agreed that if that country is to become part of Switzerland, it shall be a 20th canton; and I think he will agree to defer the decision till the affairs of Italy will be taken into consideration. There will remain then only Geneva to be provided for, and there is some reason to hope that the King of Sardinia will cede the territory in the immediate neighbourhood of the town, upon an assurance of receiving the permanent possession of the Genoese imperial fiefs.

Monsieur Capo d'Istria informed me yesterday that the Emperor of Russia had told Monsieur de Talleyrand, in the conversation he had with him previous to your departure, that His Majesty wished that, in consequence of His Majesty's concurrence with the other Powers in the measures which should be adopted respecting Naples, the French plenipotentiaries should give every facility for the performance of the promises made by the Allies to Geneva.

The Empress Maria Louisa has written again to the Emperor of Russia to request His Imperial Majesty's protection of her rights under the Treaty of Fontainebleau; and I understand that the French plenipotentiaries are satisfied that no further steps can be taken at this moment regarding the settlement of Italy.

The continued illness of Monsieur de Wessenberg is stated as the reason for the continued delay in the settlement of the question between Bavaria and Austria. I believe the pretensions of the King of Bavaria are more extravagant than the Prince de Metternich supposes. In a casual conversation with me the other day, the Prince de Wrede adverted to the aggrandisement of Hanover, and compared the claims of Hanover for services rendered to the general cause with those of Bavaria. Prince Metternich appears to think that it is quite impossible to settle with Bavaria at all, without taking from the Grand Duke

of Baden the territories belonging to the Palatinate which he has upon the Rhine, upon very inadequate compensation.

In the mean time the Russian cabinet are very jealous of the delay in the Bavarian negotiation, and are desirous of calling together the Commission of Five, in order to bring Prince Metternich to an explanation of its causes, which, in my opinion, are to be attributed solely to the continued illness of Baron Wessenberg.

I enclose your Lordship the copy of a note and of its enclosures which I have received from Prince de Wrede, in which you will observe that he has proposed that the Ionian Islands should be given to Prince Eugene in compensation for his claims under the Treaty of Fontainebleau. I have not thought it proper to give any official answer to this note, because I consider the period not yet arrived for the consideration of the final disposal of the Ionian Islands. But I have stated to Prince Metternich, the Count de Nesselrode and Monsieur de Capo d'Istria, all the reasons against this disposal of the Ionian Islands, in which they have entirely concurred; and from all I have heard, I am inclined to believe that the proposition was brought forward against the instructions of Prince Eugene. I shall see the Prince de Wrede this day, and will state the same objections to him.

Besides a very large personal property in the kingdom of Italy, which has been restored to Prince Eugene, as appears by the enclosed papers, his estates in the Legations are worth more than 50,000*l.* per annum, so that it will not be very difficult to give him an "*établissement convenable hors de France.*" The article of the Treaty of Fontainebleau which relates to him does not provide that he should be independent, notwithstanding that Prince de Wrede uses that expression in his note; and considering that Prince Eugene was a subject of the Emperor Napoleon, although employed in a high confidential situation and married to the King of Bavaria's daughter, a provision which should not leave him in an independent situation would appear to be exactly what was meant to be described by the term "*convenable.*" Such a provision would be more suitable to the political circumstances of Germany and Italy than one which should leave him independent.

Monsieur de Löwenhielm called upon me yesterday, and after a long discussion of the conduct of the King of Denmark, he

said that his business here related solely to Pomerania, which the Prince Royal was determined not to give up. I repeated to him the reasoning in your Lordship's despatch to Mr. Thornton, which I would have communicated to him if there had been a copy of it here, and I told him that I was astonished that he had not taken the opportunity which I knew he had had in an interview with you previous to your departure, to make you acquainted with the sentiments he had then expressed, which I informed him I should, of course, report to my government. I likewise told him that I had every reason to believe he would find all the Powers of Europe in the same disposition with ourselves, as expressed in your Lordship's despatch to Mr. Thornton.

At the close of the discussion he lowered his tone very considerably, and said that Pomerania could not be given up unless the expenses in taking possession of Norway were paid ; but I could not bring him to any further concession.

I have informed Count Nesselrode of these sentiments of Monsieur de Löwenhielm, who has promised me to lay before the Emperor to-morrow the copy of your Lordship's despatch to Mr. Thornton, which you had given to him, and to urge His Majesty to hold the same language to the Prince Royal and to his minister here. He has allowed me to take a copy of the despatch, which I will communicate to Monsieur de Löwenhielm.

Prince Radzivil called upon me yesterday, and after adverting to the promises made by the Emperor of Russia to the Poles, and reading the constitution according to which His Majesty had promised they should be governed, he said that he was apprehensive that His Majesty would be under the necessity of departing from his promises to please his Russian subjects ; and that even if the system should be completely carried into execution in the Duchy of Warsaw, it would not be extended to the Polish provinces which had been under the dominion of Russia before the war, and that in the mean time the Prussian and Austrian governments, but particularly the latter, showed but little inclination to adopt the liberal principles in regard to the Poles recommended by your Lordship to those Powers. Under these circumstances, Prince Radzivil expressed a wish that the subject should be taken up again in the conferences of the Five Powers, and that I should propose that the Emperor should take

upon himself the title of King of Poland, and should govern all his Polish subjects according to the constitution he had promised them, and that the other Powers should conform to the same as far as was practicable.

I could not discover from what he said whether Prince Radzivil had or not been sent by the Emperor; but I told him that I could not again revive the subject of Poland, nor could I repeat unnecessarily what your Lordship had entered upon the Protocol of the conferences of the Five Powers regarding that kingdom; that it would be highly satisfactory to us to find that the Poles were well governed by the different Powers under which they were placed, and we should applaud any liberal system according to which any of the Powers should announce to the world that they intended to govern their Polish subjects; but that it was impossible for us to propose such a system, or to go further than your Lordship had done.

The object of this conversation appeared to be the same as that of Prince Czartoriski with your Lordship on the same subject; and as I cannot believe that the Emperor is desirous to get rid of the embarrassment in which he finds himself by the importunities of his Polish subjects on the one hand, and the objections of the Russians to the system proposed for the government of Poland on the other, by our interference, I conclude that these communications are quite unauthorized, and are made by the Poles with a view to bring the Emperor's sincerity to a test through our means.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[838.]

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Vienna, 18th Feb., 1815.

I enclose the copy of a letter from Prince Wrede on the subject of the ratification and acceptance by the Prince Regent of the act by which the King of Bavaria has acceded to the alliance of the 3rd January, 1815.*

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

* Letter not found.

The Earl of Liverpool to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR CASTLEREAGH,

Fife House, 20th Feb., 1815.

I have received your letter from Vienna of the 6th instant, and have been very glad to find that you had determined to return to England through Paris. Your audience of the King of France may be productive of many advantageous effects, and may at this moment be particularly useful in smoothing difficulties on the Neapolitan question.

I have already fully communicated to you and to the Duke of Wellington the sentiments of our government on this point. You will not have been three days in London before you will have been thoroughly convinced of the absolute impracticability of our engaging in any military operations for the purpose of driving Murat from the throne of Naples. The truth is, the country at this moment is peace mad. Many of our best friends think of nothing but the reduction of taxes and low establishments, and it is very doubtful whether we could involve the country in a war at this moment for objects which, on every principle of sound policy, ought to lead to it. This, like all other popular sentiments in a country such as ours, will wear out; but after such a contest for twenty years we must let people taste something of the blessings of peace before we can expect fairly to screw them up to a war spirit, even in a just cause.

I am fully sensible of all the inconveniences of leaving Murat on the throne of Naples, and enter into all the personal feelings of the King of France on this subject; but I think for his own interest and for that of the French nation His Majesty ought to consider well before he embarks in military operations for the purpose of expelling Murat. Any attempt of this sort might be fatal to the Bourbons in France, if it failed of success, and should be made, therefore, with such an overpowering force as to render resistance hopeless. But is it certain that a French army could be trusted on this service? I know there are many persons attached to the Bourbons who are of opinion that the greater part of such an army would desert if opposed to Murat, especially if there were any prospect of Murat being joined by Buonaparte. This opinion, whether true or false, cannot at least be regarded as improbable, when the spirit which is known to actuate so large a part of the French army is taken into the account, and ought to be most seriously weighed by the King of France and his ministers before they embark in an undertaking which must, at all events, be extremely hazardous.

I should have the less difficulty in bringing these considerations under the serious view of the French government, as I have no scruple in avowing that the keystone of all my external policy is the preserving the Bourbons on the throne of France. I am satisfied that this alone can prevent the recurrence of the costs which we have suffered for the last twenty years, and that all other dangers may be regarded as contemptible when compared with those which would arise out of another revolution in France.

I am happy to find that with the exception of this question of Naples, you will have been able to have brought all the material points to a conclusion before you left Vienna.

We shall on this side of the water, I hope, have fairly launched our

finance and corn questions before your arrival; and it is of the utmost importance that we should be able, if possible, to carry them both through Parliament before Easter.

LIVERPOOL.

[839.]

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR LORD,

Vienna, 21st Feb., 1815.

Mr. Mazier is setting out for England, and I write a line to let you know that I have reason to believe that Prince Radzivil spoke to me, as related in my despatch of Saturday, by desire of the Emperor. Prince Czartoriski has since told me that the Emperor wished to speak to me on the same subject. I shall of course confine myself to your note.

Wessenberg has recovered, and business is again reviving. The Swiss Commission met last night, and Metternich has sent his projet to Prince Wrede. He showed it to me last night; and it is curious enough that it contains an offer to cede three points of which he knows he cannot dispose, and three others to be taken from Baden and Wurtemberg.

The three first are half of Fulda, Frankfort, and Mayence. I asked him why he did this; and he answered, that it was to draw from Wrede a contre-projet, and that he intended then to go before the Commission of Five with both, and to call upon them to interfere to put Austria in possession of her frontier. The result of this transaction will probably be to create a breach between Austria and Bavaria.

I have just returned from a conference on the affairs of Poland, in which Metternich put on the protocol an answer to your note on the affairs of Poland, drawn in very liberal terms. Hardenberg produced another, which, I believe, you had already seen: some articles were agreed to regarding proprietors under the different Sovereigns, boundaries, &c.

I have seen Wrede's contre-projet, which is, if possible, more absurd and extravagant than Metternich's projet. The latter proposes to ask for our mediation.

Believe me, &c,

WELLINGTON.

Lord FitzRoy Somerset to the Earl of Liverpool.*

MY LORD,

Paris, 23rd Feb., 1815, half-past 10 P.M.

I have as yet heard nothing of the approach of Lord Castlereagh, though he quitted Vienna yesterday week. The King has been apprised of his Lordship's desire to have an audience of His Majesty, and will receive him the day after his arrival, or, should he come early, the same day he reaches Paris. The King has, I understand, some symptoms of the gout, but I hope he is not seriously ill.

I think it not improbable that this interview may be the cause of some change in the government. Lord Castlereagh will, of course, urge His Majesty to give orders that the claims of the British creditors may be satisfied; and Baron Louis, the Minister of Finance, is so adverse to the admission of their demands that he has been known to say that he will not continue in office if they are granted. Should, therefore, the King listen to the request of Lord Castlereagh, which, by the treaty of peace, His Majesty is bound to do, and order payment to be made to the English creditors, in conformity to the 2nd and 4th Additional Articles, Baron Louis declares he will resign. If, on the other hand, the Minister of Finance should prevail upon His Majesty to put another construction upon those Articles, and refuse to admit our interpretation of them, it is supposed that the Prince de Talleyrand, who agrees with Lord Castlereagh on the subject, will be obliged to give way, and thus yield the triumph to Baron Louis, who, though placed in his situation at the recommendation of the Prince de Talleyrand, has been for some time intriguing against him, in the hope that if the latter were no longer in office he might gain the ascendancy in the King's councils and become Prime Minister.

If a direct appeal be made to His Majesty, I am confident that the question will be decided as it ought to be; but, if it is not brought before him, I have reason to fear that the revolutionary system and the inveterate hatred of Baron Louis to the English will overbalance those principles of justice which would actuate the King.

It has been rumoured, within these few days, that Marshal Soult is about to retire from the War department. He is certainly very unpopular; but, whatever may have been his ulterior views, he has rendered essential service to the government in removing from the capital thousands of unemployed officers, whose presence was dangerous to the existence of the Royal family, and he has been indefatigable in fulfilling the duties of his office.

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

FITZROY SOMERSET.

Major-Gen. Sir H. Torrens to Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD,

Horse Guards, 23rd Feb., 1815.

I return the letter from the Duc d'Orléans which Bunbury put into my hands, and I send your Lordship also the copy of an answer which the

* Lord FitzRoy was Chargé d'Affaires at the embassy in Paris.

Commander-in-Chief has transmitted in reply to a similar one from His Royal Highness.

Your Lordship will be the best judge whether or not any answer should go from the Prince Regent; and if so, it should, perhaps, be through your Lordship.

Yours most sincerely,

H. TORRENS.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

The Duke of Orleans to the Prince Regent.

MONSEIGNEUR,

Au Palais Royal, à Paris, ce 16 Janvier, 1815.

Les bontés dont Votre Altesse Royale a daigné me donner tant de preuves, dont je suis si fier et si reconnaissant, m'enhardissent à solliciter une faveur à laquelle j'attache beaucoup de prix. C'est, Monseigneur, d'obtenir que vous vouliez bien accorder au Vicomte de Chabot la décoration de Chevalier Commandeur de l'Ordre du Bain. Je crois qu'il la mérite sous tous les rapports, mais surtout par son attachement sincère pour le Souverain qu'il a servi honorablement pendant vingt-deux ans, et pour le pays qui est devenu pour lui dans ses malheurs une seconde patrie. Peut-être aussi le noble sentiment qui l'a porté à professer hautement ici la religion dans laquelle il avait été élevé en Angleterre et à ne pas en changer, vous paraîtra-t-il un motif de plus pour lui accorder cet ordre, d'autant que cette circonstance lui est défavorable ici, et l'empêchera de recevoir aucun autre ordre du Roi de France, si ce n'est celui du Mérite Militaire, qui est exclusivement destiné aux Protestans, et qu'il a déjà obtenu. Quant à moi, Monseigneur, ce serait pour moi une véritable satisfaction que celle de voir un de mes aides-de-camp décoré d'un ordre qu'il devrait à vos bontés, et qui serait une sorte de témoignage de la reconnaissance qu'elles m'inspirent, ainsi que de celle que je conserverai toujours pour l'Angleterre tant que j'existerai.

Veuillez recevoir, Monseigneur, avec votre ancienne bonté pour moi, l'hommage de mon respect et de mon attachement.

Monseigneur, de Votre Altesse Royale

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur et cousin,

LOUIS PHILIPPE D'ORLÉANS.

Je joins ici l'état de services du Vicomte de Chabot, et sa respectueuse demande.

STATEMENT of SERVICES of the VICOMTE DE CHABOT.

Entered the British service as Cornet in the 18th Light Dragoons. 1793.

Lieutenant, ditto, 1794.

Captain-Lieutenant, ditto, 1799.

Major, ditto, 1802.

Lieutenant-Colonel 9th Light Dragoons. 1807.

Colonel, ditto, 1814.

Was engaged in the following campaigns and sieges:—In Holland in 1799. Received from Sir Ralph Abercromby a letter of marked approbation for conduct in action before Ondtcarpel. A horse killed under me. Served as Deputy-Adjutant-General in Canada during the winters of 1807 and 1808. Sent out with despatches to Sir John Moore by H.R.H. the Commander-in-

Chief. Present at the action of Betanzos, in Spain. In 1809 at the siege of Flushing. Commanded the 9th Light Dragoons during the Walcheren expedition, and in Portugal for a short period, on account of returns of the Walcheren fever.

Received from His Majesty Louis XVIII. the Order of Military Merit, as reported by me to H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief, and on which the Duke of York was pleased to send me, through General Calvert, a most gracious answer.

I have now had the honour of being two-and-twenty years in the British service. The fortunate change that has taken place in my native country has brought me over to it; and I am most anxious to receive from the Prince Regent a mark that will carry with it His Royal Highness's gracious approbation of my conduct during my service in a country towards which I must ever feel the most sincere and heartfelt attachment and gratitude.

LE VICOMTE DE CHABOT,
Colonel and Lieutenant-Colonel, h.p., 50th Regt.

II.

The Duke of York to the Duke of Orleans.

MONSIEUR,

Londres, le 2 Février, 1815.

J'ai reçu la lettre que Votre Altesse Sérénissime a pris la peine de m'écrire du 16 Janvier. Toute recommandation qui vient de sa part a des droits aux attentions qui peuvent lui marquer ma considération. Je me ferai toujours un vrai plaisir de rendre témoignage au mérite personnel du Vicomte de Chabot, comme aussi à son zèle pour le service; mais j'ai regret que dans cette occasion cela lui devient inutile quant au désir qu'il a d'obtenir la décoration de Commandeur de l'Ordre du Bain, puisque les statuts de l'Ordre s'y opposent, en ayant fixé la description des services qui y donnent des droits.

J'ai fait part à la Duchesse du souvenir obligeant de Votre Altesse Sérénissime, auquel elle est fort sensible, et, ainsi que moi, elle se fait d'avance un vrai plaisir de l'espérance de voir Votre Altesse Sérénissime au printems.

Recevez l'assurance de la considération distinguée avec laquelle je suis de Votre Altesse Sérénissime

Le très dévoué serviteur et cousin,
FRÉDÉRIC.

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

[840.]

MY LORD,

Vienna, 24th Feb., 1815.

I have the honour to enclose the copies of a correspondence between the Prince Sovereign of the Netherlands and the Earl of Clancarty, which has taken place during the negotiations at Vienna.*

I have, &c.,
WELLINGTON.

* Correspondence not found.

[841.]

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Vienna, 25th Feb., 1815.

Although Monsieur de Wessenberg is recovered, the business remaining to be transacted has not advanced much since I last addressed you.

There has been one conference on the affairs of Switzerland, in which the Russian plenipotentiary reserved the Emperor's consent to the cession of Porentrui to the Canton de Berne, and likewise on the Valteline, till something decisive should be done for Geneva by Sardinia or France. Although Prince Metternich has declared his readiness to sacrifice the Genoese fiefs for the object of persuading Sardinia to make a sacrifice, no progress has yet been made in that negotiation, owing to the usual delays in the transaction of business in the Austrian Cabinet; and the Swiss affairs are at a stand.

In the mean time we have received intelligence that there exists a good deal of uneasiness and disposition to disturbance in Switzerland, particularly in the Canton de Vaud, which has armed. I don't imagine that this evil is to be attributed to the delay in settling the Swiss questions here, but to the defects of the system on which the Confederation is established.

Prince Metternich has communicated to the Prince de Wrede a projet for the settlement of the relative claims of Austria and Bavaria, in which he promises the good offices of Austria, to procure for Bavaria the possession of Mayence, Frankfort, half of Fulda, and portions of the dominions of the Grand Duke of Baden and of the King of Wurtemberg. To this projet Marshal Wrede has replied by declining to have Mayence, as the Prussians were already placed on the right of the Moselle; by refusing to give up Salzburg; by undervaluing everything offered in exchange for the territories to be ceded to Austria; and by laying claim to the territories still vacant on the left bank of the Rhine as the ancient possessions of the House of Bavaria, and as compensation for services rendered and expenses incurred in the war, and not in exchange for the territories to be ceded to Austria, as settled by treaty.

The first intention of Prince Metternich was to bring the subject immediately under the view of the Five Powers; but as his own proposition was not one which he could expect to carry

into execution, and the result of the interference of the Five Powers in that stage of the negotiation would have been to make a breach between Austria and Bavaria. I recommended to Prince Metternich to make another effort to come to an arrangement before he should call for the general interference. He then told me that he should ask for my assistance and mediation; but I have heard no more upon the subject, excepting that the Prince de Wrede was desirous that they should discuss the matter alone. I have reason to believe that they have since made no progress; and as the general jealousy of what is passing between them, and the anxiety to bring their negotiation to a termination, increase daily, I think it most probable that the subject will be taken into consideration by the Five Powers immediately, and I understand that Prince Metternich has determined to bring it before them.

The Emperor of Russia is certainly embarrassed by his situation with the Poles. He was much displeased with the note which Prince Metternich put upon the protocol of the conferences of the 21st, in answer to that of your Lordship, as His Majesty conceived it was calculated to render him unpopular among the Poles. It is so important that these Sovereigns should separate upon good terms, that I have prevailed upon Prince Metternich to alter the note, which entered unnecessarily into details to prove the anxiety of the House of Austria at all times to uphold the independence of the national government of Poland.

Since I addressed your Lordship last I have had two or three conversations with Prince Czartoriski, in each of which he urged me to propose that the Emperor should take upon himself the title of King of Poland, or at least that the partitioning Powers should bind themselves by something more formal than their declarations in their notes to govern their Polish subjects according to the system by which they had therein promised to govern them.

The Emperor is excessively anxious that the Powers assembled should concur in immediately urging the government of the Porte to act with more moderation towards the Servians, which, contrary to the stipulations of the Treaty of Bucharest, His Majesty alleges is treating that people with great severity. I have urged Count Rasoumowsky, who spoke to me upon this subject, to delay the mention of it to the other Powers till the

period at which the Powers should guarantee the dominions of the Porte.

All parties appear to have concurred in remaining silent about Italy. Accounts, however, have been received that Murat is making great exertions to reinforce his army by forced levies in the Marche d'Ancona, and that he is encouraging the independent party in Italy by conferring decorations and giving employments to those individuals belonging to it who have come into the Neapolitan dominions.

I enclose a note which the Duc de Campochiaro presented two days ago to Prince Metternich. The Duc de Campochiaro at the same time informed him that he was directed to ask for a passage for 80,000 men through the Austrian dominions in Italy, who should pay for all they consumed ; and communicated to the Prince the instructions which he had received to present a note to Prince Talleyrand, in which he was ordered to demand from the Prince whether France considered the King of Naples as an ally of Austria, and if she did, whether she intended to maintain the relations of peace established by the Treaty of Paris, and to acknowledge His Majesty as King of Naples. The Duc de Campochiaro imagined that this measure had been occasioned by the accounts sent from hence in the end of January of the probability of war, and that as the state of affairs had since considerably altered, he had determined not to present the note to Prince Talleyrand until he should receive further orders.

The knowledge of the existence of these orders, and the receipt of the enclosed note by Prince Metternich, and the demand for a passage for 80,000 men, have induced the Austrian Cabinet at length to take measures for the security of the tranquillity of Italy ; and orders have been issued within these two days for the march of a body of troops towards the Italian provinces, which will make the disposable force there amount to 150,000 men under arms.

Prince Metternich has likewise presented a note to Prince Talleyrand and the Duc de Campochiaro, in which he has informed them that His Imperial Majesty is determined to maintain the tranquillity of Italy, and to consider as an enemy any Power that shall move troops into that country.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Downing Street, 28th Feb., 1815.

I have received your Grace's letter, enclosing to me two letters of complaint from two very meritorious officers, for having been omitted in the list lately published of Knights Commanders of the Bath. The great object has been to avoid the principle of selection, as being in its nature invidious, and, for a government such as ours in England, impracticable. By the rules laid down the officers in question were, with some others, omitted, and I very much lament it. As there are several omitted whose claims are very great, it would be satisfactory if we could avail ourselves of the ratification of peace with America to amend the list, but then it must be by adopting some rule, to which we must necessarily adhere; and I know none in which your medals must not form a prevailing part. That which I feel most disposed to is to add to the list all Colonels who have four medals. The officers who would be thus included would be—

James Campbell	..	..	..	..	94th Regt.
John Guise	..	..	..	..	3rd Foot Guards.
James Bathurst	..	..	..	..	Half-pay.
Hon. J. T. F. Deane	..	..	..	..	38th Regt.
Alexander Abercromby	..	..	..	..	Coldstream Guards.
James Barnes	..	..	..	..	Royal Scots.
S. Neil Campbell	..	..	..	..	54th Foot.
Felton Hervey	..	..	..	..	14th Light Drags.

To this might be added all colonels having commanded brigades in any one action in which medals have been given. I am not sure how many more this would include, but I will send the list by next messenger.

Now tell me what you think of this rule, or suggest any other, which, not adding too many Knights, would be more calculated to embrace the most deserving; but *selection* cannot be admitted; and there will therefore always be some meritorious officers omitted, unless the order becomes indiscriminate.

I will not put your Grace in the invidious situation of having been the person consulted. My reason for writing now is, that I have doubts whether we shall not raise fresh dissatisfaction by an amended list; and unless I could be sure that the list would include all who ought to have it, I think it had better remain with all its faults as it is; and I shall not therefore advise any addition, unless I have some reason to believe it will be approved.

I am yours ever sincerely,

BATHURST.

I enclose a list of *Colonels* having medals. If any addition be made, all General officers having more than one medal should have it, but I think not further.

The Earl of Liverpool to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Fife House, 28th Feb., 1815.

I have written to Lord Clancarty to-day to inform him that the Prince Regent had been graciously pleased to declare his intention of investing him with the Order of the Bath, in consideration of the important services which he had rendered to the country by the assistance he has given to Lord Castlereagh on various important occasions, and more especially in the late negotiations at Vienna.

We have not yet heard of Lord Castlereagh's arrival at Paris. We rather expect he will reach London by the end of this week.

With the exception of a debate in each House on the subject of Genoa, we have managed to put off all questions of foreign policy till after Lord Castlereagh's return. The House of Commons is almost exclusively engaged at present on the Corn question. If it depends upon numbers within doors, there can be no doubt of the result; but every effort is making to excite a clamour amongst the people, and it is of the utmost importance, therefore, that the Bill should be carried through with as little delay as possible. We have all the Irish with us, and almost all the country gentlemen who are in opposition.

I shall be most anxious to hear that you are entirely recovered from the cold and fever with which you were attacked on your first arrival at Vienna.

I should hope that you would not have much difficulty in settling the points which remain for discussion at Vienna, with the exception of that of Naples.

Lord Castlereagh will bring with him the last sentiments of the King of France and his government as to the course which they wish to be adopted on this question. I cannot but still think it a most hazardous undertaking for the King of France to send a French army on this service unless he is actively supported by the Austrians and Russians; and in that case Murat may be induced to compromise without a struggle. Indeed, the difficulties on this head have been quadrupled by the course of the negotiations at Vienna. If the other points had been shortly and amicably settled, and Murat had then been led to believe that the Powers of Europe were determined not to recognize him, I have every reason to think that he would willingly have acceded to almost any terms which could have been proposed to him; but he has now acquired both strength and confidence from the divisions and disputes which the Russian pretensions in the first instance, and subsequently those of Prussia, have for so many months unfortunately created.

There are reports of the capture of New Orleans, but no official intelligence has been received of a later date than the 1st of January. The prospect was then favourable. It is very desirable that the American war should terminate with a brilliant success on our part; and I should feel most happy that our friend Sir Edward Pakenham should have an opportunity of establishing his military character and reputation in the eyes of the world in the first separate command on which he has been employed.

LIVERPOOL.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 28th Feb., 1815.

You will see by the enclosed that the difficulties in England upon the point of Naples are still serious, but I consider the possibility of a concert with Austria as placing the question wholly on new grounds.

You may tell Prince Metternich that the King received his overture as a proof of the Emperor's desire to establish a good understanding with him. His Majesty admitted the principle that Austria actively assisting to restore the King of Sicily to Naples was entitled to his good offices in the north of Italy; but still there is a difficulty concerning the Queen of Etruria, whom he cannot wholly sacrifice, and cannot provide for by any cessions at the expense of France. Upon the Valteline and Plaisance, both being military points interesting to Austria, he will make no difficulty. I think he will also agree to Marie Louise retaining Parma and Guastalla for her life, if the Queen of Etruria, with Lucques as a present possession, obtains the reversibility of these two latter possessions in the event of Marie Louise having no male heir other than the son of Napoleon, against whose succession Austria offers effectually to provide. In this case, perhaps, Lucques might then be made to devolve upon the Tuscan family, and Plaisance upon the Imperial. Upon all other details the King will be content. I thought it better not to enter into these points further: there are none of them, it appears to me, such as should obstruct the main object. Prince Talleyrand will receive instructions to treat personally with Prince Metternich, without communication with his colleagues.

On my arrival in England you shall hear fully from me on this subject.

The King has given me a positive promise on the subject of the British creditors. I had a severe controversy this morning with Baron Louis, but in my audience of to-day His Majesty was quite explicit. I was with the King alone yesterday for above two hours, and nearly as long to-day.

Pray tell Prince Metternich that I did not forget, on my way through Munich, to urge Montzelas to be reasonable. I believe Rose has reported to you what passed in the execution of my instructions.

I shall set out early to-morrow morning.

I am, my dear Lord, ever most sincerely yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

Excuse me to Prince Metternich for not answering his private note.

Pray return Lord Liverpool's letter.

Colonel Neil Campbell to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

On board of H.M.S. *Partridge*, 8 m. N. of Porto Ferrajo,
Isle of Elba, 29th Feb., 1815, 3 P.M.

MY LORD DUKE,

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of my despatch to His Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs,* sent for the present enclosed to Lord Burghersh at Florence, and request that it may be immediately transmitted

* Relative to the escape of Napoleon from Elba.

to London. It is sent open purposely for your Grace's information, as I do not wish to lose time. I have transmitted a copy to Vienna, by way of Genoa.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,

Your Grace's obedient humble servant,

NEIL CAMPBELL.

[842.]

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

MY DEAR LORD,

Vienna, 4th March, 1815.

It would be very desirable, if it were possible, to discharge at an early period the Austrian claims for arrears of subsidy. This measure would enable them to defray the first expenses. Their army is in full march; and Metternich appears astonished at his own decision and firmness.

Have you any intention of buying the ships, &c., at Venice? This might afford something towards expenses.

There has been an unpleasant business at Berlin. Old Blücher appears to have put himself at the head of the party in the army who disapprove of the Prussian indemnities; and he has held strong language on the subject in a public walk. He has written to the King to desire leave to resign, which is to be granted. The son has asked for the same permission, but he has at the same time taken it, as he has signed himself *ci-devant* Colonel.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[843.]

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Vienna, 4th March, 1815.

Some progress has been made in all the affairs in negotiation since I last addressed you.

The Emperor of Russia has consented to Austria's retaining possession of the Valteline and the valleys of Chiavenna and Bormio, and that Berne should have the Porentrui, on condition that the Powers should propose to Berne, through the deputy of that canton now here, some alterations in its constitution. This has been consented to; and as a treaty has been arranged with M. le Comte de St. Marsan, by which the King

of Sardinia will cede to Geneva a small district in the neighbourhood of that town, including Caronge and a tract of land between the road of the Simplon and the Lake, on condition of the cession to His Majesty of the Genoese Imperial fiefs and of including in the Swiss system the Savoyard districts of Chablais and Faucigny, I consider the affairs of Switzerland as settled. The Commission will meet to-morrow, and I will urge that its Report may be taken into consideration by the Eight Powers without loss of time.

I enclose a new projet given in by Marshal Prince Wrede for the settlement of the questions still depending between Austria and Bavaria. Upon receiving it, Prince Metternich sent for the Chancellor Prince Hardenberg, Count Nesselrode and myself; and with the exception of Frankfort, which is to remain a free imperial town, and of a cession on the left of the Rhine for Prince Eugene, and with the addition of the cession on the part of Bavaria of the town of Salzburg, the principle of this projet was generally admitted to be reasonable and fit to be adopted. The Chancellor has, I understand, since spoken to the Emperor of Russia upon the subject, who equally approves of the plan; objecting, however, positively to Bavaria receiving anything more than she has a right to by treaty.

Knowing that your Lordship had always intended that Bavaria should be the German Power on the left of the Rhine in communication with the Sovereign of the Netherlands, I urged this measure upon the consideration of the meeting at Prince Metternich's; but the Prince de Wrede has expressed himself so decidedly against the possessions on the left of the Rhine, even with Mayence, since the Prussians were placed on the right of the Moselle, but in any case without having Mayence, that there was no hope of succeeding in prevailing upon him to take them. The Chancellor and Count Nesselrode were decidedly against any alteration of the system agreed upon for Mayence; and both appeared to think that it was most fortunate that Bavaria had herself proposed to receive her compensation on the right instead of on the left of the Rhine.

There will be no difficulty respecting the cessions to be required from Wurtemberg; and, as it appears, none on the part of the Emperor of Russia respecting those required from Baden. This Power will not receive a complete indemnification. It is

intended to place Prince Eugene in a sovereignty dependent upon the King of Bavaria : where is not settled.

The only difficulty in this settlement appears to be Salzburg, to which both Austrians and Bavarians attach the utmost importance. The former are strong in treaties. The secret Treaty of Paris, which explains the three articles of the Treaty of Ried, regarding cessions, particularly specifies Salzburg among other points to be ceded to Austria ; in return for which Austria promises her good offices to obtain for Bavaria the cession of Mayence, Frankfort, and Hanau. The two former cannot be got, and Bavaria will have the last.

The line of the Inn and Salzburg are certainly important to Austria. In the possession of Bavaria, Salzburg is a menacing point upon Vienna, and upon the communication with Italy, and it breaks in upon the whole system of the Austrian line of defence. It is true that Salzburg in the hands of Austria is likewise menacing upon Munich ; but it is to be observed that Austria does not require that point for that object. Even though Bavaria should possess Salzburg, a movement from the Tyrol or from Bohemia would turn her position on the Inn ; and the two Powers are not, nor cannot be, so nearly balanced in strength as to render it desirable for Bavaria to keep Salzburg as a menacing point to be used in a counter-movement for her own defence.

In every view, then, of the question, whether of the treaties by which the parties are bound, or of their military convenience and security, I conceive that Salzburg ought to belong to Austria.

The Austrian Cabinet appears determined to persist in demanding it, and the Bavarians to refuse it. It is unfortunately not only a point of personal convenience to the Prince Royal, but has been made one of vanity to the nation ; and I am much afraid that it will not be ceded to Austria without occasioning a good deal of coolness.

The Emperor of Russia was here some nights ago, and spoke to me respecting the state of the questions between the Kings of Sweden and Denmark regarding the Treaty of Kiel. His Majesty appeared at first to think that the Prince Royal had some cause for complaint against the King of Denmark, and he wished to know what line the Prince Regent intended to take

upon this subject. I referred His Majesty to your Lordship's letter of the * to Mr. Thornton, which it was obvious he had not read. I then told him that after the inquiry and reports which had been made by the Commissioners on the part of the Allies, it was quite impossible to allow the Prince Royal to charge the King of Denmark with encouragement of the resistance of the Norwegians, and that His Majesty could not now be put on his trial on the vague surmises of M. de Löwenhielm; that the Prince Royal, if he has any proof, ought to produce it; and if he had not, he ought to be required to perform his treaty. I then begged His Majesty to reflect upon the unfavourable impression which would be made throughout Europe if a treaty which had drawn so much attention were not performed in its articles in favour of the King of Denmark; and I told him that I was quite certain that the Prince Regent would not pay the compensation for Guadaloupe till the treaty was performed. His Imperial Majesty said he would read your Lordship's despatch to Mr. Thornton; and it appeared to me that what I had said to him had made some impression upon him.

I have since received, yesterday, the duplicates of Mr. Thornton's official and secret answer, Nos. 6 and 7, to your Lordship's despatch. I propose to send the former to be laid before the Emperor, with such observations as I shall think useful; and I will afterwards endeavour to obtain an audience from His Imperial Majesty, in order, if possible, to prevail upon him to order his Minister at Stockholm to act in concert with Mr. Thornton on this subject, before he will leave Vienna.

His Imperial Majesty's departure is now fixed for the 15th, and I understand will probably be delayed till the 20th. I think he will not go till after I shall have heard from your Lordship from England.

Nothing more has passed on the affairs of Italy. Murat has, I understand, in some degree altered his tone since he has heard of the state of affairs here in the commencement of February.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

* Blank in manuscript.

[844.]

To the Earl of Liverpool.

MY DEAR LORD,

Vienna, 12th March, 1815.

I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 28th February, which I received yesterday. You'll see how we are going on in mine to Lord Castlereagh of this date.

My journey to Presburg has been of use to me, and I am getting quite well. The hot rooms here have almost killed me.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[845.]

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Vienna, 12th March, 1815.

Since I addressed you on the 4th inst., Count Rasoumowsky called upon me, and acquainted me that he had been directed by the Emperor of Russia to confer with me on the contents of a paper which His Majesty had received from the Count de Löwenhielm regarding the questions between Sweden and Denmark. In consequence of this communication, in which it appeared that His Imperial Majesty was disposed to view the matter favourably for the interests of the King of Denmark, I sent to Count Rasoumowsky the letter upon the subject which I had already prepared, addressed to the Count de Nesselrode, of which, with its enclosures, I now transmit your Lordship a copy. I have not since had an opportunity of seeing the Count de Rasoumowsky, and I have received no written answer; but from what he said I imagine the Emperor will adopt the measure I have proposed.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[846.]

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Vienna, 12th March, 1815.

The King of Saxony arrived on the 4th instant and passed on to Presburg, and I now enclose the protocols of the different conferences of the Plenipotentiaries of the Five Powers which have since taken place in regard to the affairs of that kingdom.

In consequence of the desire expressed, by direction of the Emperor of Austria, in the conference of the * , that Prince Talleyrand and I should accompany Prince Metternich on his mission to the King of Saxony, we proceeded to Presburg on Wednesday; and on Thursday, having been presented to His Majesty, we laid before him the protocol of the conference of the * , and the arrangements for the cession of parts of Saxony and of the Duchy of Warsaw. His Majesty afterwards saw each of us separately, and he expressed to each the strong objections he entertained to all the parts of the arrangement proposed to him. We remained at Presburg on Thursday and Friday, and in several conferences with his Minister, the Comte d'Ensiedel, urged the expediency of the King's acquiescence in the arrangement, and repeatedly stated, as well in these conferences as in the conversations we had with the King, the absolute impossibility of his attempting to negotiate till he should have given his consent to the cessions.

At length we yesterday morning waited upon His Majesty to take leave of him previous to our return to Vienna, having been informed by the Comte d'Ensiedel that His Majesty was prepared to give us his answer. After taking leave, the Comte d'Ensiedel gave to each of the Plenipotentiaries a note, of which I enclose a copy, by which His Majesty refuses to consent to the arrangement proposed. To this note we thought it expedient immediately to send the enclosed reply.

It appeared to me that the King was not aware of the nature of his own situation, or of the exertions which had been made to save him; or to know exactly how far he could depend upon France. He treated with contempt, and a good deal of vivacity, the recommendation which I gave him not to allow himself to delay his decision from any hopes he might entertain of the success of Buonaparte's plans; and upon the whole I conceived that he was inclined to endeavour to excite a popular compassion in his favour, notwithstanding that his case is so bad, and His Majesty knows that we think it so.

The result of our mission to Presburg having been reported this day in the conference of the Five Powers, it was determined to proceed immediately to carry into execution the cession to Prussia, and for the present to leave in the hands of Prussia that

* Blank in manuscript.

part of Saxony destined for the King under a provisional administration, and to prepare an answer to the Comte d'Ensiedel's note, in which the conduct of His Majesty since 1806 should be recorded.

The Comte d'Ensiedel is coming here this day, and it is expected that when he will find the Five Powers determined to carry their arrangement into execution, he will be disposed to acquiesce in it in the name of the King.

Unless, however, His Majesty shall consent to withdraw the note of which I enclose the copy, I conceive that the Allies at least must reply to it.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Foreign Office, 12th March, 1815.

Your Grace will have received from Lord FitzRoy Somerset and other British authorities intelligence of Buonaparte's landing and progress. I now enclose copy of the instruction which I have been commanded to address to his Lordship for the direction of his conduct.

Your Grace will perceive therein laid down the principles upon which His Royal Highness's conduct will be regulated. The re-establishment of Buonaparte's authority is deemed by the Prince Regent incompatible with the peace and security of Europe; and he trusts that the Powers who have so gloriously conquered the peace will concur with him in such efforts as may be necessary to preserve it.

With this view, it appears to His Royal Highness desirable that the Sovereigns assembled at Vienna should publish a joint declaration, announcing their determination to maintain inviolable the Peace of Paris, and, as the only security for the due observance of the same, their resolution to support the lawful Sovereign of France against Buonaparte.

It appearing to His Royal Highness that this can best be done by assembling an imposing force on the French frontiers; that the burden may fall as equally as possible, your Lordship will propose that the whole or such part of the 75,000 men as the Four Powers are liable to furnish under the Convention supplementary to the Treaty of Chaumont shall be appropriated to this purpose; and that the charge may be more equally distributed, the Powers of Germany, whose accession to that treaty has not yet been obtained, might be required to furnish a reasonable quota.

The efforts of Austria being now so largely directed to Italy, it cannot be expected that she can also appear in force upon the Rhine; but no inconvenience will arise from this. If all the other Powers, including Russia, furnish their contingents, I think the gross force on the eastern frontier ought not to be less than 200,000 men.

I should hope, from the state of the business at Vienna, that your Lordship would find no great difficulty connected with the instructions you will receive by the present courier on Italian affairs to prevail upon the Powers to sign at once a treaty placing, by an early ratification, all the arrangements already agreed upon out of the reach of doubt. This will give great confidence, and excite little jealousy.

If you can effect this, you may give the Emperor of Russia, in conjunction with the Dutch plenipotentiary, an assurance* that the half of the Dutch loan, under the regulations as agreed upon, will be defrayed by us ; it being understood that His Imperial Majesty will act in concert with us in the other measures remaining to be settled. I suggest a written assurance, to remove doubts, considering that the minor details of the measure, as to interest, sinking fund, &c., can be best negotiated here in communication with the Treasury.

Your Grace will be enabled at Vienna to watch the progress of this attempt by Buonaparte to overturn the existing order of things in France, and consequently in Europe ; and you can judge, with reference to the state of affairs at Vienna, where your personal presence is likely to be of most use to the public service. The Prince Regent, relying entirely on your Grace's zeal and judgment, leaves it to you, without further orders, either to remain at Vienna or to put yourself at the head of the army in Flanders. The only reservation I am directed to make is, that your Grace is not to expose yourself by returning to the interior of France, unless in the command of troops.

I have the honour to be, with great truth and respect, my Lord,

Your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Viscount Castlereagh to Lord FitzRoy Somerset.

MY LORD,

Foreign Office, 12th March, 1815.

Your despatch of the 9th, enclosing two notes addressed by you to the Count de Jaucourt, has been received and laid before the Prince Regent.

His Royal Highness has been graciously pleased to approve the answer your Lordship addressed to that Minister, and I have now to authorise your Lordship to repeat to His Most Christian Majesty the deep and earnest interest the Prince Regent takes in the effectual suppression of this daring attempt to disturb His Majesty's legitimate authority.

You will assure His Most Christian Majesty that the Prince Regent, considering the preservation of the peace which has been so happily concluded as essentially dependent on the discomfiture of this desperate project to shake His Majesty's throne, will lose no time in inviting the other Powers of Europe to unite their efforts with his to support the cause of His Majesty against Buonaparte and such as may adhere to him.

With this view, I shall this night instruct the Duke of Wellington to present this invitation on His Royal Highness's part to the Sovereigns assembled at Vienna, and propose to them to assemble without delay an im-

* N.B.—The words "*in writing*" after "assurance" in the original, but not in this duplicate.—W. *March 28th, 1815.*

posing force on the frontiers of France, to act according to circumstances in support of His Most Christian Majesty and his loyal subjects.

The Prince Regent has also given the necessary orders to his squadrons, especially those in the Mediterranean, to act in concert with the naval forces of France in execution of such measures of general security as His Majesty may have ordered.

Orders will also be given to the troops in the Low Countries (and the Prince of Orange will be requested to unite his troops to those serving in the pay of Great Britain) to assemble and prepare for service. The British government will be prepared to concert with that of France with respect to future measures of common interest; but they persuade themselves that His Most Christian Majesty will feel the importance of not prematurely having recourse to the aid of foreign troops, more especially where the magnitude of the force is not such as unconnectedly to render effectual service.

I shall instruct the Duke of Wellington also, if this attempt of Buonaparte should meet with a temporary success, to endeavour to confirm in a treaty the arrangements already agreed upon at Vienna, in order that the Powers may be at liberty to act with the more vigour, reserving such points as may not yet have been regulated for subsequent arrangement. His Grace will also have a discretionary authority, if events should appear to him to render it expedient, to proceed, without further orders, in person to the Low Countries, there to take upon him the command of the army, leaving the diplomatic duties to be conducted in his absence by the Earl of Clancarty and the other Plenipotentiaries.

You may assure the King of France that, in addition to the personal sentiments of respect and attachment which the Prince Regent feels for His Majesty, His Royal Highness considers the consolidation of the peace of Europe to depend upon the preservation of His Majesty's authority; and that in this conviction, it is a great satisfaction to him to find his duty and his inclination equally prescribe to him to tender to His Majesty his support and best wishes.

Your Lordship will invite the French government to instruct Prince Talleyrand to co-operate with the Duke of Wellington in the execution of these orders.

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Foreign Office, 12th March, 1815.

After I wrote to your Lordship from Paris, I received from the King the enclosed memorandum in answer to Prince Metternich's.

Since my return I have had a letter from Count Blacas, copy of which I send with several enclosures. You will find in these papers ample proofs, in addition to the detailed reports from General Nugent and Lord William Bentinck, of Murat's treachery, at least of his double dealing. It is quite clear that Buonaparte, the Viceroy, Fouché, and other members of the family believed him to be false to the Allies. Your Grace will find the reports above alluded to among the papers at Vienna. These reports, together with the letters I now send, will enable your Lordship to satisfy the other Powers of Murat's treachery. It is particularly important that

Austria should have the means of justifying herself in considering the treaty as violated by Murat.

The intelligence received from your Grace of Murat's recent conduct, coupled with Buonaparte's descent in France, has removed all remaining scruples on the part of the British government. They consider that Murat has forfeited every claim, and that there is no safety, especially for Austria, while he is at Naples. They are therefore prepared to enter into a concert for his removal, and, under proper security as to the system to be established, to support the pretensions of Ferdinand the Fourth to the throne of Naples, whom they have never ceased to acknowledge and to describe in all formal acts as King of the *Two Sicilies*.

As there will be some nicety in giving to our line on this question the form most likely to prove satisfactory to Parliament, it might be desirable that we should accede, according to our own form, to the treaty previously agreed to by Austria and France, in the negotiation of which you will assist with a view of rendering the details as little objectionable as possible.

The substance of our line will be as follows:—We shall continue to consider Ferdinand the Fourth as Sovereign of Naples, and agree to concert measures with the other Powers, having the like views, for the removal of Murat, either by negotiation or force. This concert ought to include Spain, Russia, and Prussia, although they may not all furnish troops.

In the event of actual hostilities, it is plain and understood that the weight of the military effort must fall upon Austria, and that France and Great Britain can only aid collaterally and by maritime demonstration. The King seemed willing to give 40,000 or 50,000 men, or the equivalent of a part in money.

The government here is very reluctant to bind themselves by treaty to furnish troops: circumstances may enable them to do so; but they wish in the first instance to contract no larger engagement as to Naples than they lately had with regard to Norway, which you will find detailed in our treaty with Sweden. I conceive this will not make any difficulty, as *our* military aid must be but a secondary question, if we help them a little in corn, ships, and money. In the former article we can, I have no doubt, do something, and in the latter I have an expedient by which I hope to give them 70,000*l.* a month, for about four months, without going to Parliament to ask for subsidy: that is, by not deducting the value of the stores supplied to them from the Chaumont subsidy.

This whole question is now put upon a footing that you may press it to a conclusion, preserving, if you can, to us the form in which our accession is to be given.

CASTLEREAGH.

The Hereditary Prince of Orange to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Brussels, 13th March, 1815.

Having in this moment received a very alarming letter from FitzRoy Somerset, in which he says that the French army is in insurrection, and that Napoleon had got as far as Lyons, I send Colonel Berkeley without delay

to England; for this naturally makes me feel more than ever the necessity of being prepared here; and if Napoleon continues to have any success, nothing but a combined and rapid movement of the British, Dutch, and Prussian troops disposable in this neighbourhood can stop him, and save Louis XVIII. My opinion is that we ought to support him with all we can, and move to that effect into France, if Napoleon continues to gain ground; and on this head I beg to have your instructions. Sir C. Stuart might, perhaps, be directed to induce the Dutch to be prepared to move also. In the mean time I intend to put the principal places, without loss of time, in some state of defence, and beg you will send out as soon as possible the heavy artillery, which may be wanted before long. I wish likewise you would direct supplies to be sent without delay to Ostend, sufficient for a garrison of about 5000 men, and to Antwerp for 8000, sufficient to last six months; because both these places are, as your Lordship must be aware of, without provisions in this moment. The garrison of Lille is very ill disposed, and much in favour of Napoleon; but the Comte d'Erlon, who commands in that district, is supposed to be in favour of the Bourbons. In short, it is impossible to foresee what consequences this may have; but I feel perfectly assured that your Lordship will agree with me in thinking that nothing ought now to be spared to put ourselves here in a state of defence. I have just sent General Lowe to Aix-la-Chapelle to learn in how far we can depend upon the assistance of the Prussian troops under General Kleist's command, and have recommended to my father to assemble a Dutch corps in the neighbourhood of Maestricht. Pray send Colonel Berkeley back with an answer to the different points touched upon in this letter, and that without loss of time; for it seems to me that we may be here *à la gueule du loup* before we are aware of it. I should like to have an answer within a week.

Ever your most truly devoted

WILLIAM, HERED. PRINCE OF ORANGE.

Lord FitzRoy Somerset to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Paris, 14th March, 1815.

I have received your letter of the 4th instant, and I am very anxious to hear what measure the several Powers have determined to adopt in consequence of Buonaparte's invasion.

I enclose copies of my two last despatches, by the first of which you will see that it was a bad business at Lyons; and, altogether, I see no reason why it should be at all expected that Napoleon should not succeed, as the troops join him, and affairs, in such difficult circumstances, are not well managed at all. But on the other hand, it is monstrous to suppose that a few blackguard soldiers could give the law to such a country as France, if there were any patriotism, any independent feeling in the people; and therefore I cannot refrain from hoping that if Buonaparte gives them time for consideration, the inhabitants in general, and eventually the troops, will see that it is for their interest that he should be opposed; and in one or two instances already corps have refused to follow their officers, who

wished to march upon Paris. Such has been the case with General Le-febvre Desnouettes, the two Generals Lallemand, and the Count d'Erlon. The latter had a very considerable force; but he has been arrested by Mortier, and the troops are gone back to their garrisons. I think it doubtful whether the Lallemands will or will not be shot. All these occurrences happened to the northward, far from Buonaparte; and it is to be apprehended that if they had been near him, they would have gone over to him, as well as those at Lyons. Macdonald behaved very well on that occasion; and it is worth while to mention the way he was left, to show the influence the very name of the Emperor has upon the troops. The Marshal having exhorted his troops to do their duty, thought he could depend upon them. He palisaded the bridge, and formed his troops behind it. On the approach of the advanced guard of the Emperor, a sentinel challenged it, and was answered, "Français de l'Empereur." Immediately the officers rushed forward, tore away the palisades, and, followed by their men, declared for Buonaparte. Macdonald had to run for it. All that is known further is, that Buonaparte himself was still at Lyons on the 11th. It is hoped that Ney, who is at Besançon, will do something. I wish he may fire a shot, which nobody has done yet. Buonaparte has told his troops, "Point de décorations; point de noblesse," which it is thought here will have a great effect; but I cannot say I think so, as both French soldiers and officers aspire to the one, and the latter are fond of the other.

Paris continues quiet.

I enclose a letter for your Grace, which arrived yesterday, from Mr. Schrader. His principal object is, I think, to say just enough to be rewarded for his services.

I have as yet heard nothing from England in regard to Napoleon's arrival. It is possible that this letter may reach your Grace before that I wrote on the 11th, as I sent that by Brussels, M. de Jaucourt then believing that the Strasburg road was not safe. I understand, however, that it is perfectly so. The Duchess went off Saturday night, just at the moment that a messenger arrived with the intelligence of the death of Edward Pakenham. I commissioned Mr. Briscall to tell it her.

Alava is here.

Your most faithful servant,

FITZROY SOMERSET.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 14th March, 1815.

As the intelligence of the ratification of the American peace may be of importance at the present conjuncture, the rather after our late disaster, I lose no time in sending you the official notification of it. Their success at New Orleans had not altered the temper either of the government or the people of the United States. The former ratified, and the latter rejoiced with the utmost impatience and delight.

Our corn riots have ceased in London; and as there is no movement in the manufacturing towns beyond some wicked placards, I hope this embarrassment will pass away. You will perceive we carried the bill through

the Commons with a high hand ; and the immense majority last night in the Lords against Lord Grey's motion for further inquiry will have the best effect.

Our details from France are very imperfect. The 'Moniteur' of the 11th, announcing Buonaparte's expected entry into Lyons on the 10th, has reached the city, and excited, naturally, fears as to the fidelity of the troops. All private letters from Paris, to the 10th inclusive, speak sanguinely of the loyalty of the army, as well as of the people.

Lord Grey and Whitbread threw out last night a hope that we should abstain from all interference in what is passing in France. I was not myself present, being confined by a cold ; but I understand this sentiment was very coldly received, and I am sure will not be re-echoed by the nation. Provided the King and his adherents can give a sufficiently national complexion to his cause to relieve the Powers of Europe from the odium of appearing to impose him by arms upon France, he may venture to call for foreign assistance.

To save that pride which it is so dangerous to offend in France, some caution will be requisite in drawing up your declaration. When at Paris, with large armies in the heart of France, and a new system to launch, the Emperor of Russia's declaration that Napoleon and his dynasty had ceased to reign, and that the Allies *never* would treat with him, was well timed ; but I doubt whether you can now venture to take it so high, if Buonaparte is extensively supported, without giving him an advantage in exciting the army and nation to resist foreign dictation.

We can often do more than we can say ; and I see no reason to fear that the Parliament or the nation will shrink from supporting the Continental Powers in whatever system of vigorous policy they may be prepared to adopt against Buonaparte. We must only at the outset avoid too dictatorial a pledge, which might give his adherents in France, as well as the Opposition here, the handle to represent the support of the Bourbons as a foreign and not a French cause. Might not the declaration be addressed to Louis XVIII., expressing the indignation excited by this attempt ; stating the sense entertained by the Powers of Europe of the benefits conferred on the Continent by his return to France ; that he had given to his own subjects and to the world that repose of which Napoleon by his unrelenting ambition and faithless conduct had so long deprived it ; that they looked to him as the only hope and assurance that Europe could have of the continuance of these blessings ; and that, whilst they disclaimed all interference in the internal concerns of France, they were ready to support him as the lawful Sovereign against all his enemies ? After a declaration of this kind, if the Legislature adheres stoutly to the King, I think, *upon their representation* of its expediency to check a civil war, the King might accept foreign aid.

Excuse these hasty ideas, which are merely hints, and not instructions.

Ever yours, my dear Lord, very sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

St. James's Square, 16th March, 1815.

The accounts from Lord FitzRoy are so bad that we can feel no confidence of the King's means to sustain himself, and the whole may crumble to pieces, so as to leave us no cause to support, except an undisguised dictation to France as to her Monarch, which we could not justify or regard as permanent, even if we had power, in a military sense, to give it an existence.

This will naturally induce you to pause in bringing forward any general declaration, which must not be hazarded on light or doubtful grounds. Under the circumstances first represented, and being desired by the King, its effect would have been to animate, whilst to refuse it would have been to betray a dangerous indifference; but the question is different now. Our march must be regulated as when we entered France, upon principles we can avow and maintain towards the nation. If they will not make the cause of the Bourbons sufficiently their own to enable us to support it as theirs, we cannot maintain it as ours.

If you find money indispensable to bring the Prussians effectually forward, you may advance them something out of the balance of the Supplementary Convention, for which we are to account exclusively with them. They will probably have claims to the amount of 400,000*l*. If you find it necessary to assist them, do it progressively, and make Hardenberg keep it quiet. To retain this spur in hand, you had better take the advance upon yourself, without admitting that you have instructions to authorise it.

Harrowby observed an ambiguity of expression in my last despatch relative to the Dutch loan. Of course it will be understood that the half is only to be borne by Great Britain and Holland, each Power bearing one fourth.

The Duchess safe arrived.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Foreign Office, 16th March, 1815.

The despatches received this morning from Paris, copies of which I enclose, your Grace will observe give a most unfavourable account of the state of the King's affairs.

Although Paris and the country generally are tranquil, and the population not unfriendly to the government, the progress of Buonaparte appears to have been hitherto unchecked by any opposition from the army, whilst strong indications of disaffection have manifested themselves in particular corps, some of which have actually joined themselves to his standard.

The private letters do not afford a more encouraging prospect; and if the force under Marshal Macdonald, or some other of the corps to the southward, cannot be brought speedily to act against him, the dissolution of the

King's authority and government may be speedily effected, in opposition to the inclination of the nation, by the supineness or corruption of the soldiery.

The alarming aspect affairs have so suddenly and (when compared with all the early reports) so unexpectedly taken, will no doubt have been notified to your Lordship direct from Paris. In the judgment of His Majesty's ministers these circumstances form only so many additional motives for the Powers of Europe to assemble without delay a most powerful force upon the Rhine, and in advance of that river, as the only means of securing the peace of Europe, in the event of Buonaparte's resumption of the government, or, if the French nation shall stand by their lawful Sovereign, of encouraging and supporting them in doing so.

The great change which has taken place in the state of the question may however suggest more caution to be observed in the issuing of any declaration from Vienna till the character of the contest is more precisely established; for although interference on the part of the Great Powers of Europe would, in the judgment of His Majesty's government, be both wise and necessary, at the instance of the King and his government, if sustained by an adequate national support, yet, consistent with the principles on which the Allies have hitherto acted, it would be a very different question to march into France for the purpose of restoring a Sovereign who had been betrayed and abandoned by his own troops and subjects.

I state these principles for your Grace's consideration, leaving the application of them to your judgment, as circumstances arise, upon conference with the ministers of the other Courts. You will, however, lose no occasion of calling their attention to the Treaty of Chaumont, as the only safe basis upon which their conduct can now be founded. If Buonaparte is again to appear upon the stage, and to wield the power and resources of France, more especially under the intoxication of such a restoration, there is no safety for Europe but in a close and indissoluble union of the Four Great Powers, supported by all the other States, who will naturally rally round their standard.

I am sorry to observe, by despatches from Sir Charles Stuart, that the Prussians have already withdrawn a considerable part of their force, not less than 40,000 men, from the country between the Meuse and the Moselle, weakening at the same time the garrison of Luxembourg. Your Grace will feel the pressing importance of providing adequately for this important part of the frontier, including the provisioning of that fortress.

You will also use your utmost influence to terminate amicably the existing differences between Austria and Bavaria, and to secure the effective aid of the latter Power at this critical conjuncture.

Whatever differences of opinion may have prevailed under other circumstances, I trust that every minor consideration will be buried in the common interest which all must feel to preserve, at least so far as concerns the existing boundaries of France, the glorious results of the late war.

I have the honour to be, with great truth and respect,

My Lord, your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

Major-General Sir H. Lowe to General Kleist.

MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

A Bruxelles, ce 16 Mars, 1815.

Le Prince Héréditaire m'a chargé de vous envoyer la copie ci-adjointe d'une lettre qu'il vient de recevoir dans ce moment du Général Fagel. Si ce contenu est vrai, ou bien fondé, Votre Excellence naturellement en aura reçu des avis par des autres occasions.

En tout cas S.A.R. a pris toutes ces mesures nécessaires, soit pour assister la cause du Roi Louis XVIII. en cas que les circonstances pourroient l'exiger, soit pour se défendre en cas des malheurs entraîneroient le besoin d'un tel système. Il a déjà donné ordre pour la réunion de ses troupes à Ath et dans le voisinage, et dans très peu de jours notre armée y sera rassemblée. Il a reçu avis au même tems que S.A.R. le Prince Souverain, dès le moment d'entendre les nouvelles du débarquement de Buonaparte, a donné ordre pour la marche de l'armée Hollandoise dans la direction de Maestricht et Hasselt. Il espère qu'il se trouvera bientôt un corps d'environ 20 mille hommes.

En prenant toutes les mesures précautionnaires que dépendent de lui, il n'a pas manqué en même tems chercher toutes les notions possibles sur les mouvemens de Buonaparte et les dispositions que peut prendre le Roi pour se soustraire de son attentat. S.A.R. a envoyé un officier de confiance à Paris pour faire connoître au Ministre Anglais les mesures qu'on prend, afin que le Roi en peut être instruit, et que Sa Majesté peut faire connoître lui-même ses vœux et desirs sur tel objet, S.A.R. étant déterminé d'y accéder en tous les points qu'il croit être dans les vues de son gouvernement, sans même attendre des instructions précises à cet égard.

Si Buonaparte est arrivé ou arrivera dans peu de jours, son premier mouvement serait naturellement avec toutes ses forces dans cette direction. Telle ai-je entendu a déjà été sa déclaration. Dans le cas qu'il rencontre des obstacles dans la marche à Paris, nous serons en avant, et à même de pouvoir opérer quelque chose à l'avantage du Roi s'il exige. C'est dans le jugement de V.E. de décider sur les meilleures mesures à prendre avec l'armée sous ses ordres dans des cas si extraordinaires. La marche en avant de son armée a paru à Son Altesse Royale la chose la plus favorable pour l'opinion générale, et pour accélérer toute opération ultérieure; mais ce mouvement auroit plus qu'un double effet s'il étoit appuyé par les mêmes démonstrations du côté de l'armée Prussienne, spécialement pour ce qui a rapport à l'opinion générale en France, et à vos desirs de s'opposer aux plans de Buonaparte pour la subversion du système actuel. Le Prince a été charmé d'entendre la disposition que V.E. a déjà manifesté à cet égard. Il m'a chargé de vous en donner ses remerciemens, et à dire qu'il en est sensible on ne peut plus.

Il voit toute l'avantage de la position fixée pour l'armée Prussienne; et s'il a cru suggérer quelques démonstrations plus marquées sur les frontières de la France, il ne doute pas que les raisonnemens offerts ne lui seroient pas d'excuse.

La plupart des garnisons de Lille, Valenciennes, et Maubeuge sont marchés pour Paris, mais c'est pour revenir bientôt si Buonaparte s'empare de la capitale. S'il rencontre de l'opposition, nous voici bien à même de pouvoir en profiter.

H. LOWE.

The Prince of Orange to Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD,

Brussels, 17th March, 1815.

I received this morning your letter of the 14th; and it is indeed with satisfaction that I have heard that the Duke of Wellington is likely to come to the Netherlands. I will be happy to deposit in his hands the command the British government thought me worthy to be intrusted with; and I shall always be proud of this mark of confidence. But although it would have been mortifying to me to give it up, under the present circumstances, to anybody else, yet to him I do it with pleasure; and he may be well assured that under all circumstances I will second him upon a larger scale with the same zeal I served him formerly as his aide-de-camp. I shall never forget that period of my life; I owe everything to it; and if I now may hope to be of use to my country, it is to the experience I acquired under him that I have to attribute it.

Everything in this moment depends upon collecting a large body of troops on the northern frontier of France, since Buonaparte will, I am persuaded, enter Paris very shortly. He then will move without delay down upon this frontier; and I am assured that in one of his proclamations, which, however, I have not seen, he declares his intention to retake Belgium; but if he does not attack us, it becomes our game to move upon him without delay. I have taken all the steps of precaution I thought necessary under the present circumstances. I can rely upon the assistance of General Kleist. I have persuaded my father to assemble a large body of Dutch troops about Maestricht; and steps have been taken by him to that effect. The disposable British troops are collecting about Ath and its vicinity, so as to occupy the country between Tournay and Mons. I had already taken it upon myself to order the works at Ostend, Nieuport, Ypres, and Tournay, to be carried into execution; and they are in progress. I mean likewise to secure Mons against a coup de main. What I want most is the artillery to arm these places; and I beg you will hurry it out. I heard of the guns being embarked for some time. The peace with America being ratified, it would be very desirable and most necessary to send more British troops into this country. No loss of time is everything in this moment; and I am persuaded that in three weeks, if not sooner, the French revolted army can be and most likely will be on this frontier with Buonaparte at their head. I have directed Colonel Sir George Wood, commanding the Royal Artillery in this country, to write for more companies of artillery, which are absolutely necessary. I think it is in contemplation to organise a militia or something of the kind in this country; and I am sure nothing could assist the Belgian government more in this than if you would place 10,000 or 20,000 stands of arms to my disposition to arm the new levies if required.

I send to-night an officer to the Duke of Wellington, giving him every information with regard to the army and to my plans of operation, in case I am called upon to act before he arrives. My dear Lord, I think we ought not to give ourselves more law than a fortnight or three weeks, and everything which is to be done must be done within that period.

Ever yours most truly,

WILLIAM, PRINCE OF ORANGE.

Pray send reinforcements, if you can. My father has been proclaimed to-day King of the Netherlands.

Extrait d'une Lettre de Séchéron, près de Genève.

Le 17 Mars, 1815.

Le préfet du département de l'Ain, le Baron de Capelle, vient d'arriver ici. Je sors de chez lui. Il est entré avec moi dans les plus grands détails, surtout ce qui s'est passé dans son département. Voici à peu près ce qu'il a dit :—

“ Quelques moments après les étonnans événemens arrivés à Lyon, mon département fut inondé d'émissaires de Buonaparte, lançants partout ses proclamations. Les premiers jours je fis saisir plusieurs paquets de ces imprimés ; mais lorsque je me plaignis à la gendarmerie de ce qu'elle n'arrêtait point les individus qui les colportaient, ils vinrent tous me supplier de ne pas les obliger à une démarche qui les perdrait si l'Empereur avait le dessus. Je fis mettre en prison les premiers gens d'armes qui me tinrent ce langage, mais peu à peu tous devinrent infidèles. Je me servis alors de quelques espions secrets, et je parvins ainsi à arrêter une révolte générale. Tout était en fermentation ; mais personne n'avait encore arboré la cocarde tricolore. J'étais dans cette critique position lorsque le Colonel Gautier, qui commandait quelques milliers d'hommes, vint, le désespoir dans l'âme, me faire part que la plus grande fermentation existait dans ses troupes ; qu'elles ne parlaient que de Napoléon ; que son nom les électrisait toutes ; qu'il ne voyait aucun moyen d'éviter une insurrection générale ; et que non seulement il était impossible de songer à envoyer ses troupes contre Buonaparte, mais qu'il craignait encore de ne pouvoir les empêcher de courir à lui. ‘J'ai l'ordre,’ a-t-il ajouté, ‘de conduire mon régiment ici (à Bourg) ; lorsqu'il verra l'esprit de votre ville et son agitation, il sera impossible d'arrêter le soldat.’ Le Colonel Gautier paraissait au désespoir. Il me demandait ce qu'il devait faire. Je lui rappelais ses sermens au Roi ; il me répondit comme un homme qui n'avait plus sa tête, que la cause du Roi était perdue, que toute l'armée passerait à Napoléon, qu'on ne trouverait pas un soldat qui fit feu sur lui. ‘Si j'abandonne mes troupes, je n'ai plus de ressources. Je me dévouerais inutilement à la cause du Roi.’ Quand je vis cela, je ne doutais plus que le Colonel Gautier ne passa à Buonaparte si ses troupes désertaient. Le soir même les régimens arrivèrent ; je les entendis un quart d'heure avant qu'ils fussent sur la Place ; les cris de ‘Vive Napoléon !’ remplissaient la ville. Dès lors je fus certain que le Colonel Gautier ne résisterait plus aux vœux de son régiment.

“ Le lendemain de cette scène je fus voir le Maréchal Ney, qui venait d'arriver à Lons-le-Saulnier. Il me parut très monté contre Napoléon, et décidé à soutenir le Roi. Je le vis cependant découragé en apprenant l'esprit des corps dont il venait prendre le commandement ; et en raisonnant avec moi sur les moyens de défendre la cause du Roi, il dit, ‘Il n'y a qu'un moyen ; il faut qu'il se fasse porter sur un brancard à la tête des troupes. Je réponds alors que le soldat lui sera fidèle, et personne n'aura la lâcheté de l'abandonner.’ Le Maréchal me dit qu'il avait fait la revue des troupes, et leur avait fait renouveler le serment de fidélité au Roi ; ‘mais peut-on s'y fier,’ ajouta-t-il, ‘quand on voit tout ce qui se passe ?’

“ Comme j'étais très fatigué, je fus un moment me jeter sur un lit ; mais jugez de mon étonnement lorsque mon domestique vint me reveiller à six heures du matin, en m'apprenant que le Maréchal Ney était sur la

Place, au milieu des troupes, et qu'il leur avait annoncé qu'il passerait avec elles aux ordres de l'Empereur Napoléon. Je ne pus croire à cette trahison, et je fus chez le Maréchal. Il parut avoir honte de me voir, et lorsque je lui demandais si ce qu'on m'avait dit était vrai, il me répondit, '*C'est un plan arrêté avec tous les Maréchaux.*' Nous avons vu que les choses ne pouvaient aller ainsi, et nous avons rappelé Buonaparte. Le Roi est un brave homme, mais ceux qui l'entourent ont cherché à nous humilier. Chaque jour ils devenaient plus insolens, et quoique nous eussions les premières places, on ne cessait de nous faire des avanies. Nous ne pouvions souffrir ces affronts. Les émigrés ont encore perdu le Roi.' Je ne pus m'empêcher de m'écrier, 'Comment, Maréchal, vous avez rappelé cet homme! Sa présence va attirer sur la France les armées étrangères.' 'Les armées étrangères!' reprit encore le Maréchal; 'lorsqu'on saura cette nouvelle on frémira jusqu'au fond du Kamschatka.' 'Vous sacrifiez, donc, votre patrie à un moment d'humeur! Vous avez oublié tout ce que Buonaparte a fait. Croyez-vous, Maréchal, qu'il puisse changer, et ne voyez vous pas d'avance tous les malheurs assaillir la France?' 'Je connais Buonaparte mieux que vous,' reprit Ney, avec humeur. 'Je sais tout ce que nous avons à redouter, mais il changera, ou nous le tuerons.' 'Il est impossible qu'il change son caractère,' reprit le préfet; 'vous ne le tuerez pas, parcequ'il aura trop de pouvoir, et vous-même vous risquez de périr. Il vous enverra à l'échafaud si vous contrariez ses projets.' Le Maréchal dit alors avec irritation, 'Je sais tout ce que nous avons à craindre; mais je préfère mille fois être pilé dans un mortier par Buonaparte que d'être humilié par les gens qui n'ont jamais fait la guerre. Les Bourbons ne peuvent nous convenir; nous avons hésité un moment si nous mettrions la couronne sur la tête du Duc d'Orléans, ou si nous rappellerions Buonaparte. L'opinion de l'armée nous a entraîné.' Le Maréchal essaya alors de m'engager à tourner du côté de Buonaparte. Il me dit que la révolution était faite, que dans quelques jours le Roi ne régnerait plus, et que mon intérêt me commandait de proclamer l'Empereur. J'ai répondu au Maréchal que rien au monde me ferait trahir le Roi; et lorsqu'il a insisté, je lui ai dit, 'Si vous violez vos sermens, vous avez au moins votre gloire militaire; vous pourrez dire que vous ne voulez vous battre contre un ancien frère d'armes — contre celui qui vous avait comblé de biens. Mais nous, si nous trahisons, que nous restera-t-il? la honte, l'infamie. Nous serons à jamais couverts de boue, avilis même aux yeux de Buonaparte. Nous sommes les officiers civils du Roi; c'est entre ses mains que nous avons prêté serment. Buonaparte nous a rendu ceux que nous lui avions fait, et rien ne pourra nous excuser à nos propres yeux.' Le Maréchal, en voyant ma détermination, n'a plus insisté. En me quittant, il dit, 'Faites ce que vous voudrez.'

"Je suis rentré à mon préfecture profondément affligé, et désespérant de la cause du Roi. J'ai rencontré partout les soldats, les paysans, fanatisés au nom de Buonaparte. J'ai appris qu'on avait foulé aux pieds la cocarde blanche, brisé partout l'emblème des lys, déchiré les drapeaux blancs. Le peuple est dans l'ivresse; tout avait la couleur du commencement de la Révolution de 1789. Il semble que Buonaparte leur apporte la liberté, le bonheur, et les délivre de la tyrannie. Il faut avoir vu cette effervescence, cette folie, pour la croire. Un sous-préfet de mon département est venu me voir dans ce moment. Il avait fait il y a quelques jours une proclama-

tion des plus virulentes contre Buonaparte; et cependant il me consultait sur ce qu'il devait faire. Etonné de sa question, je lui ai demandé s'il pouvait balancer? Il m'a parlé de sa femme, de ses enfans. Je lui ai dit alors, 'Et votre proclamation contre Buonaparte?' Il m'a quitté comme hors de lui, mais je suis persuadé qu'il sera resté à son poste, et qu'actuellement il administre pour Napoléon.

"Lorsque j'ai vu que la révolte était générale, et que l'on ne tarderait pas à venir briser à ma porte les armoires du Roi, je me suis dit il faut périr en les défendant, ou abandonner ma poste. Dans la circonstance présente ce dévouement aurait été inutile, et je me suis déterminé à venir ici."

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

[847.]

MY LORD,

Vienna, 18th March, 1815.

Your Lordship has been so frequently disappointed in your expectations that business would be brought to a close here, that you will not be surprised at finding that the Swiss Declaration has not yet been made, and that the settlement with Bavaria is still at a stand.

The delay of the former is to be attributed to the continued unwillingness of France to consent that the three valleys of the Valteline should belong to Austria, unless this consent should be connected with the arrangement of the affairs of Italy. I believe, however, that this difficulty is at last overcome, and that the Declaration will be delivered to-morrow in a conference of the Plenipotentiaries of the Eight Powers and the Deputies of the Swiss Confederation.

The settlement of the Bavarian question appears more difficult. The King of Prussia had strongly objected to the cession by Hesse of Hanau to the Bavarians in exchange for Salzburg; but His Majesty has withdrawn his objections, and has consented to co-operate with the other Powers to obtain by his good offices the cession of Hanau from the Elector.

It will remain then to be seen whether the King of Bavaria will cede Salzburg, of which I entertain some hopes, particularly if the Emperor of Austria should consent to leave His Majesty in possession of all the pecuniary advantages to be derived from the manufacture of salt.

I enclose your Lordship the protocol of the conference of the ministers of the Five Powers, on the refusal of the King of Saxony to accede to the cession of his territory. This protocol has not yet been signed; and it was hoped that its contents

would have induced the King to accede to the treaty. Nothing, however, has been heard from him since; and I am apprehensive that it will be necessary to carry into execution the measures therein referred to.

Nothing has yet been done in the questions between Sweden and Denmark. The Comte de Löwenhielm, brother of the minister-plenipotentiary from the King of Sweden, arrived here some days ago, charged with a mission on this subject; but I have not heard that he has had any success.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Prince of Orange to Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD,

Brussels, 21st March, 1815.

I receive a courier in this moment from Paris, and hear from General Fagel and FitzRoy that all is over. No troops will fight against Buonaparte; they all join him; and he himself is probably in this moment at Paris. The King was supposed to have left it on the 19th, but this is not certain, and to have gone to La Vendée. The Duc d'Orléans is at Lille. I wrote to him this morning. Pray send out the reinforcements that are intended for the Netherlands without delay, and arms for the Belgian militia which is going to be formed. It would be of the greatest use to this government if you would do so; and the more you send the better: 25,000 or 30,000 at least would be required.

I desired Colonel Sir G. Wood to make a requisition for field artillery, which I am very anxious to have out here as well as ammunition. I caused Colonel Colborne to write to General Bunbury, enclosing him a list of all that would be required to complete the army to take the field. Every attention, I believe, is paid by the Prussians to Luxembourg; but at the same time I mean to give General Kleist a hint about it. He is collecting his army, and is going to have a strong corps near Liège to communicate with the army in Belgium. The Dutch and Belgian army in the field will consist of 23,100 rank and file, out of which 3100 horse.

For ever your most truly devoted,

WILLIAM, PRINCE OF ORANGE.

[848.]
*

To Lord Burghersh.

MY DEAR BURGHERSH,

Vienna, 22nd March, 1815.

I have received your letter and despatches of the 16th. I have no more instructions from England respecting Murat than you have, and can give you none.

He has offered the Austrians, and even the King of France, to join in the general confederacy against Napoleon, which offer has not yet been accepted by either; and in regularity he ought not to march; and in marching he commits an act of direct hostility against the Pope, against Austria, and against the world.

It may be questioned whether that act of hostility can or ought now to be resented, if Murat should himself gloss it over with the professions of good intentions. When I say "it may be questioned," I hope you will believe that I consider it only a question of means; and that, if the Austrians have the means, they ought forthwith to fall upon him. I take it, however, to be almost certain that, unless he has coupled this act of hostility with a declaration that he intends to be King of Italy, he will not be attacked; and I recommend you to shape your course accordingly. Our last accounts from Paris are of the 19th. At that time matters were in a very uncertain state; and although I understand that the legislature intended to accompany the King if he should quit his capital, the existence of the means of a civil war appeared to be very doubtful. The solution of this question would probably decide upon the measures to be adopted against Murat.

I am going into the Low Countries to take the command of the army, as soon as I shall have settled here a treaty something like the Treaty of Chaumont, without the subsidiary part. Other matters here are going on but slowly; and Napoleon's expedition has not increased our facilities.

Give my best love to Priscilla.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Wellesley.

[849.]

MY DEAR HENRY,

Vienna, 24th March, 1815.

I have received your letter of the 26th of February.

From what the Emperor of Russia said to me here about Spain, I should doubt that Tatischeff's efforts at Madrid are directed to any specific object. The marriage of a Russian Princess into any great family in Europe is very difficult, because the Russians insist as a point of dignity that she shall

carry with her her Greek religion ; and up to this moment none of the great families have consented to receive one as reigning Princess on these terms ; and they are all married into the families of the third or fourth order in Germany, excepting one Princess to a younger brother of the Emperor, the Palatine of Hungary, where the Greek religion is professed. What the Russians are looking to everywhere is general power and influence ; but as they have neither wealth nor commerce, nor anything that is desirable to anybody excepting 400,000 men, about whom they make more noise than they deserve, they can acquire these objects in a distant Court like Spain only by bustle and intrigue. The Emperor in more than one conversation has expressed to me his apprehensions that unless we should take great care of Spain, we should throw her into the arms of France, and his desire to prevent that misfortune. He is very insincere, and it is difficult to judge at all times what he means ; but I should doubt his having instructed Tatischeff to oppose our views for the marriage of the King with the Portuguese family, particularly as he can have no views of that kind for one of his own sisters.

You will have seen what a breeze Buonaparte has stirred up in France. We are all unanimous here, and in the course of about six weeks there will not be fewer than 700,000 men on the French frontier. I am going to take the command of the army in the Netherlands. I hope to be able to leave this the day after to-morrow.

I have recommended Labrador to accede to the general alliance, and I am going to give him a memoir of a plan of operations to be carried on on the frontier.

Ever, my dear Henry, yours most affectionately,

WELLINGTON.

The Prince of Orange to Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD,

Brussels, 24th March, 1815.

Buonaparte is moving on ; and some reports say that he is not far from Lille. The Duc d'Orléans is in that town, which makes me hope that it will hold out some time. The Prince of Neuchâtel is arrived. He brought me a letter from the King, who is at Ostend. I send the Prince back immediately to the King, entreating him not to leave the Continent, since he has still a party in France which would be lost, or at least lose all

hopes, if he left this country. I have moved a considerable body of troops upon Tournay, which I mean to defend as an intrenched camp, should Buonaparte move down upon me on that point. His force, by all accounts, cannot be considerable; and I think myself strong enough to stop him until Kleist's corps joins me.

Ever yours,

WILLIAM, PRINCE OF ORANGE.

I cannot say more for want of time. Hurry out everything; no time must be lost. I go to Tournay to-morrow.

Sir Charles Stuart to Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD,

Hague, 24th March, 1815.

I had already made up this day's mail when I received your two letters of the 21st.

The mission of Tripp to Paris was a measure entirely adopted at Brussels without the knowledge, much less the consent, of this government. I have endeavoured to check the mischief which might result from the motives of his journey being known by requesting His Royal Highness to enjoin strict secrecy to all the persons who are acquainted with the circumstance.

My letters to Lord Castlereagh of this date will explain the mistake arising from Nagell's conversation upon the subject of the plan transmitted to the young Prince last week. There is, however, a lukewarmness about the King and his ministers whenever I bring forward this subject which will not be corrected until our engineering commission have entered upon the active exercise of their functions.

Although the Russian minister does not enjoy the confidence of the King to the degree which has been represented, he does mischief as a professional planmaker, who has a system ready cut and dried for every contingency which can occur.

Only this morning the Secretary of State showed me a plan that minister had confided to him for the defence of the King's dominions under the present circumstances, being neither more nor less than the occupation of the old Dutch line from Antwerp to Breda and Venloo, and the advance of the whole combined English, Prussian, and Dutch armies along the Meuse to Luxembourg, which of course leaves Brabant and Flanders at the mercy of the enemy.

As M. de Nagell proposed to confide this paper to the ambassador in London, I could not but point out to him the mischief he would do to his own cause, and recommend it to be thrown into the fire; advice he was at last persuaded to follow.

To say the truth, unless the Duke of Wellington shows himself and uses strong arguments to compel them to fortify the frontier, I see plainly that we shall have to combat difficulties at every turn. The want of money will be a justification for delays which proper energy might easily get over; and I know not where it is to be sought unless in his counsels.

Believe me, with many remembrances to Lady Bathurst and Lady Musgrave,

Ever yours faithfully,

CHARLES STUART.

As Pfhull does not go to Brussels, I think the alarm of his ascendancy may subside.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 24th March, 1815.

Your letters of the 12th arrived to-day, and whatever minor differences may prevail, the main principles seem to be sound. The common sense as well as the common necessity of a strict union amongst all the Powers for war and for peace are so obvious, that I do not apprehend the unexpected disasters in France will either discourage their exertions or shake their constancy.

I am much at a loss to give you any intelligible view of the state of things in France; the Duke de Feltre is our last and best authority. The army, which he estimates at about 200,000 men, is nearly all gone over. The nation is for the King, but inactive; the South and West animated by the best spirit. It is reported the King has Lisle, but we know not for certain. After such a crash, but without a shot being fired, we must wait for some time before we can judge what has survived the devastation.

My former letter will have apprised you that we look to the Treaty of Chaumont as the natural basis of our future system with the Allies. If the Sovereigns could come to Brussels, it might facilitate much a perfect understanding, formed upon a precise knowledge of the actual state of affairs. In the mean time, as you may wish to know how far, under all the difficulties of winding up the expense of the late war, the British government can go *in the event of actual hostilities*, I have obtained authority to say that we can furnish five millions for all the Continental Powers. The payments must be equally divided in twelve successive months, and the distribution be left to you. In the Treaty of Chaumont the sum was the same for 150,000 men each Power, distributed equally between Russia, Austria, and Prussia. If you find Bavaria and other smaller Powers must have *something*, it must be at the expense of the three Aristocrats.

With respect to our own force, we cannot attempt to carry it beyond 75,000 men; but with what the King of the Netherlands and the King of Hanover can add, you may consider that the quota, independent of subsidy, which fell upon Great Britain by the Treaty of Chaumont, will be thus made up.

In one of my former despatches, undervaluing the success of Buonaparte, and conceiving it impossible that the King's adherents should be so little capable of resistance, I contemplated an arrangement of force upon a very inferior scale to what must now be looked to. What you state in outline is very formidable, but not beyond the necessity of the case.

You will see that the question respecting Murat is in your hands, and you can alone judge what is best to be done. I doubt Campochiaro having

authority to make conditions as to the disposition of Murat's army without reference. Murat can have no fair pretence for refusing to send an auxiliary corps into France : his personal presence would be *unseemly*.

Believe me, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Foreign Office, 24th March, 1815.

I enclose a communication received from Murat, through the Chevalier Tocco, who has been residing here, as Mr. Walker has been at Naples, without any accredited character.

I am directed by the Prince Regent to acquaint your Grace that Mr. Tocco has been informed that no answer can be given to this overture in London, and that the decision will be taken by your Grace (to whom the proposition would be this night transmitted) in concert with the other Powers now assembled in Congress.

In referring this question to your Grace, to be decided on the spot as may be best for the general interest of Europe, I am to inform you that, in the judgment of His Royal Highness's confidential servants, the Neapolitan question has assumed a new shape under the late extraordinary events in France. Whilst Louis XVIII. was supposed to be firmly established on his throne, the difficulty was to consolidate the peace of Europe so long as a dynasty remained at Naples which neither France nor Spain would acknowledge. The case is different now : it is a question of public safety in Europe ; and neither the King of France, nor even the King of Sicily, can expect that the policy to be observed towards Murat can be regulated upon considerations of minor importance.

If the Powers of Europe should consider this overture to be *bonâ fide* on the part of Murat ; if they should be of opinion, under the actual circumstances of Europe, that it is prudent to take advantage of it ; and they find that Murat adheres to his professions notwithstanding the extent of success which has attended Buonaparte's usurpation, your Lordship has full powers to conclude a treaty with him ; but you will endeavour to combine it with such arrangements as may appear best calculated to insure Murat's fidelity, to secure the tranquillity of Italy, and to leave the Austrian army free to operate on the south of France in force.

If Murat's only object is to secure his footing in the kingdom of Naples, and if a treaty with England is the security he most covets to obtain this quietus, he ought to submit to such arrangements as are necessary to inspire confidence in his intentions. With this view it appears to me deserving of consideration, instead of remaining in force towards the north of Italy, and consequently holding a menacing position, which, being liable to abuse, must impose upon Austria the necessity of rendering a proportional force inactive in that quarter, whether he might not be required to unite his proportion of active force to the Austrian army intended to operate in the south of France (say to the extent of 20,000 or 30,000 men), and to retire the principal part of his force to the southward, making such reductions in

it as a recognition on the part of Great Britain, Russia, and Prussia must render prudent on his part.

Your Grace will of course have no concealment towards the Prince de Talleyrand with respect to this overture; but, whilst you will give all due weight to His Highness's reasoning, the Prince Regent's government does not consider that either the French or Spanish plenipotentiaries can expect the other Powers to submit to their judgment upon this question at the present moment, when the tranquillity of Italy may so essentially influence the general security of Europe, and contribute even to the maintenance of the Bourbons on the throne of France.

On the other hand, however wise the measure may be, there may be a delicacy on their part in being immediately parties to it. If such should be the case, I do not conceive, if all the other Powers concur in preserving him at Naples, that this will make any essential difficulty on the part of Murat, as, when his recognition has been once obtained generally from the other Powers of Europe, there will be not only an increased motive but an honourable justification for the Bourbons at a suitable moment to acquiesce in an arrangement which circumstances have rendered inevitable.

I am, with great truth and respect, my Lord,

Your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

P.S. I have the honour to forward to your Grace a despatch from Mr. Tocco to the Duc de Campochiaro, by which he transfers, on the part of his Court, the negotiation on the subject of this despatch to the Duke.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

The Chevalier Tocco to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Londres, 24 Mars, 1815.

D'après les communications verbales que j'ai eu l'honneur de soumettre à V.E. touchant l'inébranlable intention de S.M. le Roi de Naples à persévérer dans le système de la coalition Européenne, et le traité définitif de paix, tant désiré, qui doit s'ensuivre, je m'empresse d'expédier au Roi, mon maître, un courrier, pour qu'il soit instruit de tout ce dont V.E. m'a fait l'honneur de me communiquer à cet objet.

Je prends la liberté de prier V.E. de faire passer la ci-incluse au Duc Campochiaro.

Agréez, My Lord, etc.

LE CHEVALIER TOCCO.

II.

Richard Walker, Esq., to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Naples, 7th March, 1815.

On the departure of Mr. Fagan from this city the charge of the Consulate devolved upon me as Vice-Consul, to which office I had the honour of being nominated provisionally, by Lord William Bentinck, until the pleasure of His Majesty's ministers was known.

I have, therefore, the honour of informing your Lordship that in consequence of the important and surprising intelligence of the escape of Buonaparte from the island of Elba, on the 26th ultimo, with 1200 or 1400 men, in five or six days, as is reported here, an extraordinary Cabinet Council was held yesterday, and I received a note last night from the Duke of Gallo requesting very particularly to see me this morning.

On my going there he told me that he had it in a special command from the King to inform me officially, as the only person in any public situation under the British government here, that His Majesty had declared to the Council, in the strongest terms possible, his firm and most decided resolution to cultivate and preserve the friendship of Great Britain, both politically and commercially; and that whatever events may result from this unexpected occurrence, his determination to attach himself by every means in his power to the interests of Great Britain was unalterable: his expression in French, *inébranlable*.

His Grace requested me to transmit this information, which is the substance of the conference, to your Lordship by a Cabinet courier, which he sends off to London this morning.

I have omitted to say that I took the liberty of expressing to the Duke my being persuaded what would be the King's decision, but that I was happy in having it announced from such high authority.

No particulars of the destination of Buonaparte seem to be known here; and even if they were, your Lordship will naturally be in possession of them long before you could receive them from me.

Being without any instructions, I have been under the necessity of acting according to the best of my own judgment, and if I have erred, it has not been from intention; but I should be extremely happy to be favoured with directions from your Lordship for my better regulation, to which I shall implicitly conform.

The courier waits for my letter; and I have only to assure your Lordship that whatever events may take place here interesting to the British government I shall omit no opportunity of communicating as early as possible.

With the utmost respect, I have the honour, &c.,

RICHARD WALKER.

III.

The Chevalier Tocco to the Duke de Campochiaro.

MIO CARO DUCA,

Londra, 26 Marzo, 1815.

Profitto delle gentili esibizioni di Mylord Castlereagh per farvi pervenire la presente, e non ad altro oggetto che per ricordarmi alla vostra memoria. Lord Wellington ha dovuto darvi un'altra mia con un corriere spedito l'altra notte, in seguito delle nostre conferenze. Malgrado tali occasioni straordinarie, ho giudicato opportuno diriggervi lo straordinario vinzoni, che parte oggi, affine di darvi le dilucidazioni necessarie, e dei dettagli circa ciocchi si è qui passato. Non potrei ripetervi la stima che ha di voi Mylord Castlereagh, ed il modo con cui si è espresso sul vostro conto. Io che vi conosco da vicino non avrei potuto dir di più: qual sia la sensazione che ne ho provato la so, indovinare, non ignorando la rispettabile amicizia che ho per voi. Ho spedito alle 9 oggi per Napoli, conferenze a mezzogiorno, alle 2 la nostra spedizione. Se questa vita dura ancora un mese mi seppelliranno a S. Pancrazio a canto al mio povero fratello. Si il travaglio è grande, la riconoscenza è immensa: voi ne saprete già il tutto. Mille saluti a Cariatì ed a Schirina. Gradite che vi

ripeta gli attestati della mia sincera amicizia. Aspetto tra giorni la dimissione, se calcolo che sarete ancora a Vienna, verrò ad abbracciarvi.

Non mi dimenticate col buono Abbate.

LEON TOCCO.

Se non vi riesce del minimo incommodo (condizione forjola) vi preghemi spedirmi col primo viaggiatore un ecran per lume. Nel Coll. Mark è propriamente vicino ad una bottega coll' insegna della Regina Carolina. Ce n' eran dei bellissimi, con varj trasparenti, potuto poelo sul nostro conto. Di nuovo addio, potreste spedirmelo con un corriere Inglese per mezzo di Lord Wellington, che ne spedizie tutti giorni.

[850.]

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To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Vienna, 25th March, 1815.

The Duke de Campochiaro called upon me some days ago, in company with the Prince Cariati, and informed me that as soon as Murat had heard at Naples, on the 5th inst., of the departure of Buonaparte from the island of Elba, he had called together his council, and had informed them of his determination to adhere to his alliance with the Emperor of Austria, and had directed him (the Duke de Campochiaro) to inform the Austrian ministers and the plenipotentiaries of the Allies collected at Vienna of this determination. He made the same verbal communication to Prince Metternich, Prince Talleyrand, and all the other ministers.

In three days afterwards, on the 23rd, Prince Metternich received from Naples reports that the whole of the Neapolitan army was in movement towards the frontier; that Murat's horses and field equipages had been sent to Ancona; that he was himself to follow immediately, and to establish his head-quarters at that place. He had not moved, however, as late as the 12th.

It appears that, for some days after the 5th, he had manifested a good deal of interest in what was passing in France, and was much agitated. He had had frequent interviews with certain French officers established at Naples, and had despatched several of them into France; and he had given very unsatisfactory answers to the Austrian minister, Count Mier, both in regard to the line he intended to pursue in the contest likely to take place in France, and in regard to the object of the movement of his troops to the frontiers.

By the same occasion accounts were received from Rome, by which it appeared that he had given notice to Lucien Buona-

parte of his intention to enter the Papal States and to move one column upon Rome, and that Lucien, thinking the measure was in the progress of execution, had informed the Pope of it. It is imagined that the failure of Buonaparte at Antibes, of which accounts had been received at Naples, had induced Murat to stop the march of his troops, and to delay his own departure from Naples, but that the plan will have been resumed and carried into execution as soon as the accounts will have been received of the first successes of Buonaparte.

These accounts of the conduct of Murat, coupled with the proofs transmitted to me by your Lordship in your despatch of the 12th inst. of Murat's treachery in the last war, appear to have convinced the Powers assembled here of the absolute necessity of attacking him forthwith.

According to the latest accounts, the whole of Italy was quiet, and apparently the expedition of Buonaparte into France had occasioned a good deal of disgust and terror.

I entertain no doubt that Murat will move forward as soon as he shall hear of Buonaparte's success; and if he should find that the Austrians do not tamely submit to his encroachments, he will probably proclaim himself King of Italy, and will endeavour to revolutionize the country.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

[851.]

MY LORD,

Vienna, 25th March, 1815.

The King of Bavaria has expressed such an unwillingness to give up Salzburg, and it appeared so likely that the peremptory demand of that point by Austria, supported by the other Powers, would create a breach between Austria and Bavaria, and lastly and principally, as Prince Metternich had, in negotiating the secret treaty of Paris, made some verbal promises, which, if admitted to exist, would do away the force of his treaty, the Emperor has consented to waive his claim; and I enclose a paper which will explain the scheme according to which it is now proposed to settle the arrangement with Bavaria, omitting the cession of the town and a great part of the territory of Salzburg.

I understand, however, that Prince Wrede now refuses to cede the Innviertel ; so that there is still reason to apprehend that the question between the two Powers will not be settled without leaving some grounds of disagreement.

Prince Wrede is to be called to-morrow to the Conference of the Five Powers, in order that an endeavour may be made to bring him to reason.

The King of Saxony has written to the Emperor of Austria to request to have time to consult some of the principal persons of his kingdom before he shall consent to the cession to Prussia. In consequence of this application, the protocol which I transmitted to your Lordship in my despatch No. 16 has been signed, and its provisions ordered to be carried into execution ; and I expect that in a few days the King will signify his assent to the arrangement.

I have been concerned to observe, however, that the Prussians have shown an excessive eagerness to keep possession of the whole country. They have complained more than once of the joy manifested by the King's party at Dresden upon hearing of Napoleon's return to France, and have expressed their apprehensions of the consequences of placing the King at Dresden in case the existing crisis should lead to war with Napoleon, and the certainty that His Majesty's return must weaken the exertions in the general cause. I have, however, told them plainly that, if the King consents to the cession, the articles agreed upon must be strictly carried into execution ; and, having spoken to the Emperor of Russia upon the subject, His Imperial Majesty was entirely of the same opinion.

The Emperor of Russia has not consented to make the remonstrance in common at Stockholm in regard to the Treaty of Kiel, recommended in my letter to Count Nesselrode of the * , forwarded to your Lordship in my despatch No. * ; but he has consented that a joint remonstrance shall be made by the ministers of Austria, Russia, France, Prussia, and Great Britain, to the Comte de Löwenhielm, which will be in substance the same as that letter.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

* Blank in manuscript.

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

[852.]

MY LORD,

Vienna, 25th March, 1815.

Sir Charles Stuart having informed me, and M. Nagell having informed the Dutch ministers now here, that the Prince of Orange had thought it expedient to take upon himself the title of King of the Low Countries upon the receipt of the intelligence of the landing and progress of Buonaparte in France, I made known this circumstance in a conference with the ministers of Austria, France, Russia, and Prussia, on the 23rd instant, and I enclose the protocol of that conference.

I afterwards took occasion to inform the Russian ministers that I had received your Lordship's instructions regarding the arrangement of the Dutch loan, in consequence of which they stated upon signing the protocol that the Emperor was ready to acknowledge the Prince of Orange as King of the Low Countries.

I enclose the copy of a note which I have since received from Prince Metternich regarding the claims of the Emperor of Austria on the Low Countries, of which I have only acknowledged the receipt, and have referred it to Lord Clancarty and the Dutch ministers here, in order that these claims may be adjusted in the manner settled by your Lordship.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

[853.]

MY LORD,

Vienna, 25th March, 1815.

I have the pleasure of informing you that the affairs of Switzerland are settled, and the Declaration, of which, with the Protocol in the Swiss Commission, I enclose copies, was delivered to the Swiss Deputies three days ago.

Your Lordship will observe that the principal difference between this Declaration and that agreed to by the Swiss Commission previous to your Lordship's departure from Vienna consists in the retention of the valleys of the Valteline, which are to be annexed to the Duchy of Milan, and in the annexation of the Porentrui, as well as of Basle, to the Canton de Berne. The first measure was occasioned by the strong objection of the

inhabitants of the Valteline to become a part of the Canton of the Grisons. They are by local circumstances connected naturally with Italy instead of with Switzerland, and for the last eighteen years they had been a part of the kingdom of Italy. For these reasons, and as the Valteline is a military position of importance to the Austrians for the defence of their dominions in Italy, it was thought expedient that that district should remain attached to the Duchy of Milan.

The principality of Porentrui could not be used, as was intended, to negotiate with France for a cession to Geneva; and as we had obtained by other means a cession from the King of Sardinia for Geneva, it was thought expedient to annex the whole Bishopric of Basle to the Canton de Berne.

The King of Sardinia has agreed to cede a district in the neighbourhood of Geneva, including Caronge, containing about 9000 souls, and connecting the town with some of their detached territories, in exchange for the Genoese Imperial fiefs, to which the Emperor of Austria has ceded his claims. His Majesty has likewise consented to the neutralisation, under the Swiss protection, of the districts of Chablais and of Faucigny. We had hoped that he would likewise cede a district which extends between the Lake and the great road of the Valais; but His Majesty has stated some well-founded objections to making this cession, and I believe we must be satisfied with the cession of Caronge, &c.

The affair of the precedence of Ambassadors is likewise settled, and I will forward your Lordship the protocol by the first messenger.

In consequence of our refusing to agree to any arrangement regarding naval salutes, and explaining that our practice was by no means objectionable, all mention of that point is omitted.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Sir Charles Stuart to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

The Hague, 25th March, 1815.

The rapid succession of events since I had the honour to address your Lordship hardly enables me to keep you regularly apprised of the measures to which the state of things in France has given rise at this Court.

I have letters from General Sir Hudson Lowe, who was empowered by the Prince of Orange to communicate with General Kleist, who commands the Prussian troops at Aix la Chapelle.

The accompanying paper contains the substance of the queries transmitted to that officer, together with the answers which the present state of the force under his command allowed him to return. The means at his disposal are, however, likely to be soon materially augmented, as General Gneisenau has already quitted Berlin, under orders to march to his support with all the corps which are yet in the countries between the Weser and the Rhine.

Their immediate advance is the more necessary, since the spirit which has been manifested among the Saxons at Aix la Chapelle, after the determination of the Congress respecting the fate of Saxony was rendered public, has been very alarming; and as no reliance can be placed on their exertions, it is very desirable that they should be replaced by troops which can be entirely depended upon.

His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge writes me that 10,000 of His Majesty's Hanoverian troops will be assembled between the Ems and the Weser before the end of next week.

Twenty-five thousand Dutch are already on march towards Maestricht and Venloo, and the British army under the command of the Prince of Orange are concentrated in the vicinity of Ath. Ostend is provisioned for four months, and the British magazines are placed at Antwerp.

The Landwehr of this country will be embodied immediately.

The result of Colonel Tripp's journey to Paris with a view to gain intelligence to ascertain the exact state of affairs, and to learn how far any movement upon the frontier might be deemed expedient, having been the expression of a strong desire on the part of the French ministers to bring their quarrel with Buonaparte to an issue without the intervention of foreign assistance, it became necessary to wait for the despatches, of which M. de Capellen was the bearer, and for the declaration signed by the Ministers assembled in Congress on the 13th, before this Court could decide what part to take.

The intelligence they have just received has, however, induced the King to send full powers to his Plenipotentiaries authorizing their immediate and unqualified accession to every measure which the other members of the Alliance, and more especially His Majesty's ministers, may deem expedient; and as Buonaparte's arrival at Paris has now, in a great measure, decided the question, they are at the same time directed to learn for the information of their Court the extent of means which the Allies are determined to bring forward for the re-establishment of a government in France which may be compatible with the tranquillity of Europe. This government relying, however, with more confidence on your counsels than upon the result of the discussions to which the events now passing may give rise, the Dutch Plenipotentiaries are directed to express in the strongest terms the King's anxiety that you should accept the command for which you have been selected in the Low Countries, and that your acceptance should induce you to lose no time in repairing to Brussels.

I have the honour to be, with great truth and respect, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient servant,

CHARLES STUART.

[ENCLOSURE.]

GENERAL KLEIST'S Opinions, expressed in a series of Answers to Queries.

Query.

Suppose Buonaparte to be at present at Lyons, joined by the French army, and to entertain either of the following projects, viz., to endeavour to subvert the government by marching direct to Paris, or to attempt to create a spirit in his favour among the French nation at large by marching against the Allies stationed on this side of the Rhine, and endeavour to force them across the river, preparatory to any changes in the government, what are the means of the Allies, and what would be the best disposition, to resist him in either project, or to disconcert his measures by anticipated arrangements?

Réponse.

Si les Souverains Alliés ont résolu de prêter leur assistance au Roi de France, il paraît qu'il faudrait avant tout s'assurer des deux points de Paris et Nancy : Paris comme le centre de l'opinion publique, qui paralyse en même temps les forteresses du Nord ; et Nancy, qui, comme la capitale de la Lorraine, offre non seulement des ressources immenses pour la guerre, mais paralyse en même temps les forteresses de Metz, Thionville, Verdun, Longwy, et Sansoucies. Pour assurer la sûreté de ces deux corps et ses lignes de communication, la politique dictera si on peut demander du Roi de France les places de Maubeuge, Avesnes, et Soissons, etc., ou d'y placer des garnisons mêlées avec les Français du parti du Roi.

Aussi longtemps que l'armée Prussienne du Bas-Rhin reste dans la défensive, elle sera rassemblée en deux corps :—

1er corps à Juliers, 42 mille hommes.

2e corps à Coblentz, 9 mille infanterie, 1500 cavalerie.

Dans cette position elle devrait attendre les trois cas suivants :—1. L'ennemi se dirige sur Mayence. 2. Il se dirige sur Luxembourg. 3. Il se dirige sur Bruxelles.

Dans ces différents cas l'armée pourroit se diriger avec la plus grande facilité ou sur Mayence, sur Trèves et Luxembourg, ou sur Bruxelles. Il semble que la meilleure position de l'armée de la Belgique (le rassemblement) seroit à Ath ; et si l'ennemi dirige ses forces contre l'Allemagne, entre Bruxelles et Louvain.

Query.

Suppose a part of the French army not in immediate contact with Buonaparte to declare itself for him, and to hoist the tricolor cockade, what measures to be taken by the Prussian and Allied forces opposite to them, no violation of the frontier, however, being attempted by it?

Réponse.

Le Général Comte Kleist donne l'ordre qu'au moment où les troupes Françaises arboreroient la cocarde tricolore, toute communication avec la France cesseroit, et les troupes placeroient des avant-postes sur les frontières comme en guerre.

Query.

Suppose the frontier to be violated, what steps of retaliation to be used?

Réponse.

Alors les avant-postes se replieroient sur les corps de rassemblement.

Sir Charles Stuart to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Hague, 25th March, 1815.

I enclose the accompanying copy of a letter I have just now addressed to Lord Castlereagh.

I have since seen a letter from the Hereditary Prince, dated the 24th, stating that Louis XVIII. had, on the preceding day, quitted Lisle for Courtray, and that His Majesty is now at Bruges.

His Royal Highness adds that Buonaparte has already reached Arras at the head of 14,000 men.

Under these circumstances the Prince of Orange was making arrangements with General Kleist to move forward. His letter does not, however, clearly explain whether it is his intention to cross the French frontier. I should conceive the instructions which he received from Lord Bathurst, dated the 21st, and which positively direct him not to commit any act of hostility against France without an express order from His Majesty's government, would have been received at that time, and would induce him not to pass beyond the limit of the Low Countries.

Believe me, my dear Lord, ever sincerely yours,

CHARLES STUART.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Sir Charles Stuart to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

The Hague, 24th March, 1815.

The moment the news of the arrival of Louis XVIII. and of the Duke of Orleans at Lisle was known at Brussels, His Royal Highness the Prince of Orange thought it expedient to send his aide-de-camp, Baron Tripp, to that fortress, with a letter, repeating the offers which had lately been brought forward through the agency of the same person at Paris.

The resolution of Louis XVIII. to adhere to the principles laid down in the answer he transmitted through his ministers to the Prince of Orange before he quitted Paris is strongly demonstrated in the accompanying letter, which he addressed to His Royal Highness upon this occasion.

General Count Maison having been deserted by the whole of the force which, under his orders, had covered the retreat of the King towards the departments on the frontier, has sought refuge at Brussels. This officer states that he has every reason to believe Buonaparte will move at the head of all the troops he can collect without loss of time in the direction of Lisle, but that he will not be able just at present to bring forward a larger force than 40,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry, though it is probable that number may be materially increased after a short delay.

As I have reason to think that, under these circumstances, symptoms of disaffection have appeared in some of the towns near the frontier, I shall leave the Hague to-morrow on my way to Brussels.

I have, &c.,

CHARLES STUART.

II.

Louis XVIII. to the Prince of Orange.

MON COUSIN,

Lisle, 23 Mars, 1815.

Je suis bien sensible aux sentimens que vous m'exprimez et aux offres que vous voulez bien me faire. J'avais déjà chargé le Comte de Blacas de vous en remercier de ma part, et je suis très aise de vous répéter que c'est avec confiance et sécurité que je vois les armées de mes alliés sur les frontières de mes états, que j'espère qu'elles n'entreront point en France, et que je compte d'ailleurs sur mes traités avec eux, et sur les nouveaux engagements qu'ils viennent de prendre, pour assurer la tranquillité de l'Europe et l'indépendance de la France.

Je n'ai pas cru devoir faire entrer le Baron de Tripp dans cette place, quelque plaisir que j'eusse eu à le voir. Je lui envoie cette lettre, et je vous prie d'être bien certain des sentimens d'attachement sincère avec lesquels je suis, mon Cousin,

De Votre Altesse Royale le très affectionné Cousin,

LOUIS.

Sir Charles Stuart to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Brussels, 25th March, 1815.

I have the honour to transmit for your Lordship's information the copy of a letter I have received from Baron de Nagell respecting the continued communication between Condé and a village on this side the frontier.

I have the honour to be, with great truth and respect, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient servant,

CHARLES STUART.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Baron de Nagell to Sir Charles Stuart.

Bruxelles, ce 24 Mai, 1815.

J'ai l'honneur de communiquer à Votre Excellence la copie d'un rapport fait à Son Excellence le Baron de Capellen, et de soumettre à sa sagesse s'il convient d'en donner connaissance à son Excellence M. le Feld-Maréchal Duc de Wellington.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur voudra bien me permettre de lui renouveler l'assurance, etc.

A. W. C. DE NAGELL.

La facilité avec laquelle la communication a existé jusqu'à présent, malgré les ordres de Votre Majesté, entre la France et ce pays, par l'intermédiaire de Condé et de Peruwelz, petite ville des Pays-Bas : les voitures y vont et y viennent aussi facilement qu'il y a deux mois.

Il paraît que le poste d'Hanovriens qui s'y trouve n'a pas reçu jusqu'à présent d'ordre d'empêcher la communication, et qu'il n'en a envoyé également aucun au maire (homme très estimé d'ailleurs), lequel n'a appris que la communication était interrompue que le dix-huit en se rendant à Tournay.

Il n'est pas douteux que ce point n'ait servi de moyen à la circulation de

beaucoup de personnes suspectes et dangereuses, et peut-être aussi à la désertion et à l'envoi en France de chevaux et de munitions.

[The Adjutant-General to give orders to our outposts, firstly, that no person is to be allowed to pass out of the country without a passport signed by me, or by M. de Nagell, or Baron Capellen; secondly, that all persons attempting to pass in are to be sent to the police at Brussels, reporting their names and qualities to head-quarters.

WELLINGTON.]

Colonel Scovell to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Chaddesden, near Derby, 25th March, 1815.

I should be wanting in gratitude if I lost a moment in offering to your Grace my services, such as they are; nor will any event give me greater pleasure than to find myself once more under your command in any situation you may think me qualified to fill.

Believe me, my Lord, to be most sincerely and truly

Your obedient servant,

G. SCOVELL.

[I shall be happy to have him, and will write to him when I shall have looked a little more about me.

WELLINGTON.]

General C. Colville to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Bath, 25th March, 1815.

Having now attained that proud object of my ambition, the dignity of a Knight of the First Class of the Order of the Bath, I cannot refrain from troubling your Grace with the knowledge of the gratification it has afforded to myself and family, and to many others who have had the kindness to feel interested in my success in this particular; for although your Grace, when first, in Paris, you gave me hopes of obtaining this honour, most obligingly told me that I should owe it to myself alone, I cannot less feel my weight of obligation to the Commander who has upon every occasion so favourably brought forward the notice of my conduct in the line of service I have had the good fortune to be engaged upon.

It is no small part of my gratification, I assure your Grace, that of the reward conferred upon me I shall have many participators among those whom I have at different times had the happiness to command in the army under your orders, conceiving as I do that they will feel this honour as reflecting upon themselves.

I cannot better express myself than in the words of my Lord Bathurst when communicating the Prince Regent's gracious intentions: "I would to God it had not been upon such a vacancy" that I am advanced to this dignity; but existing as it unfortunately does, I have a pleasure in mentioning to your Grace a letter to me from the late Sir Edward Pakenham upon the occasion of his own appointment to a Red Ribbon, and which I have communicated to Lord Bathurst in the idea that it would be satisfactory to him to see, that had our most gallant and liberal-minded friend possessed the power of appointing his successor, he would perhaps have been the very person who has become such.

Permit me now, my Lord, to say, that in the prospects opened by the late unfortunate events in France, I hope it will not be long before I have the honour of again serving under your Grace's immediate command.

I have the honour to be with the highest respect, my Lord,
Your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

CHARLES COLVILLE.

[I am very much obliged to him for his letter, and sincerely congratulate him on receiving his well deserved honours.

WELLINGTON.]

[854.]

To Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD,

Vienna, 26th March, 1815.

I have received your letter of the 28th February, regarding the Order of the Bath, and I am quite at a loss what to recommend upon it. I don't think it advisable to add to the number of 180, because you will observe that for every officer of the army you add, one of the navy will be added likewise, neither can you alter the list.

My own opinion is, that your rule was originally defective in the allowing of the appointment of Colonels with fewer medals than Lieutenant-Colonels; and the application of it has been erroneous in every rank. Some very worthless fellows have got the Order, and others highly meritorious have been left out. Some, it appears, of the rank of Colonel and Lieutenant-Colonel are not qualified; but there are deserving General officers who are qualified whose names have been omitted, and the names of others included who really deserve very little.

However, I am afraid it is impossible to apply any remedy now.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Foreign Office, 26th March, 1815.

I have had a full communication with Lord Melville upon your Grace's despatch relative to Antwerp. The Board of Admiralty are entirely satisfied with the precautions your Grace proposes to adopt, and are by no means desirous of pressing Admiral Martin's suggestion with respect to the destruction of the Basin, the effectuating of which they conceive would not, in a naval point of view, compensate for the expense and odium necessarily attendant upon such a measure.

I have the honour to be, with great truth and respect, my Lord,

Your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 26th March, 1815, at Night.

I have nothing material to add to my letter. We wait with impatience for intelligence from all quarters. The great question is, can the Bourbons get Frenchmen to fight *for them* against Frenchmen? If they can, Europe may soon turn the tide in their favour; and the process of fermentation once begun, they may create real partisans instead of criers of "Vive le Roi!" and doers of nothing.

If we are to undertake the job, we must leave nothing to chance. It must be done upon the largest scale. With Mayence, Luxembourg, and Lisle, you start on *solid* grounds, and no fortresses in the rear to blockade as before; but you must inundate France with force in all directions. If Buonaparte could turn the tide, there is no calculating upon his *élan*; and we must always recollect that Poland, Saxony, and much Jacobinism are in our rear.

I wish you would turn in your mind the principles to be acted upon in France. The applying those you acted upon in the south is out of the question to the force you will now command of all nations. The utmost we could attempt would be to be honest ourselves, and this would only make our allies more odious. My notion is that France must pay the price of her own deliverance; that the King should consider the Allied troops as auxiliaries; that the revenues should be received by his officers, and afterwards be appropriated in a just ratio between his native and foreign troops; that every corps should be accompanied by a French ordonnateur, through whom all requisitions for forage and subsistence should be made, the value to be paid in *bons*, the liquidation of which should be assured upon a peace, either in whole or in the greater proportion at the expense of the French government. Unless some system of this sort is agreed upon, the war will either degenerate, as it did last year, into an indiscriminate and destructive pillage, or *we* shall be bankrupts and driven out of the field in three months. I know the difficulties of what I suggest; but the alternative in the less objectionable sense leads at once to impossibilities and ruin.

Pray consider whether the territorial acquisitions of Austria must not be

reduced into articles. I think she cannot rest her title merely upon the secret and very general article in the Treaty of Paris.

I am, my dear Lord, ever yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

We long to hear of you in Flanders.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Foreign Office, 26th March, 1815.

I enclose for your Grace's information copy of a despatch addressed to Sir Charles Stuart, in which are sufficiently explained the grounds upon which this temporary arrangement of the mission to the King of France has been made.

Your Grace can best judge of the means that can be brought forward, as well as the measures that should be adopted, in pursuance of the decisions taken at Vienna. If Lisle has been saved for the moment, it is of the last importance to preserve it to the King. With this view an authority has been given to the Prince of Orange, upon His Majesty's requisition, to furnish 8000 Hanoverians to assist in garrisoning it.

It is curious to observe in the *Moniteur* of the 22nd, that almost the first act done by Buonaparte, on his return to the Tuileries, was creating Carnot a Count *for his defence of Antwerp*.

Whilst I am writing to your Grace upon the security of the Low Countries, I think it right to mention some intelligence which I received this day, the truth of which may deserve your investigation. The substance was, that Buonaparte had taken measures for introducing a number of officers into the Belgic levies, and amongst others some Poles, from whose influence he hoped they would be induced to join his standard.

The Duke de Feltre estimates the French army at 200,000 men, and thinks Buonaparte may be able to assemble 60,000 men on the side of Lisle and Valenciennes without much delay. Trogoff, who arrived last, says he understood his troops were already defiling in that direction.

I have the honour to be, with great truth and respect,

My Lord,

Your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Viscount Castlereagh to Sir C. Stuart.

SIR,

Foreign Office, 26th March, 1815.

Although the intelligence received of His Most Christian Majesty's arrival at Tournay is not yet considered as official, the Prince Regent has nevertheless deemed it of importance to lose no time, especially being informed of the detention of the corps diplomatique at Paris, to accredit a suitable representative near His Majesty's person.

His Royal Highness, under these circumstances, has directed me to forward to your Excellency the accompanying credentials. The vicinity of the King of France's position to the present seat of the King of the Netherlands' government at Brussels, the Prince Regent persuades himself, will permit of your Excellency's being thus accredited for the moment without inconvenience to both Sovereigns. Your experience of the affairs of France, and your subsequent acquaintance with those of the Netherlands, cannot fail under present circumstances to be productive of great advantage to the combined interests of both Sovereigns. Should Lord FitzRoy Somerset be permitted to join the King, his Lordship will stand in the same relation to your Excellency which he did to the Duke of Wellington when at Paris till further orders, unless, upon the assumption of the command in the Low Countries by his Grace, he should think fit to call upon Lord FitzRoy to resume the functions of his Military Secretary.

I am happy to find that your Excellency's Secretary of Embassy, Mr. James, has arrived at the Hague. If in the execution of this temporary service you should deem Mr. Gordon's services useful, I shall direct him on his way to Vienna (for which place he leaves town in a few days) to place himself at your Excellency's disposal, leaving it to you to send him to his destination whenever his presence can be dispensed with.

On presenting your letters of credence to the King of France, you will renew to His Majesty on the part of the Prince Regent those assurances of cordial and unshaken attachment which His Royal Highness so sincerely feels. The Prince Regent awaits with impatience the development of the events now in progress; and as soon as he receives a full communication of the views and sentiments of His Majesty and of the Sovereigns assembled at Vienna, he will lose no time in taking such a determination upon the existing state of affairs as the security of Europe and the preservation of the general interests may dictate.

I hope the Duke of Wellington may be expected to arrive at Brussels soon after this despatch. I beg your Excellency will so regulate the messenger's journey as to afford the best chance of meeting his Grace on the road.

The accounts received to-day speak favourably of the public spirit in the western departments, and that a considerable force is forming there in support of the King's cause. The south also is represented as extremely well disposed. Should these reports be confirmed, we may hope that Buonaparte will not be enabled to draw much resource in men and money from the country beyond the Loire. I doubt, however, their capacity to act offensively being such as to divert materially his attention from the north, towards which I understand all the troops near Paris have been put in motion; Buonaparte meaning himself to follow them as soon as a force sufficient to act with effect is assembled. His first object will be to secure the fortresses, if possible Lisle, and to complete the corruption of the troops which still adhere to the King.

I long to hear that the Prussians are advancing, and that an adequate force is likely soon to be brought together, not only to protect the Low Countries against an irruption, but to support whatever plans may be settled at Vienna. The safety of Lisle is an object of the last importance.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Viscount Castlereagh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 27th March, 1815.

It is to be presumed, in the hurry of their departure, the Foreign Office at Paris has not been stripped by the King's Ministers of any of its contents, and consequently that our secret treaty with France and Austria, as well as all Prince Talleyrand's correspondence, will fall into Buonaparte's hands. He will of course try to turn this to account, first, in privately sowing discord, and if he fails in this, he will expose the whole in the *Moniteur*.

I have desired Sir C. Stuart to ascertain from Blacas how the fact stands, and leave it to your judgment to take such steps as you deem most suitable for counteracting any unfavourable impression.

I flatter myself, after all he knew long since, it cannot produce any unfavourable impression on the Emperor of Russia's mind. He must feel assured that the whole grew out of differences now settled, and a most indiscreet declaration of Prince Hardenberg's. The treaty is upon the face of it purely defensive, and all our proceedings since have proved this beyond a doubt.

In haste, ever yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

The King of Naples to the Grand Duke of Tuscany.

MONSIEUR MON FRÈRE,

Ancône, ce 27 Mars, 1815.

On m'annonce que Votre Altesse Impériale s'éloigne de la Toscane, et on assigne pour motif de son départ le mouvement de mes troupes que j'ai jugé nécessaire de faire avancer sur le Po. N'ayant eu en aucun circonstance avec Votre Altesse Impériale que des relations amicales, je ne puis me persuader qu'elle ait considéré mes troupes comme ennemies, et qu'elle ait cru devoir quitter ses états parcequ'elles devaient s'en approcher. Si je pouvais penser qu'une telle idée ait pu entrer dans votre esprit, je m'empresserai de rassurer Votre Altesse Impériale, en lui déclarant que je n'eus jamais aucun motif ni aucun projet d'hostilité contre la Toscane, et même qu'il était dans mes intentions de ne pas faire passer mes troupes dans ce pays si Votre Altesse Impériale y fut restée. Dans les circonstances actuelles il ne serait pas sans danger que la Toscane restât privée de la présence de son Souverain. Le pays abandonné aux intrigues et aux passions qui s'agitent de toutes parts pourrait devenir un théâtre de désordre. Comme j'ai le plus grand intérêt à prévenir tout ce qui pourrait en ce moment troubler la tranquillité de l'Italie Méridionale, j'ose prier Votre Altesse Impériale de rentrer à Florence, et je la préviens que si mon invitation demeurerait sans effet je pouvais me trouver dans la nécessité de faire occuper militairement la Toscane, afin de la préserver des troubles qui pourraient s'y élever.

Le parti auquel Votre Altesse Impériale s'est déterminée m'a d'autant plus vivement affecté qu'il paraît concerté avec celui qu'a pris le Pape.

Je ne peux dissimuler à Votre Altesse Impériale que l'absence des deux Souverains dont les états se forment des pays qui vont se trouver entre mon

royaume et mon armée pourrait me forcer à des mesures extraordinaires, que je voudrais éviter.

Sur ce je prie Dieu qu'il vous ait, Monsieur mon frère, en son sainte et digne garde.

Votre bon frère,

JOACHIM NAPOLEON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

The Grand Duke of Tuscany to the King of Naples.

Florence, 2 Aprile, 1815.

La lettera di cui V.M. si è dagnata onorarmi ne 27 corrente mi è pervenuta per mezzo del Ministro di Inghilterra, non prima di questo giorno. Essa mi ha trovata in Firenze, ed io non ho mai creduto che le truppe di V.M. fossero per tonare i miei stati. Ho gradito sommamente la dichiarazione che ella ha la bonta di fare sull'immunità de mio territorio che io non ho attualmente occasione di abbandonare. Questa dichiarazione puo servire a dissipare che potessero essersi sparsi tra i miei sudditi, i quali prendono interesse a tutto ciò che mi rigarde. Tio adunque se ne possero le maggiori obbligazioni.

Prince Talleyrand's Answer to a Note addressed to him by the Ambassadors at the Congress, renewing the engagements of the Treaty of Chaumont.

Vienne, le 27 Mars, 1815.

Le soussigné, Ministre et Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Très Chrétienne, ayant le département des Affaires Etrangères, a reçu la note que leurs Excellences Messieurs les Ambassadeurs représentant au Congrès les Puissances signataires du Traité de Chaumont lui ont fait l'honneur de lui adresser, en lui communiquant le Traité de Vienne du 25 de ce mois, par lequel les engagements contractés par le Traité de Chaumont susdit sont renouvelés dans la vue de préserver la France en particulier, et l'Europe en général, des suites que pourroit avoir l'invasion de Buonaparte, et de maintenir l'ordre des choses établi par le traité du 30 Mai, 1814.

Le soussigné prie leurs Excellences d'agréer tous ses remerciements de la communication qu'elles ont bien voulu lui faire. Il s'empressera de la faire parvenir à Sa Majesté Très Chrétienne ; mais il a dès à présent l'honneur de leur annoncer qu'il se trouve suffisamment autorisé par la teneur de ses instructions à adhérer, au nom de Sa Majesté Très Chrétienne, à toutes et chacunes des stipulations contenues dans le susdit traité du 25 de ce mois, lesquelles seront exécutées de la part de Sa dite Majesté dans toute la latitude des moyens dont les circonstances lui permettront de disposer.

Le soussigné a l'honneur de renouveler à leurs Excellences l'assurance de sa haute considération.

LE PRINCE DE TALLEYRAND.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Communication of the Treaty concluded at Congress to the Prince de Talleyrand.

Vienne, le 27 Mars, 1815.

Les soussignés ont l'honneur de communiquer à Son Altesse Monsieur le Prince de Talleyrand un traité qu'ils viennent de conclure, dans le but de con-

sacrer par un acte solennel les décisions que leurs augustes Souverains ont jugé à propos de prendre à la suite de l'invasion de Buonaparte en France.

Cet engagement prouvera à Sa Majesté Très Chrétienne leur invariable résolution de combattre de tous leurs moyens l'ennemi qui vient de troubler de nouveau la tranquillité de la France et de l'Europe. Ils sont chargés d'inviter le Roi à vouloir bien adhérer à ce traité, et prient en conséquence Monsieur le Prince de Talleyrand de faire immédiatement parvenir à Sa Majesté cette communication.

Les soussignés saisissent avec empressement cette occasion de renouveler à Son Altesse Monsieur le Prince de Talleyrand l'assurance de leur haute considération.

HARDENBERG.

HUMBOLDT.

METTERNICH.

NESELRODE.

RASOUMOFFSKY.

WELLINGTON.

WESSENBERG.

Sir C. Stuart to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Brussels, 27th March, 1815.

The statement in the letter from the Prince of Orange, to which I referred in my last, announcing the march of Buonaparte at the head of 15,000 men to Arras, turns out to be unfounded: he certainly had not quitted Paris on the 24th.

The information of General Maison enumerated the different corps at his disposition from the *livret* of the French army; and the assurances of the Duke of Orleans, with whom I had a very long conversation this morning, confirm my belief that 50,000 men is the utmost extent of force he can bring forward in the first moment: but the error of the Bourbons in leaving 36,000,000 of crowns at Paris, and the subsequent capture at St. Omer's of three fourgons, containing the crown jewels and a sum in gold, amounting together to nearly as much more, which Louis XVIII. was endeavouring to send to England, give him resources in money which I do not believe he has been able to command at any former period.

The Duke of Orleans is convinced that he cannot, under any time or circumstances of preparation, bring more than 150,000 men into the field.

As the strength of the force to which he is opposed must depend in a great measure upon the time which is allowed for the reinforcements which arrive daily, I have strongly urged the Prince of Orange to confine his present measures to the establishment of a system of cooperation with the Prussians and Dutch, and to avoid the commencement of hostilities under circumstances which may lead to unconnected efforts, committing government at a risk which no probable advantage can justify. Matters will, therefore, remain in their present state at this head quarters until your Lordship's arrival.

The reorganization of the Maison du Roi in the provinces of Belgium, which has been recommended by the Duke de Berry, is not, I understand, encouraged by the Prince of Orange, and the tendency of such a measure to increase the hostility of the garrisons on the frontier leaves no cause, if I am rightly informed, to regret their absence.

Louis XVIII. is at Ostend, Monsieur is at Ghent, the Duke de Berry and Prince de Condé at Brussels, and the Duke d'Orléans is gone to England.

FitzRoy Somerset is still at Paris; but no one has heard from him either here or in England.

The King of the Netherlands comes here the day after to-morrow.

Believe me, my dear Lord, yours most faithfully,

CHARLES STUART.

To the Comte de Nesselrode.

[855.]

SIR,

Vienna, 28th March, 1815.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I have received the following instruction from Lord Viscount Castlereagh regarding the Russian debt in Holland: "If you can effect this," viz., have a treaty signed, placing, by an early ratification, all arrangements already agreed upon out of the reach of doubt, "you may give the Emperor of Russia, in conjunction with the Dutch plenipotentiary, an assurance in writing that the half of the Dutch loan, under the regulations as agreed upon, will be defrayed by us and the Sovereign of the Netherlands."

"I suggest a written assurance to remove doubts, considering that the minor details of the measure as to interest, sinking-fund, &c., can be best negotiated here in communication with the Treasury."

I request your Excellency therefore to give directions to His Imperial Majesty's Ambassador in London to enter upon a negotiation on this subject with His Majesty's and the Dutch minister under the regulations as agreed upon with your Excellency.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Prince Metternich.

[856.]

SIR, .

Vienna, 28th March, 1815.

I have had the honour of receiving your Highness's note, in which you have enclosed me the copy of a letter of the 21st March from Marshal Bellegarde, and one of the 20th March from Lord W. Bentinck, in consequence of which I have

written a letter to Lord W. Bentinck, of which I enclose your Highness the copy.*

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Sir Charles Stuart to Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Brussels, 28th March, 1815.

The possibility of embarrassment arising from the knowledge of His Royal Highness the Prince of Orange's offers of succour to Louis XVIII., or from acts of hostility taking place before the instructions of His Majesty's government could reach Brussels, induced me to address His Royal Highness the letters of which I enclose copies on the first alarm occasioned by the different reports from the frontier.

Not having, however, succeeded in dissipating the uneasiness of the Dutch government, I determined to comply with the wishes of Baron de Nagell, and to proceed without delay to Brussels.

I accordingly arrived here yesterday, and as far as I have been able to ascertain the dispositions which have been adopted by the Prince of Orange, I find matters in the best state which the means at his command will admit.

Although a system of perfect good intelligence is otherwise established with General Kleist, the proposal of that officer to pass the Meuse and to occupy the district between that river, the Sambre, and the French frontier has not been admitted. The left bank of the Meuse, opposite Namur, is therefore the extreme point of the Prince's cantonments.

The whole British and Hanoverian force, with the exception of the troops which are necessary in the garrisons, are thrown forward so near the frontier as to cover the country, and to afford protection against any movement which Buonaparte may venture to make until the arrival of succours from England shall permit measures of farther precaution.

Although the Prussian Minister at the Hague has, I find, attempted to give General Kleist a control over the Dutch troops marching towards the Meuse, which would in some measure have separated them from the Anglo-Hanoverian army under the Prince of Orange, I have reason to believe that his suggestions upon that subject have not been listened to either by the Dutch government or the Prussian General officers: I cannot therefore think that this proposition, more than the refusal of the Prince to allow the Prussians to cross the Meuse, will disturb the good understanding which is so essential to success at the commencement of a campaign.

The French Princes who have taken refuge in this country have been exceedingly desirous to avail themselves of these circumstances to reorganize the military household of Louis XVIII. to enable them to act in concert with the Allied armies on the frontier. The results which are to be expected when the intelligence of this measure shall transpire in France, and the experience of the mischief which the existence of such a corps

* See *Wellington Despatches*, 1st edition, vol. xii. p. 284.

occasioned to the Bourbon cause before the emigration of the Royal Family, I think justify the determination of the government of this country in not countenancing the undertaking.

Antwerp is in part provisioned for four months, and I understand that the magazines will be completed for that period in ten days at furthest. As the artillery which is wanted at Tournay has not arrived from England, heavy guns have been sent forward from the former fortress, which it is probable will be mounted this day on the works of that town. This artillery must be replaced at Antwerp by the guns originally intended for the destination of Tournay.

I have, &c.,

CHARLES STUART.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Sir Charles Stuart to the Prince of Orange.

SIR,

The Hague, 21st March, 1815.

I have been honoured with your Royal Highness's letter of the 18th, making known the arrangements which your Royal Highness had deemed expedient to enable the combined army to take the field, in case the progress of public affairs in France should menace the safety of the Low Countries.

I am to acquaint your Royal Highness that these measures will be seconded by every possible exertion on the part of the King's government, who have issued orders for the provisioning of Antwerp and Ostend for four months, and for the immediate departure of the artillery to be placed at Ypres, Ostend, and Tournay.

I cannot better explain to your Royal Highness the opinions of His Majesty's government respecting any movement into France on the part of the Allied and British troops, than by reference to the instructions transmitted from Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Wellington and Lord FitzRoy Somerset, which express the hope that His Most Christian Majesty will feel the importance of not prematurely seeking the aid of foreign troops, especially if the magnitude of the force is not such as unconnectedly to render effectual service.

Under these circumstances your Royal Highness will, I am convinced, see the propriety of maintaining a strict silence upon the subject of M. Tripp's and General Fagel's communications with M. de Blacas respecting the movements of the army under your Royal Highness's command.

On receiving the first accounts of Buonaparte's progress to Lyons I lost no time in recommending the Duke of Cambridge to adopt every measure which circumstances should permit to put the remaining corps of the Hanoverian army into movement, so that they might be enabled to co-operate with the British, Dutch, and Prussians, if events should require ; and His Royal Highness informs me, under date the 18th March, that orders have been issued for the immediate assembly of 10,000 men between the Ems and Weser, who will be ready to take the field about the 27th or 28th.

I have, &c.,

CHARLES STUART.

II.

Sir Charles Stuart to the Prince of Orange.

SIR,

The Hague, 25th March, 1815.

The arrival of the packet from England having brought me instructions for the guidance of my conduct in the present emergency, dated the 22nd of this month, it is very necessary that I should lose no time in laying before your Royal Highness the sentiments of His Majesty's government respecting the present circumstances of the moment, as the important question of peace or war may in some measure depend upon the dispositions of the army under your command.

In despatches, dated the 21st, Lord Bathurst and Lord Castlereagh distinctly observe that although they consider it highly expedient every measure of precaution which can contribute to the security and protection of the frontier should be adopted without delay, yet it is particularly desirable that I should, under no circumstances, recommend an actual invasion of the French territory or a recourse to hostilities until I receive further instructions from His Majesty's government. Although I consider your Royal Highness's intention of moving forward in co-operation with the Prussian army under General Kleist to be the result of a determination to occupy the positions *within* the Belgic frontier which military experience may point out to be advisable, the serious consequences of any offensive measure before the above-mentioned instructions of His Majesty's government shall be known impose upon me the duty of preventing any possible misconception by addressing the present communication to your Royal Highness.

I have, &c.,

CHARLES STUART.

*Un Mot sur le Retour de Napoléon Buonaparte à Paris.**

Le retour subite de cet homme extraordinaire a paru si étonnant par sa rapidité, la facilité avec laquelle il est remonté sur un trône qu'il venait à peine de quitter nous a paru si singulier, que notre première pensée nous a induit à croire qu'il avait été appelé par un parti, et que même son chemin a été jollonné par quelques agents fidèles.

Je partageais cette opinion lorsque je suis arrivé au milieu de ce peuple léger, qui, changeant de mœurs et d'habitudes à chaque oscillation politique, n'est jamais si près d'abandonner l'objet de ses affections que lorsqu'il lui renouvelle serment de fidélité.

J'ai retrouvé sur la scène les mêmes hommes que depuis l'aurore de la Révolution de ce pays ont tour à tour détruits et érigés les divers pouvoirs ou factions qui ont successivement gouverné la France depuis 25 ans, et qui enfin, après avoir servi Napoléon Buonaparte, ont été les machinateurs les plus actifs de sa destruction. A la vérité il s'étoit séparé d'eux depuis quelques années ; et comme aucune ne trouvoit de sécurité pour l'avenir au

* Malta, 6th Nov., 1815.

I certify the following to be a true copy made by me from a paper in the handwriting of Lieutenant-General Savary, and which I returned to him.

FRED. HANKEY, Lieutenant-Colonel.

milieu des agitations continuelles d'une conscience surchargée, ils ont tant faits qu'ils se sont rendus nécessaires au rétablissement de la dynastie des Bourbons, aux malheurs de laquelle ils avoient si puissamment contribués dans des époques antérieures. Ils comptent sur un oubli du passé, mais par précaution ils auront quelques nouvelles intrigues prêtes à faire jouer contre la légitimité de leur Souverain, s'il ose songer à faire examiner leur conduite. Ils veulent qu'il en soit en ceci comme du mystère de la Trinité, hors de la portée de l'intelligence humaine.

Je n'ai pas perdu mon temps à Paris. Pendant mon séjour j'ai vu des hommes de bien des opinions différentes, et il faut l'avouer fort peu qui m'avait paru avoir une confiance entière dans un avenir paisible. Les uns et les autres m'ont parlé avec tant de bonne foi de ce qui a précédé et suivi le retour de Buonaparte, qu'ils m'ont rangé de leurs opinions. D'après ce qu'ils m'ont raconté de cette hardie entreprise ils sont convaincus que Buonaparte n'avoit aucun intelligence ni aucun point de contact avec la France, pas même avec les personnes qui lui conservoient le plus sincère attachement ; et je tiens de quelqu'un qui étoit à l'île d'Elbe avec lui, qu'effectivement il s'y plaignoit quelques fois de cet état d'abandon et d'oubli. Mais il fit rien pour leur donner de ses nouvelles, ni en avoir des leurs. Il recevoit exactement les journaux Français ; son habitude de les lire, et de juger de l'état de l'opinion d'après eux, étoit resté le même, et il forma la sienne sur l'état dans lequel devoit être les esprits en France, par la lecture des actes du gouvernement ; et enfin, pour me servir des expressions de sa compagnon de sa retraite, "son agent à Paris étoit le *Moniteur*."

Au mois de Novembre, 1814, il commença à se former à Paris une opposition manifeste au système que les Bourbons vouloient ramener en France. Plusieurs attentes maladroites, portée soit à la liberté personnelle ou à la réputation de quelques individus, alarmaient la tranquillité de tous, et furent le prétexte que l'on saisit pour commencer à se mettre en défense. On ne se voyoit pas encore, mais en se rencontrant on se comprenoit à l'œil ou à demi mots.

Il y a en France trop d'hommes expérimentés en révolution, et accoutumés à tâter le pouls à l'opinion, pour n'avoir pas observé l'état de l'atmosphère politique : dans cette circonstance ils commencèrent dès lors à songer à eux-mêmes, parcequ'une fois que l'on est mis sur l'avant-scène comme ils sont fait, il y auroit dû danger pour eux à vouloir rentrer dans la coulisse, où des rivaux ne manqueroient pas d'aller les atteindre pour les mettre dans l'impossibilité de nuire à leurs projets.

Cet état de l'opinion en France faisoit chaque jour des progrès, et à la fin de Décembre la famille royale étoit le sujet des plaisanteries universelles, d'un manque de respect, et en un mot sur une pente de déclinaison dans laquelle non seulement il ne lui étoit possible de s'arrêter, mais, au contraire, qui prenoit sensiblement de l'accélération.

Les machinateurs de révolution observoient attentivement cet état de choses, et activoient ou retardoient leurs mouvements selon qu'ils pouvoient le faire plus ou moins sans danger.

En partant pour le Congrès de Vienne, M. de Talleyrand avoit emmené avec lui, en personnel, les moyens d'être en communication exacte avec les différentes coteries qui alloient se former de toutes parts à Paris, et il avoit laissé à Paris ceux d'être informé de même à Vienne de tout ce qui lui

deviendrait nécessaire d'apprendre. Il ne tarda donc pas à connaître tout le progrès que faisoit l'opposition; et comme de loin les objets grossissent toujours, il se laissa facilement persuader qu'il feroit des vains efforts pour soutenir une maison au retour de laquelle il avoit été forcé de consentir contre son propre intérêt; qu'il lui seroit plus avantageux de se ranger du côté de la majorité absolue, laquelle étoit décidée à tout tenter pour obtenir la Régence; parcequ'enfin il auroit encore la gloire d'avoir par son habileté amené le changement qui au fond étoit son premier projet.

Tout ce qu'on écrivoit de Paris sur l'état de la France étoit unanime, et il ne s'agissoit plus que de savoir du quel côté on feroit crouler l'édifice, et comment on s'y prendroit.

Les faiseurs se préparent donc à édifier un nouvel ouvrage. Il y avoit à Vienne, avec M. de Talleyrand, le Duc d'Alberg. C'étoit ordinairement lui qui alloit porter les communications ambiguës, et en général tout ce qui étoit hors des bienséances; on s'inquiétoit peu des mauvais succès qu'il pouvoit avoir, mais en bon serviteur il faisoit hommage à celui qui l'employoit de toutes les bonnes fortunes qui lui survenoit.

J'ai appris à Paris, et M. Fouché le disoit assez haut, que depuis longtemps avant le retour de Buonaparte il avoit une correspondance suivie avec M. de Metternich; l'on m'a même fait voir quelqu'un de ses amis que l'avoit lue. M. Fouché disoit qu'il ne s'occupoit de rien, lorsqu'il reçoit directement une ouverture de M. de Metternich: elle étoit claire, et si positive que l'on ne pouvoit se méprendre sur la nature des relations qui étoient établies à Vienne par le canal du Duc d'Alberg, à côté de celles qu'on y traitoit officiellement avec les pouvoirs du Roi de France.

Quelque ait été la conviction morale de M. Fouché sur ce point, il ne voulut cependant pas répondre à cette ouverture avant d'être plus amplement informé, et c'est après qu'on l'eut satisfait qu'il commença à mettre la main à l'œuvre.

La nature des propositions de M. de Metternich étoit précise. Il les posoit en trois questions, dont les réponses doivent lui faire connaître l'état de l'opinion en France. Celle des trois sur laquelle il insistoit particulièrement étoit relative au rétablissement du jeune N. sous la régence de sa mère. Cette idée plaisoit généralement en France; aussi la réponse de M. Fouché fut favorable. Il s'établit depuis lors un commerce de lettres à ce sujet, desquelles M. Fouché tiroit toutes sortes d'arguments qu'il jetoit dans le monde, tout en préparant l'exécution du projet dont il devenoit le cheville ouvrier.

La classe des artisans à Paris étoit dans une extrême indigence, et offroit beaucoup de moyens de soulèvement. L'armée professoit hautement ses principes, et son attachement pour Buonaparte. C'est dans ces deux éléments que M. Fouché chercha les moyens d'exécution. Paris étoit rempli de généraux de toutes les armées; il fit pratiquer ceux comme pour être doués d'une grande bravoure personnelle, et à la fois susceptibles d'être électrisés; il en eut beaucoup plus qu'il ne lui en falloit, et c'est par là qu'il prépara dans toutes les divisions militaires un mouvement qui devoit partir comme l'électricité même.

Tout étoit prêt pour agir lorsqu'il fut dans l'obligation de prendre quelques confidants pour composer une commission du gouvernement, qui seroit devenu indispensablement nécessaire immédiatement après la chute des

Bourbons. C'est dès ce moment que son projet commença à devenir épineux, et effectivement parmi les collaborateurs qu'il s'associa il y eut de la diversité d'opinion. Mais il les ramena à la sienne en leur disant que le seul moyen d'arriver à avoir l'Empereur, comme ils le désiroient, c'étoit de commencer par la régence, parceque le fils sauroit bien ramener le père. Les persuada-t-il ? ou eux-mêmes prirent la résolution de le tromper, et de profiter de tout ce qu'il avoit déjà fait dans le but de tourner le tout au bénéfice de Buonaparte.

C'est ce qu'on n'a pu me dire, mais les choses étoient d'accord, et l'on n'attendoit plus qu'une réponse de Vienne pour commencer, lorsque tout-à-coup Napoléon Buonaparte débarqua à Cannes ! Il se fait précéder de proclamations, et du bruit que sa femme et son fils viennent le joindre si bien, que tout le monde le crut. Est-ce une inspiration qu'il a eu ? Le fait est que le langage étoit si conforme à celui que tenoit les gens de M. Fouché, que tout le monde lui fit les compliments d'un événement dont il étoit intérieurement fort mécontent.

Les bruits de l'arrivée de la femme et du fils de Buonaparte lui firent soupçonner qu'il avoit été joué par Talleyrand, qu'il supposoit s'être servi de lui pour tout préparer, et ensuite avoir fait prévenir Buonaparte à l'Ile d'Elbe qu'il n'y avoit plus qu'à se montrer. Il étoit d'autant plus porté à croire que Talleyrand ne laisseroit pas échapper l'occasion d'entrer en grâce avec Napoléon, qu'il les avoit fort mécontent des Bourbons. C'est ce qui décida Fouché à faire commencer le mouvement des troupes lorsqu'il sent Buonaparte à Lyon. Le mouvement eut lieu, et Fouché arriva au château des Tuileries au secours du vainqueur, en lui disant qu'il n'avoit pas perdu de temps à ordonner aux troupes de marcher, afin que s'il avoit rencontré quelques obstacles en chemin il eut trouvé de suite de quoi les lever. Buonaparte eut l'air de le croire, ainsi Fouché fut-il derechef son ministre.

Pendant que Fouché se croyoit joué par Talleyrand à Vienne, Talleyrand se croyoit joué par Fouché à Paris. Il n'en douta plus lorsqu'il le vit Ministre de la Police. Ils s'observoient tout deux lorsque Talleyrand, après s'être vu proscrit, imagina de faire envoyer par M. de Metternich un courrier particulier à Fouché pour lui demander des détails sur un événement aussi surprenant qu'inattendu, et déterminer par lui offrir tous les moyens de l'Autriche pour la régence, ou tout autre ordre de choses ; d'offrir même la république. Fouché reçut le courrier. Peu après M. de Metternich lui demanda par un autre courrier d'envoyer en tel endroit de la ville de Basle un agent à lui avec des signes de reconnaissance, qu'il lui indiquoit ; qu'il s'y trouveroit quelqu'un pour reconnoître son envoye et l'entretenir.

Je ne sais comment il arriva que Buonaparte connut l'entrée de ce courrier à Paris. Il le fit arrêter avant qu'il eut été chez M. Fouché, lui fit prendre ses dépêches, dont on tira des copies avant de remettre le tout en son lieu et place. On garda le courrier jusqu'à ce qu'on eut pu envoyer un faux émissaire à Basle, muni des signes de reconnaissances indiqués par M. de Metternich ; puis on renvoye le courrier achever sa mission, en lui défendant de rien dire de ce qui lui étoit arrivé. Le courrier promet tout pour avoir sa liberté, mais le premier usage qu'il en fit fut en s'acquittant de sa mission de raconter à M. de Fouché toute sa mésaventure. Celui-ci

se garda bien d'envoyer qui que le soit à Basle, et dès lors ne douta plus que l'on n'étoit plus sa dupe. Il se regarda comme perdu, et il ne s'occupa plus que de perdre Buonaparte : il ne lui remet aucun compte de l'arrivée du courrier Autrichien, et ne lui communiqua rien des antécédents de son intrigue ; mais il donna la plus grande publicité aux propositions de Metternich, et par là diminua considérablement le nombre des partisans de Buonaparte. Lui-même Fouché y croyoit de bonne foi, et voilà comme il s'est rendu lui-même l'instrument de la vengeance que Talleyrand vouloit tirer de lui.

L'un et l'autre furent bientôt désabusé, et reconnurent qu'ils s'étoient réciproquement fait peur. Dès lors ils se rapprocheront, et c'est par la crainte du mal que Talleyrand pouvait encore ressentir de la part de Fouché qu'il le fit nommer Ministre du Roi Louis XVIII. Ces deux hommes, réunis à Paris, ont travaillés de concert à faire éloigner et proscrire les personnes desquelles ils pouvoient craindre les divulgations, et ont tant fait qu'ils ont établi dans l'opinion du parti du Roi que le retour de Buonaparte étoit l'œuvre d'une intrigue de quelques-uns de ses partisans qu'ils signaloient à la justice, tandis qu'ils savent bien que ce retour n'a eu aucun antécédent, pas plus que celui d'Egypte, et ils savent bien mieux encore que la véritable conspiration étoit celle qui se traînoit à Vienne dans des petites conférences particulières, dont eux-mêmes les deux hommes rivaux et ennemis étoient les directeurs, et auroient retirés les premiers fruits.

Il y a quelque chose de bien singulier dans la carrière politique de ces deux hommes. Tout deux prêtres, ayant sillonné en même temps les diverses époques de la révolution à bords opposés, ils sont par des directions différentes toujours arrivés au même port.

C'est au moins un heureux présage pour l'avenir ; car enfin ces longues suites de tragédies doivent avoir un terme, et ces révolutions cesseront quand leurs machinateurs ne seront plus. C'est le plus sage avis à donner au Roi de France, et il faut espérer que nos deux habiles fourbes seront aussi exacts au rendezvous que le mépris général leur assigne sur le même banc de justice.

Ainsi soit, etc.

MEMORANDUM BY THE MARQUESS WELLESLEY.

The Allies had declared that they would not treat with Buonaparte, and would not consent to his remaining at the head of the French government ; but that they would not attempt to force any other leader or form of government upon France contrary to the will of the French nation.

This declaration was approved by the British government, and the Ministers called upon Parliament to grant large supplies, upon the plea that it would enable the Allies to enter France immediately and put down Buonaparte before he could have time to assemble an army to oppose them ; whereas, if time were allowed him, he might become powerful, although Lord Liverpool said he had information, upon which he could rely, that the nation was decidedly adverse to Buonaparte, and that he was only supported by a military conspiracy, which might easily be put down by an immediate effort.

Lord W.'s objections to this course of policy were as follows :

He thought it a great mistake on the part of the Allies to direct their hostility personally and exclusively against Buonaparte, instead of against the Revolutionary system of France. That the declaration was a virtual abandonment of the Bourbons, and an engagement not to disturb any other form of government or party in France, provided Buonaparte was not at the head of it. That such a declaration was a great encouragement to the Jacobins, into whose hands Buonaparte had thrown himself, to assume the government; and that he did not see that the situation of England would be improved by placing France under a Jacobinical government, with Carnot at the head, and perhaps Buonaparte in command of her armies.

That the grounds upon which the Ministers asked for supplies were not founded in fact.

If an immediate advance of the Allies was practicable, Lord W. might not perhaps oppose it; because, from the dispersed and unprepared state of the French army, it was possible that Buonaparte might have been put down without bloodshed and without the risk of protracted warfare. But it was evident, from the distance to which the Russian and the other Allied armies had retired, that three months at least must elapse before they could enter France in force; that Buonaparte being in the midst of the resources of France, and so near to the scene of action, if left to himself for two or three months, he would certainly have an army equipped, and probably obtain a declaration of the will of the nation in his favour; and before that time could elapse he would certainly strike the first blow, and that possibly the Duke of Wellington might be driven from the Netherlands before he could be supported.

That the prospect of being able to advance immediately and anticipate Buonaparte was a fallacy. That three months of military inactivity must inevitably take place on our side, and that it was unwise to forego the possible advantage of negotiation in that interval, if it had no other object than to ascertain the real inclination of the French people, and whether they might not be disposed to choose a government, with or without Buonaparte, which would be agreeable to themselves and promise tranquillity to Europe. That the appearance of negotiation would at all events distract parties in France; whilst on the other hand the refusal to listen to any proposal, added to the general preparations for the invasion of France, were calculated to unite the French nation in support of Buonaparte.

But Lord W.'s greatest objection to plunge into a new war (independently of the exhausted situation of this country) was that he could not foresee any benefit that could be expected by England, even in the event of complete success. The object of the Allies, in the event of success, was to remove Buonaparte and replace Louis XVIII. on the throne. Lord W. was convinced that Buonaparte's resistance would be greater than Ministers expected; and although he felt the Allies would ultimately succeed if they persisted, his expectation of the benefit to the general tranquillity of Europe which it was hoped would result from the restoration of the Bourbons had been very much weakened by the short experiment which had been made of the effect of their authority in France. Neither the disposition they had shown towards England, nor their capacity for governing the French people, seemed to hold forth any inducement for this country

to make great sacrifices for the restoration of that family. It was evident that they had given dissatisfaction to the French people, and had lost almost all the popularity which seemed to attend their return to France in 1814. Notwithstanding Lord Liverpool's information, Lord W. thought that Buonaparte's uninterrupted progress to Paris and the overthrow of the King's authority throughout France in ten days, without a shot being fired, was a strong proof that the nation did not wish for the Bourbons now, whatever might have been the case last year.


In the event of the most complete success, therefore, at the end of a long campaign, or probably two campaigns (for the events which produced the sudden termination of the war could not have been foreseen), although Louis XVIII. might be restored, it was manifest that he could not (in the existing temper of the French nation) be maintained upon the throne without the presence, for a considerable time, of a large British military force; and considering the financial state of this country, and the impatience which the people of England might be expected to feel under the continuance of their burthens during a period of nominal peace, Lord W. was of opinion that such a state of things had many disadvantages which would not attend a state of actual war.


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THE HISTORY OF THE
CITY OF BOSTON
FROM 1630 TO 1800

BY
JAMES KNOLLY





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Supplementary despatches, correspondence, and memoranda of Field Marshal
Arthur Duke of Wellington, K.G

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